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"and upon what basis." In speaking thus he not only did not tell the truth, but told the opposite of truth, which in France is termed "lying."

It is but natural that Premier Clemenceau should be unable to restrain his indignation when Count Czernin, justly anxious as to the final consequences of the western offensive, reversed the rôles with such audacity, representing the French Government as begging for peace at the very moment when, with our allies, we were preparing for the infliction of a supreme defeat upon the Central Empires.

It would be too easy to recall to what extent Austria has importuned Rome, Washington, and London with solicitations for an alleged separate peace which had no other aim than to slip upon us the yoke which she professes to find to her taste. Who does not know the story of a recent meeting (in Switzerland, of course) of a former Austrian Ambassador and a figure high in the councils of the Entente Allies? The conferences lasted only a few minutes. Here again it was not our ally who sought the interview. It was the Austrian Government.

Does not Count Czernin remember another attempt of the same sort made in Paris and London only two months before that of Count Revertata by a person of much higher rank? That again, as in the present case, is authentic, but much more significant proof exists.

CONFIRMED BY PAINLEVE Professor Paul Painlevé, who preceded M. Clemenceau as Premier, issued the following explanatory statement:

During the year 1917 Austria made several attempts to open semi-official negotiations with the Entente Allies. Notably in June, 1917, I was advised by the Second Bureau that Austria, through the person of Count Revertata, had several times asked, through a Swiss intermediary, for an interview with the officer attached to the Second Bureau, Major Armand, a distant relative.

Alexander Ribot, then Premier, having been consulted, Major Armand and Count Revertata met in August, 1917. The matter stopped there, and no interview took place from August until November, when I left office.

The events which occurred afterward naturally are unknown to me, but I presume, from the statement made by Premier Clemenceau, that Count Revertata returned to the charge.

AUSTRIA'S OFFICIAL STATEMENT The following official statement regarding the matter was issued the same day at Vienna by the Imperial Government:

On instructions from the Foreign Minister Count Revertata, Counselor of the Legation in Switzerland, repeatedly had discussions in Switzerland with a confidential agent of M. Clemenceau, Count Armand, attached to the French War Ministry, who was sent to Switzerland to interview Count Revertata. As a result of the interview of these two gentlemen in Freiburg, Switzerland, on Feb. 2, the question was discussed whether and on what basis a discussion concerning the bringing about of a general peace would be possible between the Foreign Ministers of Austria-Hungary and France, or between official representatives of these Ministers.

Thereupon Count Revertata, after obtaining instructions from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, toward the close of February declared on behalf of the Minister to Count Armand, for communication to M. Clemenceau, that Count Czernin was prepared for a discussion with a representative of France, and regarded it as possible to hold a conversation with the prospect of success as soon as France renounced its plan for the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine.

Count Revertata received a reply in the name of M. Clemenceau to the effect that the latter was not in a position to accept the proposed renunciation by France of this disannexation, so that a meeting of the representatives at that time would, in the view of both parties, be useless.

GENERAL SMUTS'S TESTIMONY

The Paris Matin on April 7 stated that General Smuts, South African representative in the British Cabinet, was the "figure high in the councils of the Entente Allies" referred to by the French Government in the statement of April 5 denying the assertion of Count Czernin that the French Prime Minister had sought to open peace negotiations with Austria-Hungary. The representative of the Dual Monarchy who met General Smuts in Switzerland was Count Mensdorff-Pouilly-Dietrichstein, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London when the war broke out. Immediately upon being introduced to Count Mensdorff, says the newspaper, General Smuts, taking the initiative in the conversation, bluntly said:

"Is it true that you wish to make a separate peace?

This direct query was too much for the trained diplomat, and the Count began a long, evasive reply.

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VIENNA'S SECOND STATEMENT Further elaboration of Count Czernin's version of the case was proffered on April 8 in a second official statement issued at Vienna by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, as follows:

In contrast to the first brief declaration of Premier Clemenceau, in which he gave the lie to Foreign Minister Czernin, it is observed with satisfaction that M. Clemenceau's statement of April 6 admits that discussions in regard to the question of peace took place between two confidential agents of Austria-Hungary and France. The account given by M. Clemenceau of the initiation and course of these negotiations, and likewise the statement by M. Painlevé on the same subject, however, deviate in many important particulars and to such a degree from the facts that a detailed correction of the French communication appears to be necessary.

In July, 1917, Count Revertata was requested by an intermediary in the name of the French Government to state whether he was in a position to receive a communication from that Government to the Government of Austria-Hungary. When Count Revertata, after having obtained the sanction of the Austro-Hungarian Government, replied in the affirmative to this inquiry, in the same monthJuly, 1917-Major Armand was charged with such communication by the then French Premier, Ribot. He arrived on Aug. 7, 1917, at Count Revertata's private residence in Freiburg, the Count being distantly related to him.

Major Armand then addressed to Count Revertata a question as to whether discussions between France and AustriaHungary were possible. Thus the initiative for these discussions was taken from the French side.

Count Revertata reported to the AustroHungarian Foreign Minister that this question had been put on instructions of the French Government, and the Minister thereupon requested Count Revertata to enter into discussions with the French confidential agent, and in the course of these discussions to establish whether by this means a basis for bringing about a general peace could be secured.

On Aug. 22 and 23 Count Revertata en

tered into discussions with Major Armand, which, however, as Premier Clemenceau quite correctly declares, yielded no result. The negotiations thereupon were broken off.

Parleys Resumed in January

The Clemenceau version that the discussions between Revertata and Armand were proceeding on his entry into office is incorrect. Not until January, 1918, did Armand, this time on instructions from Clemenceau, again get in touch with Revertata. The thread had been broken in August, 1917, and was therefore again taken up by Clemenceau himself in January, 1918.

From this fresh contact there resulted the discussions referred to in the official communiqué of April 4, 1918. It is, however, correct that Count Revertata handed to Major Armand on Feb. 23, 1918, the memorandum regarding which Premier Clemenceau only cites the first sentence and which confirms that in the discussions with Armand, which. had taken place in August, 1917, Revertata was charged with the task of finding out whether proposals were obtainable from the French Government, which had addressed to AustriaHungary an offer of a basis for a general peace, and also whether they would be such as Austria-Hungary could bring to the knowledge of her allies.

It, therefore, entirely corresponded with the facts when Count Czernin in his speech on April 2 last declared that Premier Clemenceau, some time before the beginning of the western offensive, had inquired of me whether I was prepared for negotiations and on what basis.

The accusation of lying brought against Count Czernin by M. Clemenceau cannot therefore be maintained, even in the restricted sense made by the present communiqué of the French Government.

Admits Other Peace Manoeuvres

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Nothing is known to the Austro-Hungarian Government of entreaties for an alleged separate peace with which the Austro-Hungarian Government worrried the Governments of Rome, Washington, and London. When M. Clemenceau asks the Austro Hungarian Foreign Minister whether he remembers that two months before the Revertata affair-that is, about a year ago-an attempt of a like nature was made by a personage of far higher rank, Count Czernin does not hesitate to reply in the affirmative. But for the sake of completeness and entire correctness it should be added that this attempt also led to no result.

So much for the establishment of the facts. For the rest, it need only be remarked that Count Czernin for his part would see no reason to deny it if, in this

or any similar case, he had taken the initiative, because, in contrast to M. Clemenceau, he believes that it cannot be a matter for reproach for a Government to make attempts to bring about an honorable peace, which would liberate all peoples from the terrors of the present

war.

The dispute raised by M. Clemenceau has, moreover, diverted attention from the real kernel of Count Czernin's statement. The essence of this statement was not so much who suggested the discussions undertaken before the beginning of the western offensive, but who caused their collapse. And M. Clemenceau up to the present has not denied that he refused to enter upon negotiations on the basis of the renunciation of the reacquisition of Alsace-Lorraine.

RETORT BY CLEMENCEAU Premier Clemenceau replied to this Vienna statement on the same day by issuing the following:

A diluted lie is still a lie. Count Czernin told a lie when he said that some time before the German offensive began Premier Clemenceau caused him to be asked “if he was ready to open negotiations and upon what basis."

As to the passage in the manuscript note of Count Revertata, where he says he acted for Austria to obtain peace proposals from France, the solicitant's text is authentic, and Count Czernin has not dared to dispute it.

To hide his confusion he tries to maintain that the conversation was resumed at the request of M. Clemenceau. Unfortunately for him, there is a fact which reduces his allegation to nothing, namely, that Clemenceau was apprised of the matter on Nov. 18, 1917, (that is to say, the day after he took over the Ministry of

War,) by communication from the intermediary dated Nov. 10, and intended for his predecessors. For Count Czernin's contention to be true, M. Clemenceau would have had to take the initiative in question before he was Premier. Thus Count Czernin is categorically contradicted by facts. He is reduced to maintaining that Major Armand was M. Clemenceau's confidential man. Well, until this incident M. Clemenceau had seen this officer of the Intelligence Department only once, for five minutes at a riding school fifteen or twenty years ago.

Finally, Count Czernin, as a last resource, says that what he attributes to M. Clemenceau is unimportant. "What is really important," he affirms, "is not to know who took the initiative for the conversations before the offensive, but who caused them to fail." Then why all this fuss? To demonstrate that every French Government, like France itself, is immovable on the question of Alsace-Lorraine?

Who could have thought it would have been necessary for Count Revertata to elucidate for Count Czernin a question upon which the Emperor of Austria himself has said the last word? It was no other than Emperor Charles who, in a letter dated March, 1917, put on record in his own writing his adhesion to "France's just claim relative to AlsaceLorraine." A second imperial letter stated that the Emperor was "in agreement with his Minister." It only remained for Czernin to contradict himself.

Ex-Premier Ribot stated on April 9 that during his Premiership "France never directly or through a neutral intermediary took the initiative in any such proceeding as the Austrian official communication asserted."

German Designs on Madeira

Colonel Lord Denbigh, in an address before the Royal Colonial Institute, London, recently told how German designs upon the Island of Madeira were checkmated by Great Britain in 1906. He said it was more or less a piece of secret history outside diplomatic and naval circles. At Madeira, he said, the Germans first took a hotel. Then they wanted a convalescent home, and, finally, desired to establish certain vested interests. They demanded certain concessions from Portugal. The German Ambassador, early in 1906, called on the Portuguese Government, and said that, if the concessions asked for were not granted, the Kaiser would send his navy up the Tagus to Lisbon. The Portuguese Government telegraphed to England, and that night the British Admiralty were on the point of mobilizing the whole resources of the British fleet. They thought of another way of meeting the situation, however, and sent the Atlantic fleet close up against the Portuguese coast. They let the Kaiser know what had happened through an undiplomatie source, with the result that next day the German Ambassador had to call again on the Portuguese Government and explain that he had exceeded his instructions.

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This diagram indicates the courses and ranges during the first stage of the battle, from the establishment of contact by the battle cruiser squadrons at 3:30 P. M. until the arrival of the German battle fleet about 5 P. M.

The British battle cruisers, and, presumably, those of Hipper also, were formed in bow and quarter line; or line of bearing-the ships on parallel courses but diagonally astern of the leader. During the approach the light cruisers and destroyers on each side-the position of which is not indicated-were spread out ahead of the main squadrons. The British second light cruiser squadron later took station ahead of Beatty and at 4:38 gave warning of the approach of the German battle fleet.

At 4:42 the British battle cruisers turned in succession, (squadron right countermarch,) the rear ships following the course of the leader. According to the diagram published with the official British reports in The London Times, Admiral Hipper's turn at 4:52 was to the left; but the German charts and some later British diagrams indicate the direction as above.

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Graves of American soldiers who perished in the sinking of the Tuscania, at Port Charlotte, Island of Islay, Scotland

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County volunteers of Islay firing a volley at the funeral of Tuscania victims at Kilnaughton, to the accompaniment of bagpipe lament

(Times Photo Service)

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