JERUSALEM, Surrender, 285.

LIBERTY Loan Poster, 333.

NATIONAL Army Men Ready to Leave for France, 31.

"NEW YORK'S Own" on Parade, 30.

TANKS, French and American, 459.
TRAFALGAR Square, London, 522.

TUSCANIA Victims' Graves, 332.

UNITED STATES Congress on Steps of Capitol, 236.

VENICE as Seen from Airplane, 269; Naval
Batteries in Lagoons, 297; Dwelling

Houses Ruined by Bombs, 299; St. Marks
Protected by Sandbags, 300.

VINDICTIVE (cruiser), After Fight at Zeebrugge, 460.

PALESTINE, British advance, 37; region taken by Gen. Allenby's forces, 155. PICARDY Battle, 198-204; diagram of gap held by Gen. Carey, 389; diagram of situation held by Gen. Fayolle, 390; perspective map, 391.

RUMANIA, changes in boundaries by Bucharest treaty, 58, 533.

RUSSIA, territories surrendered under BrestLitovsk treaty, 53.

SERBIA, in relation to surrounding States, 147.

UKRAINE, and other regions of Russia under German domination, 451. VENICE, 295.

WESTERN Campaign, American sectors, 1, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40. ZEEBRUGGE Raid, 463.

THE NEW YORK YORK

T

HE Spring of 1918 witnessed the bloodiest fighting of the war and probably the most bitter recorded in history. Whether viewed from the standpoint of the numbers involved, the losses suffered, or the issues at stake, the battles of Picardy and Flanders have had no parallel in ancient or modern times.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

The great Teuton drive, long expected by the Allies and widely heralded by the Germans themselves, began on the morning of March 21. Intense artillery fire lasting four hours preluded the onset, and then the infantry in great force advanced to the attack.

The assault was made on a front of fifty miles from southeast of Arras as far as La Fère and was everywhere successful. It has been demonstrated repeatedly in the course of the war that a carefully prepared offensive by either side is bound to obtain a certain measure of initial success; and a yielding of first-line positions by the Allies was anticipated as inevitable. The Entente strategy had taken this into account, and had arranged for a probable retirement to a second line and a possible withdrawal to a third. There, however, it was expected that the retreat would halt and the enemy be thrown back.

But the speed of the German advance and the power of its attack deranged the

plans of the British 3d and 5th Armies, which held this portion of the front. The enormous forces massed against them stormed the first-line trenches and overwhelmed the defenders by sheer weight of numbers. The British fell back, fighting doggedly and with splendid heroism, but unable to stem the onrushing tide. Their second and third lines shared the fate of the first, and the battle soon developed into one of open warfare.

The Germans, moving on interior lines, had gathered a force that outnumbered their opponents at the point of attack in a ratio variously estimated at from three against one to five against three. In addition they employed the so-called von Hutier tactics, which on a smaller scale had proved successful at Riga, a fresh division passing through an exhausted one, to be in turn succeeded by another, so that, despite frightful losses, a fresh and vigorous mass of troops could be kept pressing against the defending line.

Besides the advantage of being able to choose their point of attack and assemble there overwhelming numbers, the Germans were favored by the weather. At that time of the year the ground is usually so soft as to make military operations on a large scale impossible; but when the German attack began the ground was firm, dry, and suitable for the rapid progress of both men and guns. Moreover, on the morning of March

Vol. XV.

21 a fog prevailed, which enabled the enemy to approach without detection until within a few feet of the advanced line of General Gough's 5th Army. These outpost positions, while it was expected that they would be eventually captured, had been so planned as to decimate the German divisions and retard their progress by a system of crossfire. The Germans however, owing to the mist, swept over these positions at once, and the British crossfire on which so much depended was never delivered.

The British fell back on their line of resistance, but this, too, was quickly overwhelmed and they were forced to retire to their battle positions. Here for a time they held, and their artillery and machine guns inflicted fearful losses on the enemy. But the attack could not be stemmed, and a retreat began which seemed for a time to threaten the most serious consequences.

The primary aim of the German High Command has been clearly demonstrated by the course of the battle and from documents found on prisoners. It was to strike the allied armies at their juncture, roll up and destroy one of them, and then turn upon and crush the other. These tactics were sound, justified by military science, and had been frequently employed by Napoleon.

The ultimate strategic objective of the enemy was undoubtedly either to reach the Channel ports or Paris, or both. The attainment of either would prove a dangerous though not necessarily a fatal blow to the allied cause; but the immediate objective, which would have facilitated the attainment of the other two, was the City of Amiens, a railway and supply centre of vital importance to the Entente system of defense, the possession of which would have put Paris in immediate peril.

A situation developed in the course of the fighting where the road to Amiens lay wide open, had the Germans known it and been able to take advantage of it. The enemy onset had been so rapid and formidable that the British 5th Army in its retreat had not had time sufficient or engineering forces available to blow up bridges whose destruction would have

retarded the German advance. This was pressed so vigorously that the retreat continued in an accelerated ratio. Serious gaps opened up between certain divisions, until a breach of eight miles intervened between the 5th Army and the 3d, commanded by Sir Julian Byng.

That the Germans did not improve this opportunity was due to the very completeness of their first success. They had progressed so swiftly that various elements of brigades and divisions were intermingled in hopeless confusion. the time this had been straightened out, the gap had been closed by one of the most thrilling and brilliant exploits recorded in the war.

By

General Sandeman Carey had been called on hastily to avert the threatened disaster. The forces at his disposal were pathetically inadequate, but he quickly gathered together a nondescript army of laborers, American engineers, telegraph linemen, and even cooks, got ammunition from what sources he could, dug shallow trenches with feverish haste, disposed his scanty machine-gun crews at strategic points, and, battling desperately day and night, held his position until his improvised troops were reinforced and the gap was definitely closed. Seldom has the classic phrase "j'y suis, j'y reste had a finer illustration.

At another phase of the battle a second gap developed, which, though not quite so dramatic in the features that marked its closing, might have been even more serious, when thirty miles intervened between the British 5th Army and the French 6th Army. Here General Fayolles, who had just arrived from Italy, repeated with his organized divisions what Carey had accomplished with his "scratch" army, and held the foe in check until juncture could be resumed.

For several days of furious fighting the British were forced to retreat, though never at any time did the retreat become a rout. Never were the tenacity and indomitable courage of the British armies more fully conformed to their traditions. But at every point they were outnumbered, and the German pressure was irresistible.

By March 25 the enemy had gained an

Vol. XV.

area of 500 square miles, penetrating beyond Bapaume, Péronne, Brie, and the forest northeast of Noyon. Two days later they had captured Albert and taken Roye and Noyon from the French, who, as early as the 23d, had begun to relieve certain portions of the hard-pressed British right.

That latter success, however, was quickly neutralized by a French counterattack on the 29th, which recovered eight square miles between Lassigny and Noyon. On the same day the enemy enveloped Montdidier, and on the 30th. gained ground north of the Scarpe beyond Vimy Ridge.

A particularly bitter phase of the fighting developed on March 28, when the German command shifted its attack and made a desperate attempt to capture Arras. The assault was made on the British battleline from Gavrelle southward to below the Scarpe. Nineteen German divisions were employed-seven north of the Scarpe and twelve south of the defenses of Arras. Tremendous gunfire preceded the attack, on a scale rarely exceeded during the war. The German leaders had orders to take Arras at any cost, and were prodigal of the lives of their men; but the British fought like tigers, and wave after wave beat upon their defenses in vain. The battle ended in an utter defeat of the enemy.

The days that immediately followed developed only minor operations of attack and counterattack, but on April 4 there was a fiercely contested fight on a ten-mile front between Grivesnes and the Amiens-Roye road, where the Germans suffered a bloody repulse in a futile attempt to drive a wedge between the junction of the British and French armies. Another desperate attack against the British position at Eucquoy on April 7 was thrown back with heavy losses.

At this point and date the first phase of the German offensive may be said to have come to an end. In its spectacular features it had achieved a marked degree of success. Prisoners to the extent of 75,000-though these figures are disputed by British authorities-were claimed by the Germans, together with

a large number of guns and war material, and the enemy lines had been advanced to within ten miles of Amiens. But a heavy toll in lives had been exacted for the ground gained, the allied armies were still unbroken, and the German objectives had not been attained.

One event, however, had occurred during these days of strenuous fighting that was of tremendous significance and promise to the allied cause. On March 28 General Foch was appointed Generalissimo of the allied armies in France. This event of supreme importance, toward which the Entente had been tending for many months, was hastened by the emergency that the battle had created. The lack of unity in command had long been a source of weakness that was fully recognized. The Versailles conference had sought to correct this defect, but had proved inadequate.

The appointment was hailed with enthusiasm by all the members of the Entente, and nowhere more warmly than in Washington, which had long urged such action. The attitude of this country was emphasized when General Pershing called upon General Foch, on the day of the latter's appointment, and unreservedly placed all the American forces in France at his disposal.

The second phase of the offensive began on April 8, when the enemy heavily bombarded the region of La Bassée and Armentières, following up the artillery action by attacks in force. Here, as in the first phase, the Germans struck at the junction of two armies, in this case the Portuguese and the British. Here, also, the first onset met with success. On April 9 the enemy had penetrated the allied positions in the neighborhood of Neuve Chapelle. On the 11th Armentières was captured, and by the 12th the Germans had reached Merville, eleven miles southwest of Armentières.

It was on this date that General Haig issued his historic order, which, while it breathed undaunted courage, spoke volumes for the desperate situation of his army. His words, " Our backs are to the wall," sent a thrill of apprehension through the allied nations, relieved, however, by the General's declaration that

Vo'. XV.

the French armies were moving rapidly and in great force to his support.

A few days later the promised reinforcements-first proofs of the value of the unified command-arrived, and the thin, heroic British line immediately stiffened. The mass and momentum of the enemy attack perceptibly slackened, although bloody fighting raged for many days about the towns of Wytschaete, Meteren, and Bailleul. These were taken and retaken many times. The fiercest fight was that waged for the possession of Mont Kemmel, the capture of which by the Germans, it was thought, would force the withdrawal by the British from the Ypres salient. Eventually the hill was captured, but so withering a fire was laid upon it by the British artillery that it proved of little value. It became evident that Ypres could not be taken without the capture of the three hills of Scherpenburg, Mont Rouge, and Mont Noir. In the struggle for these on April 29, the German forces under General Sixt von Arnim met with a disastrous defeat. So definite was their repulse and so unexampled their losses that the second phase of the offensive practically ended on that date. Although in the following months there were many local actions of more or less severity, chiefly to the advantage of the Allies, the battleline remained substantially the same.

While it would be futile to minimize the advantages gained by the Germans in this colossal offensive, they may quite as easily be exaggerated. The Germans captured a large number of prisoners, great quantities of guns and ammunition, and more than 3,000 square miles of terrain. On the Amiens front they advanced their lines to within ten miles of that city, and in the Flanders area they reached within thirty or forty miles of the Channel ports.

But they fell short of their objectives, and for every advantage gained they paid a harrowing price. How great was their loss in human material can be known definitely only after the war is over, but that it greatly exceeded the Entente losses admits of no doubt. The unity of command, forced upon the Allies by the exigencies of the struggle, was itself

equivalent to a battle lost for the German cause. The depleted ranks of the enemy had no such reservoir to draw from as that possessed by the Entente in the hundreds of thousands of American soldiers pouring steadily into France. And, far from being shaken by the retirement of their troops, the morale of the allied nations was hardened under the strain.

The part played by American troops in the Spring fighting, while a minor one on account of the limited number engaged, received the warmest encomiums of the French and British military authorities. The first important operation in which they took part occurred at Seicheprey in the Toul sector on April

20.

Preceded by a severe bombardment of gas and high explosive shells, a German force of 1,500 men, consisting largely of picked storming troops, launched itself against the American position, with the apparent intention of separating the French from the American lines. It penetrated the first-line trenches and took the village in the first stages of the attack, but in furious hand-to-hand fighting the Germans were driven back and the lines re-established. The American losses in the battle were from 200 to 300, but the German loss greatly exceeded this.

An official report of the War Department, issued on April 29, declared that American units had taken part in the fighting east of Amiens and had acquitted themselves well. At Villers-Bretonneux, on April 30, a heavy German attack directed especially against the Americans was sanguinarily repulsed, the ground being covered with enemy dead. A month earlier 300 American engineers took part in Carey's dashing exploit and did heroic work.

On the Italian front conditions remained quiescent during the period under review. A great Austrian army, estimated to total 1,000,000 men and well provided with munitions, faced the Italians on the Monte Grappa front and along the Piave. It had been expected that an Austrian offensive would be launched while the Germans were mak

Vol. XV.