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present only affects such words as denote abstract qualities. The following synopsis, the materials for which' are mainly drawn from the Grammaire de la Langue Romane, of M. Raynourd, and from An Essay on the Origin and Formation of the Romance Languages, by G. C. Lewis, Esq., shows at a glance the influence of this principle in the various dialects of the Romance.
1. Latin amor, color, honor, favor, labor, vigor, &c. 2. The Spanish has retained the Latin orthography, as
3. The Italian adds an e to the Latin, as amore, colore, favore, onore, &c.
4. The Provençal adds an s to the Latin, as amors, colors, honors, favors, &c.
5. The orthography of the old French was unsettled, vacillating between the Latin and Provençal, as amor, or amors, favor, or favors, honor, or honors, &c.
6. The middle French changed the o of the Latin into ou, as amour, favour, colour, honour, &c.
7. The modern French has changed ou into eu, as ameur, honneur, faveur, &c., except labour, where the orthography of the middle period is retained.
8. With the middle French agrees the English in all the words we have adopted, as honour, favour, labour, &c.
To whatever principle the u owes its introduction into honour, &c., to the same we may undoubtedly attribute the addition of an s in the Provençal, of e in the Italian, and the introduction of the u in the middle French and English. To the operation of the same principle must we look for the cause of the introduction of the o into the Saxon nehgbur, thu, thusend, thurh, &c.--English neighbour, thou, thousand, through, &c. We see, therefore, that this is not only a law of the Romance languages in this particular class of words, but that it pervades the English language, affecting alike words from either the Latin or Teutonic side.
Immediately connected with this point, and bearing directly upon the importance of this orthography, is the question, when this rule first began to exert an influence. It seems to be admitted by Dr. Webster, and is no doubt the fact, that the foregoing class of words came into the English from the Latin, but through the French, and, if so, they came from the middle French, while the orthography was ou; and, hence, the u is an important item in philological history, as it points to the source from which, and marks the channel through which, these words have come.
If there were no other reasons for retaining the letter, this alone would be amply sufficient.
We may also obtain further confirmation of this conclusion
from the laws governing the changes of other words derived from the Latin in the Romance languages. Osus.— The Latin has a large number of nouns with this termination ; we have a couple of dozen before us, every one of which has undergone some change in the derivative dialects. The first, is the omission of the Latin termination us, which is done by all the modern dialects of that language. The following synopsis will show the nature of these changes :
1. Latin; amorosus, cariosus, furiosus, generosus, luxuri
2. The Spanish and Italian have dropped the termination us, and substituted an o, as amoroso, carioso, furioso, generoso, luxurioso, &c.
3. The old Provençal simply omits the Latin termination, as amoros, carios, furios, generos, luxurios, &c.
4. The old French dropped the Latin us, like the Provençal, but sometimes changed the s into x, as amoros, or amorox, generos, or generox, furios, or furioz, &c.
5. The middle French changed o into ou, as amorous, or amoroux, glorious, or glorioux, generous, or generoux, &c. The first form of this word was sometimes written with a final e, as gloriouse, and the second with z instead of x, as amorouz. This orthography is found in a poem of Raoul de Coucy, who died A. D. 1249.
6. The English and modern Provençal add an u, as glorious, furious, &c.
7. The modern French have changed ou into eu, as glorieur, furieur, &c.
From this table it is made evident that the u in honour, favour, &c., owes its introduction into those words to the cause, whatever it might have been, which introduced it into amorous, curious, furious, glorious, generous, injurious, imperious, laborious, luxurious, &c. &c.
Us-IUS.— To the foregoing we must also add those words which, denoting qualities, have been derived from Latin nouns ending in us and ius.
These words would not allow the dropping of the termination, and we have, therefore, copied their orthography, inserting an o to make them correspond with similar words in English. Thus the Latin arduus, barbarus, ludicrus, odorus, &c., become, in English, arduous, barbarous, ludicrous, odorous, &c. So, also, the Latin censorius, gregarius, pius, impius, serius, vicarius, &c., in English are written censorious, grey arious, pious, impious, &c. But the all-pervading character of this principle is still more strikingly confirmed by the fact that, when we could not bring the Latin nominative—the case we have usually followed in these derivations—under this law, we have
taken some one of the oblique cases as the basis of our English word. Thus, Lat. nom. victor, gen. victoris, Eng. victorious ; Lat. nom. saluber, gen. salubris, Eng. salubrious ; Lat. nom. uxor, gen. uxoris, Eng. uxorious, &c.
It would seem that, if any position in philology be capable of demonstration, the foregoing is sufficient to establish the authority of honour, &c., and, if we are not much mistaken in our conjectures, it was the omission of this mode of comparison which prevented Dr. W. from discovering the reason for writing the words in question in this manner, and led him to attempt to expurgate them from our language. If
, by omitting this letter, our language could be made uniform, there would be some good ground for the change ; but, so far from that, it in fact introduces still greater irregularities, compelling us to omit the u in such words as Saviour, and the like, where every principle of analogy and propriety is opposed to it. There are also some two or three other points of orthography to which we have not room at this time to allude, but to which we intend a reference at some subsequent period.
Art. VIII.-1. Defence of Usury. By JEREMY BENTHAM. 2. Essay on the Usury Law. By " A RHODE ISLANDER.”
It is our design in the present article to exhibit briefly and perspicuously what we consider to be the true theory of interest. We think that such an exhibition must lead naturally to a correct estimate of the character of those laws which are commonly denominated usury laws; for it may be asserted with confidence, that the superficial notions which are current in regard to these, spring alınost wholly from want of acquaintance with the real ground on which interest rests, and the main principles by which it is adjusted.
Interest may be defined as the price paid for the use of money. It has been common to speak of the interest of money. By some writers the expression is considered inaccurate; for example, by Adam Smith and J. B. Say. The former rather intimates than declares its impropriety;' but it is expressly and repeatedly denounced by the latter.' We are told by these
I Wealth of Nations, book ii. c. 4.
writers that the proper expression is interest of stock or of capital, because, in reality, what is lent is the capital which is bought with the money. This objection is not merely a useless nicety or quibble; it is positively erroneous. For, in the first place, money is sometimes borrowed for other purposes than purchase ; secondly, when it is wanted for purchase, it is often expended in purchasing the services of man, or other values which are not capital : and lastly, the interest is not at all affected by the capital which is purchased, inasmuch as, whatsoever may have been the fluctuations of the latter in point of value, the same sum of money must always be returned, together with the stipulated interest. This interest is the interest of the money as much as the price paid for any article is the price of that article, and not the price of something else for which it may be exchanged. Were a man to borrow a horse and exchange it for an ox, he could hardly persuade the owner that it was an ox which he had lent.
It is common to speak of the price of money, by which is meant the interest paid for it. This way of speaking is incorrect; for interest is not the price of money, but the price of its use, just as horse hire is not the price of a horse.
Let us look for a moment at price generally, before entering upon a consideration of that particular species of price termed interest.
Man is subject to wants, and possesses capacities of enjoyment. These wants and capacities occasion desires. The necessaries, conveniences, and luxuries, which minister to these desires, are said, by political economists, to possess utility. In this use of the term utility (a use which some will be reluctant to concede), no distinction is made between laudable and blamable desires. All gratification is denominated useful. Thus Say speaks of " the utility of an object, or, what is the same thing, the desire to obtain it." We readily see what is meant by this language, though, strictly speaking, to call the utility of an object the same thing as the desire of a person, is absurd. The author meant, and should have said, instead of “the desire to obtain it,” its capacity of gratifying desire.
The term value is used in two very different senses ; at one time meaning value in use, at another value in exchange, or exchangeable value. There are things of the most precious value in one sense, which have little or none in the other. Air, for example, is of such value in use as to be indispensable to our existence; yet its exchangeable value is generally nothing. Jewels are of little value in use; yet their exchangeable value is very great. The distinction between these two kinds of value
· Political Economy, book ii. c. 1.
arises out of the fact that some useful objects are within the reach of all, while others are appropriable and possessed by individuals. The want of the former is never felt ; the want of the latter can, in general, be satisfied only by an exchange of values.
We define wealth as an accumulation of exchangeable value. We say exchangeable, for the purpose of excluding, among other things, natural and acquired talents. It is maintained by Say, in our opinion incorrectly, that these should be included under the denomination, wealth. But a man of talents is never spoken of as wealthy, unless he has possessions of a different and certainly inferior nature. Wealth is material value. The erercise of talents is, it is true, exchangeable value; but no accumulation of this value is possible, and hence it can never constitute wealth.
Price is the estimate of one exchangeable value by another. This estimate may be higher or lower than actual exchangeable value. Hence it seems to us erroneous to call price—as Adam Smith, Say, Wayland, and other writers, do—the same as exchangeable value. The owner of an article surely may demand a higher price for a thing than it is really worth in the market; he surely may sell it at a price below its real worth. In our definition, we say erchangeable value; for, as we have before observed, value is of two kinds—value in use, and value in exchange. Air, light, water, &c., though of indispensable utility, have not commonly any price affixed to them. not commonly, and this restrictive expression is of importance. Multitudes, as well as we, have bought a draught of water at the summit of a mountain ; the prisoner will readily pay his keeper a high price for unwonted enjoyment of sunshine and the open air ; and, indeed, scarcely any thing can be named to which a price may not be affixed under certain circumstances.
Money being the acknowledged material standard of value, by price is generally meant an estimate in money; and this idea of estimation in money is usually included in the definition of price, as, e. g., by Say and Wayland. But, in our opinion, it is more philosophical to consider price as the estimate of one value by comparison with any other. Otherwise no foundation is left for the really valid distinction drawn by Smith, Say, and others, between real and nominal price, i. e., the price in actual value, and the price in money ; for if, as Say states, “ the price of an article is the quantity of money it may be worth," when this quantity of money is the same, the price must be the same, which he shows not to be the case, since money may
Political Economy, Introduction, p. 41, Am. ed. 2 Political Economy, book ii. c. 3.