128, that "every vacancy in the burial board shall be filled up by the vestry within one month, and in case any such vestry shall neglect to fill up any such vacancy, the vacancy may be filled up by the burial board at any meeting thereof." It was held that the word "may" in this provision was not imperative. By a statute it was provided that in a certain event a bridge should "become a public bridge and may be maintained by the county." "This," say the court, "is a direction to a public body (not an option to a private person or corporation), in the execution whereof the inhabitants of that county have a pecuniary interest. In fact the public generally may be said to have such an interest. Where persons or the public have an interest in having the act done by a public body, 'may' in such a statute means 'must.'93 This rule must prevail where there is nothing that would evince a contrary intention in the statute or in the surrounding facts." 94 96 The word "shall" in its ordinary sense is imperative. "When the word 'shall' is used in a statute, and a right or benefit to any one depends upon giving it an imperative construction, then that word is to be regarded as peremptory." "5 But the intent of the act controls, and when the spirit and purpose of the act require the word "shall" to be construed as permissive it will be done. Thus an act of California provided that on or before February 1st in each year the board of education of the city of Sacramento should furnish to the board of trustees of the city a detailed estimate of the probable amount of money required for school purposes for the current year and that the board of trustees "shall levy a tax" sufficient to raise this amount, with a proviso that the school tax should not exceed twenty-five cents on the hun 92 Id.; Reg. v. Overseers of South Weald, 5 B. & S. 391. 93 Newburgh Turn. Co. v. Miller, 5 John. Ch. 113; Malcolm v. Rogers, 5 Cow. 188. 94 Phelps v. Hawley, 52 N. Y. 23, 27; Steckert v. East Saginaw, 22 Mich. 104; Spangler v. Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297, 58 Am. Dec. 571; Supervisors v. People, 25 Ill. 181. 95 O'Rear v. Crum, 135 Ill. 294, 25 N. E. 1097. 96 Boyer v. Onion, 108 Ill. App 612. dred dollars. It was held that the statute was not mandatory and that the board of trustees could exercise its discretion as to the amount to be levied for school purposes." A statute contained a provision that on the failure of the plaintiff to furnish security for costs as ordered by the court his suit “shall be dismissed." It was held that the statute was directory and that the court could extend the time and accept security after the rule had expired.98 97 Board of Education v. Board of Trustees, 96 Cal. 42, 30 Pac. 838. 98 Rosenfeld v. Swarts, 22 R. L 315, 47 Atl. 690. CHAPTER XVII. RETROACTIVE STATUTES. § 641 (463). Retroactive statutes regarded with disfavor.- Retrospective statutes relate to past acts and transactions. Retroactive statutes are those which operate on such acts and transactions and change their legal character or effect. Congress, as well as the states, are expressly forbidden by the federal constitution to pass any ex post facto law,' and the states are forbidden to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. As retrospective laws are generally unjust and in many cases oppressive, they are not looked upon with favor. Says the court in Montpelier v. Senter, "Retrospective legislation is not favored, and is prohibited by the constitution of some of the states, as being highly injurious, oppressive and unjust; and nowhere will retrospective effect be given to a statute unless it appears that it was the intent of the legislature that it should have such effect." And the supreme court of Minnesota says: "Again, it is a well settled rule that laws are not to be construed retrospectively, or to have a retrospective effect, unless it shall clearly appear that it was so intended by the enacting body, and unless such construction is absolutely necessary to give meaning to the language used.”4 § 642. Statutes operate prospectively only unless intent clear to the contrary.-The general rule is that statutes will be construed to operate prospectively only, unless an intent to the contrary clearly appears. It is said "that a law will not be given a retrospective operation, unless 1 Art. I, secs. 9 and 10. 2 Id. 372 Vt. 112, 47 Atl. 392. 4 Brown v. Hughes, 89 Minn. 150, 153, 94 N. W. 438. that intention has been manifested by the most clear and unequivocal expression." And in another case: "The rule is that statutes are prospective, and will not be construed to have retroactive operation unless the language employed in the enactment is so clear it will admit of no other construction." The rule is supported by numerous cases. The 5 State v. Kearney, 49 Neb. 337, Loan & T. Co. v. Minn. & N. W. R. R. 339, 70 N. W. 255. 6 Bauer Grocer Co. v. Zelle, 172 Ill. 407. 50 N. E. 238; Cleary v. Hoobler, 107 III. 97. 7 Barnes v. Mayor, 19 Ala. 707; Ex parte Buckley, 53 Ala. 42; Englehardt v. State, 88 Ala. 100, 7 So. 154; Couch v. McKee, 6 Ark. 484; State v. Wallis, 57 Ark. 64, 20 S. W. 811; Fayetteville B. & L. Ass'n v. Bowlin, 63 Ark. 573, 39 S. W. 1046; State v. McNally, 67 Ark. 580, 55 S. W. 1104; Rankin v. Schofield, 70 Ark. 83, 66 S. W. 197; Pignoz v. Burnett, 119 Cal. 157, 51 Pac. 48; American Refrig. Transfer Co. v. Adams, 28 Colo. 119. 63 Pac. 410; Gardner v. Resumption M. & S. Co., 4 Colo. App. 271, 35 Pac. 674; Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 225, 209, 10 Am. Dec. 121; Goodsell's Appeal, 55 Conn. 171, 10 Atl. 557; Bowen v. New York, etc. R. R. Co., 59 Conn. 364, 21 Atl. 1073; Wood v. Vernon, 8 Houst. 48, 12 Atl. 656; Friedmann v. McGowan, 1 Penn. (Del.) 436, 42 Atl. 723; Trask v. Wannamaker, 21 D. C. Rep. 119; Sammis v. Bennett, 32 Fla. 458, 14 So. 90, 22 L. R. A. 48; Bond v. Munro, 28 Ga. 597; State v. Bradford, 36 Ga. 422; Jimison v. Adams County, 130 Ill. 558, 22 N. E. 859; Gage v. Nichols, 135 Ill. 128, 25 N. E. 672; People v. McClellan, 137 Ill. 352, 27 N. E. 181; Fisher v. Green, 142 Ill. 80, 31 N. E. 172; American Co., 157 Ill. 641, 42 N. E. 153; Voight v. Kersten, 164 Ill. 314, 45 N. E. 543; Moore v. Chicago Guaranty Fund L. Soc., 178 Ill. 202, 52 N. E. 882; In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N. E. 646; Richardson v. U. S. Mortgage & Trust Co., 194 Ill. 259, 62 N. E. 606; McWethy v. Aurora Elec: L. & P. Co., 202 Ill. 218, 67 N. E. 9; Kersten v. Voight, 61 Ill. App. 42; Rock Island National Bank v. Thompson, 74 Ill. App. 54; S. C. affirmed, 173 Ill. 593, 50 N. E. 1089; Porter v. Glenn, 87 Ill. App. 106; Nelson v. Gibson, 92 Ill. App. 595; Halpin v. Prosperity L & B. Ass'n, 108 Ill. App. 316; Kennedy v. Des Moines, 84 Iowa, 187, 50 N. W. 880; Perkins v. Lyons, 111 Iowa, 192, 82 N. W 486; Morrison v. Pepperman, 112 Iowa, 471, 84 N. W.522; Galusha v. Wendt, 114 Iowa, 597, 87 N. W. 512; Ft. Dodge Elec. L. & P. Co. v. Ft. Dodge, 115 Iowa, 568, 89 N. W. 7; Percifield v. Aumick, 116 Iowa, 383, 89 N. W. 1101; Fultz v. Fox, 9 B. Mon. 499; Long v. Louisville, 97 Ky. 364, 30 S. W. 987; Berg v. Berg, 105 Ky. 80, 48 S. W. 432; Nicholson v. Thompson, 5 Rob. (La.) 367; Deyraud's Succession, 9 Rob. (La.) 357; Miller v. Reynolds, 5 Martin (N. S.), 665; Guidy v. Rees, 7 La. 278; State v. Bermudez, 12 La. 352: MacNichol v. Spence, 83 Me. 87, 21 Atl. 748; Dyer v. Belfast, 88 Me. 140, 33 Atl. 790; Kimball v. Masons' Fra rule is especially applicable where the statute, if given a retrospective operation, would be invalid, as impairing the ternal Acc. Ass'n, 90 Me. 183, 38 Atl. 102; Commonwealth v. Hewitt, 2 H. & M. 181; State v. Norwood, 12 Md. 195; Appeal Tax Court v. Western, etc. R. R. Co., 50 Md. 279; Johnson v. Johnson, 52 Md. 668; In re Lee's Estate, 76 Md. 108, 24 Atl. 422; Wild v. Boston & M. R. R. Co., 171 Mass. 245, 50 N. E. 533; Humphrey v. Auditor-General, 70 Mich. 292, 38 N. W. 214; Hall v. Perry, 72 Mich. 202, 40 N. W. 324; McNaughton v. Martin, 72 Mich. 276, 40 N. W. 326; Auditor-General v. Board of Supervisors, 76 Mich. 295, 42 N. W. 1101; Shaw v. Morley, 89 Mich. 313, 50 N. W. 993; Haines v. Board of Supervisors, 99 Mich. 32, 57 N. W. 1047; Auditor-General v. Bay County Supervisors, 106 Mich. 662, 64 N. W. 570; Angell v. West Bay City, 117 Mich. 685, 76 N. W. 128; Norris v. Hall, 124 Mich. 170, 82 N. W. 832; Sleight v. Roe, 125 Mich. 585, 85 N. W. 10; Broffee v. Grand Rapids, 127 Mich. 89, 86 N. W. 401; Nowlen v. Hall, 128 Mich. 274, 87 N. W. 222; Green v. Anderson, 39 Miss. 359; Reed v. Swan, 133 Mo. 100, 34 S. W. 483; Shields v. Johnson County, 144 Mo. 76, 47 S. W. 107; State v. Ziegenhein, 144 Mo. 283, 45 S. W. 1099, 66 Am. St. Rep. 420; Clay v. Mayr, 144 Mo. 376, 46 S. W. 157; O'Brien v. Ash, 169 Mo. 283, 69 S. W. 8; Mintner v. Bradstreet Co., 174 Mo. 444, 73 S. W. 668; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Shull, 74 Mo. App. 486; Monett v. Beaty, 79 Mo. App. 315; Huff v. Woodmen, 85 Mo. App. 96; Ryan v. Maxey, 14 Mont. 81, 35 Pac. 515; State v. Dickerman, 16 Mont. 278, 40 Pac. 698; Bullard v. Smith, 28 Mont. 387; State v. Kearney, 49 Neb. 325, 68 N. W. 533; S. C. affirmed on rehearing, 49 Neb. 337, 70 N. W. 255; McIntosh v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 33, 70 N. W. 522; Commercial Bank v. Eastern Banking Co., 51 Neb. 766, 71 N. W. 1024; Stilphen v. Stilphen, 65 N. H. 126, 23 Atl. 79; Allen v. Bernards Tp., 57 N. J. L. 303, 31 Atl. 219; Matter of Miller, 110 N. Y. 216, 18 N. E. 139; Matter of Cager. 111 N. Y. 343, 18 N. E. 866; Matter of Estate of Van Kleeck, 121 N. Y. 701, 25 N. E. 50; Matter of Scott, 148 N. Y. 588, 42 N. E. 1079; Germania Savings Bank v. Suspension Bridge, 159 N. Y. 362, 54 N. E. 33; Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 508, 5 Am. Dec. 291; McMannis v. Butler, 49 Barb. 176; Hill v. Nye, 17 Hun. 467; Matter of Miller, 47 Hun, 394; Lapham v. Marshall, 51 Hun, 36, 3 N. Y. S. 601; Matter of Prime, 64 Hun, 50, 18 N. Y. S. 603; Matter of Wolfe, 66 Hun, 389, 21 N. Y. S. 515; Foley v. Royal Arcanum, 78 Hun, 222, 28 N. Y. S. 952; O'Reilly v. Utah, Nev. & Cal. Stage Co., 87 Hun, 406, 34 N. Y. S. 358; Roddy v. Brooklyn City, etc. R. R. Co., 32 App. Div. 311, 52 N. Y. S. 1025; Hempstead v. New York, 52 App. Div. 182, 65 N. Y. S. 14; Greer v. Asheville, 114 N. C. 678, 19 S. E. 635; Bank v. Hodgin, 129 N. C. 247, 39 S. E. 959; State v. Staley, 5 Ohio C. C. 602; State v. Cincinnati Tin & Japan Co., 21 Ohio C. C. 218; Seton v. Hoyt, 34 Ore. 266, 55 Pac. 967, 75 Am. St. Rep. 641; Catterlin v. Bush, 39 Ore. 496, 59 Pac. 706, 65 |