statute has been repeatedly re-enacted with the same punctu ation." But as a rule punctuation is entitled to but little weight. The punctuation of the original act as passed by the legislature governs instead of the punctuation of the printed copy."

93

A statute read as follows: "The annual salaries and compensation of the members of the uniformed force of the department of street cleaning shall be fixed by the board of estimate and apportionment and shall not exceed the following:" Then followed eighteen clauses each separated by a semicolon, the first and last being as follows: "Of the general superintendent, three thousand dollars; " "Of the hostlers, seven hundred and twenty dollars each, and extra pay for work on Sundays." The claim was made that the words "and extra pay for work on Sundays," applied to all of the eighteen clauses. But the court held that the punctuation made it clear that the intent was to apply it to the last clause only. The court says: "The punctuation of this statute is of material aid in learning the intention of the legislature. While an act of parliament is enacted as read and the original rolls contain no marks of punctuation, a statute of this state is enacted as read and printed, so that the punctuation is a part of the act as passed, and appears

court says: "Now in construing a statute punctuation may be changed or disregarded. It will not, ordinarily, control unless other means fail. At the same time it is more or less to be relied upon in ascertaining the meaning intended. The presence of a comma, in one place or another, would not be allowed to subvert the obvious mean. ing of a sentence. On the other hand, it would not, without reason appearing for it, be disregarded. If that which appears to have been the general purpose of the legis

lature is as well effectuated by reading the statute exactly as it has been caused to be printed, as it would be by changing it, even as to punctuation, no adequate motive is present moving to the change." This language is quoted and approved in Slingluff v. Weaver, 66 Ohio St. 621, 629, 64 N. E. 574.

91 Commonwealth v. Kelly, 177 Mass. 221, 58 N. E. 691.

92 State v. Pilgrim, 17 Mont. 311, 42 Pac. 856; Wade v. Lewis & Clark County, 24 Mont. 335, 61 Pac. 879. 93 McPhail v. Gerry, 55 Vt. 174.

in the roll when filed with the secretary of state. The constitution provides that, except in case of necessity, formally certified by the governor, every bill must be printed 'in its final form' and placed upon the desks of members of the legislature at least three days prior to its passage, and upon the final reading no amendment is allowed.

"The punctuation, however, is subordinate to the text and is never allowed to control its plain meaning; but when the meaning is not plain, resort may be had to those marks, which for centuries have been in common use to divide writings into sentences, and sentences into paragraphs and clauses, in order to make the author's meaning clear. . . The words relating to extra pay are not separated from the remaining words of the clause by a semicolon, as would be expected if they applied to the preceding clauses, but by a comma, which indicates an intention to limit their application to the clause in which they appear. This clear system of punctuation forbids, as we think, that the last words of the last clause, viz., ‘and extra pay for work on Sundays,' should be read as a part of each of the other clauses except the first, which is obviously general in its application. The effect of the punctuation is the same as if the sentence was divided into eighteen independent sentences, with the first clause a part of each." "

§ 362 (233). Headings and marginal notes.— In England marginal notes are not regarded as part of the law for the same reason that applies to the title and punctuation.95 Added to a section in the copy printed by the queen's printer, they form no part of the statute itself, and are not binding as an explanation, or as a construction of the section.96 Headings which were arranged in the bill and adopted with

94 Tyrrell v. New York, 159 N. Y. 239, 242, 243, 53 N. E. 1111. See also State v. Desforges, 47 La. Ann. 1167, 17 So. 811.

95 Claydon v. Green, L. R. 3 C. P.

521; Venour v. Sellon, L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 523; Sutton v. Sutton, L. R. 22 Ch. Div. 511.

96 Claydon v. Green, supra.

98

it, it was held, might be referred to to determine the sense of any doubtful expression." The latter is true in this country also. Headings or titles inserted by compilers and not enacted by the legislature are not entitled to consideration.99

97 Hammersmith, etc. Ry. Co. v. Brand, L. R. 4 H. L. Cas. 171.

98 People v. Gaulter, 149 Ill. 39, 36 N. E. 576; Mackey v. Miller, 126 Fed. 161, C. C. A.

99 Cram v. Cram, 116 N. C. 288, 21 S. E. 197. And see Logan v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S. W. 948.

CHAPTER XIII.

INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION - GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

§ 363 (234). The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the law-maker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. "The

intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads