The State v. Durein. (Crowley v. liquor saloons than to any other source." Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 90, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620.) It is true that intoxicating liquors may be devoted to sacramental, medical, scientific and mechanical uses, all conducive to the welfare of society; but this fact does not remove the stigma which has been fixed upon them. Intoxicating liquor is intoxicating liquor still, whether it be employed before the altar, at the bedside, in the laboratory, in the manufactory, or in the saloon. It is still the prolific source of disease, misery, pauperism, vice, and crime. Its power to weaken, corrupt, debauch and slay human character and human life is not destroyed or impaired because it may be susceptible of some innocent uses, or may be used with propriety on some occasions. The health, morals, peace and safety of the community at large are still threatened, and under the form of government established for this state, and for the union of states of which it is a member, those are special subjects of local legislative cognizance. Both for his own good and for the good of the state the will of the individual should be allowed the widest possible latitude. But he cannot be left to define his own sphere of liberty in all cases. While he cannot be subjected to the arbitrary and despotic dominion of others, absolute autonomy is but a synonym for anarchy. Therefore the state must of necessity at times interfere. Such interference may extend to the taking of life itself. "He may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot. The State v. Durein. down in its defense." (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 362, 49 L. Ed. 643.) Nothing is more sacred than the right of the individual to the care of his own body and the preservation of his own health. To many persons the injecting of vaccine virus into the flesh and blood is utterly loathsome, and should be repelled as an assault of the most abhorrent and abominated kind; yet, in the interest of the public health, submission to it may be enforced by criminal penalties. "But the liberty secured by the constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation. of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others. This court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that 'persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned.' Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471, 24 L. Ed. 527, 530; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 id. 613, 628, 629, 42 L. Ed. 878-883, 18 Sup. Ct. 488; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co., 27 Vt. 148, 62 Am. Dec. 625. In Crowtey v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 89, 34 L. Ed. 620, 621, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, we said: "The possession and enjoyment of all The State v. Durein. rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law."" (Jacobson v. Massachusetts, supra, 361.) The manufacture and sale of property in itself wholesome and harmless may be entirely prohibited merely to prevent deception and fraud. "Moreover, concede for the sake of argument only, that even although a particular exertion of power by congress was not restrained by any express limitation of the constitution, if by the perverted exercise of such power so great an abuse was manifested as to destroy fundamental rights which no free government could consistently violate, that it would be the duty of the judiciary to hold such acts to be void upon the assumption that the constitution by necessary implication forbade them. "Such concession, however, is not controlling in this case. This follows when the nature of oleomargarine, artificially colored to look like butter, is recalled. As we have said, it has been conclusively settled by this court that the tendency of that article to deceive the public into buying it for butter is such that the states may, in the exertion of their police powers, without violating the due-process clause of the fourteenth amendment, absolutely prohibit the manufacture of the article." (McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 63, 24 Sup. Ct. 769, 49 L. Ed. 78.) "It has therefore been adjudged that the states may legislate to prevent the spread of crime, and may exclude from their limits paupers, convicts, persons likely to become a public charge, and persons afflicted with contagious or infectious diseases. These and other like things having immediate connection with The State v. Durein. the health, morals, and safety of the people, may be done by the states in the exercise of the right of selfdefense. The deception against which the statute of Massachusetts is aimed is an offense against society; and the states are as competent to protect their people against such offenses or wrongs as they are to protect them against crimes or wrongs of more serious character. And this protection may be given without violating any right secured by the national constitution, and without infringing the authority of the general government. A state enactment forbidding the sale of deceitful imitations of articles of food in general use among the people does not abridge any privilege secured to citizenship of the United States, nor, in any just sense, interfere with the freedom of commerce among the several states. It is legislation which can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves.' Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, 6 L. Ed. 23." (Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 478, 15 Sup. Ct. 154, 39 L. Ed. 223.) "Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine, or imitation butter, of the kind described in the statute, is, or may be, conducted in such a way, or with such skill and secrecy, as to baffle ordinary inspection, or whether it involves such danger to the public health as to require, for the protection of the people, the entire suppression of the business, rather than its regulation in such manner as to permit the manufacture and sale of articles of that class that do not contain noxious ingredients, are questions of fact and of public policy which belong to the legislative department to determine. And as it does not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the court must take judicial cognizance, that it infringes rights secured by the fundamental law, the legislative determination of those questions is conclusive upon. the courts. It is not a part of their functions to conduct investigations of facts entering into questions of public policy merely, and to sustain or frustrate the legislative will, embodied in statutes, as they may happen to approve or disapprove its determination of The State v. Durein. such questions. The power which the legislature has to promote the general welfare is very great, and the discretion which that department of the government has, in the employment of means to that end, is very large. The legislature of Pennsylvania, upon the fullest investigation, as we must conclusively presume, and upon reasonable grounds, as must be assumed from the record, has determined that the prohibition of the sale, or offering for sale, or having in possession to sell, for purposes of food, of any article manufactured out of oleaginous substances or compounds other than those produced from unadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk, to take the place of butter produced from unadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk, will promote the public health, and prevent frauds in the sale of such articles. If all that can be said of this legisla tion is that it is unwise, or unecessarily oppressive to those manufacturing or selling wholesome oleomargarine, as an article of food, their appeal must be to the legislature, or to the ballot-box, not to the judiciary. The latter cannot interfere without usurping powers committed to another department of government." (Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 685, 8 Sup. Ct. 992, 32 L. Ed. 253.) If the drastic measure adopted by the state of Massachusetts to prevent an epidemic of disease may be upheld, it is not apparent why the power of the legislature should fail in the presence of the lingering pestilence which the statute of this state seeks to stamp out. If the importation, manufacture and sale of a perfectly inoffensive article of food may be prohibited. merely because commercial fraud would prosper upon it, intoxicating liquor ought not to be able to defy the law. In the License Cases, 5 How. 504, 12 L. Ed. 256, the purpose of some of the statutes there assailed was charged to be to prohibit altogether the importation and sale of intoxicating liquors; therefore, it was |