progress of events at Richmond, and elsewhere along the theatre of war, or we may advance immediately to the conquest of the city. It is assumed that the position indicated should be taken at once, inasmuch as the rebels will then be compelled to strengthen Richmond by the withdrawal of forces from the line of the Rappahannock, and even from the Gulf coast, or they will abandon Richmond at once. It would seem that an army of fifty thousand men at the point indicated, supported from the river, would be proof against any successful attack; yet the presence of such a force at a position so near the capital of the rebel States would compel the rebel leaders to hold in reserve at Richmond, or its immediate vicinity, at least one hundred thousand men. By this we gain in numerical strength; and the facility with which we could transport troops from the Chesapeake, the Potomac, and Fortress Monroe would fill the enemies of the republic with the most serious and overpressing apprehensions.

It would seem, then, to be a military necessity that such naval force as may be required should at once appear in the James River upon the line indicated, that the rebels may be kept from occupying strategic points essential to the execution of the plan suggested. It would not follow, nor ought it to follow, unless the rebel force in Richmond was greatly reduced, so as to invite and assure the success of an attack, that an attempt would be made immediately upon the rebel capital. Delay would be advantageous in some respects. We compel the rebels to concentrate for the defence

of Richmond, we use the season for the capture of the Southern ports; and, succeeding in these undertakings, we render the occupation of Richmond by June or July next the most probable event of the future.

If, after the capture of the cities of the Gulf and the consequent breaking of the lines of railway, we are to fail in reducing Richmond, then it is assuredly true that a winter and spring campaign upon that city would also prove a failure. If we contest for the Mississippi River, for Mobile, for Charleston, for Wilmington, it is not in the nature of things that we should fail everywhere. Indeed, the probability of success is so great that we may feel assured of the accomplishment of all these undertakings during the first half of the present year.

These things successfully accomplished, and it might be wise to delay the attack upon Richmond even beyond the year 1863. The railways through the South should be cut and destroyed for long distances; the iron removed or rendered useless; every bridge that can be reached should be burned, or otherwise destroyed; the navigable rivers should be traversed by armed boats; and East Tennessee occupied, and its railway communications with Richmond broken up. The capture of Charleston and the other ports of the Atlantic, together with the opening of the Mississippi River, will satisfy the country and the army that the campaign has been successful; while foreign nations will be compelled to admit in their policy, if not in words, that the restoration of the Union is an accomplished fact. Time, decision, energy, and the capacity to use

circumstances aright, to foresee events that in the laws of reason and of human logic are inevitable, will do the rest. If, moreover, we capture Mobile and Wilmington, who will ask whether Richmond can be taken? Richmond can only capitulate, and the rebel leaders can only choose between capture and flight. It might, indeed, happen that the attempt to advance this policy would lead the rebels, under the influence of despair and hope, to abandon Richmond; or, withdrawing the body of the army southward, to trust the defence of their capital to fortresses, intrenchments, and the soldiers within the fortifications. This policy would still leave us the advantage, as, by falling upon the railways in the rear of their army, we could separate Richmond from the Confederacy. Upon the basis laid down, it would seem incredible to history that the spring and early summer should have passed away, and the rebel authority continue as it is at this moment.

The policy, then, to which these suggestions lead, embodied in propositions, may be stated thus:I. Open the Mississippi River.

II. Menace Richmond with a formidable naval force upon the James River, and a formidable land force upon the angle between the James and the Appomattox; and be prepared to support this force from the Potomac and other points, should it be deemed necessary for defence, or to advance upon Richmond if the rebel army in that city should be materially diminished.

III. The capture of the ports named by sudden attacks of large forces on land and water; regarding

the capture of Richmond as a thing to be desired and attempted should circumstances so invite, but not to be pursued as an object of the war, nor as in any considerable degree essential to the ultimate success of the national arms.

IV. The abandonment of the attempt to protect loyal men in the rebel States. Nor should any effort be made to induce such to identify themselves with the government until our successes and the experience of the rebel population shall have made it safe for loyal people to announce and defend their opinions without the active protection of the national government. When the rebel power shall have been broken, the opportunity for the free expression of opinion will gradually return to the people. Then such free expression will not be attended with personal danger; but, until that time arrives, it is wise for our government to direct its military operations without regard to the existence of loyal men, discountenancing expressions of loyalty in the rebel districts rather than giving encouragement to them. The rebel territory is so vast that it is simply impossible to give personal or even local protection to the people. We should attempt (1) To occupy so much rebel territory as is essential to the protection of the loyal States, and nothing more; (2) To seize such strategic points as may be necessary for present or future operations; (3) To penetrate the rebel territory for the purpose of breaking and destroying lines of communication. When these things shall have been successfully accomplished, the rebel army will be separated into parts; its sources of supply cut off; its ultimate annihilation certain.

216

THE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT TO SUPPRESS THE REBELLION.

SPEECH DELIVERED BEFORE THE NATIONAL UNION LEAGUE ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C., JUNE 16, 1863.

IT

T would be unkind in me, ladies and gentlemen, if I were to-night, under the circumstances both of the climate and of public affairs, to make a long speech, even to indulgent hearers.

Since the rebellion opened, I have followed but one line of conduct in regard to whatever I have thought, done, or said in reference to public affairs. I do not propose any departure from that course to-night. It is simply this: to give that advice and counsel which the exigencies of the country demand, without regard to its effect upon myself or upon the opinions, purposes, principles, or feelings of other

men.

The crisis is too important to allow any man to deviate from that course of conduct; and what I have said and done, and what I shall say or do, all turns upon one idea, and has in the end but one purpose; and that is, the extinction of the institution of slavery, as the means by which the rebellion is to be quelled, the Union restored, and civil war for ever after prevented. Believing this to be the necessary and inevitable consequence of the overthrow of that institution, and educated as I have been in