taken for a proof that he had changed his opinion upon the meafures which brought about this unhappy war. Such a conclufion would be unjuft, and he trusted no gentleman in that Houfe would draw it. He trufted the Houfe would feel that if he waved all thefe topics, it was because he did not confider them as neceffary for the illuftration of the arguments he had to fubmit on the prefent occafion. He fhould, therefore, for the fake of argument, grant (always begging it to be understood by the way, and for the fake of argument alone, he did fo) that the prefent war was a juft, prudent, and neceffary war, called for and entered into for the general fafety of Europe, and for the intereft of this country. This was the broadeft way in which he could lay foundation for argument; and upon principles fo laid down, he fhould fate why he thought it was neceffary at the prefent time, under the prefent circumstances, for that Houfe to interfere and to give its opinion in an addrefs to the Throne, as he fhould have the honour of moving. If there were any who thought that this might have a bad effect upon the public mind, all he could fay, was, that on his part that would not be intentional, as he was of a different opinion. He had always understood that the grounds of the prefent war on the part of Great Britain were principally thefe: First, the particular alliance we had with the Dutch, attacked as they were by the French. Secondly, not only this alliance, which in point of good faith called upon us to act from a regard to our own honour, but alfo on account of the intereft we ourselves had in the iffue. There was another ground ftated, and that might be divided into parts, as indeed on former occafions it had been, he meant that which was flated upon the general footing of the aggrandizement of France, and the effect and operation of the fpirit of their councils. Thefe were the grounds upon which we undertook the prefent war. His object was now to fhew, that upon none of these grounds could the prefent war be continued. He knew he might, and perhaps he fhould be told, that we had been at confiderable expence in this war already, and that we had met with confiderable fuccefs in the profecution of it hitherto; therefore gentlemen inclined to infift upon thefe points, would fay, that under fuch circumftances it was fair for us to fay, that we were intitled to indemnity for the expences we

had sustained, and security against future danger, or that if we had not, the war fhould be followed up with vigour.That principle, as far as it regarded the situation of our allies, he did by no means deny; but the continuation of the prefent war for indemnity to ourselves and indemnity only, after the real object of the war was gained, could be maintained only upon prudential confiderations: now taking it as a matter of prudence, he should wish to ask what could we promise to ourselves upon the continuation of the prefent war? What was it that we proposed to gain? These were all the grounds he fhould have to fubmit to the House. In the first place, therefore, he should apprehend from thefe premises, that whatever sentiments of indignation the people of this country might feel with regard to fome of the proceedings on the part of France, pretty general the indignation was felt, and by none more than by himself, yet he believed it was not in thẹ contemplation of the people of this country, at the commencement of the war, to infift on giving France its old absolute monarchy, or indeed to infist on giving it any form of Government whatever, or to interfere with any form of Government that might be found in that country. He thought he was ftating nothing more than the general with of the people of this country, and what they felt at the commencement of the war, that the object of it was not that of giving to, or insisting on, any form of Government to France. He stated this point negatively, because it would hereafter make the pofitive part which he should afterwards fubmit the more intelligible. We were not to revenge the death of the King of France, at least we were not to go to war for that purpose, although he felt as much as any person in this country upon that melancholy occafion, and he believed, that in this country at least, it was an event unanimously lamented; yet it was not for this that we went to war, how far the indignation of the people had been raifed upon that topic, it was unnecessary for him to fay; it was fufficient in the present instance for his purpose to say it was not the ground of our going to war, either infifted on by the most fanguine advocates for the measure, or by the still higher authority of the communication from the Throne.The object of the war avowed was, as he had opened in the commencement of his prefent addrefs to the House, to pre

ferve Holland as our ally, and to prevent the aggrandizement of France, which was faid to be formidable on account of the fentiments which appeared to actuate their councils. There was indeed another ground, which was, that the French had declared war against us. That being admitted to its full extent, would go only to the establishinent of one principle—that of making the war a defenfive war; by a defensive war he did not mean to describe the mode of carrying it on, for it must be carried on, as all mankind knew, by force of arms; but it was on that account merely a defenfive war in principle, which ceafed with the occafion that gave it birth. And if he were asked, when was the time he would put an end to such a war? He would anfwer, when we could make our enemies. defift from carrying on their operations against us; subject to the confideration of an indemnity, if indemnity could be obtained by prudential, defirable means; always keeping in view, that indemnity was also a point to be governed by confiderations of prudence and difcretion. If, therefore, we had no ground for fufpecting that France had any farther means of acting hoftilely against us, or any of our allies, we could not justify to ourselves the continuance of the war folely upon the ground that France had declared war against us. When we had put an end to the aggreffion, then was the time to put an end to the war fo commenced. With respect to Holland, our ally, he must observe, that the question, whether Holland be now safe from any attack from France? was eafily anfwered; and he believed that every man in that House, and every man of intelligence in this country knew the answer to be in the affirmative-But whether in the prefent state of affairs the future fafety of our allies, the Dutch, was to be secured by our pursuing the war in conjunction with the other combined powers, was a question not easily answered in the fame way-How far, if this war was countenanced by us, the general safety of Europe would be preserved, was a topic he did not wish to decide upon, because it afforded, in his opinion, a profpect that could not be agreeable to any man who had the least regard for the principles of liberty-all he meant in this place was-that the Dutch, as well as ourselves, were at this moment fufficiently fortified and guarded against any attack from France-Was there a man this day in this coun

try who feriously thought that with regard to Holland and to us, peace could not be made with France with perfe& fafety? Now he came to the confideration of the general state of Europe at this moment. We attacked France, because our allies were attacked by her-and because we faw in the chara&er and spirit of her councils, views of her own aggrandizement. Was this fpirit, and were thefe views peculiar to France?Had we not witneled the fame fpirit in other powers of Europe? Had not all parties in that House, all the people of this country, concurred in detefting the conduct of the present combined powers with regard to Poland? Was not that scene fufficiently infamous; Did it not exhibit fufficient tyranny, oppreffion and breach of faith? Could we conceal from ourfelves the conduct of Ruffia and of Pruffia upon that fubject? Were we to partake of the infamy of that tranfaction?—God forbid we should. Let us afk ourselves, with all the indignation we naturally entertained against the conduct of France on many points, whether the conduct of the Court of Berlin and the Court of Petersburgh in their invafion of Poland, and afterwards the partition of it, was not equal in infamy to any thing that France was ever guilty of? Upon this part of the fubject he had fome obfervations to make to fome Members of that House, upon the alarm they expreffed in the commencement of this feffion, at the progrefs of the French. What did thefe gentlemen now feel when reflecting on the conduct and the progrefs of the Emprefs of Ruffia, and the King of Pruffia? Was this matter of alarm to any of these gentlemen? But it feemed that nothing was now to be alarming but French principles. Such were the horrid cffects of fear on account of these principles, and so far it had affected the Empress of Ruffia and the King of Pruffia, that they had laid hold of Poland in the panic. He begged pardon of the Houfe for introducing any thing ludicrous upon fo grave a subject; but a story which he remembered, appeared to him fo appofite, that he could not refift the temptation of reciting it: "A perfon detected in the act of taking a watch out of the pocket of another, being accused of it, confeffed the fact, but faid in his defence, that he had been ftruck with a panic, and in his fright he had laid hold of the first thing he could, which happened to be the gentleman's watch which he conveyed into his pocket.” If, in

the prefent cafe, Poland was the first thing these great powers, Ruffia and Pruffia, could lay hold of; fuch, was the effect of these royal alarms, fuch the conduct of these Royal panic-struck Sovereigns, that in the fpafins of their fear, they could not quit their hold, and having each an equal right to retain what they had within their gripe, moft equitably agreed to divide the kingdom between them! Did gentlemen think themselves happy in feeing this mode adopted to refift French principles. Was this conduct lefs dangerous to Europe than that of the' French? He knew many reafons why it was more dangerous. One was, that fuch a combination of defpots were carried on with more fecrecy, than in the wild ftate of a democracy was poffible at any time. And here he wished to know what anfwer gentlemen would give him, if he afked, whether they thought, that, even if the French had been able to retain all they took, Flanders and Brabant, it would have been more dangerous to the general profperity of Europe than this divifion of Poland? Or that now they were reftored, and fuppoling them to be under the condition they stood in by the order of the Emperor Jofeph, was there a man in that House of opinion, that our fafety required the continuance of this deftructive war?

As to Savoy, he should say nothing by way of comment upon the conduct of Great Britain; he believed that bufinefs had been commenced on the part of the French, without any thing intended to be done by us, and certainly without any promise of affistance from us to the party attacked; and therefore we were not involved in any point of honour on that account. He had indeed been told, but he had no means of arriving at real knowledge upon the fubject, that application had been made to us at that time, and that our answer on that occafion amounted to a flat negative. In fhort, he wished to afk gentlemen who heard him, whether, from all the circumftances put together, relative to this war at this moment, might not peace now be obtained from France, even with the reftitution of the King of Sardinia's dominions; but he fhould think it hard if this country was bound to infiit upon fuch terms. It might be asked of him, whether, when we had spent millions in the prosecu tion of he prefent war, and considering the fituation we are in at the present moment, and likewife that the convulfion and VOL. XXXV.

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