673 the hiftory of this country, to which the honourable gentleman was fo fond of alluding? Where could he find any fuch principle in any of those wars which this country had carried on in fupport of its independence? And if fo, what was there in the peculiar fituation of the French, the disturbers of the peace of Europe, and the unprovoked aggreffors of this country, that fhould require any other measure to be dealt to them, than what we had been accustomed on former occafions to afford to our enemies. With a prospect of fuccefs so great as we had in the prefent moment, were we to grant them an impunity for all these designs which they had so unjustly formed and attempted to carry into execution? Would this tend in any degree to remedy the temporary inconvenience to this country, which the honourable gentleman has stated as refulting from the war, but which, in reality, is produced by collateral causes? In no cafe would the conduct here pointed out be expedient. But of all cafes, where we ought not to stop merely because the enemy stops, is that where we had suffered an injury without having either obtained reparation or fecurity. This I will illustrate by what is at prefent our fituation. And first I will afk, what was the state of this country with refpe&t to France, previous to the declaration of war on her part. We then contended, 1. That she had broke a treaty with our allies, which we were bound to fupport. 2. That he had engaged in fchemes of ambition and aggrandizement, inconfiftent with the interests of this country, and the general fecurity of Europe. 3. That she had entertained principles hostile to all Governments, and more particularly to our own. fequence of all thefe circumstances, you then declared in addreffes to His Majefty, that if proper fatisfaction was not obtained, a war must be the confequence. But while this was in agitation they had themfelves declared war, and been guty of a sudden and unprovoked aggreffion upon this country. Is then that aggreffion, the climax of all their injuries, to induce you to abandon those reasonable views of fatisfaction which before you entertained. The neceffity of fecurity against those three points, their difregard of treaties, their projects of ambition, and their dangerous principles, certainly becomes greater, inafmuch as their injuries are increased by the aggreffion. The argument then for fatisfaction, instead of VOL. XXXV. 4 R In con being diminished, derives greater ftrength from this last circumstance. Indeed if we were foiled, we might then be induced to abandon thofe views with which we had fet out, to submit to the hardship of our fate, and to receive fuch terms as neceflity might dictate. But thofe terms which the motion. prescribed are not fuch as are to be aimed at in the first instance, but fuch as are only to be fubmitted to in the last extremity. The queftion then is, whether we fhall now court calamity, whether we fhall, after a moft fuccefsful commencement, voluntarily fubmit to all the most direful confequences of failure and defeat? At prefent we have both right and intereft on our fide. Shall we abandon both? Shall we, with the means of doing ourselves juftice, pass by the most repeated and aggravated injuries, and grant peace to thofe whofe unprovoked aggreffion alone compelled us to arm in our own defence? The queftion refolves itfelf into this; Shall we, from a view of the prefent fituation of the belligerent powers, risk more by vigorously perfifting in the war till we have obtained its objects, or by abandoning it without either reparation or fecurity? I fhall only put the question, and leave it to you to decide.Allow me only to fubjoin a few remarks with reference to fome points urged by the honourable gentleman who made the motion. We thought it neceffary in the first instance, upon being attacked, to enter vigorously into the war. Did we not fee the evils which we might expect to encounter in carrying it Were we infenfible of thofe calamities with which every war is attended? Have thefe evils and calamities turned out to be greater than at firft were expected and forefeen? On this point I fhall not refer you to the inflamed exaggerations of the honourable gentleman, who predicted from the war, even in its commencement, every poffible calamity, fuch as the most alarming difcontents at home, the total stagnation of commerce, and interruption of public profperity; and who represented that its infallible confequence must be not to check the schemes and repulfe the progrefs of the enemy, but, on the contrary, to unite their views and concentrate their vigour. No-however juftified I might be in taking this statement, I' fhall refer you only to the more moderate apprehenfions of those who, though convinced of the neceffity of the war were not infenfible to its dreadful confequences. Thefe apprehenfions happily have been difappointed, and the very re verfe of thofe calamities, which there was but too much reafon. to dread, has taken place. The war has been attended, even in its outfet, with the most brilliant, rapid, and unexpected fuccefs. The views of the enemy have experienced a moft effectual check, and every circumftance concurs to favour the hope of our being able completely to accomplish every object of the war. Was there any thing then in this fituation to in duce us to abandon our views of reparation and fecurity?Were we to give up our claims of fatisfaction, merely because we had been beyond example fuccefsful in repelling an unjust attack To urge this point, would indeed be wasting the time of the Houfe. The only queftion that remained was, at what period, and from what fituation of affairs, we were to obtain that reparation and fecurity which we defired? How long were we to wait for thefe objects? Were we to place them upon circumstances which might never happen, and thus purfue them without any poffibility of attaining our end, which might be the cafe if we looked to the establishment of any particular Government in France? The answer to thefe questions, like the degree of fecurity and reparation to be obtained, depended upon circumftances of comparison. I declare, that on the part of this Government there was no intention, if the country had not been attacked, to interfere in the internal affairs of France. This was clearly proved by the fyftem of neutrality, on our part, fo ftrictly obferved. But having been attacked, I affirm, that there is nothing, either in the addreffes to His Majesty or the declarations of his fervants, which pledges us not to take advantage of any interference in the internal affairs of France that may be necessary. I, for my own part, repeat, that I have given no fuch pledge. I do not fay that if, without any interference, fufficient fecurity and reparation could be had for this country, I would not, in that cafe, be of opinion that we ought to abftain from all interference, and allow their Government to remain even upon its prefent footing. But I confider the queftion of obtaining thefe, while the fame principle that now prevails, continues to actuate their Government, to be extremely difficult, I will not fay altogether impoffible. But I fhould certainly think, that the beft fecurity we could obtain, would be in the end of that wild ungoverned fyftem, from which have refulted thofe injuries against which it is neceffary to guard. There are, however, degrees and proportions of fecurity which may be obtained, and with which we ought to reft fatisfied; but thefe muft depend upon the circumstances that fhall afterwards arife, and cannot be afcertained by any previous definition. But when you have feen yourselves and all Europe attackedwhen you have feen a fyftem eftablished, violating all treaties, difregarding all obligations, and, under the name of the rights of Man, uniting the principles of ufurpation abroad, tyranny and confufion at home-you will judge whether you ought to fit down without fome fecurity against the confequences of fuch a fyftem being again brought into action. And this fecurity, it appears to me, can only be obtained in one of three modes—ift, That these principles fhall no longer predominate; or 2dly, That thofe who are now engaged in them fhall be taught that they are impracticable, and convinced of their own want of power to carry them into execution; or 3dly, That the iffue of the prefent war shall be such, as by weakening their power of attack shall strengthen your power of refiftance. Without thefe, you may indeed have an armed truce, a temporary fufpenfion of hoftilities; but no permanent peace; no folid fecurity to guard you against the repetition of injury and the renewal of attack. If on thefe points we have made up our minds, if we are determined to profecute the war till we fhall obtain proper fatisfaction, and at least be able to provide fome fecurity for the continuance of peace, the prefent motion can only tend to fetter the operations of war, to delude our fubjects, to gratify the factious, to inflame the difcontented, to difcourage our allies, to ftrengthen our enemies. What could be the effect of any negociation for peace in the prefent moment? It is not merely to the character of Marat, with whom we would have to treat, that I object; it is not to the horror of thofe crimes which have stained their Legiflators, crimes in every stage rifing above another in point of enormity; but I object to the confequences of that character, to the effect of thofe crimes. They are fuch as render negociation ufelefs, and muft entirely deprive of ftability any peace which could be concluded in fuch circumftances. Where is our fecurity for the performance of a treaty, where we have neither the good faith of a nation, nor the refponfibility of a Monarch. The moment that the mob of Paris becomes under the influence of a new leader, mature deliberations are reverfed, the most folemn engagements are retracted, or free will is altogether controled by force. In every one of the ftages of their repeated revolutions we have faid, "Now we have feen the worst, the measure of iniquity is complete, we shall no longerbe fhocked or aftonished by the contemplation of added crimes and increafing enormities." The next mail gave us reafon to reproach ourselves with our credulity, and by prefenting us with fresh crimes and enormities ftill more dreadful, excited impreffions of new aftonishment and accumulated horror. All the crimes which difgrace hiftory have occurred in one country, in a space so fhort, and with circumftances fo highly aggravated, as outrun thought and exceed imagination. Should we treat with Marat, before we had finished the negociation he might again have defcended to the dregs of the people from whom he sprung, and have given place to a still more defperate villain. A band of leaders had fwayed the mob in constant fucceffion, all resembling in guilt, but rifing above one another in point of enormity, each striving to improve upon the crime of his predeceffor, and fwell the black catalogue with new modes and higher gradations of wickedness Atas Parentum pejor avis tulit. Nos nequiores, mox daturos No treaty can exift on their good faith independent of the terms of peace. Could they be bound by engagements more folemn than those to which they had pledged themselves in return for our neutrality? What new engagements can be more binding, or from what part of the character of the leaders, or what change in the principles of action, can we expect greater good faith, or ftricter attention to engagements, than were exhibited by their predeceffors? To make a treaty with them would only be to afford them an opportunity of breaking it off before it was finished, or violating it in its very commencement. But if the motion can answer no good purpose, can it answer no bad one? Might it not ferve to encourage the French? What the honourable gentleman referved as the laft part of his argument, feemed particularly to have this tendency, the conclufion which he drew of the neceffity of a peace from the fituation of the coun |