the common oppressor, yet in fact they would, even France herself not excepted, contribute assistance, in an indirect and passive manner, by obliging him to employ a great part of his armies in watching and keeping them in subjection.

The principal towns and seaports of Spain, isolated from one another, by vast distances, were not all of them to be occupied by an invading army, however numerous. In the interior, and particularly the north of Spain, the ground, in many parts, is hilly and broken, rising into lofty mountains, with defiles here and there, and in some places, even towns inaccessible to artillery. The plains of the two Castilles and Estramadura, are scarcely less favourable to invading armies, than the rugged regions that separate them from the rest of Spain. The excessive heat of the climate, and the contagion of intermittent fevers, would be more fatal to an army of strangers, than detachments of natives. The French would have to encounter a great scarcity of provisions and forage, and a difficulty of transporting these from one place to another.

In other countries Buonaparte had supplied his magazines from the depôls of the countries he invaded, improvidently suffered to fall into his hands. In Spain, no such depôts were to be found. Out of evil some times arises good. In former times there had been in every village of Spain small granaries, called positos, where the farmers were obliged to deposit every year a certain portion of their harvest as a security against famine, In the last war with Portugal go

vernment had drained those positos for provisioning the army, sent against Portugal in 1801, and failed in its promise to replenish them. Nor could the farmers ever be persuaded to confide thereafter any portion of their grain or forage to the public grauaries.

The Spaniards, of proper age, might form themselves at first into small bodies, and take every advantage to be derived from local knowledge; and when they should be under the necessity of quitting one district, or province, they might retire to another. They could break up roads, cut down bridges, intercept convoys and intelligence, fall on the enemy on his flanks; and, in short, harass him in all possible ways, without allowing him a moment's repose by night or day. By degrees smaller would be organized into larger masses, and duly trained until their local and raw militia should become equal, at length, to a regular army. It was a fortunate circumstance, that the Spanish armies had always been recruited upon limited service; by which means there were spread over all the provinces of Spain veterans who had been trained to arms, and who could now train others. Nor was it the least favourable circumstance to the cause of the patriots, that both their kings, the old and the new, with their courtiers, and so many suspicious characters, were dancing attendance in the antichamber of king Joseph, at Bayonne.Add to all these favourable circumstances, that the Spaniards were patient under hardships and priva tions, and many of them accustomed to make long journies on foot. СНАР.

Official Paper, entitled PRECAUTIONS, printed and published by the Supreme Junta of Seville. See State Papers, p. 335.

CHAP. X.

Impetuous haste and Impolicy, as well as Perfidy of Buonaparte.Astonishment as well as Admiration excited by the General Insurrection in Spain.-History of the Insurrection how divided-Before the Establishment of the Provincial Juntas.—After their Establishment; and Resolution into the Supreme Central Junta.-Tragical End of Solano, Marquis Del Socorro, Captain General of Andalusia and Governor of Cadiz.-Concert and Co-operation between the Spanish Patriots and British Commanders at Sea and Land.-Admirable

Harmony among all the Juntas.-Spanish Proclamations, admirable Compositions.-All Classes without exception enrolled in the Insurrection-Circumstances of Encouragement to the Spanish Patriots in Andalusia.-Unconditional Surrender of the French Fleet in the Harbour of Cadiz.-Insurrection in Portugal, supported and encouraged by Admiral Sir Charles Cotton.-Alliance offensive and defensive between Spain and Portugal.-Deputies from different Juntas in London.-Enthusiasm of Britain in the Cause of Spain.

JUST

UST at the time when all Buo- to wear a very serious aspect Buonaparte's arrangements, relating naparte affected to regard it with to the settlement of Spain were indifference and contempt, and was completed, and waited only for the at great pains, by means of his sanction of the junta he had called journals, to publish that indifferto Bayonne, the insurrection broke ence to the world; apprehending, out in all the provinces not imme- not without reason, that a serious diately under the the control of his and effectual resistance of his usurarms. What emotions must the pations in Spain, might awaken reintelligence of this have excited in sistance in other quarters. the breasts of the Spaniards at Bayonne, and at the castle of Marrac! As to Buonaparte, the insurrection does not seem to have given him at first much alarm. The sham national assembly was held at Bayonne; the new coustitution laid before it; and king Joseph sent to Madrid, as if nothing had happened. Even after it had begun

It was a saying among the aucient stoics, that it was a great attainment in wisdom to know when to restrain, and when to give our sentiments the impetus of passiont. There was never, perhaps, a character that was more sensi ble of the importance of this maxim than Buonaparte: one more capable of simulation and dissimu[N 4] lation

• It may be remarked, that it was not till the 20th of July, when Joseph was presumed, as in fact he did, to have entered Madrid, that Buonaparte, having Completed as he conceived his business, quitted Bayonne to proceed to Paris. Η Ανοχής και Απέχω.

lation; who could reasou more coolly, or on some occasions, giving loose to all his sails, rush on his object with greater ardour. But in his conduct towards Spain he betrayed the common weakness of being unhinged by a long continued flow of sucœess. To the emperor of the French, king of Italy, protector of the confederation of the Rhine, and mediator of the republic of Switzerland, 'it was plainly a matter of indifference what individual collected the revenues of Spain for the benefit of France; except that a prince of the house of Bourbon might have been expected to collect those of America for some years longer: whereas a change of dynasty could not fail to endanger that great source of supply, by inciting those provinces to pursue their own interest and greatness, in obedience to the very dictates of nature, by asserting their independence.

It is true, as above observed, that the guilty mind of Buonaparte could never be at peace, while such a crown as that of the Spains and the Indies, rested on the head of a Bourbon. But the impetu ous haste with which, after a long scene of successful treachery, he threw off the mask of friendship, and in violation of all that is most sacred among men, seized the persons of the royal family, was indefensible on any ground of policy.

He might have gained his end by means, though more leisurely, more secure. He had gained a complete

ascendancy over the mind and conduct of Ferdinand; as is fully proved by every act of this prince when raised to the throne, and particularly by his journey to Bayonne. The power and influence of Buonaparte, in his character of ally and mediator, with so many French troops in Spain, which might be reinforced on various pretences, was unlimited. It was in his power to occupy Cadiz, Carthagena, Ferrol, St. Audero, and other ports, and thus to cut off all regular and sure communication with England. By bestowing as a gift, on Ferdinand, the throne of his ancestors, he might have degraded him in the eyes of his subjects, compelled him to become, like his father, the miserable instrument of French rapacity, and ultimately like him to abdicate the throne for the safety of his person. In a word, he might have pursued any conduct but that which mor tally wounded the pride of every Spaniard, and which every Spani ard considered as a personal insult. It must, however, be admitted, that the explosion of indignant patriotism, which burst forth at the same moment in all the provinces of. Spain, was more than Buonaparte, or any one could have expected. It seems to have astonished even the Spaniards themselves.

The juuta of Seville looked upon it to be, as it were, the inspiration of heaven, and little short of miraculous +." And this, by

the bye, may serve, in some degree, as an apology for the duke of Infantado, and the other Spanish nobles, who accompanied Ferdi

See Vol. XLIX. HIST. EUR. p. 45. Notę. + See Manifesto of the Junta of Seville.-State Papers, 336.

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