to dividends and the right to share in the final distribution of the corporate property, may be prejudiced by its destruction. In this case the ships were the means by which profits were to be earned, and their loss would naturally, in the ordinary course of things, diminish the capacity of the corporation to pay dividends, and consequently impair the value of the stock. The same would be true in other cases which might be mentioned; as, for example, where buildings producing rent, owned by a corporation, should be burned. It is not necessary, to constitute an insurable interest, that the interest is such that the event insured against would necessarily subject the insured to loss. It is sufficient that it might do so, and the pecuniary injury would be the natural consequence. Cone vs. Insurance Co., 60 N. Y., 619. "The question now before us was considered by the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Warren vs. Insurance Co., 31 Iowa, 464. The court, in a careful opinion, reached the conclusion that a stockholder in a corporation had an insurable interest in the corporate property. In Phillips vs. Insurance Co., 20 Ohio, 174, there is an adverse dictum, but the decision went on another ground. In Wilson vs. Jones, L. R., 2 Exch., 139, the action was upon a policy in favor of the plaintiff, a shareholder in the Atlantic Telegraph Company, a company organized to lay the Atlantic cable. The court construed the contract as an insurance of the plaintiff in respect to the adventure undertaken by the company to lay the cable, and it was held that his interest as shareholder was an insurable interest, and likened it to an insurance on profits. (See, also, Paterson vs. Harres, 1 Best & S., 336.) It is difficult to perceive any good reason why, if a stockholder could be insured on his shares in a corporation against a loss happening in the prosecution of a corporate enterprise, he could not insure specifically the corporate property itself embraced in the adventure, and prove his interest by showing that he was a share holder. "The question here is, did the plaintiff have an insurable interest covered by the policy? The amount of damages is not in question. Except that the parties have taken that question out of the controversy, the extent of the loss would be a question of fact to be ascertained by proof, and the recovery up to the amount insured would be measured by the actual loss. We are of opinion that the view that a stockholder in a corporation may insure specific corporate property by reason of his situation as a stockholder, stands upon the better reason, and also that it is in consonance with the current of authority defining insurable interests in our courts. The cases of Herkier vs. Rice, 27 N. Y., 163; Rohrbach vs. Insurance Co., 62 N. Y., 47, and National Filtering Oil Co. vs. Citizens' Ins. Co., 106 N. Y., 535; 13 N. E. Rep., 337, sustained policies upon interests quite as remote as the interest now in question. It would be useless reiteration to restate the particular facts and grounds of the decisions in these cases. It is sufficient to refer to them, and to say in conclusion that it seems to us, both upon authority and reason, that the insurance now in question is not a wager policy, but is a fair and reasonable indemnity, founded upon a real interest, though not amounting to an estate, legal or equitable, in the property insured. "The judgment should therefore be affirmed. All concur." SECTION 26. CONSTRUCTION. Although fire insurance policies, like all other forms of contracts, are to be construed according to the intention of the parties, still all doubts will be construed in favor of the insured. This applies even in the case of standard policies, i. e. policies which are fixed by state statutes." The reason for this favor shown to the insured is on account of the opportunity afforded to insurance companies to take advantage of the insurer by inserting ambiguous terms which will bear very heavily on the insurer. "The act (Chapter 488, Law 1886), providing for a uniform policy known as the 'standard policy' and which makes its use compulsory upon insurance companies, marks a most important and useful advance in legislation relating to contracts of insurance. The practice which prevailed before this enactment, whereby each company prescribed the form of its contract, led to great diversity in the provisions and conditions of insurance policies, and frequently to great abuse. Parties taking insurance were often misled by unusual clauses or obscure phrases concealed in a mass of verbiage and often so printed as to elude discovery. Unconscionable defenses, based upon such conditions, were not infrequent, and courts seem sometimes to have been embarrassed in the attempt to reconcile the claims of justice with the law of contracts. Under the law of 1886, companies are not permitted to insert conditions in policies at their will. The policies that they now issue must be uniform in thier provisions, arrangement and type. Persons seeking insurance will comé to understand to a greater extent than heretofore the contract into which they enter. Now, as heretofore, it is competent for the parties to a contract of insurance, by an agreement in writing or by parol, to modify the contract after the policy has been issued, or to waive conditions or forfeitures. The power of agents, as expressed in the policy, may be enlarged by usage of agents, its course of business, or by its consent, express or implied. The principle that courts lean against forfeitures is unimpaired, and in weighing evidence tending to show a waiver of conditions or forfeitures the courts may take into consideration the nature of the particular condition in question, whether a condition precedent to any liability or one relating to the remedy merely, after a loss has been incurred. But where the restrictions upon an agent's authority appear in the policy and there is no evidence tending to show that his powers have been enlarged, there seems to be no good reason why the authority expressed should not be regarded as the measure of his power; nor is there any reason why courts should refuse to enforce forfeitures plainly incurred, which have not been expressly or impliedly waived by the company. Quinlan vs. Ins. Co., 133 N. Y., 356; 31 N. E., 31. SECTION 27. TEMPORARY BREACH OF CONDITION. It has been held by some courts that a temporary breach of a condition subsequent, which does not contribute to a subsequent loss, merely suspends the policy instead of terminating it. This view, which in theory would seem to be the correct one, was well argued by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Traders Ins. Co. vs. Tatlin, as follows: "The question of primary importance on this record is, were these policies in force at the time the property was destroyed by fire. In New England Fire and Marine Ins. Co. vs. Wetmore, 32 Ill., 221, the conditions in the policy provided that if, after insurance, the insured buildings should be occupied in any way so as to render the risk more hazardous than at the time of the insuring, or if the risk be increased by any means whatever within the control. of the assured, such insurance should be void so long as the premises should be so appropriated, applied or used. In the application for insurance in that case the premises are described as a dwelling house, with some boarders. The evidence showed that for a period previous to the fire, but not when the fire happened, a room attached to the main building had been used as a stable for a horse and the main building for a saloon, but at the time the insured property was destroyed it was vacant. On this state of facts it was urged the use of the property as a stable increased the risk, etc., and it was said: 'Stables are special hazards, for the insuring of which a higher premium is demanded than for a dwelling or a boarding house. But the proof shows that the fire did not • 163 III., 256; 45 N. E., 255. occur whilst the small room was so used. The premises had been vacant some months before the fire, and there is no proof going to show that this use of the room increased the risk or contributed in the remotest degree to the loss. Had the fire occurred whilst it was used as a stable, then, doubtless, the policy would have been avoided. The meaning of the condition is, if the house or premises shall be appropriated to any prohibited use, then, so long as it is so appropriated, the policy shall cease to bind the insurers.' It was in that case further said: "The import of this language,' (the contract in the policy), 'it seems to us is most clear, not that this policy shall be absolutely void, to all intents and purposes, if the premises are misappropriated, but only while they are so improperly used the insurance shall have no effect. * By the express language of the conditions * policy was to be void and of no effect only so long as an improper use of the premises shall exist; when it ceases to exist then the policy is in full force.' This is a leading case in this State, and the court recognizes that it is not in accord with the decisions of New York, yet declares the rule to be as stated. * the "The above case was followed by Schmidt vs. Peoria Marine and Fire Ins. Co., 41 Ill., 295, where the condition in the policy was: 'No fire in or about said buildings, except one under kettle securely imbedded in masonry (used for heating water), and made perfectly secure against accidents.' With this condition the contention of the company was, that it was a warranty that there should be no fire except under the kettle, and a breach would avoid the policy. It was held the words above used should be construed with reference to the conditions of the property at |