on the mind of the judge advocate, with respect to the original request which he, (the accused), had made for a list of the charges and specifications. It was stated by the julge advocate, that he, (the accused), had never been denied a copy. He admitted that he was originally furnished with a copy, but he found an error in it, which rendered it necessary that he should apply for another. It was answered, that the error only consisted in the difference between 13 and 30, in the dates of two letters. He contended, however, that this was not a difference of that trivial character which was imputed to it. Where all the references were to dates, a single error of this kind changed the entire order of the references, and threw the whole into confusion. If the date of a single letter was incorrect, where there was nothing but lates to rely upon, it might lead to a train of errors of the most important consequences. He protested, therefore, against this error being set down as a mere difference in the date of a letter between the 13th and 30th. The accused then begged leave to refer to the original grounds on which the objections of his counsel had been founded. It was matter of importance that he should know on what ground he stood. It was important for him to understand whether he was here to answer to some grave charge affecting his own honor, and the interest of the service and of his country; or whether it was merely to render an account for having infringed some of the minor rules of deeorum, and violated some undefined courtesy of life. He apprehended, both from the advice of his counsel, and the lights which his own judgment afforded, that, before the court could pronounce any sentence in his case, it would be necessary to show that the offence, with which he stood charged, came within the meaning of some positive rule of action, prescribed by a known and fixed law. It has been contended, however, on the authority of a loose expression of an eminent writer on military law, that it was not necessary, in order to bring of fences within the cognisance of a court martial, that they should be defined by a specific law; but that the prosecutor has nothing to do but to lay before the court certain facts and allegations, and that it then remains in the breast of the court to define the offence itself, as well as to prescribe the punishment. This doctrine is founded on a work on martial law, by TytJer, of which a practical digest has been made for the use of our military system, by general McComb. He confessed that he was struck with astonishment when he heard this reference made, since he had looked over all the other authorities, all the best writers on the subject, and found an uniform agreement of opinion that, in trials before courts martia!, the offences charged must be set forth with as much precision, as in trials before civil courts. To show this, he would refer the court to Adye's treatise on military law, page 62, where this doctrine is laid down; and the same Mr. Tytler, whose authority, to prove the contrary, was relied on by the judge advocate, is equally explict on this point, as might be seen in pp. 216, 217, of his work. In the digest of general McComb, the same doctrine is laid down with equal precision. It was impossible for the most cursory observer to compare these authorities with the doctrines which had been laid down by the judge advocate, without perceiving that they were in decided opposition to each other. He did not deny that the judge advocate had quoted the words of the author to whom he referred; but he had misapplied his words. They are susceptible of a plain and easy explanation. Mr. Tytler is speaking of military courts martial in England, but has no reference to those of the navy. The distinction between the military and naval system is an anomaly in English law. Naval legislation has been, session after session, the subject of parliamentary discussion, and the code by which that branch of the military department is governed, is now fixed upon estab lished principles. McArthur says this digested law makes it necessary that offences should be enumerated. The military law, on the contrary, does not proceed from parliament: but instructions which have, to a certain extent, the effect of articles of war, are authorized to be, and frequently are, issued by the crown, and by these courts martial are bound. It is agreed on all hands that the latitude given to military, far exceeds that given to naval courts martial. Jo vol. 1, of McArthur, p. 20, the origin of the naval articles of war is given, as well as a succinct history of the mutiny act, and also the military articles of war. In the same passage, the author proceeds to show that the naval code is established by act of parliament; but in military law, the crown is the great source. As to capital offences, they are provided for by the mutiny act. The crown also, may, by printed regulations, prescribe additional punishments, not extending to life and limb, (see page 43.) Both the English codes, indeed, differed from ours, in making punishment, for immoralities and ungentlemanly conduct, discre tionary with courts martial. Again, Tyler, in his 2d chapter, on the authority of courts martial, states that the act of parliament authorizes the crown to lay down regulations, not extending to life and limb. Here Mr. Tytler has explained his own meaning, when he declares that other offences are punishable by courts martial, than those which are laid down by the articles of war. This is confined to military courts martial; for McArthur denies the inference, as regards the navy. He read from Tytler the language which had been quoted by the judge advocate in his argument to show that it was only to be considered as a corollary of what he had before stated. He next briefly viewed the statement of Tytler as to the legislative powers said to be vested in courts martial. Was this a power which enabled them to define crimes as coming within the cognizance of military law? He considered the language of Tytler as, perhaps, incorrect in this particular In the argument which the counsel for the accused had made in a former stage, the distinction between legislative and judicial character was stated. There are in our military law several general enactments; such as "conduct unbecoming an officer," in our military articles of war, and fraud and other scandalous conduct, in our naval articles. The facts which constitute these offences are not defined; but the discretion, by which courts martial were to be bound, on finding guilty on these charges, was equivalent and in unison with the power vested in civil courts. It appears that courts martial have a greater range of discretion than courts of common law. They are, in the highest sense, courts of honor; but there is a limit to their discretion. The gravity of the offence is defined by the law under which they act. By the law in England, they must find an officer guilty of conduct scandalous and unbecoming the character of an officer and a gentleman-so, in our law, they must find guilty of conduct unbecoming the character of an officer. This brought him to consider another of the navy articles of war, (the 32), to which a wide construction has been given. This article states that all crimes which had not been specified in the preceding articles, may be tried and punished according to the laws and customs, in such cases, at sea. This has been relied on, as an authority of suf ficient weight to justify the looseness of the specifications. This article has been borrowed, with only a small change, from the corresponding article in the naval code of Great Britain, which will be found in the appendix of the 1st vol. article 36, naval articles of war. The only difference is, the British article says "in such cases used at sea;" while, in ours, it rues, “such cases at sea.” Is a disrespect The first circumstance which struck me, on hear- nishable, under the articles of war. ing this quotation, was the utter absence, as he un-to the secretary of the navy a crime under this act? derstood, of any sustaining authority among all the The act of congress, on this subject, had been framwriters on martial law. There have been five wri-ed with more than ordinary care and caution, and all ters referred to in the course of the proceedings, and those persons are excluded from its provisions, tonot one of these refers to this article as operating to wards whom a disrespect cannot be regarded as a extend the power of courts martial. There is none military offence? He contended that neither the sethat even mention it-not one alludes to it as giving cretary of war nor the secretary of the navy, could Neither in En-be considered a commanding officer. The term, in any extension to the power of courts. gland, nor in this country, has any charge ever been the articles of war, applies only to such military comprefered under this article; it appears to have been manders as are in the service, and through whom the merely regarded as having reference to those minuter orders of the departments are conveyed. The seoffences which are likely to occur at sea, and do not cretaries can only be regarded as civil officers, as come under the notice of a court martial. How then members of the president's councils. The president does this article extend the powers of courts martial to himself is, by his official station, a military, as well as the legislative limit which has been contended for? a civil officer, and, of course, the military superior He here quoted the language of the article. Although of every officer in the service. Yet, he was of opinion the article does not describe the terms and forms, it that this provision would not have extended to him, evidently refers to something which does describe had he not been expressly named; but only to such Here officers as were engaged in actual and active comboth, and that is the laws and customs at sea. then we have something which harmonizes with the mand. If, then, this disrespect is not cognizable by common or statute law of civil life. There appears the articles of war, it would have been strange if to have been a sort of statute law for the navy, hand- congress had wrapped round the secretary of the ed down from age to age. A rule exists which, once navy, a more sacred and inviolable protection. Disascertained, fixes the crime as absolutely as though respectful conduct and letters are terms wholly unit was specified in a distinct article. The judge ad-known to the articles of war. The only words there vocate has referred to the crime of murder as not are "mutinous" and "contempt." He need not show being specified by any particular statute, and as not the difference between these expressions; contempt requiring any other enactment than that which de- is the middle expression between mutiny and disre fines the punishment. The argument of the counsel spect, which may be regarded as the two extremes. for the accused must have been strangely misunder- It is a qualified disobedience. It would take up too stood, if it was supposed that he intended to main-much time of the court to illustrate this by the many tain the opposite of his position. There was an un- instances which were within reach, and he would written law which, on this point, was sufficiently de- therefore refrain. But to whom is this contempt to be offered? It finite. But all that could be said in reference to this 32d article is, that, instead of defining and enumerat- must be contempt to a superior officer. In all the ing the crimes to be tried and punished, it refers to naval articles of war, this contempt is only cognizasomething by which they are described, as definitely ble when it is offered to an officer in the execution of as is required by the common law. It would there-his duties, between whom, and the persons guilty of fore be incumbent on the prosecution to show, not only that the crime which is charged exists, but that it is one which is punishable at sea. He must show, by oral or written testimony, what are the uses at He must bring forward naval commanders of experience to testify to the laws and customs to which they apply. 30a. it, there is an immediate connexion. The secretary of the navy, although at the head of the department. communicates all military orders, in the character of a counsellor and organ of the president, and does not, therefore, stand in that immediate relation with the members of the service. determined what a specification shall embrace, and to what it may extend, it is as clear as any principle or practice of common law. It must specify the precise time and place, and circumstances, so as to show under which of the articles of war the offence is cog In addition to the positive and conclusive evidence On this subject, the accused would make this broad concession. If a charge is made under the 3d arti- which shows that offences must be prescribed as ele of war, it matters not what the specific offence is coming within some specific law, there are other it is left to be defined by the court; the only thing points in the argument of the learned judge advocate, requisite is, that it be brought up to the standard of on which he desired to make some observations. the article; that it must be scandalous or fraudulent The judge advocate remarks on the right of the acnesses. It has been the uniform practice of courts conduct, "unbecoming the character of an officer."cused to receive a list of the charges and the witThis brought him to consider, and he would do it in a collective form, in order to save the time of the court martial to furnish such a list. But the furnishing --those parts of the charge which impute direspect does not depend on this custom, but on a positive to somebody. "Letters of a disrespectful character." law, by which it is enacted, in terms, that the charges Some of these letters are addressed to the president and specifications shall be served on the prisoner, of the United States, and some to the secretary of the at a reasonable time. As writers of authority have navy, but nothing is said as to whom the disrespect is offered. Nor, in default of this specification, is there any circumstance which can lead to a discovery as to whom this disrespect is offered. He had before stated the distinction between the naval and military articles on the subject of disrespect; and he would This part of the argument of the judge advocate now take the ground, that, before the court can try and punish this alleged offence, it must be shown to was somewhat curious. Tytler and others have been On the quoted to prove that, in England, this is not essential, be one coming under the articles of war. subject of disrespect or contempt to a superior offi- but, on the contrary, that objections sometimes lie cer, he would remark, that this is an offence of many against the details being made too specific. If the shades. It has been shown by the articles, that not reasoning which had been already urged by the aconly mutinous, but disrespectful words, are punisha- cused, had been urged with success, it would be scen ble; but it must be shown to whom they are applied. that the articles of war are specific on this head. The The law of congress has specified the persons-the charges must be specified minutely; they must be president of the United States, congress, the chief furnished to the prisoner, and are to be regarded as magistrates and legislatures of states, and command-unalterable. We are told that this is a rule intending officers towards whom disrespect is made pu-ed for the benclit of the accused, and if he consent to nizable. waive it, no subsequent objection can be taken on the ground of its violation. He would only make this simple remark on this point. Is it reasonable that, if the court has been found to have gone on in a course of error, that the accused should be gravely asked to waive the benefit of the law, by giving up a point which that law has introduced for his benefit? The right of the prisoner to be served with the charges, is an important circumstance; as it shows him the particulars of the offence alleged, and, at the same time, enables him to refer to the article of war under which it is made punishable, The terms which describe the offence are supposed to be a sufficient guide in this respect. It is also an important right that he should be supplied with a list of the witnesses against him, because it puts it in his power to produce counteracting evidence, or, if he shall find it necessary, to assail the credit of those witnesses who may be brought against him. There are three authorities who sustain the view which the accused has taken. The judge advocate, however, had brought forward, in support of his argument, the authority of sir Charles Morgan, the judge advocate of England, who doubts the application of this law, but only on the single authority of Tytler. The objection of sir Charles Morgan, however, may rather be taken as an exception to the general rule, rather than a denial of it. He does not deny the general rule, which has been so ably laid down by Adye, Tytler and Mc Arthur, but only throws a doubt on the universality of its application. The accused proceeded, in the next place, to take a view of that part of the argument of the judge advocate, which laid down an analogy between the proceedings before courts martial and those at comimon law, on the subject of demurrer and taking issue on the indictment. The plea which the accused had put in of "not guilty," the judge advocate had contended, prevented him from objecting against a supposed informality in the proceedings; the former being, in fact, the taking issue on the indictment, and the latter availing himself of a demurrer against the facts charged; both of which the accused could not do, although he might take his choice of either. The demurrer admitted the facts, but objected to the form; the plea of "not guilty" denied the facts. The accused now entered into a minute and technical legal argument, to controvert the position which the judge advocate had taken. When the plea was originally put in, it was put in with a protest, reserving all exceptions to the form. It was understood by the court that the plea of a general issue could not be taken as a waiver of such exception. But it has been objected, that this exception could not be taken up but as a demurrer-a demurrer which admits the truth, and must lead to a verdict of guilty. It was utterly impossible, under these circumstances, to take advantage of a demurrer, and, therefore, the objections were withdrawn. The accused protested against this course of exception, as taking the matter from the broad basis of right and wrong, on which it ought to rest, and placing it on a mere form of special pleading. One of the most extraordinary conclusions which had been made by the judge advocate was that, because it is not in the power of the accused to make a motion exactly similar to that in common law, to quash the indictment, his exception must be taken as a demurrer. If you demur, you admit the fact; and, if the demurrer is overruled, you are found guilty. analogy could exist between the proceedings before them and a court of civil law. The only mode which was left to the accused was to except against the charge itself. The legal consequence of a demurrer is confined to a court of common law. No other court, in its practice, admits this consequence. In the court of chancery it is, in fact, completely dispensed with; when the demurrer is overruled, you go on to answer to the facts. Instead of being called demurrer, in the old Roman law, it is called exception; and varies, in its consequence, from a demurrer; and this kind of exception is neither peremptory or declamatory. In Scotland, before the issue is pleaded to, the accused pleads to the libel, which is similar to a demurrer, precisely as was the ease in the old Roman law. It is, therefore, a clear right of a prisoner, before a court martial, to take exceptions-and the time most proper for the exercise of this right, is that when, in common law, you would plead a demurrer. It might, perhaps, be contended that, in common law, if a prisoner pleads to the general issue, he cannot plead to an exception. In some form or other, the court will see that there is some offence charged which is defined by law, and will punish it according to law; and that it is not merely a transgression of some of the minor decorums which are usually practised in society. He would now proceed to examine whether, in the absence of any criminal charge in the specifications, any charge had been made out which was sus tainable. The 2nd charge had already been commented on, at some length, when the objections against it were formerly urged by his counsel. This charge is, in terms "insubordinate conduct, and conduct unbecoming an officer." The first question which asked for some consideration, was the precise meaning of this charge, and, after much deliberation and inquiry, it was apprehended that it amounted to nothing more than a reiteration of the first charge, which is "disobedience of orders" It had no other meaning. In his argument on this subject, the counsel for the accused had been charged with going into a nice and captious verbal criticism. However he might be disposed to yield to the justice of such a remark, had the criticism related to a matter of only common and unimportant parlance, he could not agree that it was just when applied to a case in which so many consequences were involved as in the present charge. It had been said, that this effort of philological ingenuity was intended to show that every word ought to be used in its radical or primitive sense. It had not been intended, however, to show that wherever a word had received, by the usages of society, a different meaning from its primitive sense, that such meaning was necessarily incorrect. He had not forgotten the remark of a witty logician, which allowed even the coining of new words to render the construction of a sentence more perfect. The accused would never quarrel, in common utterance, with the use of the word "insubordinate." Subordinate and insubordinate have been used in a sense referring to a regular gradation of rank; but it is a question, whether it has ever been used to signify any lapse of virtue, or to constitute a charge of crimes. The counsel for the accused had been misunderstood if he was supposed to have objected to the mere word as one of common use; but he contended, justly, that it was a term inadmissible in a criminal charge. The learned judge advocate had exercised much in [The technical argument into which the accused then went on the subject of demurrer, arrest of judg-dustry and ingenuity in finding authorities for the use ment, &c. we understood too imperfectly to attempt to give an abstract of it to our readers.] The law has, in the constitution of a court martial, reated in the same persons, the offices of judge and juror, These must be separated before a strict of the words "insubordinate" and "subordinate." It was admitted that "insubordination" had acquired a more extended meaning that its correlative adjective, "insubordinate." But still it admits of this meaning -"disobedience of orders." Judge Marshall, in the application of the word "insubordinate," refers not to individual conduct, but to military or collective bodies. Insubordination is disorganizing, and has a tendency to anarchy; and in this sense it is used by the learned judge, whose authority is unexceptionable. But, after all, the learned judge advocate had come to exactly the same conclusion with himself, that insubordination was a breach of subordination. The word "insubordinate," however, is not to be found in any of the departments of literature, and could not, therefore, be received into a criminal charge. One remarkable circumstance is that, after all this effort to show that the word is correct, its application, in the charge under consideration, is no where laid down. What crime is embraced in the word "insubordinate?" It can only mean that tendency to anarchy and disorganization, in which sense it has been used by judge Marshall; but, in any other sense, it is to be regarded as altogether inadmissible. The first specification, under this charge, refers then to no disobedience of orders; it merely relates to the writing and transmitting of letters of a disrespectful character. The meaning of this, it is not easy to comprehend. To whom these letters were disrespectful, is not known. What the letters are, is not specified; and, it is replied, when an objection is made to this want of precision, that the only way to have made the specification more distinct, would have been to set out the various letters. It might have been done so. Such is the course adopted in all trials for libel. But with respect to the fact of their coming under the operation of the law. What are the letters stated in the specification? 1st. A letter to the president of the United States, dated April 27, 1825. 24. A letter to the secretary of the navy, dated March 16, 1825. sure had been cast upon him, and was desirous to take off the edge of the unkindness. There could be no doubt that the language in which his recall had been made, carried on it prima facia evidence of s disposition to condemn his conduct. He had stated that the conduct of the government towards him was irreconcileable with its conduct towards gen. Jackson. He would now advert to another instance of the in consistency of this conduct. The secretary of the navy had written a letter signifying that, in consequence of complaints which had been made of the manner in which captain Cassin had insulted the subjects of Spain, by plundering their vessels, &c. that officer would have to return to the United States to explain his conduct, unless he could meet the charge with a direct denial. The accused communicated the letter to captain Cassin, who sent home his explanation, which being deemed satisfactory to the 'department, he heard no more of it to this day. The accused asked the court to compare this letter with the one by which he, (the accused), was recalled; and it would be seen that something had occurred which had made the secretary less careful of wounding his feelings than he was in the case of captain Cassin. He believed that, had the opportunity offered, and he had transmitted, at the moment, the same explanations, which he had now made to the court, it would have been considered as satisfactory as the explana tion of captan Cassin was deemed. But the speci fications do not relate to the merits of the case between the secretary of the navy and the accused; but merely to the terms in which the letter was expressed, and on that point he submitted to the decision of the court. Let his letters be subjected to examination, and it would be found there was no indecorous expression -nothing which digressed into impropriety; taking The first of these, the letter to the president, com- it for granted that he had cause for complaint. He plains indeed of hard usage; but the complaint is ex- did not deny that they might have been written with pressed in decorous terms. He could not have select- more regard to politeness, or in a more polished style, ed terms more accordant with decorum. And was but he resisted the imputation that there was any this an act to be condemned by a court martial?-thing which could be deemed rude or offensive. As Does it amount to any wrong or injury done to a su- to the letter, of April 17th, to the president, there perior officer? The right is expressly given, by the was nothing in it which could be deemed improper. articles of war, to make complaint to the command- Is the navy reduced to so low a condition, that its ing officer. The question cannot, therefore, be, whe- members must not dare to whisper complaints, exther the complaint was wrong, but whether the phra- cept in a smiling tone? It was unnecessary for him scology was such as it ought to have been, or such as to enter into an examination of the various contents should have subjected him to a court martial? As he of this letter. It complained of the terms of his re could not understand that the cause of his complaint call, of the delay which had taken place in the inwas matter for the investigation of a court martial— vestigation-all fair and just subjects of complaint. or whether the writer of the complaint or the presi- These were all evils which were felt by him, as galldent, was in the wrong, it was impossible for him tu ing. He had a right to complain, and when that decide, a priori, what was the precise nature of the right was denied him, he should no longer desire to charge. So far from having a disposition to offer in- retain the commission he held. sult to any member of the government, it was with a reluctance and diffidence, and hesitation, the most extreme, that he made his complaint at all; and only in consequence of his long and painful suffering was it finally made. Mr. Monroe's letter had been produced, to show that whatever had been done in his case, was under the direction of the president. But the secretary of the navy was the organ, the channel through which he received his orders. The rules of the service do The accused called the attention of the court to his not, except in particular cases, permit a direct comletter to the president of January 1st. What does it munication between the officers and the president. contain? A complaint of the contumelious manner But there was nothing in his letter which could be in which he had been recalled for having committed taken as an attack on the secretary of the navy; nosome alleged offence at Foxardo. From his corres- thing which ought to affect his official feelings, or be pondence with the secretary of the navy, it would deemed injurious to him as a private gentleman. appear that the secretary thought there was something What were these letters to prove? That he was the unequal, unjust and harsh in the conduct which had author of these orders? is it to be inferred that been pursued towards him. Complaints had been made every mouth is to be shut; that the accused must not against general Jackson, in congress; but, on that oc- apply to the president himself, nor, if there was any casion, the executive authorities steppe between higher authority, to that authority? He should have him and his assailants, and defended him. In one of complained to the president, not to the secretary of the letters which the accused had received from the the navy. It seems, then, that a complaint might secretary, that oficer seems to be desirous of explain-have been made to the secretary of the navy, but not ing the reasons for sending out a successor to the ac- to the president; yet, all acts and orders emanate cused. He had no doubt that the secretary had pen- from the president. ned that letter under a conviction that unkind cen- With respect to the letter of the secretary of the navy, of June 14th, referring to the anonymous note, others, the author states his inability to obtain The published in the National Journal, it would be seen,principal inquiry ought to be, what motive could by the evidence of Mr. Force, that he had some causeduce the author to give an inaccurate statement? Le to suspect that the secretary of the navy was, in supposed that the inaccuracies originated in any some way, connected with the publication of that bad motive, and that it is the duty of the court, under note. But unless there had been something deroga- that impression, to take cognizance of any trifling.ertory to the character in the note itself, how could it be ror-typographical or otherwise. Is it necessary for disrespectful to him to consider him as the author? the accused to defend himself against that which is not He had himself received a letter from the secretary of the navy, of the same date with the note, expressed in terms equivalent to those in the note, and almost identical in its language, and this naturally led to the suspicion he had formed as to the authorship of the note. And he saw nothing indecorous in the secretary making a communication to a public journal, to correct a suppossed mis-statement. If it had not came from him, circumstances justified the accused in attributing it to some source which was in his confidence, the date and terms of both communications being the same. It had not been asserted that the secretary of the navy was not privy to the note, and it had been admitted to have emanated from one in his confidence. The accused would now proceed to take a more cursory view of the other specifications, relying more upon the documents which were before the court, than on any remarks which he should be able to make. charged-a wicked desire to mutilate? He could easily show what pains he took to be correct; his ef forts to procure the journals, and to guard against mistakes of every kind. In another view of the case, what possible motive could there be for mis-stating facts? Look at all the errors, from the beginning to the end, and it will be seen that nothing occurs to change the sense, although there are many singular discrepancies. And are these to be chargeable to the accused, or the clerks he employed to make the copies? Yet, it is alleged that they thus originated. The judge advocate had examined Mr. Harrison, who copied the record of the court from the original minutes. A number of erasures and interlineations were pointed out to him: the erasures were made with ink, and the words erased might, with some little difficulty, be made out; and it is singular that, in some instances, these erased words were so different from the words interlined in their stead, that it was impossible to believe that one was substitated for the other, by the mere mistake of the copyist. In one instance it is remarkable that the pamphlet of the accused agrees with the record as it stood, previous to the erasure. The evidence on this point was strong in favor of the accused. What follows? Is it not probable that after the copy was taken for the accused, the erasures were made? He begged to disclaim any illiberal imputation. It was the duty of the judge advocate to make his copy as perfect as possible, before he sent it to the department. What renders this supposition more probable is that the copy of the last day's proceedings was corrected in the hand-writing of the judge advocate himself. The second specification charges him with having published, without authority, the proceedings of the court of inquiry. So much had been said on this subject in the former argument of his counsel, that the accused would not take up much of the time of the court on this point. It may well be asked, under what fixed rule or article, the publications of the proceedings of the court could be charged as a crime? The court, while in session, had certain powers, and might, as the present court martial had done, have issued an order prohibiting the taking notes for publication, and could have punished any contempt of that order. It was considered disrespectful to lay before the public the proceedings of the court of in- He considered himself, therefore, warranted in quiry, until the facts had been before the executive. the conclusion that these discrepancies were not But it would be hard, indeed, after so many prece-chargeable to him or to his clerk; but that they were dents for this act, which the courts of law exhibited, owing to changes in the phraseology which the judg that this should be made the subject of a criminal ment of the judge advocate had, on revisal, induced charge. It had been said, that, although the court him to make. There was another circumstance which had been dissolved, the president had the proceed- he would state in corroboration. One of the inaccuings before him for deliberation. He was at a loss racies pointed out in the printed pamphlet, is the to know what evil could result from a publication, omission of a note, which is appended in the margin during the deliberations of the executive. His de- of the record. How does that affect the proceedings? liberations are not open. Almost the only means he In the body of the record, the judge advocate can has of obtaining any information from out of doors, only insert the regular proceedings of the court; is through the public prints; and the mischiefs which every thing of a digressive character must be added were to be apprehended from closing them would be as a marginal reference. The omission of this note, more serious than any which were to be feared from therefore, did not injure the correctness of the retheir full liberty. port of the proceedings. The document, with the The next specification is, that the accused publish- omission of which he was charged, was a letter for ed an incorrect statement of the proceedings. In which he applied, without success, to the judge adreference to this specification he urged that it was vocate. That gentleman had, indeed, explained the fully as probable that the incorrectness might exist reasons which had induced his refusal, but they did in the copy made of his minutes for the judge advo- not appear to the accused to be conclusive. He was cate, as in the publication of the accused, which had not disposed to attach censure hostilely, but he must also been copied from the original minutes of the complain, that, with all these pregnant circumstances, judge advocate, and compared with the utmost care, showing the nature of these mistakes, and the inno in order to prevent the possibility of error. When cence of the accused of any evil motive, the secretathese errors came to be examined they were foundry of the navy and the law officer of the court, should to be of the most trivial character: misspelt words, have thought the errors worthy to be made the suba false concord, a phrase italicised. The fact is,ject of a grave charge before a court martial. He however, that the motives of this publication have been greatly misunderstood. It does not purport to be a full and correct report. It is simply an exposition of the facts which occurred at Foxardo, and the consequences which resulted from that affair, together with the proceedings of the court of inquiry. These proceedings are not exactly set out as they oc curred: some of them are stated to be mere abstracts; would not go more into detail, with respect to this point. The court had the documents before it, and would be directed by them in its decision. The 4th specification brings up again disrespectful words, in the form of insinuations: thus insinuations and incorrect statements are referred to, without a single specification to show in what they consist. With regard to the secretary of the navy, he had complained |