Crouse vs. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co. cannot be found in the record, except after considerable search and delay. The business of the court is so urgent and pressing as to require all possible aids in the consideration of cases. So imperative are such demands, that a strict adherence to the rules is of the utmost importance. We cannot relax from their rigor without destroying their purpose. It is the certainty of their enforcement that makes attorneys careful. In this case counsel made very little effort to abstract the record. Page after page is taken up with figures as to the height of water above the dam at Janesville. Several exhibits are printed at length that could have been abstracted or condensed into one twentieth of the space actually covered. Testimony of several witnesses is printed in full, the greater part of which could have been omitted. as having no bearing on the real points involved. It frequently happens in the trial of cases at the circuit that a vast amount of rubbish and immaterial matter gets in, that has no bearing upon the questions involved on an appeal. Hence, as the rule says, the printed case should contain an abstract or abridgment of so much of the record as may be necessary to a full understanding of the questions presented for decision, and no more. A more lively appreciation of this rule would reduce the volume of printed matter submitted for our consideration, and somewhat lighten our labors. The objections to the brief really rest upon the infirmities in the printed case. Neither case nor brief having been prepared in conformity to the rules named, the clerk very properly disallowed the items sought to be taxed therefor. By the Court.-The motion to retax the costs is denied, with $10 costs, and the taxation by the clerk is affirmed. Harden vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. HARDEN, Appellant, vs. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY, Respondent. January 10-February 21, 1899. Railroads: Injury to passenger on freight train: Negligence: Contribu tory negligence: Court and jury. 1. The plaintiff, a passenger on a freight train, while standing in the caboose, was thrown against the door by a sudden shock of the cars coming together in making a coupling, and was injured. There was evidence tending to show that the parts of the train were brought together with unusual violence, such as could be accounted for only by negligence in the train hands or defective apparatus. Held that, although defendant's witnesses fully contradicted any unusual violence, the question of defendant's negligence was one for the jury. 2. The question of plaintiff's contributory negligence should also have been submitted to the jury, in view of the evidence in respect to his position and his knowledge that a coupling was soon to be made. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Rock county: JOHN R. BENNETT, Circuit Judge. Reversed. Plaintiff lawfully took passage on a freight train accustomed to carry passengers, which, stopping at Elkhorn to do switching, left the caboose, with three or four cars attached, standing on the track. Plaintiff, after half an hour's wait, left his seat in the caboose, and went out on the front platform, looked at the other part of the train, consisting of the engine and seven or eight cars, moving about, realized that they were likely before long to back down and couple onto the rear portion of the train, but saw nothing indicating how soon. He returned into the car, stepped into the closet, and on coming out stopped in the aisle, with his back toward the front door, hands in pockets, and spoke with another passenger for a moment. While so standing, the engine and front part of the train backed down to make coupling, and struck the rear part of the Harden vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. train with unusual severity, according to the testimony of plaintiff and one other witness, but, according to the testimony of others, with no more than usual. Plaintiff was accustomed to ride on freight trains, and had the knowledge common to that experience of the probability of a jar or shock in making couplings. The shock threw him over backward so that he struck the front door and received injuries to his back. At the close of the testimony on both sides the circuit court granted a nonsuit for want of evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant, also intimating that the plaintiff was shown by uncontradicted evidence to be guilty of contributory negligence. From judgment thereon this appeal is taken. For the appellant there was a brief by J. J. Cunningham, attorney, and M. G. Jeffris, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Jeffris. For the respondent there was a brief by Jackson & Jackson, attorneys, and H. H. Field, of counsel, and oral argument by Mr. Field. DODGE, J. 1. We find it impossible to agree with the court below in the conclusion that there was no evidence to go to the jury on the question of defendant's negligence. The testimony both of the plaintiff and of the witness Slocum tended to show that the forward portion of the train was driven against the rear part with such violence as could be accounted for only by negligence in the train hands, or defective apparatus. The testimony of both witnesses is that the shock of the collision was more violent than any either had known in the coupling of freight trains, of which both had had much prior experience. Slocum placed the rate of speed of the backing train at four or five miles per hour, of which, however, he obviously could judge only by the violence of the collision. Plaintiff testified that the caboose was driven backward some thirty feet. True, defendant's witnesses very Ward vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. fully contradict any unusual violence; but for the purpose of nonsuit the evidence for defendant, at least such as merely raises a conflict with that for the plaintiff, is not to be considered. Lewis v. Prien, 98 Wis. 87; O'Brien v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 92 Wis. 340; Kruse v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 82 Wis. 568. 2. The question of plaintiff's contributory negligence also, we think, should have been left to the jury. His knowledge, actual or imputed, of the likelihood of an immediate coupling, is by no means clear, though, of course, he must have known that such event would occur before very long. There is evidence tending to show that his stoppage in the aisle for conversation was but momentary. Again, the question is present whether his position was such as to render likely an injury if the coupling were made with ordinary care, or was perilous only in the event, not to be anticipated, of a negligently violent one. The nonsuit was improper. By the Court.-Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial. WARD, Respondent, vs. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant. January 11 - February 21, 1899. Railroads: Injury to passenger standing on platform: Contributory negligence: Assumption of risk: Instructions to jury: Proximate cause: General and special verdict. 1. A railway passenger is not, as matter of law, guilty of negligence in standing on the platform of a car, even while it is in motion, if there is no room inside. If on boarding a car he finds it so crowded that he cannot get inside without the use of main force, and concludes to ride upon the platform, the question whether he is guilty of contributory negligence, or has assumed the extraordinary risks of that position, is one for the jury under proper instructions. Ward vs. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. Co. 2. A passenger on an excursion train is entitled to just as much care for his safety as one upon a regular train. In riding upon a crowded train he assumes the inconveniences resulting from its crowded condition, but not any increased risk. 3. In an action for injuries received by a passenger while standing on the platform of a railway car, a question in the special verdict being as to whether the negligence of defendant's employees in coupling the car was the proximate cause of the injuries, it was error to refuse an instruction, asked by defendant, that the jury must answer such question “No” unless they were satisfied to a reasonable certainty, from the greater weight of evidence, that it should be answered "Yes," the substance of such instruction not being given in the general charge. 4. An instruction to the effect that the expressions "proximate cause and "direct cause" are equivalent and mean the immediate or inducing cause, was erroneous. 5. Where the questions submitted to the jury for a special verdict cover all the material, controverted issues of fact, the ruling of the court in refusing to submit more specific questions will not be reversed save for an abuse of discretion. 6. The object of a special verdict is to obtain from the jury answers to certain questions of fact, without regard to their legal effect upon the rights of the parties, and thus to obtain a result as far as possible free from sympathy and prejudice. The requiring of a general verdict also, and giving full instructions applicable to a general verdict, tends to defeat such object, and, if objections are duly made, is a material error. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Rock county: JOHN R. BENNETT, Circuit Judge. Reversed. This was an action to recover for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff while riding upon a passenger train of the defendant. The evidence showed that on the 10th day of June, 1896, the plaintiff, who lived at Orfordville, Rock county, in this state, bought a ticket entitling him to passage over the defendant's railway to Janesville, and return. The ticket was sold at excursion rates because upon that day there was a picnic of the association known as the Modern Woodmen at Janesville, and the defendant company advertised excursion rates therefor. Upon the day in |