Halbach vs. Trester and others. du Lac H. Co. v. Haskins, 51 Wis. 135; Gaynor v. Blewett, 86 Wis. 399; Plankinton v. Hildebrand, 89 Wis. 209; Witter v. Neeves, 78 Wis. 547; Cottrell v. New London F. Co. 94 Wis. 176; Morgan v. South Milwaukee L. V. Co. 97 Wis. 275; Richards v. Land & River I. Co. 99 Wis. 625. For the respondent there was a brief by Benfey & Benfey, and oral argument by Theodore Benfey. To the point that the parol evidence tending to alter the contract of indorsement was inadmissible, they cited Jones, Ev. §§ 437, 438, 508, 509; Martin v. Cole, 104 U. S. 30; Cake v. Pottsville Bank, 116 Pa. St. 264; S. C. 2 Am. St. Rep. 600; Youngberg v. Nelson, 51 Minn. 172; Charles v. Denis, 42 Wis. 56; Dale v. Gear, 38 Conn. 15; S. C. 9 Am. Rep. 353. BARDEEN, J. 1. Plaintiff was a purchaser of the note and mortgage in suit before the same became due. At the time he took the note, it had upon the back thereof an indorsement, "Pay to the order of Christine Webster," signed by the defendants. When it was transferred to plaintiff, Mrs. Webster indorsed it blank. Their engagement, in law, was that they would pay this note at maturity, if the maker failed to pay it on demand and they received due notice thereof. Charles v. Denis, 42 Wis. 56. It is the same as though the contract had been written in full on the back of the note and they had signed it. The engagement which the law implies is just as sacred and inviolable as though it had been written out in full. This being so, the elementary principle that parol evidence is not admissible to vary or control its legal effect applies. This was so decided in the case before cited, and is sustained by the best judicial thought of the country. There being no claim of fraud in securing the indorsement, the trial court properly rejected the testimony by which it was sought to establish the fact that defendants did not intend to bind themselves as indorsers. The plaintiff, being a bona fide purchaser for value before Halbach vs. Trester and others. due, was entitled to his note in its full integrity, and in law is presumed to have relied upon all the security he received. It was therefore incompetent for defendants to show that plaintiff did not rely upon defendants' indorsement. 2. As before suggested, when the defendants indorsed the note they became holden to pay the debt secured by the mortgage, upon the conditions stated. It is in proof that due demand was made and notice of the makers' default duly given. Sec. 3156, Stats. 1898, provides that "in all such actions the plaintiff may in his complaint unite with his claim for a foreclosure and sale a demand for judgment for any deficiency which may remain due to the plaintiff after sale of the mortgaged premises against every party who may be personally liable for the debt secured by the mortgage, whether the mortgagor or other persons, if upon the same contract which the mortgage is given to secure, and judgment of foreclosure and sale, and also for any such deficiency remaining after applying the proceeds of sale to the amount adjudged to be due for principal, interest and costs, may in such cases be rendered." In construing this statute, this court said in Palmeter v. Carey, 63 Wis. 426: "The statute does not require that the person held liable in the foreclosure action for a deficiency must be an original contractor of the mortgage debt. Doubtless one may become a party to it after the indebtedness has been incurred by the mortgagor, as if he indorse or guaranty a note secured by mortgage after the execution of the mortgage. We think, in such case, it cannot be successfully maintained that such indorser or guarantor is not within the statute." It was accordingly held that a purchaser of the mortgaged premises from the mortgagor, who, as a part of the purchase price, assumed to pay the mortgage debt, could be held under a judgment for a deficiency. In Fond du Lac H. Co. v. Haskins, 51 Wis. 135, the guarantors of a mortgage debt were held liable on a personal judgment for any deficiency after sale of the Halbach vs. Trester and others. mortgaged property. The case of Cottrell v. New London F. Co. 94 Wis. 176, has no application to the facts here presented. In that case the contesting defendants were guarantors of the collection of the debt secured by the mortgage. Their contract was that they would pay the debt in case it could not, by due diligence, be collected from the mortgagor or made out of the security. Such is not the obligation of the defendants in this action, as before shown. Their engagement was absolute, and subject only to the condition that payment should be demanded and due notice of nonpayment given them. Plaintiff might have maintained an action at law against these defendants upon their indorsement. As stated by LYON, J., in the Palmeter Case: "The statute is purely remedial in its character. Its purpose is to avoid circuity of action, by settling in the foreclosure suit all the rights of all the parties thereto; thus avoiding the necessity of another suit to enforce a contingent liability of one of such parties. Ordinarily a court of equity will do this without the aid of a statute, but in this particular case a statutory provision in aid of the general power of the court seems to have been thought necessary, or at least desirable. Such being the character of the statute, it must receive a liberal construction to advance the purposes for which it was enacted." Under a somewhat similar statute in Michigan it was decided that the indorsers of a mortgage note which had been duly protested for nonpayment could be joined as defendants in a suit to foreclose the mortgage, and that a judgment for a deficiency against them was proper. Michigan State Bank v. Trowbridge, 92 Mich. 217. Our conclusion is that the ruling of the trial court on both propositions was correct. By the Court. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed. Philip Meyer Co. vs. Sheboygan Chair Co. PHILIP MEYER COMPANY, Appellant, vs. SHEBOYGAN CHAIR COMPANY, Respondent. March 14-April 4, 1899. Appeal: Findings of fact. Findings of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless against the clear preponderance of the evidence. APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Sheboygan county: N. S. GILSON, Circuit Judge. Affirmed. Action to recover for castings alleged to have been made especially for defendant. The defendant had judgment, from which the plaintiff appealed. For the appellant there was a brief by Benfey & Benfey, and oral argument by Theodore Benfey. Francis Williams, for the respondent. Suffice it to say DODGE, J. No advantage can be gained from a discussion in the opinion of the facts in this case. that, after a careful examination, we do not find any clear preponderance of evidence against the finding of the court that "the plaintiff did not manufacture for the defendant, in accordance with its order and agreement, the articles sued for, and did not deliver the same to said defendant in accordance with any agreement to purchase the same by said defendant," whether that finding is intended to repudiate the making of an agreement in fact by defendant's foreman, or his authority on their behalf. That finding sustains the judgment. By the Court.-Judgment affirmed. The Rider-Wallis Co. and others vs. Fogo and another. THE RIDER-WALLIS COMPANY and others, Respondents, vs. FOGO and another, Appellants. March 14-April 4, 1899. Insolvency: Receivers: Constitutional law: Trial by jury: Judicial power: Judge at chambers: Evidence. 1. Sec. 16946, Stats. 1898, authorizing the appointment of a receiver for the nonexempt property of an insolvent debtor without a determination by a jury of the existence of the requisite facts, is not in violation of sec. 5, art. I, Const., providing that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate," etc., since that language relates only to the right as it existed when the constitution was adopted. 2. Even if sec. 1694b, Stats. 1898, is invalid, under sec. 2, art. VII, Const., so far as it attempts to empower a circuit judge at chambers to appoint a receiver of the property of an insolvent debtor, yet it is valid so far as it vests such power in the court. 3. Under sec. 16946, Stats. 1898 (providing that upon petition by creditors of an insolvent debtor for the appointment of a receiver, the court shall proceed summarily "to hear the parties and receive such evidence as may be proper, and if it shall appear to the court" that the debtor is insolvent, etc., the court shall appoint a receiver), it is error to appoint a receiver without evidence, even though the debtor does not answer or appear in the proceeding. APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Richland County: GEO. CLEMENTSON, Circuit Judge. Reversed. For the appellants the cause was submitted on the brief of F. W. Burnham and Fruit & Gordon. For the respondents there was a brief by H. M. Lewis and M. S. Dudgeon, and oral argument by Mr. Dudgeon. CASSODAY, C. J. This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court dated May 31, 1898, appointing George Wulfing as receiver of all the nonexempt property of J. W. H. Fogo, pursuant to ch. 334, Laws of 1897 (sec. 16946, Stats. 1898), made at the hearing of an order to show cause granted by a county judge April 12, 1898, based upon the petition of |