that the proposed bill was a pure iniquity." But he had no difficulty in showing that it was quite the contrary.

His calculations showed that refining expenses, including waste and usual industrial profit, amounted to 50 fr. per ton; that refiners buy sugar from the manufacturers at 26 fr. 50 per 100 kilog., i.e., 265 fr. per ton; that 60 fr. per 100 kilog. must be added to the aforesaid 26 fr. 50, as duties are nearly always paid by refiners, which means 600 fr. per ton to be added to 265 fr. cost price.

Thus a ton of raw sugar would cost the refiner 865 fr. M. Gadaud omitted to add, "at the very low rate at which I made my calculation."

Now what is the price the consumer has to pay? The market quotation for refined sugar, good quality, was, on the 3rd of March, 95 fr. 50 per 100 kilog., i.e., 955 fr. per ton.

This, then, was the gross profit made by refiners, in other words, the margin between raw and refined sugar. But from it the refining cost has to be deducted:

This leaves therefore a net profit of 4 fr. per 100 kil., 0 fr. 04 per kil., but the margin of profit it still dependent

upon the variations of cost price and sale price, the capital sunk in the refining plant, and all the industrial fluctuations. According to M. Gadaud "those 40 fr. are the tribute which consumers have to pay to refiners.' M. Gadaud then went on: "If you multiply these 40 fr. by the 500,000 tons annually produced by refineries, you get in round figures 500,000 × 40 = 20 million fr., a very large sum of money indeed, especially when one remembers how few there are to divide it.' M. Gadaud requested the Senate to put some order in to this state of things. And the Senate obeyed M. Gadaud's demand, and so did the Chamber of Deputies, by voting a refining duty equal to the presumed profit of 4 fr. on candy sugar, on refined sugar thoroughly purified hard and dry, also on other qualities of refined sugar not ranging less than 98 per cent. and on pieces per 100 kilog. of refined sugar.

M. Gadaud went on: "As compensation for this tax refiners will be assisted against foreign competition at home by a custom duty of 10 fr. ; but," he takes care to point out, "as German refiners get an export premium of 4 fr. 44 the real protection will only be 5 fr. 56. This protection is too small to enable refiners to make use of it in view of the existing speculation, for if they got it into their heads to increase their prices in order to lay on consumers' shoulders the burden of the new tax, foreign sugar would come across our frontiers at once as soon as there was the slightest difference in their favour.'

At the same time efforts were made to induce manufacturers to make white sugar which would not need refining, which would get export premiums, and which would be free from the refining tax of 4 fr. Thus M. Gadaud could triumphantly exclaim in the end: "This law is, therefore, not exclusively for refiners, it limits their actions, it is rather a drag upon them; in fact it is against them."

He drew attention equally to the protection which the law accorded to the refineries at the seaports against the

refineries in Paris. He was careful to point out that "there is a marked difference between the two." "Seaport refineries," he said, "receive raw cane sugar from the French colonies, foreign raw cane sugar, and native raw beet sugar, whereas raw sugar from the Continent is kept out by the prohibitive surtax which is levied on it." The report further explained that the object of the law was to assist and improve the relations between seaport refiners and beet sugar manufacturers. The bill provides for it in two ways. About 40,000 tons of foreign cane sugar, mainly from Java, were worked by seaport refineries. (1) a surtax is imposed by the bill in such a way that native raw sugar takes the place of foreign cane sugar, which is no longer imported. (2) the law gives a detaxe de cabotage of 2 fr. per 100 kilog. of native sugar when sent from French seaports on the Channel to French ports on the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, there to be refined and exported.

That

M. Gadaud emphasised the benefits which the French Mercantile Marine would derive from that measure, and added: "Best of all it attentuates the antagonism which exists between seaport and Parisian refiners.” sentence is indeed a remarkable one; for, in order ❝ to attentuate the antagonism," premiums are given to seaport refineries against Parisian refineries.

Moreover, the object of the bill was to take away from the refineries as much sugar as possible, and to make the manufacturers supply the public direct. Hence a manufacturing tax of 1 fr. only on raw sugar which did not go through refiners' hands, whereas the refining tax amounted to 4 fr. (law of 1897, art. 4).

M. Gadaud explained that "the difference between the manufacturing and the refining taxes will help manufacturers in their endeavour to supply direct to the consumers and it will likewise assist them to get rid of the monopoly which the Parisian refiners had practically over them.

It is easy to see, therefore, what was meant by the law

of 1897, a law, which nearly all those who talk about the sugar question, look upon as being in favour of refiners. If the bill did not kill the refining industry in Paris outright, it is only another proof of the fact that industrial and commercial necessities are superior to legislative interference.

XI.

How Refiners pay the Duty.

To calculate the amount of duty, the sugar is supposed to be in a refined state, and it is taxed according to the quantity of refined sugar it represents. That quantity is determined by a polarimetric analysis, with a rebate of twice the amount of glucose and four times the weight of mineral matters, plus a deduction of 1 per cent. for the usual waste in refining.

Refineries are under permanent excise supervision. This supervision is exercised only with regard to the quantities of raw sugar coming in, and the quantity of molasses, pieces, and by-products going out (law of July 26, 1893, and decree of August 30th, 1893). No sugar, except what has been submitted to the tariff, or what goes in under bond is allowed into refineries, and whatever the final yield of refined sugar may be, the duty once estimated remains the exact duty payable. cise supervision enables the treasury to tax all sugar which might be got in the process of fabrication in excess of the officially calculated yield.

Ex

The calculated amount of the saccharine matter in the incoming raw sugar (four times the weight of mineral matters, and twice the weight of glucose being deducted), is put to the refiner's debit; to his credit go whatever crystallizable or uncrystallizable sugar is existent in the products going out in the shape of molasses, pieces, and by-products. If more goes out than came in, or if the balance is equal, the refiner does not owe anything to the Treasury, the account shows that the rebates were not

exaggerated; but if less goes out than came in, then he has to pay the full duty, i.e. 60 fr. per 100 kilog. on the difference. When it is shown by the accounts that the rebates were excessive, as the crystallizable sugar to which they correspond is not to be found as either crystallizable sugar or glucose in molasses, pieces, and by-products sent out, it is supposed to have been turned into refined sugar, and sold as such to consumers. As a charge for this excise supervision, refiners pay 0 fr. 04 per 100 kilog. of presumed refined sugar, which is taken into the mill. This charge is refunded when sugar, after being refined, is exported.

XII.

Refiners do not get any Premium.

NEWSPAPERS when discussing the question, especially at the present moment, refer mainly to the bounties paid to the refiners, and it is thought and even believed that these are absorbed by the 36 refineries working in France, and especially by those in Paris. We have repeatedly asked to be shown those direct or indirect bounties granted to refiners by our French law of course we never obtained

an answer.

We wish to quote here the following declarations made at the Brussels Conference by M. Sébline, Senator for the Aisne department, where there are 75 sugar manufactories:

"In France, where excise supervision is resorted to, there is no bounty to the refinery (page 50). Refiners are subjected to draconic laws, everything as it comes into the refinery is entered; every item that goes out is registered. If a refiner has blundered in the manufacturing process, he has to pay the duty on the sugar he has destroyed; if he gets a surplus he is taxed for it" (page 63). Refiners do not get any bounties; it is easily proved. The law of August 3rd, 1890, as modified by the law