the living and reflective forms of man's being. Accordingly, the idea of God is not as demonstrable to the understanding as it is acceptable to the spirit of man, and where theological calculation may be baffled, religious consciousness proceeds undismayed.

It is the religious order which is the unity of religion and theism, and just as Christianity speaks of God in immediate connection with the Kingdom, so the religious consciousness finds sufficient consolation only when it invests its object with universal proportions. In all this the truth of the personality of the Absolute may be maintained, when it is seen that even the human soul cannot confine its being to narrow particular limits, but must construe its life as universal, and conduct its course as integral. Man belongs to an order which is none other than that of Absolute Life, or God. If the more familiar ideas of the Deity seem to be masked by this idea of the religious world, it must be remembered that traditional theism has been so zealous to demonstrate Deity that it has failed to redeem man from his human distress; so that anything unhappy in the utterance of independent religion is really due to a contrast, not with living belief in God, but with a rationalistic theology. We need not refer to the absence of the idea of God in Taoism, much less to the antipathy toward it expressed by Buddhism, to observe that a universal religion is not necessarily theistic, and in the all-important case of Christianity it may be assumed that if the idea of God be the same as the theistic conclusion, it is due to coincidence rather than to calculation.

Theism, which is thoroughly intellectualistic, must not be supplanted by a lower naturalism, but by a higher spiritualism. The essence of this is found in that world of spirit which religion itself has created, and the highest truth concerning man or God is expressed in the form of an order of being, instead of in an isolated thing. Egoism and subjectivism in man are intolerable and undefensible;

in God they are unthinkable. Personality is an idea so rich in its significance that we cannot degrade it to the plane of mere ipseism, but must elevate it to the realm of what Eucken has called the "Personalwelt," and which he further regards as the essence of Christianity. Such a conception was not wanting in expression in the earliest forms of Christian thinking, as we find from a glance at the neo-Platonic idealization of Christian values under the pen of Plotinus. Here appears in reverential fashion the idea of that which is "beyond being" and "beyond thought," under the guise of which the religious principle of spirit enters in to surmount and out-top reason, as reason itself ascends beyond sense. Toward this realm the ontosophical principle simply points, while of it theism is but the dim outline.

2. The Affirmation of Absolute Life

It is not something less than theism which religion demands, but something more. When we remember that the intrinsic character of religion makes it necessary for our thought to abstain from logical and ethical formulations of human faith, we can realize that the foundations of such belief cannot rest upon metaphysical and moralistic proofs. The living method, which ever keeps in the shadow of human history, can only regard theistic demonstrations as eccentric methods of realizing the religious world-order. Independent in its essence, complete in its character, and positive in its form, religion need not resort to inference when it seeks to postulate its ultimate ground; and in the real presence of Absolute Life faith forgets the arguments drawn from the rationale of natural forces or the morale of human motives. The ontological argument, however, does contain a nucleus of truth, whereby we are encouraged to search for evidence of the unity of the world, not in mere abstract thinking, but also in the manifold forms of spiritual life. Ontology, which does assume a very en

viable position in modern thought, is almost as valuable to positive religion as to speculative theism, and our loyalty to the older form of religious thinking need not be doubted when it is observed how we seek to exalt the valuable idea of being-for-self. Logic and æsthetics, ethics and rights, contain implications which cannot be fathomed unless our thought assumes an ontological form. The pursuit of this idea in its fourfold form will evince certain evidence of an Absolute Life in the universe.

1. Logic demands a principle both formal and real, in whose light it may reduce the law of identity to fundamental validity. The principium identitatis thus realizes itself when it assumes a constructive form, and only as it is invested with ontological significance may it inform man of its own inherent certainty. To be assured of the sufficiency of this principle we find it necessary to return to the consciousness of self, so that the thinker is able to declare "A is A" only as he can say "I am I." Vedanta with its belief in the Self, Socrates with his yvwo σeavтTóv, Descartes with his cogito, ergo sum, point to the common path travelled by sound thinking and exalted living; and all genuine metaphysics finds the self-evident to consist in the self-conscious. Nominalism, with its concern for the individual, and realism, which reposed in the idea that only the universal can be permanent, prepared the way for a living conceptualism, which turned from the outer world of phenomena and noumena to the inner realm of spiritual life, and Abelard, who gives us the significant word realiter, shows how humanistic our thought must be in order to have consistency.

Thought possesses real, and not only formal significance, but this real quality need not be considered to come from metaphysics alone, but also from the realm of spiritual life. Not only the canon of logic, but the impulse toward culture, should be understood under the head of knowledge, and the intellectual act which expresses the Soul's being springs from the deepest source of Absolute Life. With Plato

it is the "eros" and "mania " of the mind; with Aristotle it is the "energy of contemplation." Kant calls it Interesse, while Schopenhauer describes it as “knowledge of the willto-live." Thought is both an act and attitude, and neither can be understood until it is interpreted in the light of the One Life which is everywhere self-active. While Herbert of Cherbury was at once dogmatic and naive in discussing religion under the head de veritate, he does not fail to suggest that the appetite for truth is an instinctus naturalis, which at heart is the essence of religion. The pursuit of fundamental truth, like the principle of ultimate thought, is itself religious.

2. Upon the side of æsthetical considerations the same yearning for ultimate reality appears; art does not serve religion out of mere sympathy, but works with it because both seek the One who is the life and beauty of the world. Beauty contains the universal in the serene form of contemplation, and it is because of its ability to surmount the common conflicts of human life that it makes possible the communion of man with God. Art creates, not in mere imitation of nature, but after the manifest spirit of that process which is apparent in the world. Those who speculate upon the mystery of art return with the message of infinity and unity. Plato speaks of the " sea of beauty," while Plotinus follows æsthetics on to the " supernal realm beyond both thought and being. Bruno pursues the beautiful till it leads him to the one life of the world, and Shaftesbury traces the æsthetical into the realm of worldharmony. Schelling finds in art the means by which the human spirit transcends both morality and metaphysics, while Schopenhauer sees in the intuition of beauty a form of pure contemplation, through which the pure subject surveys the world in its entirety.

The obvious difference between religion and culture need not discourage attempts to find in the latter something of permanent significance. Both depend upon the supersensible which is internal and ultimate in human existence,

but culture seeks the mere psychological idéal, which rises superior to sense, while religion advances to the ethical idéal, whose pursuit is imperative. But, like logic, culture with its æsthetic attitude implies some kind of participation in the spiritual world-order.

Culture involves the totality of the universe which it expresses in a convincing fashion. All culture is fundamental, and cannot be perfected apart from belief in the destiny of man and the existence of God. Where common experience impresses upon man his actual situation in the world, culture awakens within him the thought that his essential being is not purely natural, but is possessed of humanity. To obey the voice of culture, and with the spontaneity of consciousness create works which are of no practical utility and no phenomenal validity, is a task which can hardly be accomplished by an individual or a race which is not already permeated with the idea of spiritual life. "He who works for sweetness and light works to make reason and the will of God prevail." The despair of culture, which Schiller bitterly expresses by saying, "Das Wissen ist der Tod," is religious despair to be cured only by faith in the humanity of man and the reality of God. Ethics cannot permit, much less can it forbid a culture which in the end is an affair of faith and religion.

The æsthetic attitude, which precedes the creation of the artistic, and which may be assumed by him who is wanting in talent for æsthetic work, cannot conceal the gleams of the Infinite which constantly make their shining presence felt. If religion in its superstitious moments has sought the presence of divine power in the witch or possessed person, appeal may be made to the exalted, and ecstatic moments of consciousness experienced by sensitive souls who perceive both beauty and significance before them. Beautiful scenes will react upon beautiful spirits in a manner which they alone understand, and those who cannot participate in their hallowed feelings may yet recognize the influx of the Absolute into the recipient