entitled to share in the dividends under a composition, no misrepresentation having been made to the bankrupt's creditors. In re Lane et al., 2 Low. 333; 14 Fed. Cas. 1070.

A bankrupt is by his discharge released from liability for breach of contract with a creditor who assented to a composition, although the creditor was ignorant of the breach at the time of giving assent. Fowle v. Parke, 48 Fed. Rep. 789.

[See notes to § 14.]

SETTING ASIDE.

§ 13. Compositions, when Set Aside.— (a.) The judge may, upon the application of parties in interest filed at any time within six months after a composition has been confirmed, set the same aside and reinstate. the case if it shall be made to appear upon a trial that fraud was practiced in the procuring of such composition, and that the knowledge thereof has come to the petitioners since the confirmation of such composition.

A composition will not be annulled by an innocent mistake of the debtor as to the amount due a creditor; and the correct amount may be proved. Ex parte Trafton, 2 Low. 505; 24 Fed. Cas. 122.

Two years after a composition had been made and the dividends distributed, creditors who had received their dividends filed a petition to set aside the composition on the ground that some of the votes in support of it had been purchased. In the meantime, the bankrupts had engaged in a new business and contracted new debts to a large amount. Before the composition, the petitioning creditors had sufficient knowledge to put them on their inquiry. Judge Blatchford held that it was too late to raise the question as to the means by which the composition was accepted, and rejected the application to set it aside. In re Herrman et al., 9 Ben. 436; 12 Fed. Cas. 19.

Where the vote of an unqualified creditor did not affect the result, a composition will not be set aside by reason of such vote. In re Walshe, 2 Woods, 225; 29 Fed. Cas. 110.

If a creditor is induced to vote for, or to sign a composition by any means different from or beyond the composition, whether known to the debtor or not, his vote so influenced operates as a fraud on the other creditors, and makes the composition voidable by any of them. A majority arrived at by bribery, though the bankrupt be no party to it, is no fair majority; and it seems that if a vote is influenced by the expectation of advantage, though without positive promise, it cannot be considered an honest vote. In re Sawyer, 14 N. B. R. 241; 21 Fed. Cas. 559 (1876).

The fact that full security is not taken does not make a composition uncertain. In re Wilson, 18 N. B. R. 300; 30 Fed. Cas. 98 (1878).

An order vacating a compromise, obtained without notice, may be set aside by the bankruptcy court without notice. In re Dunn, 53 Fed. Rep. 341.

Irregularities in a proceeding respecting a composition which are not tainted with fraud are not fatal to its validity. In re Henry et al., 9 Ben. 449; 11 Fed. Cas. 1148.

It was held to be no ground to set aside a compromise that each of the bankrupts received a sum out of the partnership fund when that fact was known to the creditors before voting in favor of accepting the proposition. In re South Boston Iron Co., 4 Cliff. 343; 22 Fed. Cas. 812.

Acts regularly done in accordance with a composition which is subsequently set aside are valid. Ex parte Hamlin, 2 Low. 571; 11 Fed. Cas. 367.

A sale which might have been avoided by the assignee in bankruptcy will not be disturbed in a proceeding to set aside a composition after it has been fully executed. In re Shaw, 9 Fed. Rep. 495.

A composition is not avoided by a delay in the payment which was caused by legal obstructions. In re Kohlsaat, 18 N. B. R. 570; 14 Fed.

Cas. 833.

A composition which is fraudulent as to some creditors can only be attacked by those who are injured. In re Hamlin et al., 8 Biss. 122; 11 Fed. Cas. 369.

A petition having been filed to set aside a composition on the ground that certain creditors had been paid more than others, the court ordered the clerk to call a meeting of creditors for the purpose of taking testimony, the petitioners to have the affirmative, and the clerk to report the testimony to the court. In re Diggles et al., 8 Ben. 36; 7 Fed. Cas. 693.

A composition was procured in consideration of a premium to be paid by the bankrupt to one of his creditors, the latter buying claims against the estate and voting them in the composition. The composition being confirmed, the creditor aforesaid received a transfer of the bankrupt's property according to agreement. It was held that the composition was fraudulent, and that the assignee of the bankrupt could recover the property thus transferred. Fairbanks v. Bank, 38 Fed. Rep. 630.

DISCHARGES.

§ 14. Discharges, when Granted.- (a.) Any person may, after the expiration of one month and within the next twelve months subsequent to being adjudged a bankrupt, file an application for a discharge in the court of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending; if it shall be made to appear to the judge that the bankrupt was unavoidably prevented from filing it within such time, it may be filed within but not after the expiration of the next six months.

(b.) The judge shall hear the application for a discharge, and such proofs and pleas as may be made in opposition thereto by parties in

interest, at such time as will give parties in interest a reasonable opportunity to be fully heard, and investigate the merits of the application and discharge the applicant unless he has

(1.) Committed an offense punishable by imprisonment as herein provided; or

(2.) With fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial condition and in contemplation of bankruptcy, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep books of account or records from which his true condition might be ascertained.

(c.) The confirmation of a composition shall discharge the bankrupt from his debts, other than those agreed to be paid by the terms of the composition and those not affected by a discharge.

Time of Application.

It was held sufficient under the Act of 1867 if a bankrupt's application for a discharge was made before the discharge of the assignee. In re Smith, 9 Fed. Rep. 952. Or if made before the final disposition of the goods. In re Young, id. 146.

It was held under the Act of 1867 that any creditor having a provable debt could apply to the court after a year and require the bankrupts to have the question of discharge determined. In re Fowler, 2 Low. 122; 9 Fed. Cas. 615.

The time within which a petition for a discharge may be filed is considered in the case cited. In re Watson et al., 29 Fed. Cas. 423.

It was held under the Act of 1867 that the court had no power to grant a discharge when no assets have come into the hands of the assignee, and the bankrupt had allowed more than one year to elapse after the order of adjudication before making his application. In re Schenck, 5 N. B. R. 93; 21 Fed. Cas. 660 (1872).

In this case the bankrupt having failed to show any reasonable cause for delay in asking for his discharge, the court ordered that the creditors have leave to prosecute suits as if he had never been adjudged a bankrupt. In re Kelly, 3 Fed. Rep. 219.

The fact that a prior petition for discharge had been made out of season did not affect the jurisdiction of the court over a subsequent petition. In re White, 18 N. B. R. 107; 29 Fed. Cas. 966.

Where the bankrupt had delayed unreasonably in applying for a discharge, the court ordered that his creditors have leave to prosecute suits against him in like manner as if bankruptcy proceedings had not been insituted. In re Whiting, 29 Fed. Cas. 1055.

Under the Act of 1867 the district court could allow a bankrupt to withdraw his petition for discharge and subsequently file another. In re Svenson, 9 Biss. 69; 23 Fed. Cas. 480.

Justice Nelson, reversing Judge Blatchford, decided that under section 29 of the Act of 1867, a bankrupt must apply for a discharge within one

year only in cases where, by reason of no debts having been proved, and no assets having come into the hands of the assignee, he can apply for a discharge within less than six months. In re Greenfield, 6 Blatchf. 287; 10 Fed. Cas. 1165.

A discharge was refused because the debtor had not applied for over one year after filing a voluntary petition, no assets having come into the hands of the assignee. Subsequently, he filed a new petition, and was adjudged a bankrupt; and the court decided that the former refusal to grant the discharge by reason of delay did not bar the new proceedings. In re Farrell, 5 N. B. R. 125; 8 Fed. Cas. 1078.

Under the Act of 1867, where debts are proved and assets come into the hands of the assignee, the bankrupt need not apply for his discharge within one year from the adjudication. In re Holmes, 14 N. B. R. 209; 12 Fed. Cas. 402.

Judge Dillon held that a discharge might be granted under section 29 of the Act of 1867 though it was not applied for within a year, where there are no assets, and the delay was satisfactorily accounted for. In re Donaldson, 2 Dill. 546; 7 Fed. Cas. 882.

The court construed section 29 of the Act of 1867 as giving it discretion to grant or withhold a discharge, according to the circumstances of each case, when the application is made after the expiration of one year. In re Canady, 2 Biss. 75; 5 Fed. Cas. 2.

An adjudication was had in 1868, and no assets came into the hands of the assignee. In 1877 the bankrupt filed a petition for his discharge. The court refused the discharge on the ground of laches. In re.Potteiger, 19 Fed. Cas. 1132.

The court refused to grant a discharge to the bankrupt who had no assets except such as were exempt, and who failed to apply within a year after adjudication, saying: "The privilege of a discharge is given by section 33 only to a person who has in all things conformed to his duty under the Act, and who has conformed to all the requirements of the Act. One of these requirements is that the application in this case be made within one year from the adjudication. The discharge is a favor granted on a compliance with the condition prescribed, and not a right." In re Martin, 2 N. B. R. 548; 16 Fed. Cas. 881.

It was held under the Act of 1867 that the district court had no power under any circumstances to grant a discharge unless it was applied for within one year after adjudication. In re Sloan, 13 Blatchf. 67; 22 Fed. Cas. 326. To the contrary effect, see In re Vorback, 1 Pac. Law Rep. 100; 28 Fed. Cas. 1278.

A petition for a discharge was filed after the election of an assignee, but before he qualified. The court dismissed it as premature. In re Wheeler et al., 5 Fed. Rep. 299.

An objection to the discharge of a bankrupt on the ground that his petition was prematurely filed cannot be waived, as it is the duty of the court to see that the law is complied with in all respects. Ibid.

Under the Act of 1867 the bankrupt was required to apply for discharge within one year from the adjudication. In re Wilmott, 2 N. B. R. 214; 30 Fed. Cas. 87 (1868).

The authority to apply for a discharge is derived entirely from the Bankrupt Act, and such application must be made within the time prescribed by law. In re Wood, 8 Ben. 237; 30 Fed. Cas. 422 (1875).

Although the Act of July 26, 1876, extends the time for applying for a discharge until the final disposition of the cause, a delay of six years in making the application, if opposed, is cause for refusing it. In re Harrison, 22 Fed. Rep. 528.

The bankrupts gave, as a reason for not having applied for a discharge, that a petition for review to the circuit court as to a controversy that had arisen during the proceedings, which was returnable November 19, 1870, had not been brought to a hearing by January, 1872. Held, that as they showed no reason for the delay in bringing the petition to a hearing, the delay in applying for a discharge was unreasonable. In re Belden, 5 Ben. 476; 3 Fed. Cas. 80.

Who May Oppose Discharge.

A creditor who has not proved his debt cannot be heard to oppose the discharge of the bankrupt. In re King, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 22; 14 Fed. Cas. 507 (1842); In re Palmer, 18 Fed. Cas. 1019; In re Levy et al., 2 Ben. 169; 15 Fed. Cas. 431. But see the following:

It is not necessary to enable a creditor to oppose the discharge of a bankrupt that his debt should have been proved, if it is provable. In re Murdock, 1 Low. 362; 17 Fed. Cas. 1010.

It was held in this case that any creditor could oppose a bankrupt's discharge, whether he had proven a debt in bankruptcy or not. In re Shepard, 1 N. B. R. 439; 21 Fed. Cas. 1250 (1868).

Only creditors who have proved their debts, or are clearly shown to be bona fide creditors, can oppose the discharge of a bankrupt. In re Boutelle, 2 N. B. R. 129; 3 Fed. Cas. 1018.

A creditor who has not proved his debt is not entitled to oppose a bankrupt's discharge, nor one who was not injuriously affected by the acts complained of. In re Burk, Deady, 425; 4 Fed. Cas. 729.

A creditor who has not proved his debt, but whose claim is taken up on the bankrupt's schedules, is competent to file specifications in opposition to the discharge. In re Smith et al., 8 Blatchf. 461; 22 Fed. Cas. 390.

Under the Act of 1841 a creditor whose claim was contingent and liquidated could appear in opposition to the discharge of a bankrupt. Ex parte Traphagen, 1 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 98; 24 Fed. Cas. 134 (1842).

An equitable claim is sufficient to qualify the claimant to oppose a discharge. In re Tebbetts, 5 Law Rep. 259; 23 Fed. Cas. 826 (1842).

A creditor having a deficiency judgment has a claim which will be released by a discharge, and can be heard on the question of discharge. In re Stansfield, 4 Saw. 334; 22 Fed. Cas. 1061.