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judiciary. The second paragraph of section 23 of the act of 1898 provides that such suits can only be brought in the courts in which the bankrupt might have brought them.

It follows that in the absence of the conditions upon which the jurisdiction of federal courts vests, such as diversity of residence, the trustee is relegated to the courts of the states. It will be of interest to observe whether any evils will result from this provision. It is clearly impossible for Congress to impose jurisdiction upon tribunals constituted by the authority of the states. If though it is not to be presumed that the danger is considerable a state court should refuse to entertain an action brought by a trustee in bankruptcy, he would be left without a forum and emasculated of means to collect the assets of his bankrupt.

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We disclaim any purpose in the above to criticise the law or to predict any failure to realize its useful and beneficent purposes. Our conclusions can be expressed in the language of Mr. Hotchkiss in the article previously mentioned:

Such is the latest product of bankruptcy legislation, genealogically examined. Starting with the Torrey bill, notable for its too harsh provisions, proceeding through the Nelson bill, as inadequate in procedure as it was lacking in a broad grasp of the dangers to commercial morality, which had to be avoided, and finally developing into a compromise between the latter and the Henderson substitute, a measure which seemed to find the golden mean, it goes on the books as a law for temporary relief, not for permanent control. Many assert that this is as it should be. The crying need for its passage was that the unfortunates, who have been in bondage to debts and judgments born of the late period of depression might be free again; and the country will quickly feel the effects of the restored energy of the tens of thousands who have gone down in recent wrecks. So far the law is expressive not only of our humanity, but of our commercial common sense.

THE BANKRUPTCY LAW.

CHAPTER I.

DEFINITIONS.

SECTION 1. Meaning of Words and Phrases.- (a.) The words and phrases used in this Act and in proceedings pursuant hereto shall, unless the same be inconsistent with the context, be construed as follows:

(1.) "A person against whom a petition has been filed" shall include a person who has filed a voluntary petition;

(2.) "Adjudication" shall mean the date of the entry of a decree that the defendant, in a bankruptcy proceeding, is a bankrupt, or if such decree is appealed from, then the date when such decree is finally confirmed;

(3.) "Appellate courts" shall include the circuit courts of appeals of the United States, the supreme courts of the Territories, and the Supreme Court of the United States;

(4.) "Bankrupt" shall include a person against whom an involuntary petition or an application to set a composition aside or to revoke a discharge has been filed, or who has filed a voluntary petition, or who has been adjudged a bankrupt;

(5.) "Clerk" shall mean the clerk of a court of bankruptcy;

(6.) "Corporations" shall mean all bodies having any of the powers and privileges of private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships, and shall include limited or other partnership associations organized under laws making the capital subscribed alone responsible for the debts of the association;

(7.) "Court" shall mean the court of bankruptcy in which the proceedings are pending, and may include the referee;

(8.) "Courts of bankruptcy" shall include the district courts of the United States and of the Territories, the supreme court of the District of Columbia, and the United States court of the Indian Territory, and of Alaska;

(9.) "Creditor" shall include anyone who owns a demand or claim provable in bankruptcy, and may include his duly authorized agent, attorney, or proxy;

(10.) "Date of bankruptcy," or "time of bankruptcy," or "commencement of proceedings," or "bankruptcy," with reference to time, shall mean the date when the petition was filed;

(11.) "Debt" shall include any debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy;

(12.) "Discharge" shall mean the release of a bankrupt from all of his debts which are provable in bankruptcy, except such as are excepted by this Act;

(13.) "Document" shall include any book, deed, or instrument in writing;

(14.) "Holiday" shall include Christmas, the Fourth of July, the Twenty-second of February, and any day appointed by the President of the United States or the Congress of the United States as a holiday or as a day of public fasting or thanksgiving;

(15.) A person shall be deemed insolvent within the provisions of this Act whenever the aggregate of his property, exclusive of any property which he may have conveyed, transferred, concealed, or removed, or permitted to be concealed or removed, with intent to defraud, hinder or delay his creditors, shall not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient in amount to pay his debts;

(16.) "Judge" shall mean a judge of a court of bankruptcy, not including the referee;

(17.) "Oath" shall include affirmation;

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(18.) Officer" shall include clerk, marshal, receiver, referee, and trustee, and the imposing of a duty upon or the forbidding of an act by any officer shall include his successor and any person authorized by law to perform the duties of such officer;

(19.) "Persons" shall include corporations, except where otherwise specified, and officers, partnerships, and women, and when used with reference to the commission of acts which are herein forbidden shall include persons who are participants in the forbidden acts, and the agents, officers, and members of the board of directors or trustees, or other similar controlling bodies of corporations;

(20.) "Petition" shall mean a paper filed in a court of bankruptcy or with a clerk or deputy clerk by a debtor praying for the benefits of this Act, or by creditors alleging the commission of an act of bankruptcy by a debtor therein named;

(21.) "Referee" shall mean the referee who has jurisdiction of the case or to whom the case has been referred, or anyone acting in his stead;

(22.) “Conceal" shall include secrete, falsify, and mutilate;

(23.) "Secured creditor" shall include a creditor who has security for his debt upon the property of the bankrupt of a nature to be assignable under this Act, or who owns such a debt for which some indorser, surety, or other persons secondarily liable for the bankrupt has such security upon the bankrupt's assets;

(24.) "States" shall include the Territories, the Indian Territory, Alaska, and the District of Columbia;

(25.) "Transfer" shall include the sale and every other and different mode of disposing of or parting with property, or the possession of property, absolutely or conditionally, as a payment, pledge, mortgage, gift, or security;

(26.) "Trustee " shall include all of the trustees of an estate;

(27.) "Wage-earner" shall mean an individual who works for wages, salary, or hire, at a rate of compensation not exceeding one thousand five hundred dollars per year;

(28.) Words importing the masculine gender may be applied to and include corporations, partnerships, and women;

(29.) Words importing the plural number may be applied to and mean only a single person or thing;

(30.) Words importing the singular number may be applied to and mean several persons or things.

(15) Judge Baldwin of the district court of Nevada charged a jury under the act of 1867, as follows: "If you believe from the evidence that W.'s property, if sold on that day" (the day when the alleged act of bankruptcy was committed), "would not have produced enough to pay his debts, then I charge you as a matter of law, that he was insolvent within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act." In re Wells, 3 N. B. R. 371; 29 Fed. Cas. 637.

Assets, in the meaning of the Bankrupt Act of 1867, are proceeds of the bankrupt's property which come into the hands of the assignee and are applicable to the payment of the bankrupt's debts. In re Wilson, 2 Hughes, 228; 30 Fed. Cas. 97 (1875).

The term "persons interested" in the Act of 1841 was held to mean those who have a direct interest in the matter immediately in controversy, and not merely a remote and contingent interest. Dutton et al. v. Freeman, 5 Law Rep. 447; 8 Fed. Cas. 175 (1842).

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