ever partook of the original relation to the parent country, and there also are examples of Greek colonies when they had become populous and strong, throwing off their subjugation to the states from which they sprung.

With us it is a standing and a sound rule to erect our colonies into states, and receive them into the Union as soon as they acquire a sufficient population. A subject to which we shall again have occasion to advert.

The discoveries made in America by Europeans, being considered as conferring an exclusive right of occupancy on the sovereign under whose authority they had sailed, various parts of this continent were appropriated by the British crown to the establishment of colonies; sometimes by extensive grants to favoured individuals, sometimes by encouraging settlers at large, reserving the general domain to the

crown.

Hence two sorts of provincial governments ensued. 1. Those denominated Royal Governments, in which the executive officers were appointed by the crown, but the legislative power was vested in the people, subject however to the control of the king in council. This form prevailed in those provinces where the general domain continued in the crown until it was from time to time granted to the settlers. 2. Proprietary Governments, where a large territory was at once granted by the crown to one or more individuals.

Of the former, Maryland granted to Lord Baltimore, and Pennsylvania to William Penn, are instances; the latter embraced the provinces of New England, as the territory was collectively termed, which was afterwards subdivided into New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, and

Connecticut. New Jersey was likewise granted to a company, and so of North and South Carolina and others. Charters were granted by the different monarchs more or less liberal in their terms, but all founded on the general relation of subjection to the crown, sometimes expressly declared, but omitted in others from a conviction that it was unnecessary.

In some of them the power of legislation was uncontrolled by the parent state. In others, the laws that were passed, were to be transmitted to England, and if disallowed by the king in council, they lost their force; but until his disapprobation was announced, they were binding on the colony, if enacted according to their respective charters. In most of them, appeals were allowed to the same authority, from the decisions of the highest provincial tribunals. There is no reason to believe that these appeals were in general otherwise decided than the justice of the case required, but the power of rejecting the acts of the legislature was sometimes capriciously exercised, or it may perhaps have been deemed expedient by the English ministry, to keep alive the sense of colonial dependance whenever the charter afforded the opportunity.

In general the courts of Vice Admiralty were reserved to the crown, who appointed the judges of them and exercised exclusive jurisdiction as well in relation to the proper subjects of maritime jurisdiction, as the collection of so much of the revenue as arose from trade, the exclusive power of regulating which was uniformly understood to be reserved. No direct commercial intercourse was allowed between them and any other than the British dominions: their mutual or internal commerce and their manufactures were seldom interfered with, yet one or two regulations calculated to promote the interests of English manufac

tures, were justly complained of, although they were peaceably submitted to.

But, for a long time, Great Britain abstained from imposing internal taxation. On some great public exigencies, when their own safety was endangered, the colonists spontaneously rendered assistance to the extent of their ability, and with these filial efforts, and with the revenue derived from imposts on trade, the parent country appeared to be satisfied. But at length the increase and prosperity of the colonies suggested to the ministry, the idea of a new contributroy fund, to be subject to their own power and not to be dependent on voluntary grants. The principle that the right of taxation depends on representation, one of the greatest beauties in the ancient constitution of England, though now reduced almost to a shadow, was disregarded, or the British subject was supposed to have suspended his right to it, by residence in a distant colony. The chartered rights, which in the reign of the Stuarts had been frequently trampled on, were again set at nought, and a scheme of internal taxation was adopted which it was supposed might be easily enforced, and would gradually introduce a systematic extraction of internal revenue. Stamp duties were imposed on most of the instruments in common use, and were to be paid to officers appointed by the crown. But the people of America were too sagacious not to perceive the danger of submitting to the first inroads upon their rights, and too firm not to resist them. By a simultaneous impulse, from one end of our continent to the other, a concerted abstinence from the use of the stamps and the resignation of many of the officers employed, the measure was rendered impracticable.

The common danger suggested the idea of an union

i

for common defence. A precedent for a congress of the provinces was not wanting. In the year 1753, deputies from several of them had assembled at Albany for a different purpose. The apprehensions of a war between France and Great Britain, in which, as we have already observed, the colonies of each would be necessarily involved, led to this assembly, the object of which was to increase the means of defence by forming an union of the provinces. The plan was disapproved by the British ministry, because it was apprehended that it might produce a concert of measures opposing the supremacy of the mother country. (6) In 1765, the object of a congress was still defence, but against an enemy of a different description, against the invasion of a ministry supported by acts of parliament which they could procure at pleasure. Remonstrance and entreaty were, however, the only weapons wielded, and these, combined with the practical opposition every where experienced, produced a change in the ministry and an abandonment of the measure. But although the law was repealed, the ministry thought it expedient to assert by a declaratory act the right to bind their colonies, by acts of parliament, in all cases whatever; a declaration disregarded by the colonists, who now began to feel their own power, till it was endeavoured to be enforced by the imposition of a duty on tea, glass, and a few other articles, expressly for the purpose of raising a revenue to defray part of the colonial expenses. But the spirit which had been raised was not easily allayed. The same indications of resistance were now renewed, but the military force in this country was increased by detachments

(6) Marshall's Life of Washington, Vol. I. p. 500, Vol. II. p. 90.

from the regular army in Great Britain-and the ministry avowed a determination to persevere. Another congress was convened, and a second course of complaint and supplication unavailingly pursued. The language was still that of faithful, though injured subjects: their grievances were imputed not to the monarch but his ministers-and in the ardent expressions of hope, that they should not be deprived of the rights enjoyed by their fellow subjects, they admitted their own subjection. Even after the fatal blow was struck at Lexington in 1775, and the whole country was in arms, the most dutiful language of subjects towards a sovereign was retained. But this incongruity ceased, when the people, perceiving no relaxation of the efforts to subdue them, boldly resolved to throw off a yoke too heavy to be borne, and no longer contenting themselves with claiming the rights of British subjects, to assert those of independent man.

By this great measure the congress of provinces became at once the congress of so many sovereign states-entitled to places in the catalogue of nations, and a meeting of humble, complaining colonists terminated in the formation of an empire.

It soon was found expedient to devise some expli cit form of association, by which the powers granted to the congress or retained by the new states should be distinctly ascertained: articles of confederation were therefore prepared, (and with the exception of one state, which, however, afterwards came into them,) speedily adopted, by which the United States were formed into a federal body, with an express reservation to each state of its freedom, sovereignty and independence, and of every power, right, and jurisdiction, not expressly delegated to the United States in Congress assembled. The federal powers were declared