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tude of influence over the lives and property of citizens have not been the criteria for distinguishing constitutional from statutory officers. It will not be seriously contended that the superintendent of prisons is of more public consequence than the commissioner of health or the commissioner of labor.

It is thus apparent:

1. That the metes and bounds set by the constitution to the

governor's executive power by the creation of elective officers are wholly fortuitous and in no way related to the simplest standards of business and common sense. The secretary of state whose duties are relatively unimportant in most respects is entirely independent of the governor; but the superintendent of public works is nominated and removed by him.

2. That in the definition of official duties the constitution follows no consistent principles, but leaves some of the most important offices wholly at the mercy of the legislature while narrowly circumscribing the functions of other offices.

3. That no principle has been followed in determining what offices should be treated in the constitution, the legisla

ture being bound in some minor matters and entirely free in others of more importance.

4. That, whether considered in relation to the organization of the executive work under the governor or independent of all other considerations, the situation requires treatment according to some consistent standards.

One hundred and thirty-eight years of political experience has demonstrated the inadequacy of mere declarations to make a chief executive. The state has never had a chief executive. The only question which can be left open when considering the government historically is this: Do the people desire or need a chief executive-should there be a single elected officer who may be held to account of what is done or do the people desire and need to try various other expedients for holding a large number of people accountable who are neither dependent or independent and concerning the result of whose action there is no way for the electorate to have an intelligent opinion. Shall the state continue to do business. with a headless, spineless institution whose moving impulse comes from an external agency or organism which seeks to exploit its activities for its selfish ends, or shall the people choose as their servant a chief executive who will be held to account for using the personnel and resources of the government for the common good?

The Present Organization for Executive Direction and Control

The fact is that the constitution itself inhibits the development of a responsible chief executive. It has set up two independent heads of Proprietary Functions-the secretary of state and the treasurer; it has set up three independent heads of groups of public service functions; it has set up one independent staff agency, the attorney general. Providing no organization for a chief executive, the constitutional inhibition against the expenditure of public moneys except pursuant to appropriations has done the rest. Acting within these constitutional powers the legislature has also failed to provide either organization or funds with which the governor might build up staff agencies, except the civil service commission, and the department of efficiency and economy-the first of which is made a continuous body-as it probably should be, and the second of which was abolished on recommendation of a new governor who came into office viewing it as a creature of an opposition party. Furthermore, the legislature has established 140 different departmental officers and commissions having administration duties with no provision for coordination and with little possibility of executive direction and control. (See Chart V, Page 98.)

Without "staff" or "line" advisers the governor is required to deal with or act upon the independent requests of all these administrative heads and groups as an observer from a far-off mountain top, or if he is visited by one who asks for his official sanction, he must decide or refuse without having the matter considered and discussed by the various other officers whose interests may be affected.

The Tenure of the Governor

New York, in her first constitution, drafted by the convention of 1777, granted the governor a three-year term, instead of the twelve-month term established in many of the other states. When the convention of 1821 overthrew the predominance of the landed class by sweeping away the freehold qualifications for voters for senators and reduced the term of the senators to two years, it also reduced the term of the governor to the same period. This provision was incorporated in the constitution of 1894. Meanwhile other states have moved in the direction of longer terms, all of the original thirteen, except Massachusetts, having abandoned the annual election. At the present time, of the original thirteen states, six (Connecticut, Georgia, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island and South Carolina) limit the term of the governor to two years; one, Massachusetts, retains the annual election; one, New Jersey, fixes the term at three years, and the remaining five have extended it to four years.

An examination of the constitutions of all the states shows that

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87-Bd. Mgrs. Reformatory Women (Bedford) 88-Bd. Mgrs. Training Sch. Girls (Hudson) 89-Mawenawasigh Chap. D. A. R. 90-Mt. McGregor Memorial Asso. 91-Johnstown Memorial Soc.

92-Bd. Mgrs. Reformatory Misdemeanants 93-Bd. Mgrs. Rome Custodial Asylum 94-Bd. Mgrs. Inst. Feebleminded Children 95-Bd. Mgrs. Craig Col. Epileptics (Sonyea) 96-Bd. Mgrs. Hosp. Care Crippled Children 97-Bd. Mgrs. School Blind (Batavia) 98-Bronx Parkway Commn.

99-State Supt. Elections

100-Bd. Trust. State Agr. Exp. Sta. (L. I.)

101-Battleship "New York" Silver Serv. Commn

102-Am. Scenic and Hist. Preserv. Soc.

103-Saratoga Monument

104-German-American Alliance

105-Comm. D. A. R., N. Y. State

106-Bd. Mgrs. Soc. Reform. Juv. Del. N. Y. C. (Randall's Island)

107-Voting Machine Commn. 108-State Racing Commn.

109 N. Y. State Athletic Commn. 110-Commn. Blind

111-Ketchum Memorial Commn. 112-Bd. Regents (Ed. Dept.)

113-Bd. Trust. Inst. Study Malig. Diseases 114-State Bd. Law Examiners

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about half of them provide for the two year term and about half or a slight majority for the four year term. A search for the factors which led to the choice of two or four years in the several states reveals no consistent explanation. It cannot be said that those states which have been making the most radical experiment in direct democracy are uniformly attached to the shorter term. On the contrary, Oregon, Washington, California, Oklahoma, Nevada and Arizona appear among those that have adopted the four year term. Neither can it be said that all of the recent conventions have adopted the four year term in spite of the tendency in that direction, for Ohio and Michigan retain the two year period. Yet it is worthy of note that Oklahoma, Arizona and New Mexico, in making entirely new organic laws, adopted the longer period. In view of these facts, it appears that in the main the tendency is in the direction of the longer term, that some states which have tried the shorter term are abandoning it, that neither geographical or political reasons account for the choice of one or the other, that the most radical democracies do not deem the short term a necessary part of their system.

From the point of view of responsibility, however, the term of four years has been more satisfactory. From the point of view of responsibility and efficiency, the two year term is without doubt subject to serious objections. The governor is hardly installed before he has to begin to think of the next election, the campaign for which begins within at least sixteen or eighteen months after his inauguration. By the time. he has disposed of the inevitable patronage, the fight for renomination has begun. Serious and prolonged study of the problems of administration is impossible. To hold the governor to account for efficient administration under such circumstances is as unjust as it is unjustifiable, particularly when the chaos in the state administrative organization is borne. in mind.

The Power of Appointment and Removal

As has been pointed out in other connections, no consistent principles have been applied in the determination of what officers should be made independent of the governor through popular election and what officers should be made subordinate to him through the exercise of the power of appointment. For instance, the state engineer and surveyor, an officer charged with duties which involve those of officers appointed by the governor, is made elective by the constitution, and an equally technical position, for which no qualifications are established, that of superintendent of public works, is made appointive. The governor's adviser on legal matters of great moment who is responsible in a large measure for the enforcement of the law, the attorney general, is elected, while the superintendent of prisons is an appointive officer.

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