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In more recent years Senator Fulbright has encouraged greater use of the United Nation's machinery for the dispensation of foreign assistance and for international lending, for channeling Peace Corps type activities through a multinational volunteer corps, and for playing a greater role in political settlements, especially in the Middle East. I could go on and name many things that Senator Fulbright has done. Probably one of the best known is the Fulbright scholarship program. Anywhere in the world you can hear about the Fulbright scholars.

Senator, Mr. Chairman, we are glad to have you with us. Do any one of you gentlemen have a statement to make before we let him start talking? You won't get to make one afterward. [Laughter.]

Senator CASE. You do him an injustice. You remember he talked a great deal when he was up there in your chair, but that was his pre rogative then. He was never a man to let an opportunity go by. W are certainly glad to welcome you today and this won't be the las

time.

SENATOR PERCY'S STATEMENT

Senator PERCY. I should like to join in welcoming our former co league.

When we made up the list of prospective witnesses, Senator Ful bright's name was put at the head of the list because no one has pu more emphasis on diplomacy rather than military force, to solve th real problems. We have wanted an excuse to have you back with us Senator, and we welcome you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Clark, you did not have the privilege serving on the committee when Senator Fulbright was chairman. H was a great chairman. Senator Clark is a new member of the commi tee doing a very fine job.

Do you have any statement to make?

Senator CLARK. No. I did have the privilege of serving in th Senate for 2 years with Bill Fulbright and we are very happy have you here again, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in the Senate but not on the Foreig Relations Committee.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall be very glad to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR J. W. FULBRIGHT, FORMER CHAIRMA COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, appreciate very much this invitation to appear before this great con mittee. It does seem to me to be a most appropriate time just as w have demonstrated that military means are not as effective as som people thought they might be. The country and the committee ough to be on the move to consider the alternative which we are here t talk about today.

NO RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE TO U.N. PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES

As you know, I have had a deep and continuing interest in the us of negotiations and discussions rather than force to resolve differences That is what this is all about. The experiences which we have suf

fered since the time referred to by the chairman, which is more than 30 years ago, have strengthened my conviction that there is no rational alternative to the principles and procedures of the United Nations. I might say, since you have mentioned it, that the impetus for that resolution, the reason the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House accepted it, unanimously, I believe, at that time, was because we were in the midst of a war, and the costs of that war were so evident to everyone that there was no question about their approval. It was, as you have demonstrated, almost unanimous in the House as a whole and it was unanimous in the committee.

The circumstances, I think, were very propitious at that time and so are they now, with a different twist, because the futility of the Vietnam war is now evident to everyone. I think it is a very appropriate time to be considering this matter.

It seems to me the development of the hydrogen bomb has removed any doubt from rational minds that the periodic breakdown of the old international system of sovereign States, precariously balanced in a chaotic and lawless arena, is no longer good enough. Incineration by nuclear weapons just is not glamorous or appealing, even to the most romantic of our cold warriors, so I again repeat there is no rational alternative to the U.N., or something like the United Nations.

COMMENDATION OF SENATORS SYMINGTON AND PERCY

I wish to commend Senators Symington and Percy for their reports to this committee on their service in the 29th session of the U.N. General Assembly. I was pleased that both of these distinguished Senators concluded that the U.N. should be supported more vigorously by the United States. I especially commend Senator Percy for suggesting this review by this committee of the United Nations and its work.

U.N. STILL FUNCTIONS TO U.S. ADVANTAGE

I should like to suggest that Americans especially should be patient and understanding with the U.N. Our own Congress is about as near or similar to the U.N. as any significant political institution in the world. For 200 years, it has survived some tough trials and many tribulations, but it still functions to our advantage. The analogy is not close, nor conclusive; it simply suggests that discussion and compromise is the only known alternative to oppression and bloodshed, so I hope we will not abandon the U.N. but on the contrary, we should seek to use it and to strengthen it.

U.N. UNIVERSITY TO BE ESTABLISHED IN JAPAN

One example of our neglect is our failure to respond in any way to the creation of the United Nations University to be established in Japan. I am reminded of this primarily because I recently had the privilege of visiting in Japan and only returned about 10 days ago. The Japanese Government, I am informed, has pledged $100 million to the University, but the United States has so far taken no action whatever. It so happens the Emperor of Japan is scheduled to come to the United States this fall. I think it would be a very fine thin

if this committee could persuade our Government to make some contribution to the project which the Japanese take to be very specially their responsibility. When you consider that the Japanese are still following our admonition not to rearm in any major way other than pure local defense, they deserve some consideration from us. For that reason, if no other, although there are many other reasons, we should support this project.

DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN U.N. CONCEPT AT FRAMING OF CHARTER

AND TODAY

Mr. Chairman, if I may for a few minutes, by way of a clarification, say a few words before I give you my major statement. It is essential that we distinguish clearly between the U.N. as envisioned by the framers of the Charter in 1945 and the organization that actually functions in New York today. This is one reason that many people, as reflected in the press, have evidenced so much disaffection about it. The one represents the U.N. idea, the conception of a responsible, effective international peacekeeping organization. The other the U.N. Assembly as it operates today-is something different. It represents in a sense the abandonment of the original idea of the U.N. I emphasize "abandonment" and not the failure of the original U.N. idea, because a plan cannot be said to have failed when no serious effort has been made to implement it. The essentially powerless and sometimes irresponsible, assemblage of nations, which is the U.N. Assembly today, is not the result of any inherent defect in the U.N. Charter or the conception on which it is based. It is rather the result of our deep mistrust of the U.N. idea, of our fear and refusal almost from the outset to put even a small measure of our trust in

international institutions.

We are all aware of the contempt in which the Soviet Union held in the U.N. in the immediate aftermath of World War II, but we are less aware of the negative attitude of the Truman administration. which almost certainly would have given the world organization short shrift but for the automatic majorities which enabled us in those days to use the world body for our own purposes. Dean Acheson, who was perhaps the principal architect of American foreign policy in the early post-war years, told an interviewer in 1970, and I quote, "I never thought the United Nations was worth a damn. To a lot of people it was a Holy Grail, and those who set store by it had the misfortune to believe their own bunk."

REVIVING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ORIGINAL U.N. IDEA RECOMMENDED

As one who did then, and still does, believe that "bunk," I contend there is nothing more important in our foreign policy, nothing more essential to our national interest, than a renewed, belated effort to breath life into the now enfeebled world organization. This is not, I emphasize, to place our trust in the U.N. as it operates today; it is rather to make a concerted effort to revive and implement the original U.N. idea. The way to do this is by making the Security Council and other U.N. organs the central forum of our foreign relations, particularly on matters of pressing import like the middle East. I would

think it most important to conduct prospective Geneva conferences under clearly delineated U.N. auspices. But more important still the U.N. can play a central role in the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict-through use of permanent international forces to patrol demiliterized zones; U.N. teams to inspect and oversee compliances by both sides with the terms of the settlement and, finally, by providing appropriate guarantees of the overall settlement.

I am well aware of the low esteem in which the U.N. is held by Israel and perhaps others, but a U.N. guarantee would also be a great power guarantee, more specifically a Soviet-American guarantee, and that, one hopes, would inspire some measure of confidence. The point is the great nations can vest power in the U.N. by lending it a measure of their own.

Even without the immediate cooperation of others there is much else the United States could do to breathe life into the U.N. We could make it national policy to appoint men or women of emminence and power-with the prestige of the late Adlai Stevenson or the late Senator Robert Taft-as our representatives in the U.N. We could make it national policy to refrain from using our veto in the Security Coun

cil.

We could make it known to the other great powers that the U.N. is our preferred forum for negotiations on arms control and other crucial issues. We could take the lead in negotiating those long-neglected agreements called for by Article 43 of the Charter, under which members would and I quote, "Make available to the Security Council *** armed forces, assistance and facilities" to deal with threats to and breaches of the peace.

NECESSITY OF EFFECTIVE WORLD PEACEKEEPING ORGANIZATION

There is very little in international affairs about which I feel certain, ut there is one thing of which I am quite certain, the necessity of fundamental change in the way nations conduct their relations with each other. There is nothing in the human environment, as Adlai Stevenson once reminded us, to prevent us from bringing about some fundamental change. Even the great legal realist of the World War II period, Winston Churchill, recognized the importance of the U.N. iea. In his famous speech at Fulton, Mo., in 1946, remembered for its ference to the "iron curtain" which had rung down across the confinent of Europe, Churchill called for a new, cooperative world order. He called for a "good understanding on all points with Russia under the general authority of the United Nations organization," and he ailed, too, for the arming of a new world body with international force. Speaking of the U.N., he said, and I quote, "We must make are that its work is fruitful, that it is a reality and not a sham, that is a force for action, and not merely a frothing of words, that it is true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some ay be hung up, and not merely a cockpit in a Tower of Babel." Churchill's call made sense in 1946, and it still makes sense. Now as en the idea of an effective world peacekeeping organization is someng more than a visionary ideal, it is an immediate and practical ecessity.

CHANGE IN UNITED STATES ATTITUDE TOWARD U.N., INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS URGED

Mr. Chairman, it will not be my purpose this morning to suggest any sweeping changes in the United Nations Charter or any of our other international institutions.

Rather, it will be my purpose to urge a sweeping change in the U.S. Government's attitude toward, and its use of, these institutions. Never before has it been clearer that the unilateral and bilateral diplomacy that has been our tool in recent years is not adequate to cope with regional and world-wide problems. The tragic catastrophe in Southeast Asia demonstrates vividly the limits of such action, hopefully for all times. As I have said so many times, the United States cannot be the policeman of the world. The only alternative is collective action and multilateral diplomacy-the principal arena for which is the United Nations.

This, of course, is what we had intended the U.N. to perform when we joined the United Nations. It is as hard to pinpoint just where or when we began to shun involving the U.N. in our problems as it is to fix a date for our involvement in Vietnam or the time of the shift of power from the legislative to the executive branch. But it seems to me to be of the same pattern. Just as the executive branch was gradually freezing the Congress out of the foreign policymaking process, so was it equally determined not to tolerate any scrutiny of its policies and actions by the United Nations.

This is a far cry from the late 1940's and early 1950's when foreign aid legislation contained provisions ending these programs whenever the United Nations could take over and when our mutual security treaties contained a standard article: "This Treaty does not affect ... the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security."

Some will argue that the coolness that has developed on our part toward the United Nations was a response to the growth and unmanageability of the institution, particularly the General Assembly. But that is somewhat like the chicken and egg argument. Did the General Assembly become what it has because its recommendations were being ignored or did we start ignoring it because it would not do our bidding and dared criticize our actions? I rather favor the former explanation because it opens the way to corrective action on our part through a change in our attitude toward the United Nations.

I may have become too insistent about the United States having to stop trying to remake the world in its own image but I believe this attitude was a factor leading to our present isolated stance in the United Nations.

As soon as we sensed that we were losing control over the United Nations and that member nations did not buy our view of the world and what should be done, we abandoned the U.N. as a major channel for American foreign policy and chose to take upon ourselves the responsibility for maintaining international peace and security..

What, however, would have happened if our attitude had been to try put ourselves in the shoes of the developing and nonalined countries? Could we not have avoided the polarization of the General Assembly and our subsequent isolation from the mainstream of world

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