Mr. Stevenson to Lord Palmerston.-[cOPY.]

23 PORTLAND PLACE, March 8, 1839. The undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States, has the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the note addressed to him by Lord Palmerston, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, under date of the 6th instant, transmitting copies of an act of the last session of Parliament, securing to authors, in certain cases, the benefits of international copyright, and desiring to be informed, by the undersigned, whether the Government of the United States would be disposed to enter into an arrangement with that of Great Britain, for the purpose of securing copyright to authors and publishers within the dominions and territories of Great Britain and the United States.

The undersigned hastens to inform Lord Palmerston that it is not at this time in his power to give the information desired, as to the course which his Government may be disposed to take in relation to this important subject. He, however, does not doubt but that the proposition of Her Majesty's Government will be received with the consideration which its importance merits, and finally result in a satisfactory arrangement between the two Governments. With this view, the undersigned will take great pleasure in availing himself of the earliest opportunity of communicating to the President the wishes of Her Majesty's Government, expressed in Lord Palmerston's note, and asking an early consideration of the subject. As soon as the decision of his Government is received, it shall be communicated to Lord Palmerston.

The undersigned prays his lordship to accept assurances of his distinguished consideration. A. STEVENSON.

2d Session.

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FORTIFICATIONS, REPAIRING OLD WORKS, &c.

[To accompany bill H. R. No. 352.]

DOCUMENTS

SUBMITTED BY

THE CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS,

IN RELATION TO

Appropriations for fortifications, &c.

APRIL 12, 1842.

Ordered to be printed.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT,

Washington, March 28, 1842.

SIR: I have the honor to report, on the inquiries made of you by the chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives, in his letter of the 25th instant, as follows:

The first inquiry is, "How many works of fortification are proposed to be erected between Mobile bay and the Rigolets, and what is the estimate for completing the works ?"

The part of the coast here mentioned is not thoroughly understood; and, until further examinations have been made, it will not be possible to state what a complete system of defence from Mobile bay to the Rigolets will require. It is known, however, that fortifications alone will not cover its whole length adequately, owing to its numerous broad inlets; and that reliance must be placed, in a degree, on floating defences, of which steam vessels seem to be the only kind suited to the circumstances.

The particular objects contemplated by the estimate of the department are the defence of passages into Mobile bay from the west; which, it is probable, will be best accomplished by a work on Dauphin island, and another at Pass au Heron. As it was possible the examination, which would be made as soon as money should be available, might show some better position for one or the other, if not for both, it was thought most prudent to leave the choice of site undecided.

Supposing, as we reasonably may, that it will be unnecessary to make a change in the positions, the effect of the works proposed will be twofold: Ist, they will prevent access to the bay of Mobile by avenues, now entirely open, which are navigable to steam vessels of war; and, 2d, they will cause these channels to become the places of resort, and even of refuge, to our own steam vessels.

These sites were selected by General Bernard, and the projects made by him. He proposed a tower at Pass au Heron, of which he estimated the cost at $25,000; and to this tower the department now intend to recommend the application of $10,000 of the whole sum of $60,000 asked.

For Dauphin island, General Bernard recommended a large work, for which the estimate amounted to $880,000. The present Board of Engineers have contemplated a reduction in the size and cost of the work of at least one-half; and it was the purpose of the department to apply $50,000 to the commencement of this work, provided the selection of the site be confirmed.

The next inquiry of the committee is, "How many works of fortifi cation are proposed to be erected for the defence of the coast of Georgia, and what is the estimate for completing said works?"

Not less uncertainty exists as to the hydrographical features of the inlets on the coast of Georgia. Although it seems to be important to give additional security to the seacoast of this State, now entirely naked on every point but its northern extremity, (namely, the mouth of the Savannah river,) the Board of Engineers has not, up to this time, been able to make any projects for defensive works there, nor have its harbors been surveyed with a view to such objects. It seemed important that at least two positions should be secured-one at the southern extremity of the coast, and the other at some intermediate harbor; and, as the outlets of St. Simond's sound and Cumberland sound were then generally regarded as affording the best water, they were recommended from this office to you, and by you, in your letter of 1st December last, pointed out to the President.

Further researches amongst maps and surveys, and especially the examination of two or three surveys made under the Navy Department, satisfied this office that Sapello inlet was not only better than St. Simond's inlet, contrary to opinions long prevalent, but was in fact one of the best on the whole southern coast. As to Cumberland inlet, no reason has been discovered for distrusting its pre-eminence over all others in that part of the State; but, in order to be certain as to its properties, this office has requested that a survey may be made of it forthwith.

In this condition of things, although some momentary uncertainty exists as to the best sites, the necessity for defensive works is not lessened, and early provision for them appears to be called for by every consideration of prudence. The uncertainty spoken of led to the proposition that the selection of the sites should be left with the President. The particular object of the works will be, not only to protect very valuable harbors for the service of our military and commercial marine, but also to cover places of rendezvous and resort for the steam vessels of war, which must, while so many harbors remain unfortified, be employed upon this part of the coast, in some numbers, during a war.

To come now to particulars: it will be evident, from the preceding remarks, that this department is not now prepared to state what the complete defence of these or any other two inlets of the coast, not yet surveyed, will require, either as to the number of the works of fortification, or as to their cost. The department designed, however, to recommend the application of the sum asked for to the commencement of two worksone for a harbor near the south extremity of the coast, probably Cumberland, and the other for a harbor near the middle, probably Sapello;

$50,000 for each work. The total cost of these works cannot, of course, be given, except from mere conjecture. In a general estimate, heretofore furnished by a board of officers, there is set down for nine inlets on the coast of Georgia the sum of $1,800,000, or, on an average, $200,000 for each. Local peculiarities will necessarily involve difference in the cost, even were all the positions of equal importance; but as the two inlets for which we now wish to provide are the most important, and may long be the only defended inlets on the coast, and as several of the others are relatively quite unimportant, it is probable we may assign £400,000 for each of these without disturbing the general average. It must be distinctly understood, however, that, although permanent works are intended, neither is designed to be large. Each work should contain a battery of some thirty guns; should contain the necessary barracks, storehouses, and magazines, for its own war garrison of two hundred or three hundred men; should be inaccessible to escalade; and should hold out against some days' bombardment and investment.

"What is the estimate for completing the work at Willoughby's Point?" is the next question: to which I have to reply, that, although the project has not yet been adapted to the ground, I have little doubt that the sum of $150,000 will bring it to entire completion; and it is anticipated that the sum asked in the estimates will allow of important aid in the defence of the passage, being derived from that position.

For the answer to the next question, namely, "What is the estimate for completing the work on Sollers's Point ?" I have turned to the project of defence made by the Board of Engineers, of which General Bernard was a member, (in the year 1818,) and find the estimate for that work to be $1,000,000.

As to the expense of "completing the work on Sandy Hook and Staten island," the subject of the next inquiry, the department regrets that it must, as in some previous instances, reply in a less direct manner than it would wish. In the want of the explicit information asked by the committee, it appears necessary to go into some detail as to the circumstances. More than twenty years ago, the Board of Engineers studied out the defences of the harbor of New York, and made all the projects and estimates. The idea then was, after careful and laborious research as to the constancy of the shoals and channels, that the complete defence demanded the erection of two very heavy water batteries on the shoals, which lie about three miles outside of Sandy Hook, and there constitute the bar. The estimate for each of these works was $1,681,412, or, for the two, $3,362,824; which sum has always been included in the statements that have been made of the total cost of the present system of fortifications.

The minute examination of the barbor since made (in the progress of the coast survey) has afforded reason to suppose, in opposition to the former opinion, that the shoals are liable to changes, which would make the establishment of such works wholly inadmissible: first, because they might, by such changes, be left entirely out of place; second, because their erection might even produce other changes, that would deprive the entrance of its liberal depth, and in a measure destroy its utility for purposes of commerce. Nothing can be allowed to jeopard so vital an interest; and accordingly, since this doubt has been raised, the idea of these large batteries has been abandoned.

No alternative is left but the occupation of Sandy Hook, which becomes indispensable. Without such occupation, an enemy will enter the lower bay, and make it his habitual refuge and rendezvous, sealing up the commerce of the city hermetically.

If a blockading enemy be constrained to lie outside of the Hook, every storm removes the seal, and vessels, lying in wait for the opportunity, slip to sea through the interval which he is obliged to leave in getting an offing; but, if permitted to occupy the lower bay, no weather nor season could move him. And this is not all. If he may once pass the Hook, an enemy can land an expedition in Gravesend bay, (the British landing place in the revolutionary war,) whence there is a march of seven miles only to the navy yard and the heights of Brooklyn, which completely command the city of New York; and against such an enterprise all the fortifications at the Narrows, and above, would be of no immediate avail. Deprived of the Sandy-Hook entrance, the enemy, with such an enterprise in view, may be made to land on Rockaway beach, whence his march will be eighteen or twenty miles long, with his flank and rear exposed to troops that may cross the East river, at either Flushing or Throg's neck.

These remarks will explain why a project for the occupation of Sandy Hook has not yet been formed, and at the same time, in connexion with the last annual report from the department, they will exhibit the pressing necessity for such a work. The general form and relations of the posi tion are well known, and a survey has recently been asked of the details. of the locality, in order to the adaptation of a project to the ground. Until this project is completed, a conjectural estimate only can be given, which may be set down at one-fifth or one-sixth of the estimated cost of the two batteries which it is to supersede, say $600,000.

Staten-island works. The Board of Engineers estimated the cost of repairing and completing these works at $450,000; but this was a great many years ago, and the works have ever since been exposed, in an unfinished state, to all the causes of injury and decay. The circular-water battery, called Fort Richmond, which might then have been repaired at no great cost, must now be rebuilt from the foundations, and Fort Tompkins itself will need most thorough and expensive repairs, and, in part, reconstruction. The department is not willing to estimate all these expenses at less than $600,000, for which sum, it is hoped, the defences of the position may be put in good condition. The sum now asked is designed to purchase the property of the State, to add, this year, about thirteen gúns to the force of Battery Hudson, and to place the reconstruction of Fort Richmond in so forward a state that its guns may, on emergency, be mounted hext year.

"What is the estimate for completing repairs and enlarging old fort at New Bedford ?" To this question I have to reply, that it is supposed the sum of $15,000, in addition to what is now asked, will complete these operations. With the sum now asked, it is intended, this year, to double (about) the present force of this battery.

The reply to the last question, namely, "What is the estimate of the whole expense for constructing the sea wall at Lovell's island ?" is, that the sum of $16,000 is the whole amount of the estimate made by Col. Thayer for that object; and I have to request that that sum may be substituted for the sum of $15,000, entered in our estimates by mistake.