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navy or fortifications, to defend our people, to protect our interests and to punish the aggressions of our enemies.

This must be the true issue made up for the country; for the "practical medium," the proper combination of them both, is denounced in the report as "attacking fundamental principles," and "incoating doctrines which we (the board) believe to be highly dangerous." Let us make that issue, and the country will sit in judgment.

The reporter appeals to history; for he says it may be well to consult experience.

How did England "cover her positions" and prepare to meet the war, when, for the first time in two centuries, the war approached her threshold; when the Emperor Napoleon assembled his nation in arms, on the further side of the channel, preparatory to his projected invasion of the island? Did she withdraw her fleet, lest it should be beaten, "fearing to submit to the issue of a single battle," and fall back upon her chain of fortifications? No. She put forth her entire energies to equip her fleet, strong in her reliance upon its ability to defend her. She well knew of how little consequence the most elaborate fortifications were in the plans of a general who subdued them, not by assault or siege, but by beating armies and winning great battles. She remembered that Italy, Germany, and Spain, countries whose frontiers were a chain of battlements, whose highways, ports, and cities, were converted into fortresses, fell without a blow, when their armies were defeated. To resort to fortifications, then, were futile; and her wooden walls again became, as in former times of peril, her only fortress. Nor was she mistaken in the results. Now, there are points of resemblance between the mother country and ourselves, which makes a policy pursued so successfully by her commend itself, without the countenance of a late President and Secretary of War, powerfully to the favorable consideration of our country.

And here I would, remark that the term "navy" means all the floating defences of the country, and not the "sea going ships" only, as the board would have it. Sea-going ships are but the better kind of "floating batteries," differing from those last, as proposed by the board to be appended to the fortifications, only as one class of vessels differs from another class; and that a proposition more injurious to the navy could not be projected than that which the board proposes, namely: "to provide our harbors with some or all of these vessels, according to local circumstances;" "leaving to the sea-going vessels" the foreign service. These "floating batteries," the small craft of the navy, are the nurseries of our officers and seamen, and enable them to obtain the local knowledge so important to a sailor. This very proposition of the board to connect them with the fortifications, as dependencies to the army, is a striking instance of the little reliance to be placed on the predictions of the board, that the proposed system of fortifications, when completed, shall release the country of the charge and danger arising from a large standing army. The very first necessary incident to their construction, in the opinion of the board, and now proposed in advance as indispensable to their security, is the addition of a naval force in the shape of floating batteries, with of course the endless consequences of arsenals and dock yards of construction and repair! Is not the opinion of the late Secretary well founded, when he urges as his radical objection to this wild scheme of fortifications, that it involves the necessity of a great standing army as a consequence?

Perhaps it would be well to inquire if the volunteer force by which the fortifications are to be manned are to hold these floating batteries (in other words) these steam-ships of war too, or will it be required to make the sinall addition of some marine brigades for this special service?

This topic may be dismissed with the remark, that the perfection of "floating batteries" are our ships of war; and that it is usual to construct them of different classes, in order to "adapt them to the local peculiarities" of each port, "for they were made to go into every port as well as into every sea.

The board favors the project of defence by "floating batteries," such as gunboats, rafts, and small craft, as an efficient means, as little, perhaps, as they deserve; as adjuncts, they are useful, sometimes highly so; alone and unsupported, worthless or real evils; for small craft alone will debauch a naval force as readily as small forts or petty stations enervate and deprave a soldiery. With the reporter, therefore, we shall take leave of the floating batteries, &c., as an exclusive means of defence, as deserving little further consideration, and proceed with him to try those "general conclusions" which "appear to be so obvious and incontrovertible;" so much so, in the opinion of the board, that they would not have touched on them so much at length," but for the prevalence of opinions which we (the board) think not erroneous merely, but highly dangerous, and which must give way before a full exhibition of the truth."

In full confidence of these opinions, the report proceeds to challenge opposition to the following broad propositions:

1st. If the seacoast is to be defended by naval means exclusively, the defensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal in power to the attacking force.

2d. As, from the nature of the case, there can be no reason for expecting an attack on one of these points rather than on another, and no time for transferring our state of preparation, from one to another, after the attack has been declared, each of them must have assigned to it the requisite

means.

3d. And, consequently, this system demands a power in the defence as many times greater than the attack as there are points to be covered.

4th. Believing that a well-digested system of fortifications will save the country from the dangers attending every form of defence by naval means, and the intolerable expense of a full provision of these means, we will now endeavor to show that such a system is worthy of all reliance.

With these "incontrovertible" positions, I must again join issue; for I coincide with the distinguished military, civil, and naval authorities whe entertain the "highly dangerous opinions" thus condemned; and who are ready to adopt, as the fixed policy of the country, the recommendations of the able statesmen with whom they originated, and listen to the matured experience of a great soldier, for that practical plan which shall neither swallow up our resources nor cover our land with castles.

There is nothing in these sentiments so highly dangerous to our welfare, nor is one sound fundamental principle attacked, as the reporter fears. Let us apply, as heretofore, their own arguments, as levelled against the naval means, to the system of fortification now proposed; and

1st. If the country is to be defended by fortifications exclusively, "the defensive force at each point deemed worthy of protection must be at least equal in power to the attacking force," or we shall have lavished our

treasure in vain, on mischievous endeavors to prepare a stronghold for our enemy at our very doors, from which we may not be able to dislodge him, at least until his object be accomplished.

But, first, let us estimate the probable amount of this attacking force, in order to ascertain the extent to which we must fortify "each point worthy of protection," to resist this attack. We can fix this amount most readily, if we assume the estimate of the board, in their argument, to be true; and our able engineers will easily calculate the cost of this resistance at each important point. Now, if we shall find this cost to be enormous, beyond the means of any nation whose institutions are not purely military, and even with it the resistance to be doubtful, surely, in the language of the reporter, it would be "preposterous" to adopt such a policy for our country, and would bespeak the wisdom of able statesmen who preferred a welltried system, better adapted to the condition of our country, upon which to rely for her security.

"We learn from these points of history (say the board) what constitutes an object worthy of vast preparation;" and "we are taught, moreover, what constitutes a great expedition; in other words, what is the amount of force we must be prepared to meet," namely, from 20,000 to 40,000 men, 35 sail of the line, and from 20 to 70 sail of inferior vessels. This is the standard of the probable attacking force, assumed by the board as the maximum assailing force which we must be prepared to meet. We may estimate, by inference, the necessary preparations to resist an armament like this, by ascertaining how it has been met elsewhere.

But let us examine, first, the preparations which are made under this system to defend our seacoast, or rather certain points upon it, (for pushed to its extreme, it can embrace but these,) from the approaches of such a force as the above, and see if these preparations be adequate to their task; and if they be not, if it is practicable to make them so.

We shall concern ourselves, at present, only with the three important points north of Virginia, inclusive, where the most elaborate preparations have been, or are to be made to meet the hostile demonstrations of an enemy; and, of these three, select New York, as being the principal attraction to a foe, and involving the greatest loss to the country by its reduction.

Upwards of eighteen "works" are constructed or projected for the defence of the city of New York, at a cost of $7,000,000, and calculated to mount 2,059 pieces of artillery. These works will require war garrisons of 9,000 regular troops, if the principal force to man them be taken from neighboring militia. These are the preparations deemed sufficient to resist the maximum expeditionary force before assumed.

What has been done can be done again.

The population, military resources, and fortifiations of the fortified city of Copenhagen, conjointly, at the period in question, were in no wise inferior to those of the city of New York. The Danish defences on one front alone, consisting of 986 guns, were on the morning of the 2d April, 1801, attacked by the British fleet-"attacked by 20,000 troops, 30 sail of the line, and 60 inferior vessels?" No; by 8 ships of the line, and 21 smaller vessels only. Of these, 3 of the 8 ships of the line grounded before getting into position; and in four hours, "after the most sanguinary conflict ever fought," the battle ended in the total capture and destruction of the enemy's

line.

"The strength of the Danish line of defence and batteries was such,"

says the same authority, "as might have been pronounced impregnable. They had 17 floating batteries, mounting each from 26 to 18 twenty-four pounders and eighteen pounders, and these supported by the forts on shore on the island of Armac and the two crown batteries, mounting 80 pieces of heavy ordnance flush with the water.'

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It was in the presence of this tremendous force, and within a proper fighting distance, that Nelson had to take up his position, furl his sails, and receive the first fire of an enemy who fancied himself securely fortified.

It is not enough to account for the result, that the board, in the criticism. of this memorable conflict between a flect and fortifiations, sum up the number of guns on either side, and attribute it to a concurrence of favorable circumstances which will not again recur. It will again recur, whenever a fleet can approach and concentrate its fire upon permanent works, until the ingenuity of engineers shall enable them to move their castles as easily as we move fleets.

The reporter counts the guns of the Danish force at 986, and counts one front of the line only, and yet counts up both broadsides of the English fleet. Was Copenhagen only fortified on one front? And does he not know that one broadside is the fighting force of a ship of war against a fixed position? The British fleet fought only 468 guns, afloat, against those 986 guns on Armac and the crown batteries; yet in four hours they were silenced, and the object gained. The assailants could have brought to the attack three times the force, for the main body of the fleet were but quiet spectators of the battle. As to the crown batteries, Lord Nelson spoke advisedly when he said of the grounding of the Bellona, Russell, and Agamemnon, "these accidents prevented the extension of our line by the three ships, who would, I am confident, have silenced the Crown islands." He knew the power of line-of-battle ships to silence batteries, and could have told the reason with as much ease as he proved its truth.

The reporter accounts for this result, indeed, but in a manner intimating that it was unusual or accidental; "concentrating, as he did," his whole force upon a part of the Danish army. This was true. This is the reason which Lord Nelson could have given to justify his confidence. It is this very ability to concentrate, to choose a position before a permanent work, which constitutes the wonderful and irresistible power of a fleet. It is precisely that power which fortifications can never reach, or substitute by the most artful and ingenious arrangements known to our engineers, and which will perhaps cause them to be built hereafter beyond the reach of sea guns. There is little to be said further of this three crown battery, which enters largely into the discussions of the reporter. Doubtless it, too, would have been reduced, as Lord Nelson said, if the ships assigned to its attack had reached their stations. But this even was not necessary. The remainder of the fleet selected its position without further regard to this formidable work; and Denmark was reduced to terms, with its strongest work untouched.

Now, as before observed, Copenhagen was in no wise inferior to the city of New York, when she shall be sheltered under the wings of these eighteen works projected by the "system ;" and yet it was subdued by a fifth of the attacking power assumed as the standard by the board, and without one of the "twenty thousand troops" which it includes.

This system, then, as applied from their own premises, is proved to be palpably defective, and unequal to its duties. Shall we, then, double the

defences, build six-and-thirty fortresses at twice these millions, and provide twice the number of troops, that New York may be safe-that we may have a defensive force at this point "equal in power to the attacking force " We might even go thus far, if the system was "worthy of all reliance:" but, at Copenhagen, whilst the fight was going on, a strong division of the British fleet in the othing beheld with envy the daring feats of their brethren in arms. But the assumed standard of the attacking force has ten times the power of Nelson's little fleet.

The attack on Copenhagen is but one of many in which fleets and fortifications have contested victory; and generally the strongest fortresses against far from formidable fleets. Of these, the board instances the attack on Algiers; "one in which," say they, "there is no room to doubt the extent to which these fortifications were engaged."

The attack was made by the combined English and Dutch fleets, mounting, according to the report, about 1,000 guns. In the fortifications that looked towards the water, the reporter estimates about 320 guns, and asserts that not more than 100 of these could be brought to hear against the fleet.

The authority from which this information was derived was not authentic. There were 200 guns afloat about the mole, independent of the batteries; and, in these last, an estimate, by good authority, makes the number not less than 1,000 guns, notoriously of the heavy caliber preferred by the Turks.

Algiers is a fortified city, built upon an inclined plane so precipitous that every house in it is visible from the sea, fortified in the entire circuit. The works rise, terrace-like, to the summit of the hills, which are crowned with batteries beyond the reach of sea guns. The lower batteries, rise tier above tier, and overhang the sea, and were generally deemed impregnable by sea.

Lord Exmouth was ordered to attack it, however, with a force deemed so inadequate in England that the most anxious doubts were entertained for the safety of his fleet. The admiral acknowledged this as a reason for sending his son away from the fleet.

Lord Exmouth sailed with five ships of the line and some smaller vessels; and, after being joined by the Dutch admiral, who brought him several frigates, on the morning of the 27th August, 1816, attacked the city at the distance of fifty yards from the principal fortifications.

In four hours he had dismantled the fortifications, and laid the town in ruins.

Several comparisons are made by the reporter, to the disadvantage of the fleet, showing that, though something was done, much was left undone. He says that all the batteries were not silenced when Lord Exmouth thought proper to withdraw, and was glad to do so; concluding with the reflection. that "the mind is not satisfied with any reasons that present themselves for the withdrawal of Lord Exmouth, the moment the land wind enabled him to do so." If the reporter had been a seaman, or had ever seen Algiers, his mind would have been satisfied at once. Lord Exmouth anchored his fleet of heavy ships at the bottom of an open bay, subject to heavy storms, and entirely unsheltered from the sea and winds. He fought his battle, and razed a city to the ground, from a position that a sloop of war would not occupy for a single night without the hazard of a wreck. When the fight was done, his self-congratulations for the auspicious land breeze,

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