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should we hesitate to distrust any other system, which we have seen has never produced such results, and to condemn it as dangerous, incompetent, and fallacious, and as unworthy of all reliance?

The reporter alludes to the stress which has been laid "on certain suc. cessful attacks, made by ships on works deemed strong," and doubts not that all such results might be accounted for by circumstances independent of the naked question of relative strength. Why, sir, the question of relative strength has been settled for a century by the British fleet. With them, the question of attack on a fortified place has been a question of expediency or policy; and the force requisite to detail for it, as we have seen by history. Their confidence in the power of naval attack on fortified places, has been fully justified. Up to the last page of their history, embracing St. Jean D'Acre, and the countless batteries in China, they have never hesitated to risk life and reputation, from a doubt as to "the naked truth" of this unsettled question. They have always acted as if the question was quieted for

ever.

When Sir Hyde Parker arrived at the Cattegat, on his way to Copenhagen, he addressed a letter to the Governor of the castle of Cronenberg, which commands the entrance to the sound, as Fortress Monroe does that into Hampton Roads, to know whether his excellency had received orders to fire on the British fleet in passing. This officer replied, that he should not permit a fleet, whose object and destination were unknown to him, to pass his post, &c. Bad weather detained the fleet three days at its anchorage; but on the 30th the admiral weighed and forced the passage without having received much damage from the tremendous fire of the fortress. When the whole line had passed, it quietly anchored five or six miles within. These, and similar cases which could be cited, settle a "naked question of relative strength," of some interest to the multitudes who have speculated upon the ability of our "Cronenbergs," to stop the transit of a fleet.

But, whatever may have been the "circumstances" referred to, the results have been too uniform to account for them by "accidents" of war. And here it may be only reasonable to inquire why it is that fortified places on the seaboard are incompetent to resist successfully the attack of fleets? If we can rely on the "facts of history," the conclusion that, after centuries of trial, they have not been able to resist, is irresistible that they cannot. Let us inquire wherefore; for in all the elaborate reasonings of the board to prove that it ought to be otherwise, we find no other causes of superior strength in fixed defence alleged, than that the fixed position of guns on shore allows a better pointage, that they are defended by stone and mortar instead of wooden walls, and that they can use the red-hot shot against combustible defences. These are strong reasons, it must be granted, and sustain the theory of fixed defences so speciously, that the experience derived from the practice of warfare has almost been overlooked.

To these accusations against the strength of ships, it may be replied as briefly: That fleets being able to choose their fighting distance and positons, from their locomotive qualities, anchor, as Lord Exmouth did, "within fifty yards," so that no shot is lost, even after the first broadside, when, from the smoke and obscurity of battle, the pointage of both is random; that ships at this distance, dealing out at broadsides tons of grape and cannister, from tier above tier of the heaviest guns, care not for the nicety of pointage-they cannot miss their enormous target.

Perhaps the disparity in personal security alleged by the reporter may not be found, upon examination, to be so great as is claimed in favor of the stone and mortar parapets. The fragments from shattered walls, the unsheltered condition of the garrison from a pitching fire, and from shells thrown by vessels in security, and the complete exposure of those parts of works taken in reverse or enfiladed by ships placed to flank the principal face attacked, seem fully to account for the great disparity in casualties which we observe in actual warfare.

The loss at Algiers, for example, was but 883 killed and wounded in the combined squadrons, whilst in the batteries between 6,000 and 7,000 were cut down. Nor must this be taken as a bad example, where all the conditions of defence by fortifications were not fulfilled. No one who has seen the wonderful defences of Algiers; the strength and solidity of the works, the guns of which look upon the anchorage; the mole-head battery, casemated with tier above tier of guns, can doubt that, as far as strength of position and massive walls were concerned, the garrison was here as secure as elsewhere. It was stone and mortar against the wooden walls; and we can count the difference in their casualties.

It was exactly so at Copenhagen, at St. Juan D'Ulloa, at St. Jean D'Acre, and in China, without encumbering these pages with other cases.

We come now to the last objection, and the most formidable weapon, at least esteemed so by the reporter, when directed by fortifications against ships of war-I mean the red-hot shot. The destructive effect of these agents against ships of war is principally inferred from the results produced upon the hulks brought by the besieging armies to the attack upon Gibraltar. I believe that heated shot were here first used, and they accomplished all that was expected of them, as they would again, under similar circumstances. But, like fire-ships, so often resorted to in order to destroy or make confusion in a fleet, they are terrible only when they take effect, but easily avoided by the skilful and resolute seaman. Fire-ships rarely succeed against a British fleet-we may say, never; they are promptly avoided or coolly sunk by their broadsides. And so with the red-hot shot; there are resources against their destructive agency, besides the power of retaliation.

We have as yet no example of their ability to save a fortress from the assaults of ships; they have not, in the lapse of a century, destroyed a fleet; nor have they yet saved the fortified cities of the old or the new world. Sir Hyde Parker did not stop to inquire if the castle of the Cronenberg would fire red-hot shot; nor Duckworth, nor Lord Exmouth, nor did Commodore Napier but yesterday, nor would the chief of a naval force stop now to make the inquiry; perhaps he would not care much. It matters little whether the shot be hot or cold, with twenty ships of the line playing upon a single face of a fortification "at fifty yards." There are but few guns served in the enibrasures under such a fire.

It is not like the attack on land; no waiting for the salvos of artillery, and where the coming shell is watched to be avoided, by seeking shelter under cover. The attack by ships is a storming party on a great scale, which must be faced, open to all the exposure of this concentrated fire. Of what avail would the diverging fire of a few red-hot shot be under such an assault as this?

Perhaps no better example of the relative strength of fleets and fortifications can be given than to make the case of two armies approaching each

other in the array of battle: one with its thousand guns distributed on every assailable point, and fastened to the spot; the other with its thousand guns, capable of moving in mass at the rate of ten miles an hour, to be thrown upon any one of the defended positions of the other. The result is as apparent as it is inevitable, be the missiles hot or cold. And this is the picture of naval warfare, trimmed of its "independent circumstances."

Here we have made the case most favorable to the fortress, by giving it an equal active force, which, from the nature of things, it can never have. No'nation can make each fortress a Gibraltar. And we have given ample time for preparation, which is rarely the case with any fortress, and can never be with ours, when its defenders are to be drawn from the neighboring militia, as is proposed by the system now before us. What then, I ask, would be the issue, with the best of our works, against an enemy which first appears with the rising sun, moving upon the defences with this vast artillery at the rate of ten miles an hour, with lighted matches, which had to assemble from their homes the militia force to meet the coming fight? Yet such is actually the plan proposed "the mode by which the system of fortifications on which we rely can be manued and served, without an augmentation, for that particular purpose, of the regular army." Such, in short, are the views of the board to which the consideration of the subject of the national defences was intrusted, and such is the tenor of the report! Are we, is the board, prepared to accede to views like these? Views which, in the eyes of men, dispassionately considered, and but "for the high authority from which they emanate," might be called, in the words of the reporter, preposterous, but that they would involve graver consequences than a simple epithet.

The board would apparently have us prepare for war without the cost of war, and the necessity of providing the necessary means-as in a recent memorable instance we have endeavored to make war without shedding blood, without fighting battles! Such would seem to be the opinion of the board, but it is an opinion graduated to the known feelings of the country, which, averse from a military establishment on a large scale, on a scale great enough to meet the exigencies of a state of war, have announced, in terms not to be misunderstood, that it will resort to other means; nay, fall back upon the household weapons of the people, rather than submit its destinies to a great standing army in time of peace. But such opinions are rather a tribute of respect to the known feelings of the country than the well-considered sentiments of military men. It is fair, nay, it is but just, to believe that the true doctrine of the military arm is in favor of an army-a great and sufficient army in time of peace, that we may be prepared for war. I say it is but fair and just so to believe, because our next best securiry in peace, and for our protection in time of war, is an army-a regular, large, and well-appointed army, competent to meet the first shock of war, and to concentrate and direct the military resources of the country in times of peril to their proper ends; but not this system of fortifications which, whilst it professes to supersede the necessity of both army and navy, involves, in addition to itself, both on a greater scale. We must have, if this system be adopted, according to the reporter, that which will make an army necessary to its preservation. We have already seen the budding germ, the first fruits of this system. "Floating batteries" attached to each fortification, "adapted to the local peculiarities of the place," are proposed as indispensable to their se

curity. In short, a little military navy, though this plan promised to relieve the country from the "intolerable burden" of every kind of defence by "naval means!" It has already been asked if these "naval means" are to be manned by the volunteer force of the country. No; this "naval means" requires men trained to the sea. Were the present army distributed to the proposed fortifications, there would scarcely be men enough in each to keep them clean. Is it not apparent, then, that additional forces must be provided, when this "system" is matured? and that the objection of the honorable Secretary is well founded, that it involves the absolute necessity of a great standing army in time of peace?

Undoubtedly the public interests would be best subserved, were the policy of a powerful army at once adopted, to meet the growing demands which are daily made upon the nation. We should then at least hear little more of these expensive fortifications, which will surely involve the neces sity of the former, and "saddle" the country with the "intolerable expense" of both.

The proposed system of fortifications is but the substitution of a name for the thing. On this foundation a great inilitary policy will be erected, after the committal of the nation by the expenditure of millions of its treasure. Is the country prepared for this? for the time has now arrived when the decision must be made.

We have seen that fortifications, though backed by regular and well-appointed armies, could not, and, however " well digested" the system, have not saved a country from the danger attending the various forms of attack by naval means; that they do not fulfil the conditions of defensive warfare, and that the, accumulation of them at the exposed points of our three thousand miles of coast would be attended with an expense beyond the means of any Government not purely military. That even should this system, which promises so much here, and which has performed so little elsewhere, meet every expectation of its framers, still it would be inert, in the protection of our vast interests, removed, by their nature, beyond its reach. Our agricultural and manufactured products, beyond the actual consumption of the country, become available only through the agency of our active commerce; and the surplus is our wealth, in the shape of returns in money and the products of foreign countries. How is the best-devised system of fortifications to reach these with a protecting arm in their com mercial transit? It is in vain to say that this duty is left to the naval arm. This is the proposition of the Secretary of War, only that he would leave the country the ability to equip a navy, instead of exhausting its treasures upon the fortifications: and this opinion is denounced as dangerous, inculcating doctrines which "attack fundamental principles."

It is clear that whatever policy we shall adopt must and ought to be nearly exclusive in its application. Such is the opinion of the board in favor of the fortifications; such is apparently the intention of the country, for it is not in the temper of our people (perhaps not within their ability, certainly not their inclination) to cover our shores with breast works, to maintain a great military force, and sustain a navy competent to the great ends of its existence. But the country is prepared to make one of these the fixed policy of the nation, and to make that one perfect of its kind.

May not the question of the board, "What, then, in general terms, shall be the means of defence?" be answered thus: That we may henceforth look to our navy as the best means of national defence; that our first and

best fortification is the navy, and that the limit to our naval preparations, except that imposed by a due regard to the public revenue from time to time," is the actual or prospective condition of other maritime nations."

The country will expect the navy to cover and defend our coasts and cities; to shield our people over the whole earth, in life, liberty, and property; to secure our commerce in the peaceful transit of the seas, to give fair play to our domestic industry, and resist the restrictions, embarrassments and impositions, to which nations, our commercial rivals, are prone to subject their weaker neighbors.

Could any system of domestic defences, situated as is our country, in the shape of a great system of empty fortifications, inert and lifeless until awakened by the broadsides of an enemy, accomplish ends of so great national importance?

Is it not visible that the appropriate means to such ends is a navy? And has not the policy of Great Britian, unwavering and intact, by even the accidents of war, tested by time and tried by events which have laid her sister kingdoms in the dust within half a century, furnished an example which, safe to follow, it would be almost folly to neglect?

Whilst thus placing the value of fortifications as a means of national defence at so low a mark, no opinion is designed to be expressed as to their abstract worth, where, as in continental warfare, they are intended to assist in the defence of inland frontiers, and, assailed by armies, are intended to retard the advance and delay the operations of land forces, and to prolong compaigns. But even here, in their appropriate sphere, they have been assailed by the contempt of experinced soldiers. "Opinions became current about twenty-five years ago, among many French generals, who thought that war should consist entirely in tactics of the troops, and that all the fortified places ought to be razed, after the manner of the Emperor Joseph II, of Germany, who, about this time, caused several to be abandoned."*

General Gaines declares as his solemn opinion, and the experience of this octogenarian soldier, bred to war and reared in the camp, who made the best defence of a fortified place on record since our revolutionary struggle, that the system of permanent fortifications proposed is no defence against fleets propelled by steam power, in a nation situated as the United States are, covering, as they do, a large extent of country bordered by a seaboard of nearly four thousand miles," and "that it is time to lay aside our obso. lete military books, borrowed from the old world ;" and, further, "that the great revolution which steam power has produced in its application to every thing that is wafted upon the seas and that rolls upon the land, applicable to the attack and defence of seaports, leaves our country absolutely destitute of the means of defence." Of so little value does he esteem this gigantic system of defence by fortifications, that he asserts, if we trust to thein for our security, "we must submit to the degradation of seeing all our seaports in the possession of the invading foe, or of seeing our cities battered down by fifty or one hundred ships of war," without the possibility of our bringing to their succor sufficient force in time for their pro

tection.

We have thus shown why it is that fortifications are not able to resist the attack of fleets, supported by striking examples, from a distant period to almost the present moment; we have shown that they do not resist suc

* O'Connor's translation of Polytechnic Treatise.

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