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cessfully; and the conclusion is not unreasonable, that, for our country, the proposed system is not "worthy of all reliance," and that it should be abandoned.

Perhaps, for the true interests of our country, it had been better that we had never known this system. It has wasted those resources which would have been turned toward the support of an efficient army; would have nurtured the military spirit of our people devoted to arms; would have sustained its discipline by keeping the army more imbodied. The camp would then have been the soldier's home; where, inured to labor and familiar with our climate, they would have been equal to the exposures of our continental wars. They would not have perished as they have done, and melted away before the hardships of the first campaign within the boundaries of our own country. The garrison life, to which this system would subject and use our gallant army, is the fruitful mother of these evils. All history teaches us that armies come from "quarters" long occupied, enervated in spirit and enfeebled in physical strength; ours, which is but the skeleton, the nucleus around which our military power is to gather, and from which our future armies are to derive their tone, should sedulously be preserved from such corrupting influences.

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But, as before hinted, the most radical objection is to be found in the enormous cost of this system. In order to estimate this, it must be borne in mind that, however plausible the plan, the works are not to be garrisoned until they are to be fought. A practical consideration of the subject will show, that when once completed they must be manned. If ever doubtful, the repeated calls of the Engineer department of "attention" to this subject entirely dispel it. "It is particularly my duty to call your attention to the state of abandonment in which many of our forts have been left for many years past, as involving, in some cases, material injury." possible to estimate this injury in dollars and cents." "The presence of a garrison under good discipline, and in the observance of a strict police, will undoubtedly avert many evils that would most certainly befal in the absence of all responsible occupants;" and, in addition to the garrison called for, "there should be stationed in every fort, according to the size, from one to six or eight persons, regularly trained to the duty, whose sole business should be its maintenance in a state of constant efficiency." corps of mechanics, in short. "Ordinary garrisons without these will not

avail."

A

other

Now, this is all right enough; and it is not noticed here for any purpose than to show how this system, when once fairly planted, will grow; and to show, what was before asserted, that a great army, to preserve, to garrison, to defend them, must of necessity be maintained, in addition to the very system which professes to supersede the necessity of such standing army!

It will not be enough to say that only small garrisons for each of these works will be required. One hundred and sixteen forts are designated, of which fifty-three are under the head of works, and may therefore be doubled in the estimate, making at least one hundred and seventy-nine fortified places to be garrisoned, and provided with people "regularly trained" to the preservation of works. Give to each of these a company, and we may perceive that, whilst we are building fortifications, to relieve us from the intolerable expense of a standing army and "every means of naval defences," we make seventeen additional regiments absolutely necessary!

With our present army of 11,000 men, we have few to spare for the defence and care of the present number of fortifications, as may be seen by the "call," so that the actual army may not be counted ou; and thus we find that, when we have completed this prodigious system, the necessity of an army of forty regiments, engineer, and ordnance inclusive, absolutely requisite to the care of that which promised to relieve the country of the "intolerable expense" of our military preparations!

Nor are these inferences imaginary; this is the practical result. It must, and, if we adopt this system, it should be so. For it is scarcely worthy of remark, that we had better blow into the air and leave in ruins citadels which command our cities with their guns, and control our harbors, that might and probably would be seized by an excited populace for lawless purposes, or by a nation hostile in its feelings and ripe for war. Both have occurred, and very recently, on our Northern frontier, though on a small scale.

We have not noticed here the additional troops which would be requisite to man the "floating batteries," or, in other words, the steam ships of war, which are proposed, by this military board, as adjuncts to these works; as perhaps, under any decision of this question, the floating batteries will be left under their appropriate department-the navy. But it may be seen to what amount they would swell the estimate.

With these premises before us, we may, in some degree, calculate the cost involved by this proposed system of defences. We have the estimate of the first cost in the public documents; we know the actual cost of some of them, and we can calculate the annual expenses of our present military force. The sum of these will show, to a dollar, what the country now pays for the support of its defensive means by the military arm; and from these the inference is sure as to what will be exacted from the country ever afterwards.

It would be difficult to calculate the relative expense of fleets and of armies, and their dependencies, to a country which employs both, or either more or less, for its defence. A close investigation of all the facts, I apprehend, would throw the onus of "intolerable expense" upon the military arm instead of the navy, as is asserted by the reporter. The true question is, which will fulfil the necessary requirements of an armed force best?

Perhaps no better approximation to the truth of the real cost of war can be had than the actual appropriations for military purposes from year to year, and the money expended within the same periods on a navy, both in peace and war. What would be the result of such a scrutiny? Since the origin of our Government, the military has been the chief drain upon the Treasury; the average appropriations for the navy would not perhaps amount to quite a half. So it is in Great Britain, though her chief reliance has been upon her navy. So in France, in Holland, in Russia, and in Spain, the public embarrassments to the Treasury and the principal cost of war has been occasioned by the cost of armi :s.

Nor shall we wonder when we look at the operating causes. The decay of ships is more rapid than the permanent fortifications intended to resist them; but in all other particulars the cost of fleets is infinitely less than that of armies. They transport their own baggage and provisions; they transport their ammunition and equipments, their camp equipage and their troops, in peace and war, at an equal cost-in all seasons, to the remotest points with celerity and certainty. All the countless contingent expenses

of an operating army are unknown to the naval force. In peace or war you can estimate the cost, and often pay it by successful warfare on the Who can calculate the cost of armies!

ocean.

A system of defence, by naval means, recommends itself by various and powerful considerations. Of all known means, in the average of years, it is the cheapest. A navy is not less useful in peace than powerful in war. Fleets are the preparations visible to the world, showing, in a manner not to be misunderstood, that in peace we are prepared for war-the surest means of averting war. Our commerce would not exist a year without its presence; our tedious and lingering negotiations are hurried to an honorable conclusion by the presence of our squadrons. The international law has, in part, in modern times, been construed to suit the claims of right instead of might, by their agency; and, for the first time in the history of the world, our citizens can go abroad without a certificate of citizenship to protect their persons from a forced military bondage. The merchant's ship, like the merchant's home, is sacred from the lawless search of haughty claimants to the dominion of the seas.

This is a system of which we can count the cost; compact in its nature, to be expanded in its operations or contracted in its limits to meet emergencies; of reasonable cost; so that the interest of the money proposed to be expended upon fortifications and their dependencies would defray the expenses of an ample peace establishment.

There is but one more point, in the report under consideration, which needs the notice of a remark. It is the necessity of multiplying fleets upon our extended coast, in order that each point may be guarded, or, in other words, lest any be left unguarded. Instead of treating this subject by assertion, or lengthened arguments upon probabilities, it was preferred to test it by the example of a Power which had for years trusted to defences now for the first time contemned. She had relied for centuries upon her wooden walls, for the protection of her trade, the security of her homes, and for the supremacy she coveted; and they had never failed her, until the first shock given by her descendants, who had followed in her footsteps. This example is complete, and applicable to our country in all its phases. To her it was a policy which led to the aggrandizement of a petty island people to a pinnacle of greatness which Rome, in her proudest day, never knew.

That policy is of no recent date. In the days of Elizabeth, Sir Walter Raleigh declared "that England is a land which can never be conquered while the kings thereof have the dominion of the sea." And we find it announced, in an old parliamentary address, that "the honor and safety of this nation, under the providence of God, chiefly depend upon our strength at sea."

M. Dupin, a French savan, who scrutinized this policy most narrowly, remarks, more recently, "that the British Government views the greater part of the foreign possessions of which she has retained the political dominion as advanced posts, in preparation to supplant, during peace, the commerce of rivals; to destroy, at need, the marines of other nations; and, lastly, to facilitate the invasion of the territory of every people who may become an enemy."

She has been true to this policy through all times and under all circumstances. The Emperor Napoleon understood this policy weli. "He remarked," says a narrator, "that ever since the time of Cromwell, we had set up extraordinary pretensions, and arrogated to ourselves the dominion

of the seas; that, after the peace of Amiens, Lord Sidmouth wished to renew the treaty of commerce which had been made by Vergennes, after the American war; but that he, anxious to encourage the industry of France, had expressed his readiness to enter into a treaty-not like the former, which it was clear from the portfolio of Versailles must be injurions to the interests of France, but on terms of perfect reciprocity, viz: that if France took so many millions of English produce, England should take back so many millions of French produce in return." Lord Sidmouth replied: "This is totally new; I cannot make a treaty on these conditions." 66 Very well," replied the Emperor, "I cannot force you into a treaty of commerce, any more than you can me; aud we must remain as we are, without commercial intercourse." "Then," continued Lord Sidmouth, there will be war; for, unless the people of England have the advantages of commerce secured to them which they have been accustomed to, they will force me to declare war." And war was made accordingly.

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Here we have apt illustration of these three important points now under consideration, to wit: What are the interests most likely to be assailed; second, by what means they are to be assailed; and, lastly, the most ef fectual means of resisting this assault.

It seems to me that the mere statement of this question points out irresistibly the auswer-the policy best adapted to the condition of our coun

try.

Is it not incumbent, then, upon us, if the foregoing conclusions be correct, to adopt a practical system thus so clearly indicated-unerring in its means, and so certain in the result? a system that can protect our firesides; which can remove the seat of war by meeting our enemy abroad, instead of inviting attack at home by awaiting it; which shall shelter our commerce in every sea; which resents as well as resists injury and insult; in peace powerful for useful purposes alone, but not dangerous to freedom; and adapted to the institutions, the wants, and the actual condition of our beloved country."

The extent to which this policy should be adopted has already, in general terms, been pointed out, both by the high authority which so earnestly reconimends it, and the military report which marks the limits of the maxinium hostile force which we must be prepared to meet, and by the striking events of the last forty years, so well known in naval history.

Our naval force may find a limit in "that imposed by a due regard to the public revenues, from time to time, and by the probable condition of other maritime nations;" by the consideration of the vast interests which we have afloat-of those domestic institutions which may be fatally endangered by the too near approach of avowed enemies, even in acknowledged peace; and by the recollection that the pretence is never wanting, when the consciousness of power stimulates the destruction of rival interests, as in the memorable instance at Copenhagen.

After the foregoing remarks, my opinions as to the proper dispositions to be made by Government for the defence of the Gulf of Mexico cannot be mistaken. But from causes which may be briefly stated, and which may be assumed as peculiar to the Gulf of Mexico, from its geographical features, a modification of this general plan of defence, as to it, seems necessary; and it is subject of congratulation that the best defences for this

section of our country are the cheapest, from being readily derived from most abundant resources.

The navigation of the Gulf of Mexico is at all times uncertain, and particularly so during the summer months, from the long protracted calms, and because of the ocean currents. The harbors, for the most part, are accessible only to the smaller ships of war, but offering, at short distances, inlets which will admit steam ships of war, either of a friendly or hostile flag, into the heart of our own or adjacent territories. Generally, these inlets to our interior waters are not defensible by permanent works, unless multiplied to infinity; for the access to the inner waters is, almost without exception, by several avenues. Besides, there are many sheltered roadsteads, which no fixed works could in any way command, and which, occupied in time of war by a hostile fleet, would blockade the Gulf, but which could not, or at least would not, probably, be held by an enemy, in the face of steam ships of war.

The numerous harbors of our neighbors sonth of the Mississippi will afford entry, shelter, and supplies, to the cruising war steamers of an enemy, being at the same time inaccessible to the usual draught of ships of war. Here, lying at our very doors, it would not be too much to say that our vast commerce of the Southwest, which constitutes the wealth of nearly one-half of our people, would be entirely at their mercy. There is not a hamlet, far less a city, on the Gulf coast, which can be thoroughly defended from a moderate force of war steamers and ships of war by permanent works, save Pensacola.

Already three large works have been constructed for the security of this last. Two more are in contemplation, to assist in the defence; and still one channel (St. Rosa's inlet) is open to the enemy, by which it can be approached.

So of Appalachicola, which is fast rising to importance. There are four inlets from the sea, one of which cannot be closed by works at all. The city of St. Joseph, too, seated on the margin of a deep and sheltered bay, cannot be protected from an enemy by works on shore.

The same may be said of the city of Mobile, the access to which is too open, and by too many channels, to be well secured by works at any cost; and certainly no number of them would secure its commerce from a naval foe.

But the most important point-namely, the Mississippi-remains to be considered.

There are so many branches leading to the main stem of this mighty river, and making a junction with it either above or below the city of New Orleans, that it is a question whether the revenues of the nation could effectually close them to an enemy by fortifications, if assailed by steam ships of war.

But the attack and defence of fortified places on the Gulf of Mexico is but one-half of the subject-matter. The main question, viz: the usance of the seas-the protection and security of the active commerce-this is the point to be considered; and may be answered, fortunately, that the same power which can keep an enemy at arm's length can also shield it in the transit of the ocean.

The commerce of Great Britain hardly suffered interruption, and her revenue therefore was unimpaired, by the long wars in which she was engaged.

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