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miles from the former, and four from the latter; twenty feet water may be carried over this bar at ordinary low water; after which, this fine bay offers no obstruction to navigation. The tide has a rise ordinarily of eighteen inches. From the intercourse by railroad with the Appalachicola river, the remarks made upon the resources of the town of Appalachicola apply to St. Joseph's equally.

St. Andrew's Bay.

Turning the north point of St. Joseph's bay, we come to the first inlet, St. Andrew's, a mere boat channel; the second pass to the north of this has 13 feet water; the third pass is very difficult for seventeen feet at the best of tide; and the fourth pass, north of this last, has only fourteen feet water These inlets are all difficult and dangerous, and five miles within the bay the channel is blocked off by sands, with about 13 feet over the best chaunel.

After passing these flats, the bay expands into the finest bay imaginable, of great depth, with high and dry banks, covered with the largest growth of valuable timber. There is a very sparse population, and the bay would afford at this time, and for many years to come, only wood, water, and shelter, to a naval force.

The latitude of the point of observation, near the principal inlet, is 30° 2' 57" north, longitude 85° 44' 45" west. The tide rises about 24 feet.

Ship Island Harbor.

The bar of Ship Island pass was found to have barely 20 feet at ordinary low water over the best part of it; the western point of Ship Island, bearing north-northeast, will, on this course, carry a ship over in the deepest water. This bar has no dangers, so that a vessel of 17 or 18 feet draught may run in on any course, and find a shelter on the north side of Ship Island, six or eight hundred yards from any part of it.

The anchorage is not, however, sheltered from the north winds, which blow off the main shore, twelve miles distant, though little danger can be apprehended from this quarter.

Ship Island affords wood and well water, but is not inhabited.

I esteem this harbor, in conjunction with the anchorage under the Chandeleurs, as the most important military position, save the Dry Tortugas on the Gulf of Mexico.

It cannot be defended well, so as to close the main avenue to the city of New Orleans, by any system of fortifications; nor would it be prudent to occupy it as a naval station, for the same reasons which forbid the use of the Tortugas for naval or defensive purposes. Both must ever be in the hands of the Power which has the maritime dominion of the Gulf of Mexico. I beg leave to refer you, for a more detailed account of Ship Island and its neighborhood, to the report which I had the honor to lay before you.

The latitude of Ship Island (western point) is latitude 30° 12' 36" north, longitude 89° 7' west.

Variation of the magnet, 7° 35' east.

Ordinary rise of tide, 21 inches.

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Tampa Bay.

The season was too far advanced to prosecute the survey of Tampa. Anxious, however, to get the depth of the main entrance, a preliminary surwey of the bar was made; twenty-four feet, I think, can be safely counted as the best water over this bar. Tampa, though a very extensive bay, is shallow far from its main shores; nor could I find any one point where good depth of water, equal to the bar, can be carried to or near the main land.

It seems to offer few facilities for naval purposes, except an anchorage, an abundance of fuel, and some good timber; water can be had with a little trouble from the Manitee river.

The adjacent country is as yet in a state of nature.

I will conclude the synopsis with the general remark, that whilst these

ne harbors are of no great utility to our ships of war of the usual construction, they are singularly well adapted to the reception and supply of a fleet of steaners, for their security and protection.

REPORT ON The defence of the Gulf of MEXICO.

In reply to that portion of your general instructions which calls my attention to the defences of the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, and requires my expinion as to the most effectual mode of guarding our great and growing interests in that quarter, I have the honor to submit, for the information of the honorable the Board of Navy Commissioners, the following report:

Before entering upon the details of a plan for the defence of the Gulf frontier, I must ask your indulgence for laying before you the reflections to which the consideration of this subject has given rise-more at length, perhaps, than I am warranted, but which the importance of the question

may excuse.

The defence of our maritime frontier on the Gulf of Mexico, although requiring a modification of any general system of national defences adapted to the local features of the Gulf coast, is yet sufficiently within the applicaLion of such a general system as to make this last the proper subject of consideration.

The deep interest manifested by the Government and the country, the zealous efforts made at intervals to build up a gigantic system of fortificaLions, the apathy which subsequently threatened to leave half finished works and splendid fortresses a common prey to neglect and the ravages af time, the growing doubt as to their utility stealing its way into the nds of all classes of our countrymen, shows that whilst all are anxious provide speedily for the defence of our country, our policy is yet unsetthed and remains to be permanently adopted.

Ampelled by the above considerations, repeated demands have been ade upon the Executive Departments, by Congress, for plans, estimates, and information, to guide to the adoption of a fixed system, which, whilst the most efficient as to power, should be of reasonable cost, and adapted to the genius of our people and our institutions. This call for information has for the most part been answered by the War Department and boards fmilitary officers; so that we are indebted to the joint labors of these, th for the direction of opinion in favor of a particular scheme, and for e progress made in the execution of the plan proposed.

The latest of these reports yet published to fix the public mind upon the

policy so strongly recommended, and which embraces all or nearly all that can be said in favor of the system of defence by fortifications, and in opposition to any other means of national defence, is found in Congress Document No. 206, 26th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives. I refer to the report of a board of officers, to whom the subject of the mili tary and naval defences of the country was committed. As the report does not touch upon the naval portion of the resolution under which the board was convened, except incidentally, to set in stronger relief the merits. of the plan proposed, it may not be out of place to supply the omission here, and endeavor to set in proper light the neglected side of this deeply interesting subject.

As the report is in fact an argument to sustain a questionable point, namely, the best "system of national defence, embracing steam and other vessels," &c., called for by the resolution, besides being a military criticism upon the very able report upon the same subject made by a late Secretary of War, Mr. Cass, an examination of this report and criticism may not be amiss to the more full elucidation of the subject-matter.

The board expresses entire concurrence in the views presented by the various branches of the military, within the last thirty years, in favor of the system of fortifications now in progress, except those of Mr. Secretary Cass, fully endorsed as they were by the then President of the United States, General Jackson; and which, say the board, "considering the high source from which it emanates, may be supposed to have disturbed the confidence of the public therein." For this reason, the report opens with a discussion of the principles announced in the documents referred to, communicated to Congress by the Executive; "the nature and source of which," says the reporter to the board, "attacking fundamental principles, and inculcating doctrines which we believe to be highly dangerous, will lead us: into amplifications which the importance of the subject will excuse."

For a proper understanding of the points in issue between the recent board and the late Secretary, a brief summary of the opinions and principles of the latter shall be stated, as the letter* and the criticisms are too lengthy for insertion.

1. He (Mr. Cass) does not concur in the suggestions of the Engineer bureau, as set forth by the Chief of Engineers, (see said report, page 26, accompanying,) particularly in those which relate to the nature and extent of some of the preparations for the defence of the country.

2. He thinks dangers are anticipated, not likely to occur; and therefore the great scale of preparation suggested by the Engineer is not called for; and hence submits his own explanatory views concerning a practical system of defence adapted to the institutions and actual condition of the country, to wit:

He would confine our preparations to the maritime frontier, as the inland border needs none, and the lake shores, under all circumstances, would be under the dominion of the strongest fleet.

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"For," says the Secretary, "a victorious fleet could disembark an army at any point; and if a harbor were closed by fortifications, the enemy would only have to seek the nearest beach, and land from boats; so that no fortifications, or system of fortifications, on the lake shores, would secure us from invasion."

Congress Document No. 243, 24th Congress, House of Representatives.

That our vulnerable point is on the seaboard, our maritime frontier. "Our coast for three thousand miles is washed by the ocean, which separates us from those nations who have made the highest advances in the arts, and particularly in those which minister to the operations of war, and with whom, from our intercourse and political relations, we are most liable to be drawn into collision. If this great medium of communication, the element at the same time of separation and of union, interposes peculiar obstacles to the progress of hostile demonstrations, it also offers advantages which are not less obvious; and which, to be successfully employed, require corresponding arrangements and exertions. These advantages depend on the economy and facility of transportation, on the celerity of movement, and on the power of an enemy to threaten the whole shore spread out before him, and to select his point of attack at pleasure.

A powerful hostile fleet upon the coast of the United States presents some of the features of a war, where a heavy mass is brought to act against detachments, which may be cut up in detail, although their combined force would exceed that of the assailing foe. Our points of exposure are so numerous and so distant that it would be impracticable to keep at each of them a force competent to resist the attack of an enemy, prepared by his naval ascendency and his other arrangements to make a sudden and vigorous inroad upon our shores. It becomes us, therefore, to inquire how the consequences of this state of things are to be best met and averted. "The first," he continues, " and most obvious, and in every point of view the most proper method of defence, is an augmentation of our naval means, to an extent proportioned to the resources and necessities of the nation; not the actual construction and equipment of vessels only, but also the collection of all such materials as may be preserved without injury, and a due encouragement of those branches of interest essential to the growth of a navy, and which may be properly nurtured by the Government; so that, on the approach of danger, a fleet may put to sea without delay sufficiently powerful to meet any force which will probably be sent

to our coast.

"Our great battle upon the ocean is yet to be fought, and we shall gain nothing by shutting our eyes to the nature of the struggle' or to the exertions we shall find it necessary to make. A contest must come, and it behooves us, whilst we have the means and the opportunity, to look forward to its attendant circumstances, and to prepare for the consequences.

"There is as little need of inquiry now into our moral as into our physical capacity to maintain a navy, and to meet upon equal terms the ships and seamen of any other nation. With ample means, therefore, to meet upon the ocean, by which they must approach us, any armaments that may be destined for our shores, we are called upon by every prudential consideration to do so. Although all wars in which we may be engaged will probably be defensive in their character, undertaken to repel or resent some injury or assert some right, still the objects of war can best be attained by its vigorous prosecution. Defensive in its causes, it should be offensive in its character. If we are to receive his assaults, we abandon the vantage ground, and endeavor, in effect, to compel him to do us justice, by inviting his descent upon our shores, and by all those consequences which mark the progress of an invading force, whether for depredation or for conquest. By the ocean only can we be seriously assailed, and by the

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ocean only can we seriously assail any Power with which we are likely to be brought into collision.

"But, independently of the policy of making our adversaries feel the calamities of war, it is obvious that, even in a defensive point of view alone, the ocean should be our great field of operations. No one would advocate the project of endeavoring to make our coast impervious to attack; such a scheme would be utterly impracticable. A superior fleet, conveying the necessary troops, could effect a landing upon numerous points upon our shores, even if the best-devised plan of fortifying them were consummated; and, from the nature of maritime operations, such a fleet could bring its whole strength to bear upon any particular position, and either anticipate the tardy movements of troops upon land, and effect the object before their concentration, or render it necessary to keep in service a force far superior to that of the enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to it upon any given point.

"These dangers might be averted or avoided by the maintenance of a fleet competent to meet any hostile squadron which might be detached to our seas. Our coast would then be defended on the ocean, and the calamities of war would be as little felt as the circumstances of such a conflict would permit.

"As to the other advantages of a navy in the protection of commerce, they do not come within the scope of my inquiries, and are not, therefore, adverted to.

"It seems to me, therefore," concludes the Hon. Secretary, "that our first and best fortification is the navy; nor do I see any limits to our naval preparations, except that imposed by a due regard to the public revenues, from time to time, and by the probable condition of other maritime nations."

As it is not practicable to close our coast by any system of fortifications, however extensive or well devised, against the enterprises of a victorious fleet, disposed to risk a landing, those who would project such a scheme would be, in his opinion, the subject of just censure. On the other hand, the Government would be more answerable, were our important maritime places left without defensive works. "I would recommend a practical medium."

To arrive at this, the honorable Secretary lays down the following prop-ositions, to wit: That no enemy will attempt to lay siege to our fortifications; and that no enemy will endeavor to make a conquest in this country. A definite object, to be attained by quick movements and vigorous exertions, which precludes large forces or unwieldy masses, will make the maximum of the attacking forces hereafter. Fortifications strong enough to ineet such efforts, to this extent, no more, I would tolerate; and to this I would limit our system of fortifications in future.

The principles of the European system of fortifications, justly remarks the Secretary, do not apply here, though they may have been transferred to this country, which, for obvious reasons, requires a plan exclusively adapted to our condition.

"Hence, I consider some of the existing and projected works larger than are now necessary." They involve great expense, and the maintenance of a standing army, or they are useless. "I would," continues he, "limit our permanent works to the size and ability necessary to resist a coup de main, which would involve the country in neither of the foregoing

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