consequences." Between this proposition and the one for the construction of fortifications on a scale of magnitude which would require armies to ́ reduce, and much time, there is a marked distinction.

The largest constructions do not interdict our waters to an enemy. Hampton roads, for example, is only one of several in the Chesapeake equally good; and so of the waters of the New England States. And there is no object which an enemy could not effect as securely since the construction of these fortresses as before. And so it is with the waters of New York and of the coast of Maine, from which an enemy cannot be excluded by fortification.

The greatest possible force which can be brought, and the greatest possible resistance which can be applied, do not constitute a practical rule for the construction of our fixed defences.

He does not question the wisdom of the original measure, but thinks that arrangements for future defence should be planned in reference to the existing state of things. The condition of the country justifies a corresponding change in the nature of our preparations, so that we may rely more upon our floating and less upon stationary defences.

Our advance in population, means of communication, commerce, wealth, in all the elements of national greatness, developed a thousand fold by the intervention of steam, leads him to doubt the necessity of extensive permanent works.

Therefore, he recommends reduction in the estimates for fortifications. This is the substance of the report which first " disturbed the public confidence" in the ability of the prodigious scheme of fortifications projected, and in part completed, for the defence of the country, of their ultimate utility, and caused those doubts whether the vast treasures still required to mature the plan were worthily bestowed. To all which, President Jackson, in his letter of April 8, 1836, communicating the report to Congress, gives his unqualified assent, in these words: "And in the consideration of which, he (Mr. Secretary Cass) has arrived at conclusions differing from those contained in the report from the Engineer bureau; I think proper to add my concurrence in the views expressed by the Secretary."

Here we have the substance of that criticism which is deemed by the reporter of the recent board to "be an attack upon fundamental principles," and inculcating doctrines highly dangerous, and which is sought, in the amplified report now to be considered, to be condemned and refuted, and substituted by a better and less dangerous plan.

I do not concur in the opinion of the board, either in the appellation bestowed upon this able state paper, or in its inferences. It was a grave report of a minister of war to the sovereign authorities of the nation, based upon information equally within the reach of the principal and subordinates of the military department; and is the more valuable because it comes uninfluenced by the esprit de metier which ever colors professional opinions. It sets forth, upon sound principles, a practical as well as practicable system of national defence, which recommends itself irresistibly to the country, by its simplicity, its comprehensive views, and striking adaptation to the peculiar institutions and the actual condition of the country.

"The principal errors, as we (the board) conceive, in the document referred to, are

"1st. That, for the defence of the coast, the chief reliance should be on the navy.

"2d. That, in preference to fortifications, floating batteries should be introduced, whenever they could be used.

"3d. That we are not in danger from large expeditions; and, consequently,

4th. That the system of the board of engineers comprises works which are unnecessarily large for the purposes they have to fulfil."

The question is then asked, "What, in general terms, shall be the means of defence ?" And, again," Shall the defence be by the navy exclusively?" Leaving the reporter to his case of a single port, the argument as to which he manages so much to his satisfaction, the reply to the last important question may be fully answered by another, " Shall the defence be by fortifications exclusively?" Both of these, I apprehend, may be answered by a negative; and then comes the demand first made, "What, in general terms, shall be the means of defence ?" We agree that it shall be by neither the fortifications nor the navy, exclusively. We cannot help agreeing that the proper combination of the two would effect "that practical medium" recommended by the Secretary, but which, nevertheless, seems to be viewed as one of the principal errors in his report.

It is true, in the case made, that the nation, with a superior naval force, with a maritime frontier rendered impregnable by fortifications, backed with an army to defend them and a treasury to pay for all, would be more than a match for her antagonist, with an inferior navy only, to resist attack. The case would be equally true if applied to any other arm, the system of fortifications inclusive.

But, I humbly apprehend, this is not a case in point; or if it is, as before observed, will apply as forcibly to the defence by fortification as to the defence by naval means exclusively.

In order to examine this question, we must suppose our adversary, like, ourselves, making, in peace, his preparatious for defence-for war. Now, there is an acknowledged limit to warlike preparations in the richest and most powerful nation, viz: her revenue-her resources. The proper consideration, then, is, how to bestow that portion of her means which she can afford for military purposes to the best advantage. She must raise an army, equip a navy, or fortify her frontier. The question then arises, to which of these she must give the preponderance, or entire preference; for it is apparent that no nation of modern times has been equal to the task of prosecuting each and all of them to perfection, even under the stimulus of the military spirit which has controlled alike the resources and the destinies of our neighbors over the Atlantic. This is the point to which I would invite the attention of the reporter. We cannot have them all; neither the wealth, the inclinations, nor the policy, perhaps, of the country, would justify such an expectation. Which, then, should we select? for select we must; that, by perfecting one, we may be secure from the assaults of our enemies and the evils resulting from a feeble combination.

Spain endeavored, at the most prosperous period of her history, to carry each arm to the highest degree of excellence known to Europe. Her army was the largest, her fleet the most numerous, and her fortifications crowned nearly every commanding position on the known globe. Her treasure and the favor of her monarchs were equally dispensed upon these several arms, and the mediocrity arising from such a distribution was apparent in the results. Her armies were beaten by the military nations wherever they encountered; her fleets were swept from the face of the ocean by her naval

antagonists; and her splendid fortresses fell in succession before every attack, though so strongly built as to defy her every effort to regain them. France was impregnable whilst reposing under the shelter of her formidable armies, to the maintenance of which every energy was strained, and to whose military spirit the genius of her people and the condition of the country had a peculiar affinity. She was overthrown at St. Vincent's, at the Nile, and at Trafalgar-where were abstracted and buried in the sea those resources which would have ensured triumph to her armies.

England has been more sagacious-true to her naval policy; she has never failed to nurse the means and cherish those interests essential to naval superiority, and which has enabled her to grasp at the dominion of the earth.

It is true that she has an army, for the regulation of her domestic affairs and for the purpose of creating a diversion in time of war favorable to her interests, and to retain her conquests. But she never permits the military interests to sap the foundation of her naval power; and, satisfied with these, she has not undertaken a system of domestic fortifications, to exhaust or cripple her resources and endanger the liberties of her people.

Here, in these examples, we may read the answer to the demand made by the reporter: "What, in general terms, shall be the means of defence?" And again: "Is a navy competent to sustain such a defence?"

We have already embarked largely in the construction of fortifications, which, when combined with a powerful navy, would undoubtedly meet all the expectations of the country. It would be folly to suffer these works to go to ruin, as it would be folly to push this system to maturity, (already too much expanded.) Perhaps the radical objection to this system would not hold so forcibly, if, after the expenditure of millions, perhaps an hundred millions, our military preparations were deemed to be complete; but, in truth, this consummation would be but the first step taken towards this end. The necessity for a large army to occupy, to preserve, and to defend them. would be imperative; and, although they might shelter our cities and protect our commerce within our ports, the naval force would still be requisite for the care of our foreign interests.

Without following the reporter through his argument on the case made, "of one," "or of several ports," to which I apprehend the foregoing reflections will be deemed a sufficient answer, let us proceed to reply to his demand: Is a navy competent to the duty of defending our country?

The reporter argues to the contrary, to wit: that an enemy "sets at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of operations, while we are left without choice in the matter; for if he thinks proper to come, and we (our navy) are not present, he attains his object without resistance."

That he comes when and where he wills, without previous indications of his designs, which may enable us to meet him successfully; that he can choose his mode of warfare, (being secure at home,) as well as plan of operations, leaving as little option in the one case as the other. "Either concentrating his fleet and attacking places where our fleet is not, or, if one be imbodied to meet him, avoiding the conflict, and acting on many points by detachments, and thus carry our uncovered points."

Again: That, to cover one position by a fleet, we must abandon all the rest to an enemy; for how, asks the reporter, can a fleet cover three thousand miles of coast?

That a maritime force cannot watch, intercept, or defeat the plans of an

other hostile fleet, as on several occasions the French fleets evaded the vigilance of the English navy.

Such are the objections of the board, set forth in their report, to the capabilities of a naval force to defend our country from an enemy.

Before taking up the objections, we must return for a moment to the object of this report. What is it? Do the board intend to recommend the system of defence by fortifications exclusively? If so, apply their own objections to this system, which were urged against the naval means.

What is there, in the best system of fortifications ever devised to cover three thousand miles of maritime frontier, which can prevent an enemy from operating with a great naval force-from making our seas and shores the theatre of his operations? Some few points may defy assaults; but who can count those other points, along this extensive coast, to which he can come "without our having any choice in the matter," and where a fortification "cannot be present to prevent the attainment of his object?" Were our whole projected chain of fortresses completed to the utmost, they would not cover a sea league of our waters; our commerce would melt from the ocean like the morning mist, and our very fishermen beg a license from our foe.

What is there in this system to hinder our opponent from coming upon us" without previous indications, which may enable us to meet him successfully?" When the city of Algiers was attacked, the morning sun which gave indication of the coming enemy, shed his last ray upon the ruins of demolished citadels. It is the habit of the greatest naval Power known to bear the declaration of her wars upon the muzzles of her guns, giving her first indications of her plan of operations by her broadsides.

What is there in this system which shall force an enemy to choose other than his own mode of warfare? Can he not concentrate his fleet, and, if disinclined to attack our fortified positions, "seek the nearest beach and land his troops ?" Or, acting by detachments on many points, carry our uncovered places?

What number of fortifications will cover three thousand miles of seacoast? How many of them would operate to control the enemy's mode of warfare; and what option would they give to us, save to await attack, and waste our resources upon points only threatened to harass us?

It is true that we often hear of " chains of fortifications ;" but the idea is abroad, and sanctioned by authority, that it is but a chain of broken links; that fortifications now-a-days "cover" only the positions which they occupy. It is urged that a fleet must abandon all other positions to cover one, a threatened one, effectually; but it is forgotten that a fleet may cover any one, or all of them; and is it not more formidable and more to be relied upon, when we reflect that it can go, and go, too, with all its concentrated power, when and where it may be wanted? We shall see hereafter how the fleets of England covered "her positions" in the most perilous periods of her history. It will suffice for the present to know that with a "system of fortifications" for the defence of the thousand open points on her thou-sand miles of seacoast, which our engineers would look upon with scorn, her soil has no knowledge of a hostile foot, and the firesides of her people have never been invaded by a foreign foe.

But the reporter has referred to history for the proofs of his positions, to sustain his plea. Let us follow him, and see how fleets have "covered positions," without abandonding a country to the mercy of an enemy.

Louis XIV, of France, determined to make a descent on England, to reinstate the dethroned monarch, James; twenty thousand troops, three hundred transports, and forty-four ships of the line, were assembled at Cherbourg and La Hogue; thirty other ships of the line were to join from Toulon, and came up during the conflict which ensued. When threatened by this formidable "plan of operations," in which they would have had no option, truly, if their reliance had been "a chain of fortifications," what did the English Government, in this alarming exigency, to "cover her positions?" Set about building up a great system of fortifications, linked together, to defend her thousand miles of coast from the foe, "coming in that array," which "would involve both fleet and coast in inevitable defeat and ruin ?" No; instead of frittering away the resources of the country upon many "uncovered points," she equipped and assembled her fleets, and, without the fear of "trusting all to the hazard of a battle," before her antagonist had lost sight of the shores of France, the invading force was destroyed to the uttermost.

All the world knows how England "covered her positions," when threatened by the great armada of Spain.

When England suspected the desire of the Emperor Napoleon to possess the Danish fleet, to aid "his plan of operations," did she wait until his plan was ripe, and in the mean time perfect a defensive scheme of perma nent fortifications? No; she hastened to cover her threatened points, by the destruction of that fleet in its own harbor!

When the French and Spanish fleets had grown to size equal, nay, superior to her own, did England fall back upon a great system of national defence by fortifications? No. And yet this was purely a defensive war. No. She built another fleet; and, trusting to the perfection which this cherished arm had attained by her unremitted care, she destroyed the combined fleets of her powerful enemies, before the calamities of war could reach her shores.

When, indeed, by favor of the elements, the hostile fleet could "evade the English navy," did her admirals hasten home to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, as is the alternative made by the reporter? No: for, though there be no impress of footsteps on the ocean, a hostile fleet leaves a broad trail, marked with ruin, which is followed by the admiral as a bloodhound on the slot.

Thus, the principal objections of the board to a system of defence by naval means exclusively seem to tell with tenfold force against the proposed system of fortifications. But, as before asked, do they intend to recommend this system so exclusively? If they do, but little more may be said, to mark its most unqualified condemnation by the country; and the more strongly, when it is shown, as I trust to show and make apparent, that fortifications must henceforth be constructed beyond the reach of fleets, to be even secure.

This is the real purport of the report, or there is none. It is true that the employment of a naval force, for certain purposes, by no means connected with the defences, is deemed requisite to the prosecution of successful war; but the idea that it can enter largely into the calculations of a mili tary system of national defence is only noticed by the reporter, because of its recent entertainment by the late President and Secretary of War-" the respectable authority from which it emanates." The true issue made is a