A quarantine law, requiring vessels entering the port of New Orleans to be inspected and to pay the examining officer a fixed reasonable fee, was held to be an exercise of the police power not forbidden by the Federal Constitution: Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455. So, also, a statute requiring the inspection of corpses before being shipped from the State and the payment of an inspection see: In re Wong Yung Quy, 6 Sawy. 442. The State cannot, under the guise of sanitary and inspection laws, impose a tax on interstate or foreign commerce, or discriminate against the products of citizens of other States or countries. A tax upon passengers entering or leaving a State is a tax upon commerce and invalid, and it makes no difference that the tax is levied on the vessel or other carrier, or that it is for the purpose of paying the expenses of enforcing the quarantine laws: People v. Pac. Mail Steamship Co., 8 Sawy. 610; People v. Campagnie Générale Transatlantique, 107 U. S. 59. A statute prohibiting the importation of Texas and Indian cattle from March to December is unreasonable, a discrimination against the products of other States, and unconstitutional: H. & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. 9. Prohibitions on Manufacture and Sale.-Laws which forbid the killing of game during certain seasons of the year, and prohibit the sale of the same during a like period, whether killed in the State or elsewhere, are not invalid as an interference with the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the States: Magner v. People, 97 Ill. 320; Phelps v. Racey, 60 N. Y. 10; State v. Randolph, 1 Mo. App. 15. A statute is not void because it provides for the condemnation of vessels found taking oysters illegally, though applying to vessels licensed as coasters under Federal laws: Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371. A statute prohibiting the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine as food was declared constitutional: In re Brosnahan, C. Ct., W. Dist. Mo., June, 1SS3, 18 Fed. Rep. 62; Powell v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. St. 265. The prohibition of the manufacture of intoxicating liquors for sale either within or without the State is constitutional: Pearson v. International Distillery, S. Ct. Iowa, Sept. 10, 1887. It is competent for the State to license or altogether prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. It has been said, obiter, that the prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors by the importer in the original package is an interference with the exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce; but it is conceded that when the imported package has either passed from the importer or been broken up, the sale may be prohibited: Perdue v. Ellis, 18 Ga. 586; State v. Robinson, 49 Me. 255; State v. Allmond, 2 Houst. (Del.) 612. We incline to the belief that even a sale by the importer in the original package may be prohibited: Dorman v. Stute, 34 Ala. 216; State v. Four Jugs, 5S Vt. 140. See, also, Groves v. Slaugter, 15 Pet. 449. A prohibitory law which discriminates in favor of native wines is invalid, to the extent, at least, of the exception: Weil v. Calhoun, C. Ct. N. Dist. Ga., Dec. 16, 1885, 25 Fed. Rep. 865. Contra, State v. Stucker, 58 Ia. 496. 10. Monopolics.-A State cannot grant the exclusive privilege of navigating the waters of the State as against vessels licensed by the United States and engaged in interstate commerce, nor the exclusive privilege of erecting and operating telegraph lines as against telegraph companies operating under Federal laws: Gibbon v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Pensacola Tel. Co. v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1. See, also, Conway v. Taylor's Exr., 1 Black 603. 11. Taration. Imported products cannot be taxed until they become a part of the common mass of property in the State. It is said that they do not become such until they pass from the hands of the importer, or the original package is broken up for sale or use: Robbins v. Shelby County Tax. Dist., 120 U. S. 48); Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 Id. 566; Waring v. Mayor, 8 Wall. 110; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; People v. Muring, 3 Keyes, 374; Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala.123. See, also, Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517; The License Cases, 5 How. 504. It seems to have been held that the products of sister States become part of the common mass of property and subject to taxation upon arrival at their destination: Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622; Hinson v. Lott, 40 Ala. 123. There can be no question that a tax imposed upon the products of another State or country not imposed on similar domestic products, whether levied directly or indirectly, as by requiring auctioneers, traveling salesmen, or others selling them to take out a special license, is unconstitutional: Webber v. Virginia, 103 U. S. 344; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 Id.566; Welton v. Missouri, 91 Id. 275; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 Id. 434; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Tiernan v. Rinker, 102 Id. 123; In re Watson, Dist. Ct. Dist. Vt., Dec. 1, 1882. 15 Fed. Rep. 511; Jackson Mining Co. v. The Auditor Gen. 32 Mich. 488; State v. Furbush, 72 Me. 493; State v. North, 27 Mo. 464; Daniel v. Richmond, 78 Ky. 542; Marshalltown v. Blum, 58 Ia. 184; Van Buren v. Douning, 41 Wis. 122; Ex parte VOL. XXXVI.-24 Thomas, 71 Cal. 204; Fecheimer v. Louisville, Ct. App. Ky., Oct. 2, 1886. It was long supposed that a uniform drummer tax, applicable alike to residents and non residents, to domestic products and those of other States, was constitutional: Woodruff v. Parhum, 8 Wall. 123; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Id. 148; Machine Co. v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676; Ex parte Thornton, 4 Hughes C. C. 220; In re Rudolph, U. S. C. Ct., Dist. Nevada, March 1880, 2 Fed. Rep. 65; Ex parte Hanson, U. S. Dist. Ct. Ore., June 24, 1886, 28 Id. 127; Territory v. Farnsworth, 5 Mont. 303; Ex parte Asher, 27 Am. Law Reg., N. S. 77; Speer v. Commonwealth, 23 Grat. (Va.) 935. But it now seems to be settled that interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the same amount of tax should be laid on commerce carried on solely within the State, and to the extent that it affects interstate commerce a "drummer tax" is invalid: Robbins v. Shelby County Tax. Dist. 120 U. S. 489; Corson v. Maryland, 120 Id. 502; Simmons Hardware Co. v. McGuire, S. Ct. La., June 20, 1887. Statutes imposing a "head tax" on alien passengers, or on vessels for landing them, or forbidding the landing of passengers of certain classes, and providing that the vessel landing them shall give bond that they will not become a burden on the State, or imposing a tax on the number of passengers carried from the State by common carriers, and like taxes, are unconstitutional: Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y., 92 U. S. 259; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 Id. 275; Steamboat Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 Wall. 31; Passenger Cases, 7 How. 283; Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580; Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35; Webb v. Dunn, 18 Fla. 721. A license tax on foreigners working gold mines has been upheld: People v. Neglee, 1 Cal. 232. But a tax on all foreigners residing in a State, not engaged in certain occupations, is void: Lin Sing v. Washburn, 20 Cal. 534. Vessels, cars, locomotives, and other instruments of commerce may be taxed as other property where registered or owned, though engaged partly or wholly in interstate or foreign commerce; but no license or other tax can be imposed on them for the privilege of entering or doing business in the ports of another State, or of transporting freight or passengers therein, so far as such transportation relates to interstate commerce: Pickard v. Pullman Car Co, 117 U. S. 34; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 Id. 196; Wiggins Ferry Co. v. East St. Louis, 107 Id. 365; Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 Id. 273; Hays v. Pac. Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; Minot v. P. W. & B. R. Co., 2 Abb. C. C. 323; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471; St. Louis v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Id. 423; Gunther v. Baltimore, 55 Md. 457; New Orleans v. Eclipse Tow-Boat Co., 33 La. An. 647, s. c. 39 Am. Rep. 279; W. P. C. Trans. Co. v. Wheeling, 9 W. Va. 170. A State has the power to require foreign insurance companies and other corporations to establish offices, take out licenses, pay fees, etc., before doing business in the State; but it cannot compel corporations engaged in interstate commerce to comply with such requirements: Cooper Mg. Co. v. Ferguson, 113 727; N. W R. Co. v. Commonwealth, S. Ct. Pa., Oct. 4, 1886; Indiana v. Pullman Car Co., C. Ct. Dist. Indiana, March 8, 1883, 16 Fed. Rep. 193; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. A tax on the number of passengers or tons of freight carried by railroads, or on telegrams, is void, so far as it relates to passengers or freight carried across State lines, or messages sent to or received from points without the State: Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; E. Ry. Co. v. State, 31 N. J. L. 531; R. Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 284; R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Id. 232. Taxes on the gross receipts of railroad and telegraph companies, and license taxes on the business of telegraph and express companies, not intended or used to obstruct business, have been declared valid, though incidentally affecting interstate commerce: Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479; M. & L. R. R. Co. v. Nolan, C. Ct. W. Dist. Tenn., Sept. 9, 1832, 14 Fed. Rep. 532; R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvani», 15 Wall. 284; Walcott v. People, 17 Mich. 68; Mobile v. Leloup, 76 Ala. 401; Sɔ. Express Co. v. Mobile, 49 Id. 404; West. Un. Tel. Co. v. Mayer, 23 O. St. 521; see, however, Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230; Indiana v. Am. Express Co., 7 Biss. 227. CHAS. A. ROBBINS. Lincoln, Neb. Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. WELLINGTON v. APTHORP, ADM'R. A valid oral contract may be made to leave a certain sum of money by will to a particular person, in consideration of services thereafter to be rendered by the promisce to the promisor, provided such services are in fact thereafter rendered and accepted in pursuance of such contract, although the promisee did not bind himself in advance to render them. The performance of the consideration renders the contract binding, and gives a right of action upon it. A, a brother-in-law of B, had for several years advised the latter as to the investment of her property, and managed it for her; the latter at one time stating to that he should have a proportion of the profits of one transaction, but nothing was in fact paid to A. Subsequently B told A that if he would continue to act as her agent and adviser, she would make a will leaving to her sister (A's wife) $5,000, or, in the event of the latter's death, would leave $5,000 to A. Afterward, upon A's wife becoming fatally ill, B asked A to accompany her to California and Nevada, and, with the knowledge of A's wife, destroyed a will in which she had bequeathed $5,000 to the latter, and, in 1878, made a new will, giving to A $5,000. After the death of A's wife, A went with her to California and Nevada, being gone several months. Upon his return he married again, without B's knowledge, and when the latter heard of the marriage she revoked the will made in 1873, and made another will, giving A nothing. Held, in an action against B's administrator, that the facts showed a contract on the part of B to leave A $5,000, which might be enforced against B's administrator. CONTRACT against the defendant, as administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Mary Chism, deceased, upon an agreement, as the plaintiff alleged, made by her with the plaintiff on or about May 23, 1878, to bequeath to him, by her last will, the sum of $5,000, and pay his expenses of a journey to California and Nevada in accompanying her there in the fall of 1878; and also upon an account annexed, for services in managing her property, in accompanying her to California and Nevada, and for cash paid as expenses on said visit. Hearing in the Superior Court of Suffolk County, before Bacon, J., who found for the defendant, and upon the plaintiff excepting, reported the case for the determination of the Supreme Judicial Court. The facts are stated in the opinion. J. S. Patton, for plaintiff. A. M. Howe aud T. J. Homer, for defendant. C. ALLEN, J.-It is not contended, on behalf of the defendant, that a contract, founded on a sufficient consideration, to make a certain provision by will for a particular person is invalid in law. The contrary is well settled: Jenkins v. Stetson, 9 Allen 128, 132; Parker v. Coburn, 10 Allen 83; Canada v. Canada, 6 Cush. 15; Parsell v. Stryker, 41 N. Y. 480; Thompson v. Stevens, 71 Pa. St. 161; Updike v. Ten Broeck, 32 N. J. Law 105; Caviness v. Rushton, 101 Ind. 502. Nor is it contended that a contract to leave a certain amount of money by will to a particular person, though oral, is open to objection under the statute of frauds. It is not a contract for the sale of lands or of goods, and it may be performed within a year Peters v. Westborough, 19 Pick. 354; Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burrows 1278; Ridley v. Ridley, 34 Beav. 478; Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560; Bell v. Hewitt, 24 Ind. 280; Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 522. Such a contract differs essentially from a contract to devise all one's property, real and personal, which comes within the statute of frauds: Gould v. Mansfield, 103 Mass. 408. The obligation of such a contract is not impaired, though the consideration is to arise wholly or in part in the future, and though the person to whom the promise is made is under no mutual, binding obligation on his part. In Train v. Gold, 5 Pick. 380, 385, it was said by Mr. Justice WILDE that "if A promised to B to pay him a sum of money if he will do a particular act, and B does the act, the promise thereupon becomes binding, although B, at the time of the promise, does not engage to do the act." This doctrine was quoted with approval in Gardner v. Webber, 17 Pick. 407, 413, and in Bornstein v. Lans, 104 Mass. 214, 216; and it is also affirmed in Goward v. Waters, 98 Mass. 596. In Cottage Street Church v. Kendall, 121 Mass. 528, 530, it was held that, "where one promises to pay another a certain sum of money for doing a particular thing, which is to be done before the money is paid, and the promisee does the thing upon the faith of the promise, the promise, which was before but a mere revocable offer, thereby becomes a completed contract, upon a consideration moving from the promisee to the promisor; as in the ordinary case of the offer of a reward." See, also, Paige v. Parker, 8 Gray 211, 213; Hubbard v. Coolidge, 1 Metc. 84; Todd v. Weber, 95 N. Y. 181, 192; Miller v. McKenzie, Id. 575, 579. It is therefore in law competent for a valid oral contract to be made |