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within sixty days after the proofs should have been made at the home office. Held, that a local agent whose authority was limited to fixing rates, countersigning and delivering policies, subject to the approval of his principal, could no waive the requirement: Rowlin v. Hekla Fire Ins. Co., S. Ct. Minn., February 21, 1887.

It was a condition of an open policy that the property to be insured by it should belong to, or be held by, the assured, in trust or on commission, or sold and not delivered. Held, that it was not competent for an agent to bind his principal by a course of dealing so as to make it liable for a loss of property in which assured had another and different interest: First Nat. Bank v. Lancashire Ins. Co, 62 Tex. 461.

If the acts of a principal have not induced a policy-holder to believe that the exercise by the agent of powers in excess of those given him will be ratified, the principal is not bound by such acts when they are beyond the agent's authority and the assured has notice of the limits of such powers: Insurance Co. v. Wolff, 95 U. S. 326.

The assent of the company in writing was required if there was any change in the situation or circumstances affecting the risk. A local agent who was authorized to receive premiums and issue policies, gave verbal consent to a change in the use of the premises. It did not appear that he had any larger powers or that he had been held out by his principal as possessing authority to waive conditions or that his acts in waiving them had been ratified. The court held that he was not empowered to waive provisions incorporated in the contract: Kyte v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 144 Mass. 43.

The members of a mutual company are bound by its by-laws, and are chargeable with notice of them.

Hence, where it is provided by a bylaw that if other insurance should be placed upon property insured by the company, its policy should be void, unless the consent of the directors was indorsed thereon, an agent cannot give such consent as binds the compary: Behler v. German Mutual F. Ins. Co, 68 Ind. 357.

When the limitation is not binding.— The agent of a foreign company, appointed by it pursuant to law, for the purpose of enabling it to transact business, who is authorized to accept risks, fix rates, and issue policies, and is supplied with the latter in blank for him to issue and countersign, stands in the place of the company in the State for which he was appointed, and is authorized to waive a condition in a policy requiring written notice of loss to be furnished the company: Eastern R R. Co. v. Relief Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 570.

The policy declared that the president or secretary were alone authorized to make, alter, or discharge contracts or waive forfeitures. The insured arranged with a friend for the latter to pay the annual premium for him when it should become due, but did not inform him when it was payable. The friend applied to the agents to whom payments had previously been made for information as to the time. They did not inform him, though they had the renewal receipt in their possession, but promised to give seasonable notice of the day. In consequence of their neglect, payment was not made within the prescribed time. The company was held liable for the neglect of the agents: Selvage v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., U. S. C. Ct. E. Dist., N. Y. June 17, 1882, 12 Fed. Rep. 603.

Restrictions contained in the policy, upon the powers of an agent, are inoperative until it has been uncon

ditionally accepted by the person to whom it was delivered. They do not affect the power of the agent to make a conditional contract for insurance: Hanickell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 40 IIun. 558.

A life policy stipulated that acceptance of the premium due thereon by the company or its agents, after the day upon which it became due, must be considered as an act of grace or courtesy, and not as a precedent for future payment, or a waiver of the forfeiture, if any future payment was not made as agreed. "Agents of the company are in no case authorized to make, alter, or discharge contracts or waive forfeitures." Held, that payment made to a general agent, after the day fixed therefor, was good, insured being in good health. The first clause of the condition stated gave implied consent for the agent to receive such payment, and by receiving it he did not exceed his powers: American Life Ins. Co. v. Green, 57 Ga. 469.

It was a condition of the policy that agents are not authorized to waive forfeitures, to make, alter, or discharge contracts; and that "no agent has authority in any case to waive or postpone payment of premiums, and the assured is hereby notified that the only evidence to him of the authority of an agent to receive any premiums on account of this policy is a receipt in printed form, signed by the president or secretary of the company." Held, not to be binding upon the general agent of a foreign company, who had no superior officer or agent in the State in which the territory assigned him was so situated, so as to render him incompetent to contract that services rendered by an insured, as medical examiner for the company, should be regarded as payment of the premium: Willcuts v. North

western Mutual Life Ins. Co., 81 Ind. 300.

A provision that no agent could waive any of the conditions of the policy, without special authority in writing from the company, applies to local and not to general agents. In the absence of proof to the contrary, a general agent is presumed to possess authority to transact all business relating to insurance and the business of the company generally. An agent who executes a policy as a general agent and one whose authority was co-extensive with the State in which he acted, may bind his principal by waiving a condition of a policy without special authority in writing: Carrigan v. Lycoming Fire Ins. Co., 53 Vt. 418, 427.

A general agent may bind his principal by extending the time for the payment of the premium, notwithstanding the policy declares that agents were not authorized to make, alter, or discharge contracts: Marcus v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 68 N. Y. 625.

An open policy issued to a general agent of the company provided that if the assured shall have or shall hereafter make any other insurance on the property hereby insured or any part thereof, without the consent of the company written hereon, it should be void. Such agent was named in the policy as the person insured. He issued certificates in favor of third persons to whom he had previously issued policies, insuring the same property without making indorsements on the policy. Held, that he thereby waived the condition requiring indorsement in writing: Richmond v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 79 N. Y. 230.

The policy acknowledged the receipt of the first premium and expressed that no receipts for premiums

should be valid unless signed by the president or secretary, and that no agent had authority to alter a policy, or to receive any premium after it became due, without special permission from the officers of the company. This was held not to be a limitation upon the power of a general agent as to the first premium: Pulmer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 84 N. Y. 63.

The company may estop itself from claiming the benefit of a limitation on the powers of its agent which is known to the insured, as by its custom in allowing him to extend the time for paying premiums and notes given therefor: Insurance Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234; Insurance Co. v. Wolff, 95 Id. 326.

Method of waiver.-An agent possessed of the fullest authority can waive the conditions of a policy only in the manner in which it prescribes. By accepting a policy with a condition concerning the manner in which its provisions may be waived, the insured becomes bound thereby: Kyte v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 144 Mass. 43. A condition in a policy issued by a mutual company, that none of its terms should be waived, unless clearly expressed and indorsed upon it, is binding upon the president thereof: Universal Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Weiss, 106 Pa. St. 20. Such a condition is binding upon the local agents of a stock company: Enos v. Sun Ins. Co, 67 Cal., 621; Gladding v. California Ins. Co., 66 Id. 6; McCormick v. Springfield Ins. Co., Id. 361; Walsh v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 73 N. Y. 5, where three judges dissented. Earlier cases on this point are collected in May on Ins., 369, 370.

The weight of authority is in the contrary direction where the policy is not under seal. An agent's oral waiver is good where it was required

that consent in writing by the company be indorsed: New Orleans Ins. Co. v. O'Brian, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 785 (Ky. Superior Court); Pelkington v. National Ins. Co., 55 Mo. 172; Hayward v. National Ins. Co., 52 Id. 181; Horwitz v. Equitable Mutual Ins. Co., 40 Id. 557. If an agent has authority to waive by indorsement on the policy, he may bind his principal by an oral waiver: Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 45 Iowa 377; Viele v. Germania Ins. Co., 26 Id. 9; Wright v. Hartford Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 522; Palmer v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 44 Wis. 201; Gans v. St. Paul F. & M. Ins. Co., 43 Id. 108; McCahe v. Dutchess County Mutual Ins. Co., 14 Hun. 599; Pechner v. Phanix Ins. Co., 65 N. Y. 195; Goldwater v. Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co., 39 Hun. 176.

A provision that the conditions of a policy shall not be waived except in writing over the signatures of the officers of the company, applies only to the formation and continuance of the contract and such of its provisions as are essential to its binding force while it is running; hence a parol waiver of the condition concerning proofs of loss is good: Curson v. Jersey City Ins. Co., 43 N. J. L. 301, 310; O'Brien v. Ohio Ins. Co., 52 Mich. 131, 139.

The parol waiver of a general agent is good, though the policy provides that the use of general terms or anything less than a distinct, specific agreement clearly expressed and indorsed on the policy, shall not be construed as a waiver of any condition or restriction therein, such agent not being specifically restricted: Steen v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, 326.

The policy provided: Any policy, renewal receipt continuing a policy, permit, consent to any agreement whatever concerning insurance, not

signed by the president and secretary and bearing the seal of the company, is void. Held, competent for the general agent and president of the company to bind it by a parol agreement, giving the policy-holder accom

modations concerning the payment of premiums, in contravention of the terms of the policy: Dillebar v. Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 70 N. Y.

567.

J. R. BERRYMAN.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1

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ASSIGNMENT FOR THE BENEFIT OF CREDITORS.

Distribution of individual assigned estate must first be made to the individual creditors, and after payment in full to them the balauce is applicable to debts of a firm of which the assignor was a member: Appeal of Fox, S. Ct. Penna., October 31, 1887.

Foreign assignment for creditors, executed in conformity with

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15 To appear in 36 or 37 Minn. Rep.
16 To appear in 60 or 61 Mich. Rep.
17 To appear in 95 or 96 N. C. Rep.
18 To appear in 50 or 51 N. J. Rep.
19 To appear in 107 or 108 N. Y. Rep.
20 To appear in 22 or 23 Neb.
21 To appear in 116 or 117 Pa.St.Rep.
22 To appear in 15 or 16 R. I. Rep.
23 To appear in 86 or 87 Tenn. Rep.
24 To appear in 77 or 78 Tex. Rep.
25 To appear in 82 or 83 Va. Rep.
26 To appear in 29 or 30 W. Va. Rep.
27 To appear in 68 or 69 Wis. Rep.

the laws of Texas relating to conveyance of lands, will pass the title to land conveyed as between parties thereto : Hervey v. Edens, S. Ct. Texas, December 13, 1887.

BANKS AND BANKING.

Stockholder of a national bank is liable to its receiver for a subscription which he made for new stock, on a proposed increase to $500,000, notwithstanding the fact that when he found at a subsequent meeting the increase was only $450,000 he refused to vote on the stock. The stockholder was held to have ratified the increase, because he retained the certificate issued to him on his subscription to the new stock: Butler v. Aspinwall, U. S. C. Ct. Dist. Mass., December 13, 1887.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Acceptance was validly made when the drawee wrote across the face of the draft the words "excepted Sept. 18, L. B. M.," and parol evidence was admissible to explain the words: Cortelyou v. Maben, S. Ct. Neb., January 5, 1888.

Accommodation indorser has the right to show that the payee indulged the maker for three years after the maturity of the note on an agreement for the employment of the payee's son by the maker: because a surety will be discharged by an extension of time, upon a valid consideration, suspending the right to enforce the payment of the debt entered into without consent of the surety: Powers v. Silbersteen, Ct. of App. N. Y., January 17, 1888.

Lost note, being the cause of action and to be proved, the trial court, and not the jury, must determine from the evidence offered at the trial whether the note was indorsed at the time of the loss; then secondary evidence of the contents of the note may be given to the jury: O'Neill v. O'Neill, S. C. Ill., January 19, 1888.

Maker is not discharged when guarantor pays on account with express promise of payee that the note should be kept alive for the benefit of the guarantor: Granite N. Bank v. Fitch, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., January 6, 1888.

Not negotiable, if the words "and attorney's fees" are inserted, because the sum to be paid is rendered uncertain: Altman v. Rittershofer, S. Ct. Mich., January 19, 1888.

Payment of balance due on a note is not presumed from acceptance of new note by the same maker for the balance: Granite N. Bank v. Fitch, S. Jud. Ct. Mass., January 6, 1888.

BILL OF LADING. See Railroads.

COMMERCIAL TRAVELER. See License Tax.

CONSIGNEE. See Railroads; Replevin.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

See Insurance; Interstate Commerce Law; License Tax; Liquor Laws; Negligence; Nuisance; Sunday Laws; Telegraphs.

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