nate certain charitable institutions as beneficiaries of the fund. Held, nevertheless, that the bequest was void and went to the heirs at law as an intestate estate: And Judge Loomis said, p. 256 "Whatever might be held by the courts of England, or of those States which have adopted the English doctrine on this subject, it is very clear that under our own decisions, which have established a definite rule on the subject in this State, this bequest cannot be held valid. It is well established with us that a gift to a charitable use must designate the particular charitable use by making the gift to some charitable corporation whose charter provides for a charitable use of its funds, or to some particular object or purpose that the law recognizes as charitable. It is enough if the object be mentioned, and the law can see that it is a charitable one; but it is not enough that the gift be merely 'to charitable uses' or 'to be used in charity,' so long as no selection is made from the long list of recognized charitable objects. And it is not enough that some person is named to whom is given the power of naming the charity. That is the testator's own matter. It is his intent that is to determine that. If he chooses to leave the matter wholly to the discretion of some person named, he can do so by making the gift to him, leaving him to use his discretion as to the disposition of it. In this case the donee takes absolutely, and the law does not trouble itself as to whether he acts conscientiously in the matter. The testator has chosen to leave the matter to uncertainty, and there the law leaves it. The charitable object, thus required to be named, may be a benefit to a class of persons and therefore uncertain as to the particular persons of the class that are to receive the benefit. This uncertainty may make the bequest void, unless there is a power given to some person or corporation to make a selection of the individuals: White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 50; Adye v. Smith, 44 Id. 70; Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Id. 513; Coit v. Comstock, 51 Id. 379; Tappan's Appeal from probate, 52 Id. 412. Here the power given the widow is not to select the particular beneficiaries of a class named, but to select the charity itself. We think that to uphold this bequest, we should have to go beyond the utmost limit to which we have gone in upholding charitable gifts. The bequest being of such a character, it clearly cannot be saved by the act of the widow in mak

ing a written designation of the charitable purposes which by it she is authorized to select."

Other States, where the English law of charities is more fully adopted, hold such bequests, though indefinite, not illegal, and if the executor or trustee, in his lifetime, duly selects certain charitable objects and transfers the property to them, they take an indefeasible and perfect title, and the heirs at law of the testator have no claim either against the executor for such disposition of the estate, or the recipients of the bounty: Zeisweiss v. James, 63 Penn. St. 465.

But suppose the executor or trustee dies without ever having made any selection or designation of any charitable object or purpose, what becomes of the legacy then? Does it in such event revert to the heirs or next of kin of the testator, or can it be by some other power still applied to charitable objects to be otherwise selected or designated? No doubt in England this can be done, since, as we have before stated, no gift intended for charity is there ever allowed to fail. Whether the same rule prevails in America may depend, in part at least, upon the answer to another question, viz. : Is this done in England by a Court of Equity, in its ordinary capacity as a Court of Chancery, or does the Lord Chancellor, on behalf of the Crown, as Parens Patriæ, seize and hold it, as the general constitutional trustee for all charities, and distribute it according to the order and direction of the sovereign as he by his sign manual may direct? If the latter be the English method, it is quite certain that in America the legacy would go to the heirs of the testator, since no court in America has this prerogative power. It is not a judicial power at all, but wholly a ministerial one.

To be sure, the Chancellor in England makes his order for such distribution, but it is only because he is the keeper of the King's conscience, and his mouth-piece, as it were, for this purpose, and the King himself, by his proper officer, sends his letters missive to the court, indicating how it should be distributed. That our courts do not possess this extraordinary power is universally agreed, whatever other differences exist in regard to the law of charities in the different States. See Fontain v. Ravenel, 17 How. 369; Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 576, Gray, J.; Dickson v. Montgomery, 1 Swan, 348; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 230;

Lepage v. McNamara, 5 Iowa, 146; Moore v. Moore, 4 Daua, 366.

This carries us back to the question, when does an English court administer a charitable legacy, by virtue only of its extraordinary power, on behalf of the Crown, and not as a Court of Equity merely? In five well marked classes of cases:

1. Where the gift is for some illegal object.

2. When the specific charitable object mentioned in the will is not in existence.

3. Where the bequest is positively declined.

4. Where the legacy is wholly indefinite, and the will provides no means of making it definite.

5. When the will is in terms indefinite, but points out some means of making it definite, which means wholly fail before the event takes place.

1. When the gift is for some unlawful purpose.

This will best appear from a few illustrations. Thus in Rex v. Lady Portington, 1 Salk. 162 (1693), the devise was to Lady Portington, "for the good of the testator's soul." It was held to be void, as being for a "superstitious use;" but that the legacy should not go to the heirs, since "the King shall order it to be applied to a proper use." In Da Costa v. De Pas, 1 Ambl. 228; 2 Swanst. 489, note; 1 Dick. 258; 2 Ambl. 712, a legacy of 1,200 pounds was given to establish a "Jesuba," or assembly for reading the Jewish law and educating people in the Jewish religion. This was also declared to be, at that time, illegal, and was disposed of by the Crown, 1,000 pounds of it being given to the Foundling Hospital in London. In Isaac v. Gompertz, cited in 7 Ves. 61 and Ambl, 228, note, an annuity of 40 pounds a year was given for the support and maintenance of a Jewish synagogue; which being supposed to be in conflict with Christianity and therefore illegal, it was ordered by the court that the Attorney-General "apply to the King for a sign manual to appoint and direct to what charitable uses said annuity shall be appropriated." In Cary v. Abbot, 7 Ves. 490 (1802), before Sir WILLIAM GRANT, Master of the Rolls, a legacy for educating poor children in the Roman Catholic faith was thought to be illegal, and was administered under the King's sign manual to other charities. So in Attorney-General v. Todd, 1 Keen,

803 (1836), a devise for the support of a Roman Catholic priest met with like fate. See, also, Sims v. Quinlan, 16 Irish Ch. R. 191 (1864). No doubt under or since the enabling acts in Great Britain, some if not all the aforesaid bequests would now be held valid and go to the purposes named; and in America, no doubt, they would be held good without any special statutes on this subject. For in this country, where no religious denomination, doctrine, or form of worship is forbidden by law, so long as the public peace is not disturbed, there is no such thing as a "superstitious use," and bequests of this kind would not for that reason be invalid. See Methodist Church v. Remington, 1 Watts, 218; Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana, 170; Hughes v. Daly, 49 Conn. 34; Magill 7. Brown, Brightly, 373; Ex parte Schouler, 134 Mass. 426; Quinn v. Shields, 62 Iowa, 129.

Second. The second class of cases is where the specific object of charity stated in the bequest is not in existence or cannot be identified.

Thus, in Simon v. Barber, Tamlyn, 14 (1829), the legacy was given to the Guernsey Hospital, to be applied toward carrying on the charitable designs of said corporation." There was no hospital by that exact name in the island of Guernsey, though there were two hospitals of a somewhat similar name; but the master to whom the case was referred, having reported that he was unable to determine what hospital the testator meant, the Master of the Rolls said-" The Guernsey Hospital, the particular charitable object of the testator, has failed, but it remains with the Crown to signify to what charitable purposes this fund shall be applied. Whenever a charitable object fails, from whatever cause, the Crown has a right to interfere." Sandford v. Gibbons, 3 Hare, 195, note (1829), and Thorley v. Byrne, Id. (1830), are exactly like it. See also Loscombe v. Wintringham, 13 Beav. 87, 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 164 (1851).

Third. So, too, where the bequest is declined by the charitable institution to which it was given. In Denyer v. Druce,Tamlyn, 32 (1829), 2,000 pounds was given to the University of Oxford, and 40 pounds per annum to another institution, which being declined, Sir JOHN LEACH said--" The legacy of 2,000 pounds and the annual payment of 40 pounds having been refused by the charitable institutions on which the testatrix conferred them,

those bequests have consequently failed. It results, therefore, that it rests with the Crown to direct the charitable purposes to which they shall be applied."

Fourth. When the gift is wholly general, indefinite in its terms, and points out no specific object or class of objects, and names no person authorized to select any objects, as of a gift merely to "charitable purposes."

Thus, in Attorney-General v. Matthews, 2 Lev. 167 (1675), the gift was to certain persons, in trust, " for the poor in general, forever." Lord Nottingham held "that the Commissioners of Charitable Uses have nothing to do with it, but it was to be determined by the King himself in this court, upon an information by the Attorney-General in behalf of the King." And afterward, "the King directed it should be given to the maintenance of the mathematical scholars in Christ's Hospital." The same case apparently is reported in Finch, 245, under the name of Attorney-General v. Peacock. In Clifford v. Francis, Freem. 330 (1679), the devise was simply "to pious uses," and the rule is thus stated: "When money is given to a charity without expressing what charity, then the King is the disposer of the charity, and a bill ought to be preferred in the AttorneyGeneral's name for that purpose; but if the charity be expressed, then it is in the power of the Commissioners for Charitable Uses." In Attorney-General v. Baxter, 1 Vern. 247 (1648), the gift was of 600 pounds to John Baxter, the author of the Saints' Rest, to be distributed by him amongst sixty pious ejected ministers. On account of the vagueness and generality of the gift, the King, on the information of the Attorney-General, ordered it to be given to Chelsea College. Although this decree was afterward reversed in 2 Vern. 105, on the ground that Mr. Baxter had the power to select the ministers and so it could be made certain, and was therefore valid, yet the principle that the Crown had the sole power of distributing general legacies was not impugned. In Attorney-General v. Herrick, 2 Ambl. 712 (1772), the devise was to the defendant Herrick and others, upon trust, to be applied to "charitable and pious uses." The Lord Chancellor (APSLEY) said, "There is no objection to the uncertainty of the object, for the King may appoint," and he added, "that he had concluded to apply to his Majesty, as