Art. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."

Art. V. "No person ✶ ** shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."

Art. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law."

Art. XIV, § 1. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."

That the first ten Articles of Amendment were not intended to limit the powers of the State governments in respect to their own people, but to operate on the National Government alone, was decided more than a half century ago, and that decision has been steadily adhered to since: Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters 243, 247; Livingston v. Moore, Id. 469, 552; For v. Ohio, 5 How. 410, 434; Smith v. Maryland, 18 Id. 71, 76; Withers v. Buckley, 20 Id. 84, 91; Pervear v. The Commonwealth, 5 Wall. 475, 479; Twitchell v. The Commonwealth, 7 Id. 321, 325; The Justices v. Murray, 9 Id. 274, 278; Edwards v. Elliott, 21 Id. 532, 557; Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 Id. 542, 552; Pearson v. Yewdall, 95 Id. 294, 296; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 Id. 97, 101; Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 79; Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 265.

It was contended, however, in argument that, "though originally the first ten amendments were adopted as limitations on Federal power, yet in so far as they secure and recognize fundamental rights-common-law rights of the man, they make them privileges and immunities of the man as a citizen of the United States, and cannot now be abridged by a State under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, while the ten amendments as limitations on power only apply to the Federal Government, and not to the States, yet in so far as they declare or

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recognize rights of persons, these rights are theirs, as citizens of the United States, and the Fourteenth Amendment as to such rights limits State power, as the ten amendments had limited Federal power."

It is also coutended that the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment, which declares that no State shall deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law," implies that every person charged with crime in a State shall be entitled to a trial by an impartial jury, and shall not be compelled to testify against himself.

The objections are in brief, 1, that a statute of the State as construed by the court deprived the petitioners of an impartial jury; and, 2, that Spies was compelled to give evidence against himself. Before considering whether the Constitution of the United States has the effect which is claimed, it is proper to inquire whether the Federal questions relied on in fact do arise on the face of this record.

The statute to which objection is made was approved March 12, 1874, and has been in force since July 1 of that year. Hurd's Rev. Stat. Ill., 1885, p. 752, c. 78, § 14. It is as follows:

"It shall be sufficient cause of challenge of a petit juror that he lacks any one of the qualifications mentioned in section 2 of this act; or if he is not one of the regular panel, that he has served as a juror on the trial of a cause in any court of record in the county within one year previous to the time of his being offered as a juror; or, that he is a party to a suit pending for trial in that court at that term. It shall be the duty of the court to discharge from the panel all jurors who do not possess the qualifications provided in this act, as soon as the fact is discovered: Provided, if a person has served on a jury in a court of record within one year, he shall be exempt from again serving during such year, unless he waives such exemption: Provided further, that it shall not be a cause of challenge that a juror has read in the newspapers an account of the commission of the crime with which the prisoner is charged, if such juror shall state on oath that he believes he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence: and provided further, that in the trial of any criminal cause, the fact that a

person called as a juror has formed an opinion or impression, based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements (about the truth of which he has expressed no opinion), shall not disqualify him to serve as a juror in such case, if he shall upon oath state that he believes he can fairly and impartially render a verdict therein in accordance with the law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement."

The complaint is that the trial court, acting under this statute and in accordance with its requirements, compelled the petitioners against their will to submit to a trial by a jury that was not impartial, and thus deprived them of one of the fundamental rights which they had as citizens of the United States under the National Constitution, and if the sentence of the court is carried into execution they will be deprived of their lives without due process of law.

In Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430, it was decided by this court that when "a challenge by a defendant in a criminal action to a juror, for bias, actual or implied, is disallowed, and the juror is thereupon peremptorily challenged by the defendant and excused, and an impartial and competent juror is obtained in his place, no inju v is done the defendant, if until the jury is completed he has ther peremptory challenges which he can use." And so in Haye v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 71, it was said: "The right to challenge the right to reject, not to select a juror. If from those who rem. in an impartial jury is obtained, the constitutional right of th accused is maintained." Of the correctness of these rulings we entertain no doubt.

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We are, therefore, confined in this case to the rulings on the challenges to the jurors who actually sat at the trial. Of these there were but two-Theodore Denker, the third juror who was sworn, and H. T. Sanford, the last, who was called and sworn after all the peremptory challenges of the defendants had been exhausted.

At the trial, the court construed the statute to mean, that, "although a person called as a juryman may have formed an opinion based upon rumor or upon newspaper statements, but has expressed no opinion as to the truth of the newspaper statement, he is still qualified as a juror if he states that he can fairly and impartially render a verdict thereon in accordance with the

law and the evidence, and the court shall be satisfied of the truth of such statement. It is not a test question the juror will have the opinion which he has formed from newspapers changed by the evidence, but whether his verdict will be based only upon the account which may here be given by witnesses under oath."

Interpreted in this way, the statute is not materially different from that of the Territory of Utah, which we had under consideration in Hopt v. Utah, ubi supra, and to which we then gave effect. As that was a territorial statute, passed by a territorial legislature for the government of a territory over which the United States had exclusive jurisdiction, it came directly within the operation of art. 6 of the Amendments, which guaranteed to Hopt a trial by an impartial jury: Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437, 459. No one at that time suggested a doubt of the constitutionality of the statute, and it was regarded, both in the territorial courts and here, as furnishing the proper rule to be observed by a territorial court in empanelling an impartial jury in a criminal case.

A similar statute was enacted in New York, May 3, 1872 (Acts of 1872, c. 475, 9 N. Y. Stat. at Large, 2d ed., 373); in Michigan, April 18, 1873 (Acts of 1873, 165, Art. 117; Howell's Stat., § 9,564); in Nebraska (Comp. Stat. Neb. 1885, p. 838; Criminal Code, § 468); and in Ohio (Rev. Stat. Ohio, 1880, § 7,278). The constitutionality of the statute of New York was sustained by the Court of Appeals of that State in Stokes v. The People, 53 N. Y. 164, 172, decided June 10, 1873, and that of Ohio, in Cooper v. State, 16 Ohio St. 328. So far as we have been able to discover, no doubt has ever been entertained in Michigan or Nebraska of the constitutionality of the statutes of those States respectively, but they have always been treated by their Supreme Court as valid, both under the Constitution of the United States, and under that of the State: Stephens v. The People, 38 Mich. 739, 741; Ulrich v. The People, 30 Mich. 245; Murphy v. The State, 15 Neb. 383.

Indeed, the rule of the statute of Illinois as it was construed by the trial court is not materially different from that which has been adopted by the courts in many of the States without legislative action: Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295; Holt v. The People, 13 Mich. 224; State v. Fox, 1 Dutch. 566;

Oslander v. The Commonwealth, 3 Leigh 780; State v. Ellington, 7 Iredell 61; Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam. 81. See also an elaborate note to this last case in 36 Am. Dec. 521, where a very large number of authorities on the subject are cited.

Without pursuing this subject further, it is sufficient to say that we agree entirely with the Supreme Court of Illinois in its opinion in this case, that the statute on its face, as construed by the trial court, is not repugnant to § 9 of Art. 2 of the Constitution of that State, which guarantees to the accused party in every criminal prosecution "a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offence is alleged to have been committed." As this is substantially the provision of the Constitution of the United States on which the petitioners now rely, it follows that, even if their position as to the operation. and effect of that Constitution is correct, the statute is not open to the objection which is made against it.

We proceed, then, to a consideration of the grounds of challenge to the jurors Denker and Sanford, to see if in the actual administration of the rule of the statute by the court, the rights of the defendants under the Constitution of the United States were in any way impaired or violated.

Denker was examined by the counsel for the defendants when he was called as a juror, and, after stating his name and place of residence, proceeded as follows:

"Q. You heard of this Haymarket meeting, I suppose? A. Yes.

"Q. Have you formed an opinion upon the question of the defendants' guilt or innocence upon the charge of murder, or any of them? A. I have. "Q. Have you expressed that opinion? A. Yes.

"Q. You still entertain it? A. Yes.

"Q. You believe what you read and what you heard? A. I believe it; yes.

"Q. Is that opinion such as to prevent you from rendering an impartial verdict in the case sitting as a juror under the testimony and the law? A. I think it is."

At this stage of the examination he was "challenged for cause" for the defendants, but before any decision was made thereon the following occurred:

"Mr. Grinnell (for the State): If you were taken and sworn as a juror in the case, can't you determine the innocence or the guilt of the defendants