promissory notes, made by the firm of R. & W., brought suit against the defendant upon her promise to pay the debts of the said firm, as consideration of the assignment to her of the firm's property and assets. It was held, upon the authority of Lawrence v. Fox, that the creditors could recover. In Francis v. Smith, 1 Duv. 121, F. by covenant bound himself to assume all the debts and liabilities of S. in the late firm of S. & O. and save S. harmless on account of all such debts. Held, that a creditcr of the firm was entitled by substitution to a personal judgment against F. on his covenant, as S., who was the only one who could object, consented thereto. If, after a new partner enters a firm, his co-partners give a bill or note in their and his names for a previous debt contracted by the old firm, he is not liable to a holder with notice: Shirriff v. Wilks, 1 East. 48. Nor will he be made liable for an old debt, by his co-partners furnishing an account stated to the creditor, in which he admitted that the debt was due by the firm: French v. French, 2 Mem. & Gr. 644; Lemere v. Elliott, 6 H. & N. 656. He may be made liable to pay the balance of an open running account, commencing before he joined the firm and continued afterwards, although payments have been made, since he joined the firm, sufficient to liquidate that part of the account for which he is directly responsible: Beale v. Caddick, 2 H. & N. 326; Scott v. Beale, 6 Jur. N. S. 559. WM. H. BURNETT. Philadelphia. [The case of Bowman et al. v. Spalding, decided by the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, February 5, 1887, is interesting in the construction put upon an agreement made between a retiring partner, the remaining partners and an incoming partner. The court held the new firm to be trustees of the assets, which the agreement specified, as to be received by the new firm, for the purpose of paying the debts of the old firm, and thus keeping the retiring partner indemnified, in addition to a personal indemnity contained in the agreement. Not only was a defense of the period of limitation denied to the new firm, upon being declared insolvent, and to its creditors, but, going further, no interest in the proceeds of these assets was allowed to the new firm and its creditors, until the trust had been discharged by payment of these debts; and the retiring partner having taken up certain claims himself, he was allowed payment in full out of the proceeds of these assets. The retiring partner was put in the place of the creditors he had paid, who were, as already shown, entitled to proceed against the new firm. See in addition to the above citations, Townsend v. Long, 77 Pa. St. 143; Ringo v. Wing, S. Ct. Ark., November 5, 1887; Hocht v. Caughron, 46 Ark. 132; Kountz v. Holthouse, 85 Pa. St. 235. The case of First National Bank of Pueblo v. Newton, decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado in 1887, emphasizes the line of cases, not embraced in the above annotation, where the creditor refuses to accept this transfer of liability.-J. B. U.] ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1 INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.2 SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRUNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS.3 COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK. GINIA. SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA." BANKS. Bankrupt estate's funds, deposited by the clerk of U. S. Dist. Ct., need not be kept separate by the bauk from every other bankrupt estate's funds, similarly deposited, and the bank is not liable for paying checks beyond the amount of the funds of the particular estate, out of other estate's funds. The bank has a right to presume that the court was properly performing its duty as trustee in drawing the checks: State Nit'l B'k, etc., v. Dodge, S. Ct. U. S., January 23, 1888; 121 U. S. 333. Deposit of cash may be recovered by the assignee for the benefit of creditors, without defalcation for the amount of commercial paper of the assignor, held by the bank, but not matured at the time of the assignment, because the status of the parties is fixed by the assignment: Chipman et al. v. Ninth Nat'l Bank, S. Ct. Peuna., April 23, 1888. Stockholder is not required by the National Banking Law to register his ownership, for the protection of his assignor of the stock, or to save harmless by reason of such former ownership; the obligation, if any, grows out of contract: Le Sassier et al. v. Kennedy, S. Ct. U. S., December 5, 1887; 123 U. S. 521. BILLS AND NOTES. Holder of a firm note cannot be met with the defense, that the note was made after the dissolution of the firm, unless it is also shown that the holder knew of the dissolution when he took the note: Forepaugh v. Biker, S. Ct. Penna., April 9, 1888. Indorsement of a note made payable to "P. & W. in liquidation" by P., charges the assignee with notice of the dissolution of the firm of P. & W., and requires the assignee to prove the authority of P. to make the indorsement before W. can be held liable to the assignee: Woodson v. Wood, S. Ct. App. Va., February 9, 1888. Transfer of a promissory note to avoid a defense, that the note To appear in 123 and 124 U. S. 2 To appear in 1 I. S. C. Rep. To appear in 34 or 35 Fed. Rep. 5 Toappear in 117 or 118 Pa.St. Rep. To appear in 67 or 68 Tex. Rep. was given without any consideration, is effectual, unless the maker can also prove that the transferee had knowledge of the object of the transfer, or that the transferee was not a bona fide holder for value, without notice: Forepaugh v. Baker, S. Ct. Penna., April 9, 1888. CHECKS. Equitable assignment of funds is not an attribute of an ordinary check, neither accepted nor certified by the cashier as good; such check is simply an order which may be countermanded, and does not transfer any money to the credit of the payee, nor create any lien on the money which the holder may enforce against the bank': The Florence M. Co. v. Brown, S. Ct. U. S., January 23, 1888; 123 U. S. 385. Memoranda or figures on the margin of a check, placed there by the drawer for his own information, are not notice to the bank to pay from a particular fund, and need not be regarded by the bank : State Nat'l B'k, etc., v. Dodge, S. Ct. U. S., January 23, 1888; 124 U.S. 333. Stoppage of payment of an ordinary check may be directed by the drawer at any time before actual payment: The Florence M. Co. v. Brown, S. Ct. U. S., January 23, 1888; 123 U.S. 385. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See United States Courts. Consequential injuries, as defined in Penna. R. R. Co. v. Lippincott (see ante, p. 1 sqq.), so defined again, with the explanation that the word “injury" is only of that certain character that the damages arising therefrom, can be estimated and paid or secured in advance, as provided in the Const. Penna., or, in default thereof, an action brought at common law; corporations and individuals now standing on the same plane of responsibility: Penna. R. R. Co. v. Marchant, S. Ct. Penna., April 9, 1888. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and securing to the accused in criminal prosecutions trial by jury and compulsory attendance of witnesses in his favor, apply only to the United States, and not to laws and proceedings under the authority of a State: In re Sawyer, S. Ct. U. S., January 9, 1888; 121 U. S. 200. Ex post facto laws, which are prohibited by the Constitution, are only those State laws which relate to crimes: Id. Mc Donald v. State, ante, p. 171, as to constitutionality of State license laws for locomotive engineers, affirmed in principle on the same statute in Smith v. Alabama, S. Ct. U. S., January 30, 1888; 124 U. S. 465. CONTRACTS. See Fraud. Cancellation of an executed contract is the exertion of the most extraordinary power of a court of equity, to be exercised only in a clear case, where the complainant has been deceived and injured, by fraud and false representations manifestly established and certainly proved: Union R. R. Co. v. Dull, S. Ct. U. S., January 16, 1888; 124 U. S. 173. Construction put upon a written contract by the acts of the parties, will prevail over the literal meaning of the written words: District of Columbia v. Gallaher, S. Ct. U. S., February 6, 1888; 124 U. S. 505. CONVEYANCE. Recitals in a deed, bind the partics and those claiming under them, but not mere strangers, claiming by adverse title, or by title anterior or paramount to the deed: Sabariego v. Maverick, S. Ct. U. S., January 23, 1888; 123 U. S. 261. COURT OF CLAIMS. See United States Courts. CRIMINAL LAW. See Constitutional Law-Jurisdiction. DAMAGES. See Constitutional Law. Exemplary damages may be recovered when the injuries have been inflicted in a wanton, malicious, gross, or outrageous manner by the employees of a corporation, whether or not the corporation had authorized or ratified the actions of their employees: Phila. T. Co. v. Orbann, S. Ct. Penna., February 27, 1888. Value of county bonds placed in the hands of a contractor for a court-house, and by him sold without completing the house in time, whereby additional expense was put upon the county, is the amount of damage suffered, and that value is to be computed at the face of the bonds: Millikin et al. v. Callahan County, S. Ct. Texas, December 20, 1887. EJECTMENT Prior possession, when shown to be continuous, is sufficient for a recovery in ejectment, from a mere intruder or wrong-doer, or one entering during the possession, without right: Sabariego v. Maverick, S. Ct. Ü. S., January 23, 1888; 123 U. S. 261. FRAUD. Profits may be divided by one interested in a contract for the construction of a railroad, with an assistant engineer of the railroad company, where the engineer had no interest in the contract, when made, and did not represent the company in the making of the contract, and, afterwards, whilst in the service of the company, the engineer had no connection with the supervision or control of the construction, or the ascertainment of the amount due to the contractor: Union R. R. Co. v. Dull, S. Ct. U. S., January 16, 1888; 124 U. S. 173. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Railroads. Underbilling the weight of freight or giving a false classification, so that less compensation is paid for carrying, is prohibited by the Act, and each carrier should hold every station agent responsible for the correctness of the weight and classification of freight received by him: Re Underbilling, The Commission, April 11, 1888. JURISDICTION. See United States Courts. Discretionary authority, delegated to any public officer or tribunal, when properly exercised, is binding upon the subject-matter, and the only questions which can arise between an individual, claiming a right under the acts done, and the public, or any person denying their validity, are the power of the officer and fraud in the claimant : Sabariego v. Maverick, S. Ct. U. S., January 23, 1888; 123 U. S. 261. Courts of equity cannot, without an express statute, exercise any jurisdiction beyond the protection of rights of property, and cannot punish or pardon crimes and misdemeanors, or appoint or remove public officers; to assume such functions, or restrain or relieve against proceedings for the punishment of offenses or the removal of public officers, is to invade the domain of courts of common law, or of the executive or administrative departments of the government: Ex parte Sawyer, S. Ct. U. S., January 9, 1888; 124 U. S. 200. LESSOR AND LESSEE. Rent paid in advance of the day, and repairs, made with the cousent of the then landlord, and to be deducted from the accruing rent, are binding upon a subsequent purchaser at sheriff's sale of the landlord's title: Kost v. Theis, S. Ct. Penna., January 30, 1888. MASTER AND SERVANT. See Fraud. PARTNERSHIPS. See Bills and Notes. PLEDGE. Possession of personal property, pledged for the security of a debt, must be given the pledgee, to create an effectual lien on the property: Williams v. Gillespie, S. Ct. Appeals W. Va., January 28, 1888. |