satisfy the insatiable greed, to fill the coffers of your lazy, thieving masters! When you ask them now to lessen your burden, he sends his bloodhounds out to shoot you-kill you! If you are men, if you are the sons of your grandsires, who have shed their blood to free you, then you will rise in your might, Hercules, and destroy the hideous monster that seeks to destroy you. To arms! we call you. To arms! Your brothers."

Fielden was addressing the Hay. market meeting at the time the police approached. The following is an extract from his remarks:

"You have nothing to do with the law except to lay hands on it and throttle it until it makes its last kick. Keep your eye upon it. Throttle it. Kill it. Stab it. * * What matters

it whether you kill yourself with work or die on the battle-field resisting the enemy? What is the dif ference? Any animal, however loathsome, will resist when stepped upon. Are men less than snails or worms? I have some resistance in me. I know that you have, too."

These quotations will sufficiently indicate the character of the utterances which these anarchists indulged in.

On August 20, 188, the jury brought in a verdict, finding the defendants guilty of murder, and fi ing death as the penalty in the case of all but Neebe, the penalty in his case being fixed at imprisonment in the penitentiary for fifteen years. The case was carried to the Supreme Court of Illinois on a writ of error, and the judgment against them was affirmed by that court in an opinion written by Mr. Justice MAGRuder, and filed on September 14, 1887. That opinion is a masterly one, and reflects the greatest honor on Mr. Justice MAGRUDER and the court. The volu

minous character of the opinion makes its reproduction in the American Law Register impossible. But it will convince any lawyer who reads it that the defendants were a most depraved set of scoundrels, who were engaged in a devilish conspiracy to subvert the law and civil society, that they had a fair and impartial trial, and most richly deserved the fate that has at last overtaken them. It is to be hoped that the opinion of the court has taught all proclaimed enemies of society the much-needed lesson that it is not safe, even in this country, to threaten and incite bloodshed. The opinion makes the way to the gallows perfectly clear for all apostles of anarchy.

Right of the Supreme Court to Review a Criminal Case.-F.rst. What right has the Supreme Court of the United States to review the judgment of the Federal courts in criminal cases? The laws of the United States do not provide for writs of error in criminal cases decided in the Circuit Courts of the United States. Those courts con. sequently exercise a final jurisdiction in criminal cases, even though life itself is at stake. While the defendant in a criminal case has no right to take his case on writ of error from the Circuit Court to the Supreme Court, yet his case may come before the latter court if the judges of the Circuit Court do not agree, and send the case up on a certificate of a division of opinion. The Acts of Congress provide that, "When any question occurs on the hearing on trial of any criminal proceeding before a Circuit Court, upon which the judges are divided in opinion, and the point upon which they disagree is certified to the Supreme Court according to law, such point shall be finally decided by the Supreme Court." Rev. Statutes, 697 of Title XIII.

There is another way in which the Supreme Court may sometimes interfere with a judgment rendered in a criminal case. For while a writ of error does not lie to enable the court to review the judgment on the ground of error in the proceedings of the Circuit Court, yet the Supreme Court may issue a writ of habeas corpus and discharge a prisoner held under an erroneous judgment of the Circuit Court when it appears that that court had no jurisdiction to render the judgment. See Ex parte Bain, American Law Register, July, 1887, p. 433, note p. 444.

Second. What right has the Supreme Court of the United States to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of a State in a criminal case? It is clear that the United States Supreme Court cannot entertain jurisdiction to review such a judgment on the ground that a right guaranteed by the State Constitution has been violated. See S.lomons v. Graham, 15 Wallace 209 (1872); Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633 (1883). That court can only review such a judgment on the ground that some Federal question is involved, that some right guaranteed by the Constitution or laws of the United States has been violated. Thus in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 365 (1885), the court nounce: "Our jurisdiction is limited to the question whether the plaintiff in error has been denied a right in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. The question whether his imprisonment is illegal under the laws of the State is not open to us."

an

The Acts of Congress provide that "A final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a State, in which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or VOL. XXXVI.—6

an authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of their validity; or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is claimed under the Constitution, or any treaty or statute of, or commission held or authority exercised under, the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege, or immunity specially set up or claimed, by either party, under such Constitution, treaty, statute, commission, or authority, may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court upon a writ of error," etc. Rev. Statutes of 1878, Title XIII, 8709.

It is to be observed that when the Supreme Court, under the provision above cited, has the right to pass in review on the judgement of a State Supreme Court, it will not review the decision except in so far as Federal questions are presented: Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252, 269 (1885).

If a Federal question is involved the writ of error can be allowed by the Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court or by any of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States: Bartemeyer v. Iowa, 14 Wallace 27 (1871).

If the application is made to a justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, while it may be made to any of them, it seems to be understood that courtesy requires it to be made to the justice who presides in the circuit from which the case comes. Hence in the particular case the application was made to Mr. Justice HARLAN, whose circuit includes the State

of Illinois. On his suggestion the application was referred to the whole court. A like application had been similarly considered in open court in Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wallace 321 (1868).

In the opinion in the particular case the court do not dispose of the point raised by counsel as to the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment in extending to the States the limitations which were originally applicable only to the nation, as those limitations are found in the first ten articles of amendment to the Constitution. The court did not find it necessary to decide that point, inasmuch as there were no errors apparent on the record even conceding the Fourteenth Amendment to have the effect claimed for it. Should the court in some future case decide that that construction is to be given to the amendment, it will necessarily result in largely extending the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, to say nothing of the revolution it will work in the prevailing theory as to the power of the States.

For instance, Article V, provides that "no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury." If this, by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment, has became a limitation on State power, as well as on national, an act of a State legislature providing for trials, on informations is void, and one thus convicted would have a right to go to the Supreme Court of the United States, to protect his right to a trial as guaranteed by the fourth article. This is but one illustration, and it serves to show the sweeping change that would be effected, not merely in the jurisdiction of the Supre Court, but in the relations existing between the States and the

United States, if the construction contended for should ever be adopted. The court will no doubt soon be compelled to directly and squarely pass on this subject, and we have little idea that it will ever adopt the theory advocated by the counsel of the condemned anarchists in this case.

Inciting the Commission of Crime.— As we have already said, on the trial of the anarchists, no evidence was adduced that the defendants threw the bomb. On what principle of law, then, were they convicted of the murder for which they were indicted? Before answering the question, we may premise that the statutes of Illinois, like the statutes of so many other States have abolished the common-law distinction between principals and accessories, and all the accessories before the facts are made principals, and may be indicted and punished accordingly.

The following extracts from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois will explain the principle upon which the defendants were convicted.

"If, therefore, the defendants advised, encouraged, aided or abetted the killing of Degan, they are as guilty as though they took his life with their own hands. If any of them stood by and aided, abetted, or assisted in the throwing of the bomb, those of them who did so are as guilty as though they threw it themselves."

Again. "If the defendants, as a means of bringing about the social revolution and as a part of the larger conspiracy to effect such revolution, also conspired to excite classes of workingmen in Chicago into sedition, tumult, and riot, and to the use of deadly weapons and the taking of human life, and for the purpose of producing such tumult, riot, use of weapons, and taking of life, advised

and encouraged such classes by newspaper articles and speeches to murder the authorities of the city, and a murder of a policeman resulted from such advice and encouragement, then defendants are responsible therefor."

No one will venture to question the accuracy of this statement of the law. One who persuades another to commit a crime is himself guilty of the crime if it is committed by virtue of his advice. Thus it has been held that if A persuades B to commit suicide: A is guilty of the murder of B: Commonwealth v. Bowen, 13 Mass. 353 (1816). It is there said: "The government is not bound to prove that Jewett would not have hung himself, had Bowen's counsel never reached his ear. The very act of advising to the commission of a crime is of itself unlawful. The presumption of law is, that advice has the influence and effect intended by the adviser, unless it is shown to have been otherwise. as that the counsel was received with scoff, or was manifestly rejected and ridiculed at the time it was given." In Regina v. Sharpe, 3 Cox C. C. 233 (1848), Chief Justice WILDE stated the law as follows: "If perBons are assembled toge her to the number of three or more, and speeches are made to those persons to excite and inflame them, with a view to invite them to acts of violence, and if that same meeting is so connected in point of circumstances with a subsequent riot that you cannot reasonably sever the latter from the incite. ment that was used, it appears to me that those who incited are guilty of the riot, although they are not actually present when it occurs. I think it is not the hand that strikes the blow or that throws the stone that is alone guilty under such circumstances, but that he who inflames people's minds and induces them by violent means

to accomplish an illegal object is himself a rioter, though he takes no part in the riot. It will be a question for the jury whether the riot that took place was so connected with the inflammatory language used by the defendant that they cannot reasonably be separated by time or other circumstances." In this case the defendant was indicted for sedition and riot. He had addressed a large assembly of persons, using very exciting and inflammatory language. Shortly afterwards a large crowd moved towards a church, in which several policemen had been stationed, and began throwing stones and conducted themselves in a violent manner. And to the same effect are the text writers," if one purposely excites another to commit an offence, as if he harangues people, inflaming them to riot, and the of fence is accordingly committed, he is guilty, though he personally takes no part in it :" 1 Bishop's Cr. Law 640.

"Every one who incites any person to commit any crime commits a misdemeanor whether the crime is committed or not." Stephens' Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 47.

An Impartial Jury.-What is an "impartial" jury in the sense in which the term is used in the Constitution? Before considering this question, we shall refer to the subject of challenges, by which the right to an impartial jury may be asserted. The counsel for the anarchists claimed that the trial jury was not "impartial" in the constitutional sense, and that they were prejudiced by the ruling as to their challenges. It appears that under the laws of Illinois each one of the eight anarchists was entitled to a peremptory challenge of twenty jurors, making the whole number allowed to the defence one hundred and sixty. Of those called into the jury box, seven hundred and fifty-sev

en were excused upon challenge for cause, and one hundred and sixty were challenged peremptorily by the defence and fifty-two by the State. Of the twelve jurors finally selected, eleven were accepted by the defendants. Before the twelfth juror was taken the defendants had exhausted their peremptory challenges, and he was challenged for cause and the challenge overruled. The claim was asserted before the Supreme Court of Illinois that their peremptory challenges having been exhausted before the panel was finally completed, the court should review the action of the trial court in those cases where challenges for cause were overruled, thus compelling the defence to exercise their peremptory challenges. The Supreme Court of Illinois, however, held otherwise, and declared that it must be made to appear that an objectionable juror was put on the defendants after they had exhausted their peremptory challenges. This ruling accords with the opinion which the Supreme Court of the United States had previously expressed in Hopt v. Utah, 120 U. S. 430 (1877), and in Hayes v. Missouri, Id. 71 (1877) and which is reiterated in the particular case. And see to the same effect: Loggins v. The State, 12 Texas Ct. of App. 65 (1882); IIolt v. State, 9 Texas Ct. of App. 571 (1880); Bean v. State, 17 Texas Ct. of App. 60 (1884); Steagald v. State, 22 Texas Ct. of App. 488 (1886); Benton v. State, 30 Ark. 328 (1875); People v. McGungill, 41 Cal. 430 (1871); State v. Simmons, 38 La. Ann. 41 (1886); State v. Drake, 33 Kans. 151 (1885); Collins v. People, 103 Ill. 21 (1882); State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 379 (1881); State v. Hoyt, 47 Conn. 529 (1880); People v. Carpenter 102 N. Y. 238 (1886); Mimms v. State, 16 Ohio St. 221 (1865); Irwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876); Hartnet v.

State, 42 Ohio St. 578 (1885); State v. Gooch, 94 N. C. 987 (1886); People v. Weil, 40 Cal. 268 (1870); State v. Brown, 15 Kans. 400 (1875); Preswood v. State, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 468 (1872); Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 742 (1853); Morton v. State, 1 Kans. 468 (1863); McGowan v. State, 9 Yerger (Tenn.) 184 (1836); Alfred v. State, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 581 (1853); Ogle v. State, 33 Miss. 383 (1857); Robinson v. Randall, 82 Ill. 521 (1876).

A case must needs lean on a pretty slender reed which at this day depends for a new trial, on the fact that a challenge for cause was improperly overruled, when the peremptory challenges were not exhausted. There is no ground of complaint in such cases except as to jurors improperly received after the peremptory challenges have been exhausted.

Now, inasmuch as this right of peremptory challenge is the right to reject and not to select jurors, if one of two defendants peremptorily challenges a juror, and the other defendant insists that he is qualified, the juror should nevertheless be excluded: State v. Mзaker, 54 Vermont 112 (1881). And because the right of peremptory challenge is the right to reject and not to select, the ruling of the trial judge in rejecting a juror challenged for cause by the State, affords, of itself, no legal ground of complaint to the defendant: State v. Creech, 38 La. Ann. 480 (1886).

If there are several defendants, each of them is entitled to the statutory number of peremptory challenges, but unless the statute expressly provides otherwise the State will only have the same number it would have if there was only a single defendant: Schoeffler v. State, 3 Wis. 839 (1854); Wiggins v. State, 1 Lea (Tenn.) 738 (1878). And see Smith v. State, 57 Miss. 822 (1880). In the Wisconsin case explaining the