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loss of trade to stage-coach companies, or of custom to inns, by reason of the introduction of a railway. The true point in any given case is, the plaintiff must have suffered a special legal damage, and it is immaterial whether it is immediate or consequential.1 The injury may be said to be consequential in the sense that it is the result of the corporate action, but if it is one for which a legal remedy is provided, then it is a direct, immediate legal wrong; but if the injury is a mere speculative, possible one, if it does not exist, but is a mere phantom of the mind, or if too remote, it cannot be considered.

Again, the legal maxim, "damnum absque injuria,” is often misunderstood. Upon this point, Mr. Justice STEPHENS said :2 "The maxim that there is no wrong without a remedy does not mean, as it is sometimes supposed, that there is a legal remedy for every moral or political wrong. If this were its meaning, it would be manifestly untrue. There is no legal remedy for the breach of a solemn promise not under seal, and made without consideration, etc., etc. The maxim means only that legal wrong and legal remedy are correlative terms, and it would be more intelligibly and correctly stated, if it were reversed so as to stand, where there is no legal remedy, there is no legal wrong." This is the true meaning; damnum absque injuria has nothing to do with whether the injury is under the common law, a statute, or a constitutional provision, the injury may be saved from being damnum absque injuria as well by a statute or a constitutional provision as by the common law; legal wrong and legal remedy are correlative terms; thus the common law has provided no legal remedy for the breach of a promise not under seal and without consideration, hence there is no legal wrong; but if a statute or constitutional provision were passed establishing a legal remedy, then the breach of such a promise would be a legal wrong, that is, a damage where there is no legal remedy is “damnum absque injuria," but the moment a legal remedy is provided, it ceases to be damnum absque injuria and becomes a legal wrong for those within the legal remedy.

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Considering our Pennsylvania decisions upon this question of damages, this principle must be borne in mind for example, under the General Railroad Law of 1849, where any portion of a man's land was taken, the injury to the remaining land was not "damnum absque injuria," because the statute provided a remedy for such injury, but where no land was taken a similar injury to a neighbor was damnum absque injuria, because the statute only provided a remedy where one's land was taken; hence the intention of the Constitution of 1874 was to provide a legal remedy where no portion of one's land had been takento prevent that being damnum absque injuria, which, under the earlier statute of 1849, had been so.

Accepting Mr. Justice STEPHENS' definition of the maxim as correct, the theory that the word " injured" in the Constitution means a legal wrong in the sense that the word legal means the common law only, is not sound; for the words remedy and wrong are correlative terms, and instead of the legal wrong existing without the remedy, it is the existence of the legal remedy that creates the legal wrong. Now, the Constitution, by providing the remedy, establishes the legal wrong, "when any man's property is injured, compensation shall be made."

It has been stated that: "There is a wide distinction between the legal meanings of the words 'damaged' and 'injured,' the one siguifying any loss of value to property, the other signifying a loss for which an action lies. This distinction is pointed nowhere more forcibly than in the familiar phrase, ' damnum absque injuria.'" The above, whilst correct, is not fairly stated. It would seem to imply a fallacy; it makes it appear that the word "injured" in the Constitution was meant to refer to a loss for which there was no recovery; this is absurd; the word is used, of course, simply to establish a remedy for those who can avail themselves of it. The maxim means, and cannot mean anything more than this-where there is no legal remedy there is no legal wrong; damnum absque injuria-damaged without injury!! Why? Because the common law, a statute or a constitutional provision has not provided a legal remedy, that is to say (1), an injury is only a legal wrong when a legal remedy is provided, and (2), in order that one can avail one's self of the legal remedy, one's right of property must have been invaded

or the special class of injury must have been specially brought within the remedy. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has correctly interpreted this maxim, as exemplified in the following cases, wherein it will be seen that the court held that the legislature had intended to provide compensation for injuries only, which would have been remedied at common law, but by examining these cases and in this examination I wish to emphasize strongly the fact that the words of the court should be carefully considered, in connection with (a) the words of the statute creating the liability, and (b), with the claim of the plaintiff under the statute. Looking at the cases in this light, it will be appreciated that what the court meant was that the plaintiffs in each case had no rights at all, therefore, the remedy was not applicable to them; that they claimed damages for an injury to something to which they had no right, and to which they would not have had a right had the company's works never been constructed. Thus, in Shrunk v. Schuylkill Nav. Company, 14 S. & R. 71, 83, an injury to a right of fishery, but court replied, you never had a right of fishery, therefore, no commonlaw wrong; in Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal and Nav. Company, 4 Rawle 9, 23, injury to a pier by reason of a flood, but court replied, the flood was the act of God, therefore, no common-law wrong; in Watson v. Pittsburgh, etc., Rd. Company, 1 Wright 469, in estimating injury plaintiff wished to consider what the lands would be worth at some future time, court replied, this is wholly fanciful. The plaintiff also wanted to prove simply the depreciation in value of the property, without confining witnesses to the direct and necessary consequences of the occupation; but the court replied, this was going too far, for the jury could thus take into the estimate any consequences, no matter how remote, and this, moreover, was the duty of the court, to decide if any given claim for damages was within the law. In Sunbury, etc., Rd. v. Hummell, 3 Casey 99, an injury arising from the risk of fire from a locomotive, court replied, purely speculative, hence no injury at common law; and in Pittsburgh, etc., Rd. v. Jones, 1 Amer. 204, an injury to a ferry franchise by diversion of business by reason of the railroad tracks crossing the street at which the ferry-boats landed; but court replied, ferry franchise gave no right to land, hence no

injury at common law. Thus in the above cases, by considering the plaintiffs' claims, it will be readily seen that they demanded compensation for injury to things to which they had no right. These cases do not hold, had the plaintiffs possessed a right to the things themselves, that an injury to them would not have entitled one to compensation; but, on the contrary, they only hold, having no right to the things in question, of course they could suffer no common-law wrong, and this is the sense in which the expression common-law wrong is used; it is important to note that the cases are not intended to, and, as an actual fact, do not attempt to decide what injuries are common-law wrongs.

But in the following cases, as the legal remedy applied to the plaintiff's claims, the injury was a legal wrong and not damnum absque injuria; thus in Commonwealth v. Snyder,' charter provided compensation for interference in any way with any person's rights of property; Snyder claimed damages because the canal company, by erecting a dam across the creek, forced the water back into Back Creek, and from this latter upon his papermill, so that he could not use the same for six weeks; the court replied, the legal remedy was applicable to Snyder, hence the injury was a legal wrong. It was not damnum absque imjuria, because Plum Creek being non-navigable, he had a right of property in it. So in Barclay Rd. and Coal Co. v. Ingham,2 Ingham claimed damages as owner of a mill-dam on a non-navigable stream for destruction of the water-power by the erection of an embankment in said stream; court replied, the legal remedy was applicable to Ingham, hence the injury was a legal wrong; it was not damnum absque injuria, because the stream being non-navigable, he had a right of property in it. Again, in Dugan v. Bridge Co.,3 charter provided not to impair or ob

1 2 Watts 418.

12 Casey 200.

33 Casey 303. This case may be considered as the converse of Shrunk v. Schuyl kill Navigation Co.; in neither case did plaintiffs have any absolute right of property; in Shrunk's case the claim was denied because the remedy did not provide for compensation for destruction of fishery, whilst in Dugan's case the remedy was provided for compensation for impairment or obstruction of navigation, although, the river being a navigable one and therefore a public highway, the legislature could have given the right to obstruct; in the former case there was no recovery, whilst in the latter there was, yet in neither case was there any absolute right of property injured.

struct navigation; plaintiff claimed damages for obstructing his right of passage on the river as a public highway; court replied, the legal remedy was applicable to Dugan, hence the injury was a legal wrong; that the legislature could have parted with the power not to obstruct, but they had not done so, hence company was liable for obstructing.

I have cited these two types of cases at length, because it has seemed to me they illustrate the true meaning of the maxim damnum absque injuria, that is to say: (1) An injury is only a legal wrong when a legal remedy is provided, and (2) in order that one can avail one's self of the legal remedy, one's right of property must have been invaded, or the injury for which one claims compensation must have been brought especially within the remedy. There are, of course, a large class of injuries which the constitutional provisions were not intended to embrace, and this type of injury is well illustrated in the following cases, thus, in Pittsburgh, etc., Rd. v. Jones,' loss of business to a ferry company, occurring by reason of the railroad tracks crossing the street at which the ferry-boat landed, the latter having no right to land under the ferry franchise, was clearly not an injury contemplated by the Constitution; so also in Edmundson v. Pitisburgh, etc., Rd.,2 carelessness and negligence are not necessary results in constructing a railroad; again, in Searle v. Lackawanna, etc., Rd.,3 the increased inconvenience and expense there would be in the future working of mines now unopened, but when they should be opened, should not be considered, nor should it be considered as an injury, in estimating the damages, what the property would have been worth at some future time, as was urged in Watson v. Pittsburgh, etc., Rd., nor the risk of accidental fire, as in Sunbury & Erie Rd. v. Hummell; again, as in Lehigh Bridge Co. v. Lehigh Coal and Nav, Co., and in Pittsburgh., etc., Rd. v. Gilleland.' where the injury is the result of the act of God, there should be no recovery under the constitutional provision. In other words, there is no relief where the injury is purely speculative, i. e., that which may in the future

1 1 Amer. 204.

1 Amer. 316.

3 9 Casey 571.

⚫ 1 Wright 469.

VOL. XXXVI.-2

53 Casey 99.
64 Rawle 9, 23.
76 Smith 445.

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