upon an estoppel. But the presumption is against bad faith, and until the contrary appears that presumption must prevail. We think that we were right in holding that, where it appears that the disability of coverture exists, it devolves upon the party seeking the judgment to show that the contract was one which the married woman had capacity to make: Vogel v. Leichner, supra; Cupp v. Campbell, supra. But this does not prevent the party from showing that he relied upon the conduct of the married woman. It would be a fraud which she will not be allowed to perpetrate for her to repudiate her representations as against one who has in good faith relied upon them. Our decisions all recognize the rule that, under the provisions of the Act of 1881, a married woman may be estopped, and that when she attempts to deny what she has previously affirmed, she is guilty of a legal fraud. Upon the admitted facts stated in the reply, the appellant, Mary J. Rogers, was estopped to deny the character of the contract into which she entered. There was no error in refusing a jury trial. The suit was of equitable cognizance, and the whole issue became one for the Chancellor, and not for the jury: Carmichael v. Adams, 91 Ind. 526; Field v. Holzman, 93 Ind. 205; Quarl v. Abbett, 102 Ind. 233-239; Brown v. Russell, 105 Ind. 46, and cases cited. It is contended that the judgment should be reversed because the bill of exceptions does not show that any evidence was given, but does show that testimony was offered. The appellants take a very erroneous view of the subject. Upon them rests the burden of showing error in the record, and if all the evidence was necessary to show this, it was for them to bring it into the record. If the evidence is not all in the record, the presumption that the trial court did right will prevail. If the bill of exceptions is defective, the appellants must suffer, and not the appellee. Judgment affirmed. The only question of general interest involved in this case is, whether and how the doctrine of estoppel is applied to a married woman? Estoppel is where a person sui juris, by words or conduct intentionally causes another to believe in the existence of certain facts, which induces him to act on that belief, so as to alter his previous condition, the former is estopped from averring against the latter a different state of facts as existing at the same time: 1 Saund. 326; Pickard v. Sears, 6 A. & E. 469; 2 Nev. & P. 488; Malloney v. Horan, 49 N. Y. 111; Anthony v. Stephens, 46 Ga. 241; Cady v. Owen, 34 Vt. 598; Lyman v. Cessford, 15 Iowa 229. And such estoppel operates only in favor of parties affected, and not in favor of those upon whom it had no influence: Whedon v. Champlin, 59 Barb. 62; Crenshaw v. Creek, 52 Mo. 98; Malony v. Horan, 49 N. Y. 111; Guthrie v. Howard, 32 Iowa 54; McDaniel v. Carver, 40 Ind. 250; Van Metre v. Wolf, 27 Iowa 341. It may be affirmed that the full doctrine of estoppel has not been applied to a married woman, because she is more or less under certain disabilities and is not in fact sui juris: Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Miss. 119; Lowell v. Daniels, 2 Gray 161; Keen ▼. Hartman, 12 Wright (Pa.) 497; Keen v. Coleman, 3 Id. 299; Martin v. Martin, 22 Ala. 86; Lothrop v. Foster, 51 Me. 367; Burns v. Lynde, 6 Allen 305; Toules v. Fisher, 77 N. C. 443; Lyman v. Cessford, 15 Iowa 233. Hence, as a married woman had no capacity to make a contract at common law, any attempted or quasi contract she might enter into were void, and did not create an estoppel: Glidden v. Strupler, 2 P. F. Sm. 400; Plumer v. Lord, 5 Allen 460; Davenport v. Nelson, 4 Camp. 25;. Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93; Todd v. Railroad, 19 Ohio St. 514; for the very good reason that if she could bind herself by way of estoppel, this would destroy her incapacity to contract at common law and present the contradictions, that although at common law a married woman cannot enter into a contract, yet she can make such contract by way of estoppel. The statutory enactments changing the common law with respect to married women enlarged her capacity to contract and carried with it the doctrine of estop pel in proportion to the enlargement of her power to contract and other sui juris powers: Richardson v. Hittle, 31 Ind. 119; Witbeck v. Witbeck, 25 Mich. 439; Reagan v. Holliman, 34 Tex. 403; Horie v. Price, 31 Wis. 82; Canty v. Sanderford, 37 Ala. 91; In re Lush's Trust, L. R., 4 Ch. Ap. 591; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382; Palmer v. Cross, 1 Sm. & M. 48; Towlers v. Fisher, 77 N. C. 413; Lyman v. Cessford, 15 Iowa 233; Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill. 18; Cual Co. v. Fasco, 79 ld 170; Sharpe v. Foy, L. R, 4 Ch. Ap. 35; Jones v. Frost, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap. 773; contra, Bemis v. Call, 10 Allen 512; Palmer v. Cross, 1 Sm. & M. 48; Rangeley v. Spring, 21 Me. 130. In proportion, therefore, as the enabling statutes have removed a married woman's disabilities under the common law, so her capacity to be bound by estoppel is also enlarged; and conversely, in proportion as the common law disabilities remain, or exist, so also the doctrine of estoppel does not operate, and does not apply: Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93; Lyman v. Cessford, 15 Iowa 229; Grove v. Jeager, 60 Ill. 249; Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Id. 18; hence, acts which before the enabling statute would not have bound a married woman by way of estoppel may do so now, under these statutes, upon the principle above stated: Lyman v. Cessford, supra; Grove v. Jeager, supra; Upshaw v. Gibson, 53 Miss. 344. But as there are no enabling statutes which make a married woman sui juris in every respect without qualification or limitation, and as a married woman can only contract with respect to her separate estate, the law of estoppel can only attach to that separate estate directly or indirectly: Wood v. Terry, 30 Ark. 393. The doctrine of estoppel as applied under the enabling statutes to the acts of a married woman arises out of, and has its origin in, fraud-some affirma or tive act of fraud, upon which a prudent person might and did rely to his injury: Toules v. Fisher, 77 N. C. 443; Schwartz v. Saunders, 46 Ill. 18; Sharpe v. Foy, L. R., 4 Ch. Ap. 35; Jones v. Frost, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap. 773; not a silent or passive act, such as mere silence in regard to her rights: U.S. Bank v. Lee, 13 Pet. 118; Palmer v. Cross, 1 Sm. & M. 68; Drake v. Glover, 30 Ala. 382; Havener v. Godfrey, 3 W. Va. 426; contra, Lindner v. Sahler, 51 Barb. 322; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 10 C. E. Green 194, but a positive, active, fraudulent act statement: Ainsley v. Mead, 3 Lans. 116; Westgate v. Munroe, 100 Mass. 227; such as where she made a sworn disclaimer of ownership: Cooley v. Steele, 2, Head 605; Lathrop v. Association, 45 Ga. 483; Cravens v. Booth, 8 Tex. 243; or where she announced at the sale of her husband's real estate that she would not claim dower, and the purchasers, relying upon her statement, made the purchase: Cɔnnolly v. Branstier, 3 Bush 702; or her false recitals in her deed: Jones v. Frost, L. R., 7 Ch. Ap. 773; or her active connivance in her husband's fraud, produced by her loaning her credit for that fraudulent purpose: Anderson v. Armstead, 69 Ill. 456; Bodine v. Killeen, 53 N. Y. 93; Ander80n v. O'Rielly, 54 Barb. 620; or knowingly permitting her husband to obtain credit on the faith of property which in truth belongs to her: Besson v. Eveland, 11 C. E. Green 471; Zimmer v. Dansby, 56 Ga. 79. See Dayton v. Fisher, 34 Ind. 356. A married woman can only be divested of her separate estate in the method and manner prescribed by the law: Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cala. 493; McIntosh v. Smith, 2 La. Ann. 758; Bisland v. Provasty, 14 La. Ann. 169; and as estoppel applies to executed, not executory, contracts of a married woman, every contract which she, by false representations, induces another to enter into with herself, is not an estoppel: Keen v. Hartman, 12 Wright (Pa.) 497; Keen v. Coleman, 3 Id. 299; Lowell v. Daniels, 2 Gray 161. It depends upon the line of demarkation above stated, and containing in some degree the elements of fraud, and injury or damage to another: Sexton v. Wheaton, 8 Wheat. 238; Lane v. Berry, 2 Duv. 282; Mounger v. Duke, 53 Ga. 281; Brown v. Kimbrough, 51 Ga 35. The general rule is that in proportion as a married woman's disabilities at common law are removed by the enabling statutes, she is within that degree bound by estoppel in pais like any person sui juris. Bellaire, Ohio. JOHN F. KELLY. Court of Appeals of Kentucky. WHEAT v. BANK OF LOUISVILLE. The appellee, a banking corporation, was a creditor to a large amount of the firm of W. & D., and its president, without express authority, and without advising the directors, agreed to a composition between the firm and its creditors. The directors held meetings between the time of the failure of W. & D. and the proposal of a composition, and also between the time of the proposal and the time of the acceptance of the composition. The board took no action in the matter, but at its meetings each member had expressed oppcsi tion to a compromise. There was no evidence of any custom of the president to act in such matters. Held, that the action of its president was not binding on the appellee. In order that the circumstances of a particular case may be sufficient to raise a presumption of authority in a bank president to bind the bank in matters beyond the scope of his usual authority, the bank must in some manner be a party to the circumstances, or must be chargeable with knowledge of them. Where an answer, in setting up an agreement with a bank, merely averred that the bank was represented by its president, but did not aver any authority in the president to represent or bind the bank, and the reply denied the alleged agreement, but did not aver that the president had no authority to act for it, held, that the authority of the president was in issue. APPEAL from Louisville Chancery Court. Chas. II. Gibson, for appellant. Hamilton Payne and Wm. Lindsay, for appellee. HOLT, J.-Wheat & Durff, doing business as merchants, made an assignment for the benefit of their creditors. The trustee instituted this action to settle the trust. The appellee, the Bank of Louisville, having been made a defendant, asserted a considerable indebtedness against the firm, and made its answer a cross-petition against its members. The appellant, John L. Wheat, alone filed an answer to it. He does not deny the indebtedness, but avers that shortly after the failure the creditors, at a creditors' meeting, agreed with Wheat & Durff and each other to accept fifty per centum of their claims in full discharge thereof; and that the bank so agreed, being represented at the meeting by its president. The answer further avers, as the indebtedness of the firm to the bank was evidenced by paper which it had indorsed to it, and upon which other parties were previously liable, that, subsequent to the making of the composition agreement, it was further agreed between Wheat & Durff and the bank that the latter should collect the indebtedness so far as possible from those first liable therefor, and when no more could be collected, that then Wheat & Durff should pay to the bank fifty per centum of the amount uncollected, and in consideration thereof be discharged from all further liability. The bank by a reply denies that it ever made either agreement; and it is now insisted that, inasmuch as it does not aver that its president had no authority to act for it at the creditors' meetings, this must be taken as pro confesso, and his action considered as its action. The answer, however, does not aver that the appellee's president had authority to agree to the composition, but merely says that the bank was represented at the two creditors' meetings by its president, without averring that he was authorized to so represent it, and that the bank agreed to the settlement. Upon this state of pleading the authority of its president to bind it by any such agreement must be regarded as in issue. The evidence is somewhat conflicting as to whether all of the creditors present at the creditors' meeting, or the president of the bank, did then agree to the composition. The decided burden of the testimony, however, supports this view, and we think it may be safely so assumed. The appellant testifies that the second agreement above named was made with the appellee's president alone, so that, when the appellant now urges that the bank's recovery should be confined to a sum equal to fifty per centum of its debt, the question arises whether it is bound by the action of its president as above indicated. If it be answered in the negative, then it will be necessary to consider the other questions that have been ably presented in argument. The charter of the bank gives him no such power. It provides that the administration of its affairs shall be under the control of a board of directors. It is conceded in argument, upon the part of the appellant, that he had no express authority to so bind the bank, and that he never advised its board of any such action by him. Neither is it contended that he, virtute officii merely, could compromise or release its debt. If he had such power, it must be traced to the assent of the board of directors, either express or implied. In truth, the position of president of a bank is one of dignity rather than power. There is an indefinite general responsibility attached to the place. He is expected to watch more closely the daily transactions of the bank than the other directors; and while they, or usage, may confer upon him special powers, and extend his authority, yet that inherent in the position is very slight. Indeed, it seems by judicial decision to be confined to taking charge of the litigation of the bank. Mr. Moore says: "The same species of limitation in the power of the president |