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CHAPTER XIII.

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Brazil and La Plata.-Folly of the war-False policy of the republicDissensions-Bank of Buenos Ayres-Mines-State of the war—i vasion of Rio Grande-Battle of Ituzaingo-Consequences-Brown's successes-Both parties desire peace-Garcia's treaty-Rejected-And justly-Garcia's defence-Rivadavia resigns-Lopez elected-Government of Buenos Ayres-Dissolution of the republic-Cordova and Buenos Ayres unite-State of the war-Brazilian ministry-Mr. Raguet's departure from Rio-Paraguay.

THE Continuance of the war be. tween BRAZIL and the PROVINCES OF THE RIO DE LA PLATA, renders it convenient to treat of the affairs of these two countries in conjunction, as this war occupies so prominent a place in their history. The dissensions, which have distracted the several portions of the republic, contribute to heighten the picture of calamity, which those fine regions present. The anarchy of the Buenos Ayreans, like the despotism which oppresses the Brazilians, is aggravated by the horrors of an idle and useless contest, which preys upon the resources and prosperity of each, without promising any advantage of adequate importance to either. It was preposterous in Pedro, already possessing an empire of such enor

mous magnitude, to seek to enlarge it by conquest, usurpation, or violating the rights of his neighbours. And it is preposterous for the re public to jeopardize its own existence, in fruitless endeavours to extend itself over all the provinces comprehended in the old viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres.

It seems to be a prevailing error in South America, that, on the one hand, the several component por. tions of the respective Spanish governments do not fully appreci ate the advantages of union to themselves; and that, on the other hand, the ancient capitals of those governments are excessively and unreasonably anxious to effect a consolidation, which is worse than useless, if it be not voluntary. Evidence of this may be found in

the recent history of all the large republics; and especially that of La Plata. The extent of the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres was always inconveniently great; and circumstances have conspired, since the commencement of the revolution, to facilitate the subdivision or dismemberment, to which it was naturally inclined. Upper Peru, although subject to Buenos Ayres, necessarily, from its local position, follows the fortunes of Peru, not of Buenos Ayres; and it is vain for the politicians of La Plata to refuse the liberty of self government to the Bolivians, with whom they will never be re-united, except as allies, or as the common subjects of some too successful conqueror. As little can the Buenos Ayreans hope that Paraguay shall belong to them, in the ordinary course of events. Their new attempt to regain the Banda Oriental seems hardly nearer a happy consummation now, than it was when Artigas maintained against them the independence of Montevideo. These cases illustrate the remark, that the government of the republic has taken a wrong view of the supposed necessity of preserving the integrity of the old viceroyalty.

It is equally evident from the proceedings of the interior provinces of the republic of La Plata, that they are ignorant of the commonest principles of political wisdom, and destitute of all sound views of their

own interest. Nothing else can satisfactorily account for the ground. less hostility they manifest towards Buenos Ayres, their frequent eruptions of strange disorder, their invasion of one another's territory, upon the pettiest subjects of difference which ever agitated men. We related some unhappy instances of this, in the preceding volume ; but since then the evil has increased beyond measure.

We left the general congress occupied with the discussion of a fundamental code. They had resolved to follow the system of central unity; and the plan of constitution reported was almost identically the same as that of Colombia. For the reasons stated in our chapter on Chile, we think it may reasonably be doubted, whether the federal system can be introduced beneficially into each and all of the old Spanish governments; but there is reason to think that the viceroyalty of Buenos Ayres affords as fair a field for the trial of it as any part of South America; because it is naturally and easily divisible into separate portions. Perhaps, therefore, it is unfortunate that the federal system was not selected by congress for the basis of their constitution; because the introduction of centralism has fur. nished the interior provinces with a pretext for inveighing against the ambition of Buenos Ayres, and the

demand of a federal constitution has proved a convenient rallying word for the disaffected. But the example of Central America, shows that stability would not necessarily attach to the federal system. Indeed, congress hesitated to fix upon the central plan, without first consulting the several provinces, and ascertaining that a majority preferred it, before proceeding to sanction it as the fundamental law of the republic.

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Nevertheless, towards the close of the year 1826, and early in the year 1827, the interior provinces were given up to the most deplorable anarchy and confusion. tached notices occasionally reach us through the South American newspapers, plainly indicating the unhappy state of things. Thus, in January, 1827, we read accounts in the Buenos Ayrean journals, of the province of San Juan being taken possession of by D. Facundo Quiroga, at the head of four hundred men from Rioja, who compelled the governor and his troops to retire to Mendoza, and seek for succour there; an incident resembling what had occurred at the same place the year before. Quiroga having routed Lamadrid, entered into Tucuman, with Ibarra, governor of Santiago del Estero, who, like Bustos, the governor of Cordova, refused to recognise the authority of the national government. But they were after

wards attacked, and their forces dispersed, by colonels Bedoya and Heredia, who then entered into the city of Santiago. When the provinces of Cordova, Rioja, and Santiago del Estero, were thus in a state of open revolt, carrying their arms into Tucuman, and yielding only to superior force, to stop their career of violence, we may conceive the disordered condition of the republic.

Afterwards, an engagement was fought in the vicinity of Salta, in which colonel Bedoya, who commanded a division of 214 men, in behalf of the general government, was defeated, and slain, with 170 of his followers. In consequence of this, the governor Arenales found it necessary to fly, taking, it was supposed, the road for Chile, by the cordillera of Huasco; and in his place, the federalist chief D. Jose Francisco Gorriti, succeeded to the command. The latter was principally enabled to do this by means of a body of Colombian grenadiers, of the division cantoned in Bolivia, who mutinied in the province of Cochabamba, and passed over the lines into Salta. This incident gave many persons occasion to say, although the imputation was entirely without foundation, that the whole was an intrigue of Sucre's. It is not credible, that Sucre, if disposed to aid the federal party against the centralists of Buenos Ayres, of which there is no

evidence, would have adopted means so fatal to the discipline of his army as the promotion of a fic. titious insurrection. In fact, the mutinous grenadiers, to the number of 180 men, beat off the division of general O'Connor, who pursued them, and they, no doubt, joined the insurgent chief Gorriti, instead of Arenales, because they must have submitted to more exact disci. pline under the latter. Besides, president Sucre would never have intrusted such a secret to the keeping of 180 private soldiers. On the contrary, the federal party in Salta accused Sucre of sustaining Arenales, who, as many thought, intended to take refuge in Chuquisaco. The chief subjects of complaint against Arenales, on the side of the insurgent party, were the prolongation of his command in the province, and the introduction there of the paper of the bank of Buenos Ayres.

The foundation upon which this bank was established, was in violation of all the soundest and most undeniable principles of political economy. It has been the misfor. tune, however, of many countries in modern times, to try most ruinous experiments in banking, when the government was pressed by pecuniary embarrassments. Nothing but the peculiar circumstances of England could have sustained the credit of its bank paper, when the specie payments of the bank of En

gland were suspended; and the fore the original establishment of a bank in Buenos Ayres, upon the principle of not paying in specie on demand, necessarily could result only in augmented financial distress. Regardless, however, of the considerations appertaining to the actual condition of the country, regardless of all the lessons of experience, the state men of the La Plata planned an institution, in which loss and ruin were inherent qualities. Congress enacted a law for the creation of a national bank, which should redeem some of its notes during the first six months of the year following the date of the law; only one third of the bills in circulation during the next six months; only one half in the six months ensuing; and only two thirds during the last moiety of the second year; and no payments being allowed at all, except in ingots of a thousand or five hundred dollars each. the same time it was provided that the notes should be current for their nominal value throughout the whole territory of the republic. The consequences were easy to be foreseen. No purchases could be made of foreign merchants in this currency; nor would it be acceptable in London, in discharge of the dividends on the national debt. Of course a great depreciation followed instantly upon the issue of the notes. As the government received them in payment of taxes,

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