It has not been believed by the Government of the United States that, in case an arrangement was not made by treaty, they would nevertheless, by special favour, be permanently exempted from the general operation of the act. But, it was presumed that Great Britain, under the expectation of a favourable issue of the negotiations that were to be forthwith resumed, would suspend the operation of the act in regard to the United States, until the result of those negotiations was ascertained. In what manner that suspension would be effected was not known.

Mr. Clay's letter is written entirely in that spirit. He did not believe that it was intended by the British Government that the act of July, 1825, should disturb the trade between the British colonies and the United States; first, and principally, because it would be inconsistent with negotiations between the two Governments, contemplated, if not yet resumed. Had it not been that it had been announced by the authorities of Halifax, that it was intended to close that port against American vessels, he would have been strongly inclined to think that the intercourse was intended to continue to be regulated by the former acts of Parliament. If the Halifax construction should prove to be correct, he was persuaded that an exception in favour of the American trade would be made by a special Order in Council.

It is true, that no such order was issued, and equally true that, after the lapse of a few weeks, neither Mr. Clay nor any other person in America expected that it would be issued. For, the Halifax construction having been abandoned,

and that as well as all the other British colonial ports remaining open to American vessels, after the day when the act of Parlia ment was to take effect, it was concluded, without further investigation, that that act was not intended, at least for a time, to operate on the United States. It has since been made known that the suspension, which in fact took place, was intended by Great Britain, not in reference to negotiation, but in order to ascertain the result of the proceedings in Congress.

Lord Dudley intimates that the Government of the United States set out with a very mistaken opinion of the views of Great Britain respecting her colonies, and more especially respecting the importance to those colonies of a direct intercourse with the ports of the United States; and he seems to think that this is the only principle which would account for some of the proceedings of that Govern

ment.

Coinciding entirely in Lord Dudley's opinion, that perfect frankness is not only consistent with friendly feelings, but even essential to a mutual good understanding and confidence, the undersigned will be as explicit on this as on any other subject. The United States do not suppose the direct intercourse between their ports and the British colonies to be necessary to those colonies. They know that the British West Indies have been supplied by other means, and have not materially suffered during those periods when that intercourse was interrupted by war, or has been interdicted by the laws of the two countries.

But, though not necessary to

either party, that commerce is known to be beneficial to both. The proof is found in the fact that it has always been carried on to a considerable extent whenever it has been permitted; that absolute prohibitions can alone stop it. That Great Britain thinks so herself, cannot be denied. It is believed that, except when the two nations have unfortunately been at war, there has not, to this day, been any time at which the intercourse has not, with certain limitations, been allowed by her, in British vessels.

There are not perhaps, two countries, within the same distance from one another, and with such easy and prompt communications, which have products so essentially different as the West Indies and the United States. There are, therefore, not any, between which commerce is more natural, and the exchange of their respective commodities more mutually beneficial. The laws, which interdict such an intercourse, are an obvious and practical departure from those principles of free trade, which, in other respects, are so ably upheld and vindicated.

It is not at all asserted that the injury arising from a suspension of that commerce, is more heavily felt by one party than by the other. The American Government neither overrates the importance to the West Indies of the direct intercourse, nor denies its great utility to the United States. In both countries the planter or farmer is, by the suspension, deprived of one of the markets for his produce,

and compelled to pay dearer for his supplies; and a positive evil is inflicted on both parties, without any visible advantage to either.

The right of Great Britain to regulate the intercourse with her colonies, is not questioned; and it is not usual for nations to make any great sacrifice, for the sake of asserting abstract principles which are not contested. She is, undoubtedly, the only proper judge of what should be her commercial policy. The undersigned has not been fortunate enough to be able to discover what actual advantages she derives from the measures in which she perseveres in regard to the colonial intercourse. He has apprehended that considerations foreign to the question, might continue to oppose obstacles to a proper understanding. Nothing has been omitted to remove those which might have arisen from misconceptions of the views and proceedings of the American Government. It is gratifying to have received assurances that the decision of Great Britain was not influenced by any unfriendly feelings towards the United States. Their sentiments for Great Britain are those of amity and good will;—and their Government is animated by a sincere desire to improve and strengthen the friendly relations of the two countries.

The undersigned has the honour to renew to Lord Dudley the assurance of his high consideration. ALBERT GALLATIN. October, 3, 1827..

B

American paper on the Navigation of the St. Lawrence.-18th

Protocol.

The right of the People of the United States to navigate the river St. Lawrence, to and from the sea, has never yet been discussed between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain. If it has not been distinctly asserted by the former, in negotiation, hitherto, it is because the benefits of it have been tacitly enjoyed, and because the interest, now become so great, and daily acquiring fresh magnitude, has, it may almost be said, originated since the acknowledgment of the independence of the United States, in 1783. This river is the only outlet provided by nature for the inhabitants of several among the largest and most populous States of the American Union. Their right to use it, as a medium of communication with the ocean, rests upon the same ground of natural right and obvious necessity heretofore asserted by the Government in behalf of the people of other portions of the United States, in relation to the Mississippi River. It has sometimes been said, that the possession by one nation of both the shores of a river at its mouth, gives the right of obstructing the navigation of it to the people of other nations living on the banks above; but it remains to be shown upon what satisfactory grounds the assumption by the nation below of exclusive jurisdiction over a river, thus situated, can be placed. The

common right to navigate it, is, on the other hand, a right of nature. This is a principle which, it is conceived, will be found to have the sanction of the most revered authorities of ancient and modern times: and, if there have been temporary occasions when it has been questioned, it is not known that the reasons upon which it rests, as developed in the most approved works upon public law, have ever been impugned. As a general principle, it stands unshaken. The dispute relative to the Scheldt, in 1784, is, perhaps, the occasion when the argument drawn from natural right was most attempted to be impeached. Here the circumstances were al together peculiar. Amongst others, it is known to have been alleged by the Dutch, that the whole course of the two branches of this river, which passed within the dominions of Holland, was entirely artificial; that it owed its existence to the skill and labour of Dutchmen; that its banks had been reared up at immense cost, and were in like manner maintained. Hence, probably, the motive for that stipulation in the treaty of Munster, which had continued for more than a century, that the lower Scheldt, with the canals of Sas and Swin, and other mouths of the sea bordering upon them, should be kept closed on the side belonging to the States. But the case of the St. Lawrence is totally different. cial, also, as seemed the grounds which the Dutch took as against the emperor of Germany, in this

Spe

case of the Scheldt, and, although they also stood fupon a specific and positive compact, of long duration, it is, nevertheless, kuown that the public voice of Europe, on this part of the dispute, preponderated against them. It may well have done so, since there is no sentiment more deeply and universally felt than that the ocean is free to all men, and the waters that flow into it, to those whose home is upon their shores. In nearly every part of the world we find this natural right acknowledged, by laying navigable rivers open to all the inhabitants of their banks; and, wherever the stream, entering the limits of another so ciety or nation, has been interdicted to the upper inhabitants, it has been an act of force by a stronger against a weaker party, and condemned by the judgment of mankind. The right of the upper inhabitants to the full use of the stream, rests upon the same imperious wants as that of the lower; upon the same intrinsic necessity of participating in the benefits of this flowing element. Rivers were given for the use of all persons living in the country of which they make a part, and a primary use of navigable ones is that of external commerce. The public good of nations is the object of the law of nations, as that of individuals is of municipal law. The interest of a part gives way to that of the whole; the particular to the general. The former is subordinate; the latter paramount. This is the principle pervading every code, national or municipal, whose basis is laid in moral right, and whose aim is the universal good. All that can be required under a principal so incontestible,

so wise, and, in its permanent results upon the great fabric of human society, so beneficent, is, that reasonable compensation be made whenever the general good calls for partial sacrifices, whether from individuals in a local jurisdiction, or from one nation considered as an integral part of the This is acfamily of nations. cordingly done in the case of roads, and the right of way, in single communities; and is admitted to be just, in the form of moderate tolls, where a foreign passage takes place through a natural current, kept in repair by the nation holding its shores below. The latter predicament is not supposed to be that of the St. Lawrence at this day, since it is not known that any artificial constructions, looking simply to its navigation, have yet been employed, either upon its banks, or in keeping the channel clear. This has been the case, in connexion with other facilities and protection afforded to navigation, with the Elbe, the Maese, the Weser, the Oder, and various other rivers of Europe that might be named : and the incidental right of toll bas followed. It may be mentioned, however, as a fact, under this head, that the prevailing disposition of Europe defeated an attempt, once made by Denmark, to exact a toll at the mouth of the Elbe, by means of a fort on the Holstein side, which commanded it. The sound dues have been admitted in favour of Denmark, but not always without scrutiny, and only under well established rules. We know that, under some circumstances, and with due precautions, a right is even allowed to armies to pass through

a neutral territory for the destructive purposes of war. How much stronger, and more unqualified the right to seek a passage through a natural stream, for the useful and innocent purposes of commerce and subsistence! A most authentic and unequivocal confirination of this doctrine, has been afforded, at a recent epoch, by the parties to the European alliance, and largely, as is believed, through the enlightened instrumentality of Great Britain, at the negotiation of the treaties at the Congress of Vienna. It has been stipulated in these treaties, that the Rhine, the Necker, the Mayne, the Moselle, the Maese, and the Scheldt, are to be free to all nations. The object of these stipulations undoubtedly has been, to lay the navigation of these rivers effectively open to all the people dwelling upon their banks, or within their neighbourhood, and to abolish those unnatural and unjust restrictions by which the inhabitants of the interior of Germany have been too often deprived of their outlet to the sea, by an abuse of that sovereignty rather than its right, which would impute an exclusive dominion over a river to any one State not holding all its shores. These stipulations may be considered as an indication of the' sent judgment of Europe upon the point, and would seem to supersede further reference to the case of other rivers, and from their recent, as well as high authority, further illustration of any kind. They imply a substantial recognition of the principle, that, whatever may sometimes have been the claim to an exclusive right by one nation over a river, under the circumstances in question, the

pre

claim, if founded in an alleged right of sovereignty, could, at best only be supposed to spring from the social compact: whereas the right of navigating the river, is a right of nature, pre-existent in point of time, not necessary to have been surrendered up for any purpose of the common good, and unsusceptible of annihilation. There is no principle of national law, and universal justice, upon which the provisions of the Vienna treaties are founded, that does not apply to sustain the right of the People of the United States to navigate the St. Lawrence. The relations between the soil and the water, and those of man to both, form the eternal basis of this right. These relations are too intimate and powerful to be separated. A nation deprived of the use of the water flowing through its soil, would see itself stripped of many of the most beneficial uses of the soil itself; so that its right to use the water, and freely to pass over it, becomes an indispensible adjunct to its territorial rights. It is a means so interwoven with the end, that to disjoin them would be to destroy the end. Why should the water impart its fertility to the earth, if the products of the latter are to be left to perish upon the shores?

It may be proper to advert to the footing, in point of fact, upon which the navigation of this river stands, at present, between the two countries, so far as the regulations of Great Britain are concerned. The act of Parliament of the 3d of Geo. IV, chapter 119, August 5, 1822, has permitted the importation from the United States, by land, or water, into any port of entry in either of the Canadas, at which there is a cus