The last blank was filled up with one year, and carried —8 ayes-2 noes, 1 divided.

Mr. Pinkney moved to expunge the clause. Agreed to,

nem. con.

The question to fill up the blank with 30 years. Agreed to--7 states for-4 against.

It was moved to fill the blank, as to the duration, with seven years.

Mr. Pierce moved to have it for three years-instanced the danger of too long a continuance, from the evils arising in the British parliaments from their septenual duration, and the clamors against it in that country by its real friends.

Mr. Sherman was against the 7 years, because if they are bad men it is too long, and if good they may be again elected.

Mr. Madison was for 7 years-Considers this branch as a check on the democracy-It cannot therefore be made too strong.

For the motion, 8 ayes-1 no-2 states divided. NewYork one of the last.

Mr. Butler moved to expunge the clause of the stipends. Lost-7 against-3 for-1 divided.

Agreed that the second branch of the national legislature be paid in the same way as the first branch.

Upon the subject of ineligibility, it was agreed that the same rule should apply as to the first branch. 6th resolve agreed to be postponed, sine die. 9th resolve taken into consideration, but postponed to to-morrow. Then adjourned to to-morrow morning.

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 13th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. Gov. Randolph observed the difficulty in establishing the powers of the judiciary-the object however at present is to establish this principle, to wit, the security of

foreigners where treaties are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of states and that of the citizens thereof. This being once established, it will be the business of a sub-committee to detail it; and therefore moved to obliterate such parts of the resolve so as only to establish the principle, to wit, that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to all cases of national revenue, impeachment of national officers, and questions which involve the national peace or harmony. Agreed to unanimously. It was further agreed, that the judiciary be paid out of the national treasury.

Mr. Pinkney moved that the judiciary be appointed by the national legislature.

Mr. Madison is of opinion that the second branch of the legislature ought to appoint the judiciary, which the convention agreed to.

Mr. Gerry moved that the first branch shall have the only right of originating bills to supply the treasury.

Mr. Butler against the motion. We are constantly running away with the idea of the excellence of the British parliament, and with or without reason copying from them; when in fact there is no similitude in our situations. With us both houses are appointed by the people, and both ought to be equally trusted.

Mr.Gerry. If we dislike the British government for the oppressive measures by them carried on against us, yet he hoped we would not be so far prejudiced as to make ours in every thing opposite to theirs.

Mr. Madison's question carried.

The committee having now gone through the whole of the propositions from Virginia-Resolved, That the committee do report to the convention their proceedingsThis was accordingly done. [See a copy of it hereunto annexed.]

The house resolved on the report being read, that the

consideration thereof be postponed to to-morrow, and that members have leave to take copies thereof. Adjourned to to-morrow morning.

THURSDAY, JUNE 14th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. Mr. Patterson moved that the further consideration of the report be postponed until to-morrow, as he intended to give in principles to form a federal system of government materially different from the system now under consideration. Postponement agreed to. Adjourned until to-morrow morning.

FRIDAY, JUNE 15th, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. Mr. Patterson, pursuant to his intentions as mention». ed yesterday, read a set of resolves as the basis of amendment to the confederation. [See those resolves annexed.]

He observed that no government could be energetic on paper only, which was no more than straw-that the remark applied to the one as well as to the other system, and is therefore of opinion that there must be a small standing force to give every government weight.

Mr. Madison moved for the report of the committee, and the question may then come on whether the convention will postpone it in order to take into consideration the system now offered.

Mr. Lansing is of opinion that the two systems are fairly contrasted. The one now offered is on the basis of amending the federal government, and the other to be reported as a national government, on propositions which exclude the propriety of amendment. Considering therefore its importance, and that justice may be done to its weighty consideration, he is for postponing it a day.

Col. Hamilton cannot say he is in sentiment with either plan-supposes both might again be considered as

federal plans, and by this means they will be fairly in committee, and be contrasted so as to make a comparative estimate of the two.

Thereupon it was agreed, that the report be postponed, and that the house will resolve itself into a committee of the whole, to take into consideration both propositions tomorrow. Then the convention adjourned to to-morrow morning.

SATURDAY, JUNE 16, 1787.

Met pursuant to adjournment. Present 11 states. Mr. Lansing moved to have the first article of the last plan of government read; which being done, he observed, that this system is fairly contrasted with the one ready to be reported-the one federal, and the other national. In the first, the powers are exercised as flowing from the respective state governments-The second, deriving its authority from the people of the respective states— which latter must ultimately destroy or annihilate the state governments. To determine the powers on these grand objects with which we are invested, let us recur to the credentials of the respective states, and see what the views were of those who sent us. The language is there expressive-it is, upon the revision of the present confederation, to alter and amend such parts as may appear defective, so as to give additional strength to the union. And he would venture to assert, that had the legislature of the state of New-York, apprehended that their powers would have been construed to extend to the formation of a national government, to the extinguishment of their independency, no delegates would have here appeared on the part of that state. This sentiment must have bad its weight on a former occasion, even in this house; for when the second resolution of Virginia, which declared, in substance, that a federal government could not be amended for the good of the whole, the remark of an ho

norable member of South-Carolina, that by determining this question in the affirmative their deliberative powers were at an end, induced this house to wave the resolution. It is in vain to adopt a mode of government, which we have reason to believe the people gave us no power to recommend--as they will consider themselves on this ground authorized to reject it. See the danger of exceeding your powers by the example which the requisition of congress of 1783 afforded. They required an impost on all imported articles; to which, on federal grounds, they had no right unless voluntarily granted. What was the consequence? Some, who had least to give, granted it ; and others, under various restrictions and modifications, so that it could not be systematized. If we form a government, let us do it on principles which are likely to meet the approbation of the states. Great changes can only be gradually introduced. The states will never sacrifice their essential rights to a national government. New plans, annihilating the rights of the states (unless upon evident necessity) can never be approved. I may venture to assert, that the prevalent opinion of America is, that granting additional powers to congress would answer their views; and every power recommended for their approbation exceeding this idea, will be fruitless.

Mr. Patterson-As I had the honor of proposing a new system of government for the union, it will be expected that I should explain its principles.

1st. The plan accords with our own powers.

2d. It accords with the sentiments of the people. But if the subsisting confederation is so radically defective as not to admit of amendment, let us say so and report its insufficiency, and wait for enlarged powers. We must, in the present case, pursue our powers, if we expect the approbation of the people. I am not here to pursue my own sentiments of government, but of those who have sent me; and I believe that a little practical virtue