ment should only, in the first instance, have authority to ascertain the number of ports proper to be established in each state, and transmit information thereof to the several states, the legislatures of which, respectively, should have the power to fix the places where those ports should be, according to their idea what would be most advantageous to the commerce of their state, and most for the ease and convenience of their citizens; and that the general government should not interfere in the establishment of the places, unless the legislature of the state should neglect or refuse so to do; but we could not obtain this alteration.

By the tenth section every state is prohibited from emitting bills of credit-As it was reported by the committee of detail, the states were only prohibited from emitting them without the consent of congress: but the convention was so smitten with the paper money dread, that they insisted the prohibition should be absolute. It was my opinion, sir, that the states ought not to be totally deprived of the right to emit bills of credit, and that as we had not given an authority to the general government for that purpose, it was the more necessary to retain it in the states. I considered that this state, and some others, have formerly received great benefit from paper emissions, and that if public and private credit should once more be restored, such emissions may hereafter be equally advantageous; and further, that it is impossible to foresee that events may not take place which shall render paper money of absolute necessity; and it was my opinion, if this power was not to be exercised by a state without the permission of the general government, it ought to be satisfactory even to those who were the most haunted by the apprehensions of paper money; I therefore thought it my duty to vote against this part of the system.

The same section also, puts it out of the power of the states, to make any thing but gold and silver coin a ten

der in payment of debts, or to pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts.

I considered, sir, that there might be times of such great public calamities and distress, and of such extreme scarcity of specie, as should render it the duty of a government, for the preservation of even the most valuable part of its citizens, in some measure to interfere in their favor, by passing laws totally or partially stopping the courts of justice, or authorising the debtor to pay by instalments, or by delivering up his property to his creditors at a reasonable and honest valuation. The times have been such as to render regulations of this kind necessary in most, or all of the states, to prevent the wealthy creditor and the monied man from totally destroying the poor though even industrious debtor-Such times may again arrive. I therefore voted against depriving the states of this power-a power which I am decided they ought to possess, but which I admit ought only to be exercised on very important and urgent occasions. I apprehend, sir, the principal cause of complaint among the people at large is, the public and private debt with which they are oppressed, and which, in the present scarcity of cash, threatens them with destruction, unless they can obtain so much indulgence in point of time that by industry and frugality they may extricate themselves.

This government proposal, I apprehend, so far from removing will greatly increase those complaints, since grasping in its all powerful hand the citizens of the respective states, it will by the imposition of the variety of taxes, imposts,stamps, excises and other duties,squeeze from them the little money they may acquire, the hard earnings of their industry, as you would squeeze the juice from an orange, till not a drop more can be extracted, and then let loose upon them their private creditors, to whose mercy it consigns them, by whom their property is to be seized upon and sold in this scarcity of specie at a sheriff's sale,

where nothing but ready cash can be received, for a tenth part of its value, and themselves and their families to be consigned to indigence and distress, without their governments having a power to give them a moment's indulgence, however necessary it might be, and however desirous to grant them aid.

By this same section, every state is also prohibited from laying any imposts, or duties on imports or exports, without the permission of the general government. It was urged, that as almost all sources of taxation were given to congress, it would be but reasonable to leave the states the power of bringing revenue into their treasuries, by laying a duty on exports, if they should think proper, which might be so light as not to injure or discourage industry, and yet might be productive of considerable revenue-Also that there might be cases in which it would be proper, for the purpose of encouraging manufactures, to lay duties to prohibit the exportation of raw materials, and even in addition to the duties laid by congress on imports for the sake of revenue, to lay a duty to discourage the importation of particular articles into a state, or to enable the manufacturer here to supply us on as good terms as they could be obtained from a foreign market ; however, the most we could obtain was that this power might be exercised by the states with, and only with the consent of congress, and subject to its controul-And so anxious were they to seize on every shilling of our money for the general government, that they insisted even the little revenue that might thus arise, should not be appropriated to the use of the respective states where it was collected, but should be paid into the treasury of the United States; and accordingly it is so determined.

The second article relates to the executive-his mode of election-his powers--and the length of time he should continue in office.

On these subjects there was a great diversity of senti

ment; many of the members were desirous that the president should be elected for seven years, and not to be eligible a second time; others proposed that he should not be absolutely ineligible, but that he should not be capable of being chosen a second time, until the expiration of a certain number of years-The supporters of the above propositions, went upon the idea that the best security for liberty was a limited duration and a rotation of office in the chief executive department.

There was a party who attempted to have the president appointed during good behaviour, without any limitation as to time, and not being able to succeed in that attempt, they then endeavoured to have him re-eligible without any restraint. It was objected that the choice of a president to continue in office during good behaviour, would be at once rendering our system an elective monarchy ; and, that if the president was to be re-eligible without any interval of disqualification, it would amount nearly to the same thing, since with the powers that the presi dent is to enjoy, and the interests and influence with which they will be attended, he will be almost absolutely certain of being re-elected from time to time, as long as he lives: As the propositions were reported by the committee of the whole house, the president was to be chosen for seven years, and not to be eligible at any time after→ In the same manner the proposition was agreed to in convention, and so it was reported by the committee of detail, although a variety of attempts were made to alter that part of the system by those who were of a contrary opinion, in which they repeatedly failed; but, sir, by never losing sight of their object, and choosing a proper time for their purpose, they succeeded at length in obtaining the alteration, which was not made until within the last twelve days before the convention adjourned.

As the propositions were agreed to by the committee of the whole house, the president was to be appointed by

the national legislature, and as it was reported by the committee of detail, the choice was to be made by ballot, in such a manner that the states should have an equal voice in the appointment of this officer, as they, of right, ought to have; but those who wished as far as possible to establish a national instead of a federal government, made repeated attempts to have the president chosen by the people at large; on this the sense of the convention was taken, I think, not less than three times while I was there, and as often rejected; but within the last fortnight of their session, they obtained the alteration in the manner it now stands, by which the large states have a very undue influence in the appointment of the president. There is no case where the states will have an equal voice In the appointment of the president, except where two persons shall have an equal number of votes, and those a majority of the whole number of electors, a case very unlikely to happen, or where no person has a majority of the votes; in these instances the house of representatives are to choose by ballot, each state having an equal voice; but they are confined in the last instance to the five who have the greatest number of votes, which gives the largest states a very unequal chance of having the president chosen under their nomination.

As to the vice-president, that great officer of government, who is in case of death, resignation, removal, or inability of the president, to supply his place, and be vested with his powers, and who is officially to be the president of the senate, there is no provision by which a majority of the voices of the electors are necessary for his appointment, but after it is decided who is chosen president, that person who has the next greatest number of votes of the electors, is declared to be legally elected to the vice-presidency, so that by this system it is very possible, and not improbable, that he may be appointed by the electors of a single large state; and a very undue in

K