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Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the citation which accompanied the Distinguished Service Award, presented to Mr. Lasky by the Secretary of the Interior, be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the citation was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CITATION FOR DISTINGUISHED SERVICE-
SAMUEL G. LASKY

(By the Secretary of the Interior,
Washington, D.C.)

In recognition of his 32 years of outstanding service in geology and technical and administrative management in the Department of the Interior: Since 1931 when Mr. Lasky began his Federal service as an assistant work has been characterized by exceptional initiative, personal integrity, and professional excellence. He advanced to principal geologist with the Survey and in 1951 he transferred to the Office of the Secretary where his special talents and experience were utilized in guiding departmental planning in mineral resources, first on the staff of the

Assistant Secretary, Mineral Resources, and
nical review staff. In 1960, Mr. Lasky was
again on the staff of the Assistant Secretary,
Mineral Resources, charged with developing
and implementing the organization of the
Office of Coal Research. In May 1961, he was
appointed Assistant Director of the Office. He
assisted the U.S. Senate Committee on Inte-
rior and Insular Affairs as chairman of its
national fuels and energy study from August
1, 1961, to September 7, 1962. The work of
this study under his chairmanship was highly
praised. It was the latest of many such spe-
cial and difficult assignments ably handled
by Mr. Lasky during his Federal service, in
all of which he has brought great credit
upon this Department. In recognition of his
eminent career in Government, the Depart-
ment of the Interior grants to Mr. Lasky its
highest honor, the Distinguished Service
Award.
STEWART L. UDALL,
Secretary of the Interior.

from 1953 to 1960 as a member of the tech

Nebraska State construction was re-
leased, its proposed text was made avail-
able to the Federal Bureau of Roads for
its comment to be included in the report
as published. The Appropriations Com-
mittee of the Senate was informed that
the Federal bureau, in turn, communi-
cated with the Nebraska highway de-
partment for its comment. This is typi-
cal of the fairness and the thoroughness
with which an effort is made to produce
a helpful and meaningful report.

Under the able leadership of Comp-
troller General Joseph Campbell, the
General Accounting Office goes about its
job quietly and efficiently. Without its
honest examination and appraisal of
governmental operations, the Congress
would have no intelligent accounting of
the extensive spending programs which
we authorize.

In sharp contrast to the legions of
public information officers who thump
the publicity tubs for almost every other
agency, the General Accounting Office
does not even have a public information
office. Yet its work is respected and
regarded highly by the public.

These thoughts are expressed in more
detail in a recent editorial in the Omaha
World-Herald. I ask unanimous con-
sent, Mr. President, to have the editorial
"Lonely Sentinels,"
Sentinels," printed in the
RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:

[From the Omaha (Nebr.) World-Herald,
Oct. 29, 1963]

LONELY SENTINELS

If the Federal agencies in Washington, D.C., were to compete on a basis of charm, glamour and persuasive publicity techniques, the General Accounting Office wouldn't even be in the running.

It's a plain Jane outfit which does its job
without press agentry. The sticky hand of
partisan or factional politics is not to be
found there. It does not run political er-
rands for the Kennedy administration or for
anybody else, including its boss, the Con-

REPORT OF GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE ON INTERSTATE HIGH- gress of the United States.
WAY CONSTRUCTION

Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, some resentment and indignation were expressed by some Nebraskans on the critical nature of the recent report of the General Accounting Office on interstate highway building within that State. This is very unfortunate indeed because this arm of the Congress is competent, well considered, and well operated. It will be remembered as an agency which was created through the active efforts of many Senators, including Senator George W. Norris, of Nebraska. The very first Comptroller General was the late Mr. McCarl, of McCook, Nebr.

Review of any Government expenditure on interstate highways by such a competent body should be welcomed because when the Interstate Highway System is completed, it will be turned over to the State of Nebraska for maintenance at State expense. It therefore behooves anyone who has Nebraska's best interests at heart to insist upon the best possible building and construction job in the first

instance.

The General Accounting Office is fair in its operations. Before its report on Before its report on

What the GAO does do is review Federal spending and make investigations to see that the taxpayers' money is spent as Congress intended. After so doing, it makes written reports to the Congress, pointing out where it believes an agency handling Federal money has strayed from proper procedures.

The GAO has made news in Nebraska these past 10 days because it issued a report in which it concluded that "ineffective review and supervision" by both the State of Nebraska and the Federal Bureau of Public Roads had resulted in "less than first-quality interstate highways in the State."

The agency added that a number of faults had been corrected, but that some remained, and that, all in all, substantial amounts of Federal-aid funds had been wasted in Nebraska on design features of questionable necessity.

This is a serious matter. Governor Mor

rison, the Nebraska Department of Roads and
the Federal Bureau of Roads have reason to
be concerned, and should feel called upon
to answer the specific criticisms.

But we can see no occasion to attack the
Accounting Office and to ask for an investiga
tion, as Governor Morrison did last week.
Washington bureau seem satisfied that the
GAO report is in order and that it will have
a good effect. We strongly hope and believe
that it will.

If it were not for the GAO, Congress would have no effective way of following up the spending of Federal dollars, just as without tee and the legislature's independent fiscal the Nebraska Legislature's Budget Commitanalyst, there could be no effective planning and review of State spending.

Legislative controlled accounting agencies, Federal and State, often make themselves unpopular with the spending agencies because it is the accounting agencies' job to let the legislatures and the people know what the spending score is.

At a time when executive departments and spending agencies are trying to blow down and run over Congress and the State legislatures with their plans for bigger and bigger

government and bigger and bigger spending, the accounting agencies often stand like

lonely sentinels as they carry out their mis

sions to alert and inform the legislatures and the people.

But the sentinels are essential if the representative system and legislative control of Government are to survive. They deserve every citizen's support.

FREEDOM VERSUS COERCION

Mr. PELL. It seems increasingly clear to me that whatever the future holds with regard to the nature of the cold war confrontation, the ideological aspect of that confrontation is going to continue. Premier Khrushchev has made it crystal clear that he intends no coexistence in the realm of ideology. I, for one, relish that challenge and am optimistic about its outcome. My optimism is based on what I believe to be an overriding advantage our society haswhereas our adversary seeks to capture men's minds, we seek to make them free.

In this competition of freedom versus coercion, the U.S. Information Agency bears the official Government responsibility for representing our side. That Agency conducts its work through every possible means of communication-radio, television, films, books, magazines, and so forth. Due to limitations on our ability to conduct information activities behind the Iron Curtain, other than shortwave broadcasting by the Voice of America, the Agency has relied heavily on exhibits. These exhibits are conducted in accordance with cultural exchange agreements and have met with considerable success. In the last year they have covered such subjects as plastics, transportation, and medicine. The exhibits are accompanied by about 25 Americans who are fluent in the language of the country in which we are exhibiting. I am told that these guides are at least as important as the subject matter of the exhibit itself in terms of representing our country. During the past year close to a million Soviet citizens attended our exhibits. All reports indicate the impact has been impressive.

I call to the attention of my colleagues the most recent USIA exhibit entitled "Graphic Arts: U.S.A.," which opened just 2 weeks ago in Alma Ata, Kazakhstan. During the first week alone over 100,000 Soviet citizens attended the exhibit. These Soviet visitors have an opportunity to see some 2,000 items of American graphic arts and how they are useful in our society. While, in part, the very existence of something American in

the hinterlands of the Soviet Union assures a large audience, the introduction into the gray Soviet society of an exhibit such as this, illustrating the color and artistry of our open society, is a vital contributing factor. This graphic arts exhibit will go from Alma-Ata to Moscow for a month and then conclude its Soviet journey in Yerevan, Soviet Armenia. Several articles have recently appeared in the U.S. press describing the reception of the graphic arts exhibit as well as the transportation exhibit in Rumania and a recent art exhibit in São Paulo, Brazil.

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Oct. 7, 1963]

RUMANIA'S WILD ABOUT U.S. SHOW

I commend these articles which follow [From the New York (N.Y.) Herald Tribune, from the New York Times of October 11, the Herald Tribune of October 7, and the Washington Evening Star of October 8 for consideration by my colleagues, and ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the RECORD.

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ALMA-ATA, U.S.S.R., October 8.-An exhibition of graphic art from the United States has become a tremendously popular attraction in this central Asian city, the capital of the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan.

In 2 days, more than 17,000 Soviet citizens, most of them in their teens or early twenties, have come to see a gay collection of funny American posters, preposterous ads, colorful book covers, and abstract prints.

The exhibition is a study in calculated disorder, diversity and gaiety. It has been designed to show what happens in a society where an artist, whatever his talents, is free to let his imagination run in any direction he wants and the message is getting across.

"You mean you're really allowed to paint like this and nobody says anything?" one of the visitors asked.

"I am against abstract art," a middle-aged man declared after having seen it all. Then he added, "I've bought tickets for the next 2 weeks."

Like all the others, he carried off a portfolio of prints and brochures given to each visitor. By the end of this week American abstract prints may be pinned to the walls of 50,000 homes of Alma-Ata and the central Asian farmlands around it.

The size of the crowds came as a surprise to Jack Masey of the exhibits division of the U.S. Information Agency. He expected a sizable turnout but not the more than 1,000 every hour who have been pouring in since the show opened.

Alma-Ata, fewer than 200 miles from the Chinese border, is the exhibition's first stop. It will be here 1 month; in December it will move to Moscow for a month, and early next year it will go to the southern part of the Soviet Union.

Much of the excitement of the opening days centered on Russian-speaking young Americans who are guides. American exhibitions in the Soviet Union have been using such guides, mostly students of Russian literature at American universities, for the last 4 years. The guides in front of the abstract prints were the most embattled.

"What would you say if they painted you like this," Oresta Szeparowyez, a young New Yorker, was asked in front of an abstract portrait.

"There are all sorts of people and they shouldn't all be made to look beautiful," she answered.

(By David Miller)

BUCHAREST.—A crowd of 10,000 Rumanians pressed against a police barrier yesterday in a vain attempt to enter a U.S. Government transportation exhibit already swamped by record attendance.

Western diplomats said it was the greatest display of affection for the United States or any Western country in postwar Rumanian history.

More than 50,000 Rumanians filed through a pavilion housing 1963 model American cars and a model of the Mercury capsule used by Astronaut Gordon Cooper. At least 5,000 Rumanians were waiting for admission when doors opened at 10 a.m.

Attendance has been the heaviest at any show ever sponsored by a foreign country. Since its opening on September 27, the exhibit has attracted an average of 25,000 a day-five times the original estimate and 40,000 last Sunday in the rain.

An hour before the show was to close yesterday at 7 p.m., U.S. officials and Rumanian police decided part of the vast crowd waiting outside could never be admitted in the time remaining. Four Rumanian-speaking American guides went through the tail end of the line and advised those waiting that the exhibit would be in Bucharest until October 18 and to please go home.

Instead of leaving Haraftrau Park (formally called the Stalin Park of Rest and Culture), where the exhibit is being held, the crowd surged forward, broke through previously erected barriers and raced for the entrance. Those at the head of the line, seeing they would be refused admission pushed forward. The two groups met head on, pushing and shoving through the narrow entrance.

Some 20 armed police shouldered their way through the congestion, forced the crowd back, erected heavy iron barriers and announced the show was closed for the night. Some in the crowd booed the militia and whistled a sign of derision. They were later questioned by police.

In another attempt to placate the crowd,

Paul Wheeler, director of the U.S. Information Agency exhibit, mounted a barrier and told the crowd in Rumanian that it was physically impossible for so many people to make their way inside. The crowd dispersed only gradually. Some 1,500 remained until the end, hoping to be admitted.

Mr. Wheeler, who served in Rumania from 1959 until 1961 as cultural attaché at the U.S. Legation in Bucharest, said he was aware of the "very sincere interest and understanding between the Rumanian and American people," but the demonstration today "far surpassed anything he had anticipated."

The 10 Rumanian-speaking Americans serving as guides have been driven to hoarseness by an avalanche of questions about how Americans live.

Armand Scala, 22, of Washington, D.C., a foreign trade major at the American University there, said he was besieged by ques

tions on salaries, unemployment, the cost of living and racial problems. Many Rumanians, he said, appeared startled when told it was possible to buy a car in the United States with a loan from the bank. Rumania, although one of the richest countries in Eastern Europe, has only 12,000 passenger cars. The United States has 68 million.

On display at the exhibit, which will also tour Brasav (formerly Stalin City) in central Rumania next month, are a Ford Thunderbird and Falcon station-wagon and a Valiant, as well as a small truck and a three-wheel post office delivery van, a model of Telstar, models of airplanes and airports and other developments in U.S. transportation.

The exhibit, given more space than needed, has been augmented with a Buick sedan and Oldsmobile and Plymouth station wagons contributed by the American community of Bucharest. A Cessna Skymaster arrived in time for the opening and was displayed in front of the exhibit hall for 3 days before leaving for another commitment. A smaller Cessna is due this week.

The crowds are expected to increase in the remaining days as word spreads through Bucharest. Handsomely printed Rumanianlanguage brochures, tracing the history of transportation in the United States are being distributed free at the exhibit.

[From the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star, Oct. 8, 1963] HOW IN SÃO PAULO Adolph Gottlieb, a leading American painter for several decades, has won the top painting prize, 2 million cruzieros, at the

current Brazilian biennial exhibition at São Paulo. We congratulate Mr. Gottlieb and share the pride of interested Americans in such international recognition accorded one of our own.

We also congratulate USIA and the Government in general for sponsoring American participation in the big Brazilian show. This is the first time our representation has been underwritten by the Government, in contrast to all other participating nations. Heretofore, American representation at Sao Paulo as at the other great international exhibition, in Venice, has been made possible by the Museum of Modern Art, New York. Last year the museum announced it could no longer afford to carry the burden that is universally assumed by governments. It is to the credit of USIA that it has moved into the gap.

Both Government officials and some persons in the art world have traditionally feared our Government's participation in the arts on grounds ranging from the chance of boondoggling to that of cultural dictatorship. USIA cut through the problem by contracting the job out to a first-rate American pri

vate institution, the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis.

The center, in a decision almost impossible to imagine being reached by a Government committee, chose to send a large show of Gottlieb paintings and a group show of contemporary American sculpture.

Previous Government involvement in similar art projects has been harassed on the one hand by congressional primitives, on the other by purist aesthetes. We think the contractural arrangement, such as is followed in many Government enterprises, answers all objections and hopefully points the way to a continuing relationship between art and Government.

Specifically, the Venice Biennale of 1964 is presently planned with no American representation at all. Since USIA has done so well its first time out, the Agency should stay in the game.

HARSH WORDS INDICATE GOOD IMPACT, USIA FEELS-SOVIET CRITICS RAP U.S. ART-AND THAT'S A GOOD SIGN

(By Bernard Gwertzman)

U.S. Information Agency officials are delighted these days with the unfavorable press notices their latest traveling exhibition has received from Soviet critics.

"We've really drawn blood this time," one USIA man said today in commenting on the most recent attack on the graphic arts show, presently in Alma-Ata, capital of Soviet Kazakhstan.

USIA officials judge the worth of their Soviet exhibitions on a scale roughly like this: The harsher and more frequent the criticism the more impact it is having on Soviet audiences.

The graphic arts show is particularly provocative because it contains abstract lithographs, book covers, advertisements, and the

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like, rarely if ever seen in Russia. In Soviet sion by the Eisenhower administration,

terms, this is "bourgeoise ideology" at its worst.

There have been four long articles in Soviet publications about the exhibition, which goes on to Moscow in December and to Yerevan, capital of Soviet Armenia, in February.

The latest criticism, published Sunday in

Mr. President, I believe that this deciconcurred in by the present administration, was sound. I think we have profited greatly from the semi-independent positions which Yugoslavia and Poland have followed.

Izvestia, says that after initial interest on est to deliberately drive these two impor

the part of the Alma-Ata people, "the number of visitors has fallen catastrophically," because of the lack of interest in this abstract art.

"Hogwash," USIA officials reply, citing figures showing that about 10,000 persons a day have been visiting the exhibit, with 30,000 on Sundays. More than 200,000 have been to the show in the 22 weeks since its opening. USIA had counted on only about 4,000 a day when the show opened.

The Soviet critics have distinguished carefully between the realistic works which one review said "attract the visitors," and other works which the same critics said have "very little light in them, very little humaneness, little of that ennobling clarity and simplicity which real art possesses."

One drawing which drew considerable criticism was Ellen Raskin's crayon portrait of F. M. Dostoyevsky, the Russian writer, done

for a cover of the jubilee edition of his works.

"In the first place, it is hard to call this sketch a portrait; it is so primitive," one Soviet critic said. But the most important thing is what we see in this drawing-not a giant of thought, not a great writer who knew how to uncover the most complex secrets of the human soul, but some kind of frowning peasant-forester with an angular forehead and an excessively large head which looks like a hatblock set on stooped, narrow little shoulders.

"And this pitiful little man, sitting all crumpled up as if he expected someone to hit him, is presented to thousands of readers as F. M. Dostoyevsky."

USIA officials say the criticism on the whole has been fuller and better rounded than in previous years. Part of the reason seems to be the improved state of East-West relations.

They suspect that the critics have been motivated by a desire to say some good things about the United States without endorsing the alien views on art. Thus, one critic's main theme was that he was "deeply disappointed" by the works.

USIA officials admit they knew the abstract and avant-garde works would shock many average Soviet viewers-conditioned to a steady diet of realism-but they said that omitting such works would give Russians a distorted impression of American graphic arts, which thrive on nonrepresentational forms.

The exhibit is one of several that have been sent to Russia as part of the Soviet-American cultural exchange agreement.

CIX-1320

It would certainly not be in our intertant nations into a tighter relationship with Moscow. For that reason, I am opposed to recent actions designed to curtail trade with Yugoslavia.

Our recently retired Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Mr. George Kennan, who is now a member of the faculty at Princeton University's Institute for Advanced Study, authored a letter on the subject which appeared in the New York Times of October 16, 1963. Ambassador Kennan is generally regarded as the chief architect of our post-World War II containment policy. He is one of our wisest and best informed citizens in the whole range of problems relating to the Soviet bloc.

I urge the Members of the Senate to read carefully the letter by Ambassador Kennan. I ask unanimous consent that the letter be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Oct. 16, 1963] KENNAN BACKS SALES TO TITO-OPPOSITION DECLARED HARMFUL TO THE CAUSE OF ANTICOMMUNISM

(NOTE.-The writer recently retired as Ambassador to Yugoslavia. He is now a member of the faculty of the Institute for Advanced Study.)

To the EDITOR OF THE NEW YORK TIMES:

There was reported in your columns on October 11 a statement made by Senator EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN and Representative CHARLES A. HALLECK, criticizing President Kennedy for permitting, by an order of May 14, 1963, the sale of $2 million of military supplies to Yugoslavia.

The President's action, they were quoted as saying, constituted a circumvention of congressional stipulations prohibiting military aid to Communist nations. The legislators referred particularly to the provisions of the 1963 Foreign Aid Appropriations Act, which they described as flatly prohibiting military aid to Communist nations, though leaving economic aid to the President's discretion, subject to certain restrictions enacted in 1961.

This description of the legal situation is not accurate. The act referred to did indeed inhibit aid to "Communist" nations; but the authorizing legislation empowered the Presi

dent to make exceptions in instances where he considered this to be "vital to the security of the United States." This applied to sales of military supplies as well as to economic aid. The President was wholly within his rights in making such a finding.

PAYMENT FOR EQUIPMENT

With respect to the particular sale in question, the term "aid" ought never to have been used. Our military aid program for Yugoslavia was terminated some 6 years ago, at the initiative of the Yugoslavs. Since then they have paid dollar cash for military equipment purchased in this country. They will do so in the present instance.

The inclusion of such sales under the provisions of the aid legislation is really a legal technicality. The purchases to be covered by this particular authorization consist of spare parts for end items acquired by the Yugoslavs in earlier years. These end items are, standards of current military procurement; as I understand it, obsolete or obsolescent by and no question of military secrecy is involved.

They were acquired in good faith. Many of them were paid for in cash. The spare parts are necessary to permit their full utilization. The Yugoslavs would presumably not have

acquired them had they known that the spare parts were going to be denied; nor would we, I am sure, have made the initial sale had we thought this possible.

We are, after all, not sharpsters. What is involved here is the good faith of the U.S. Government, not as a sponsor of aid but as a partner to a commercial proceeding. Messrs. DIRKSEN and HALLECK may not beis vital to the security of the United States. lieve that the good faith of this Government I do. The President, in approving this sale, had before him my affirmative recommendation, submitted in my capacity as Ambassador to Yugoslavia, for which I gladly accept full responsibility.

Congressional effort to bar military sales to Yugoslavia was in my opinion seriously misconceived. The effort has already brought real damage to American interests in the confrontation with Soviet power. For many years prior to 1961 Yugoslav military purchasing had been directed almost exclusively to the West.

The entire concept underlying the recent

INCREASED DEPENDENCE

The insistence of the Congress that the Yugoslavs be denied even obsolete and surplus items for which they were willing to pay cash has been a major factor in causing them to turn again to Soviet sources of supply. The effect can only be to increase the dependence of their military establishmentone of the largest military establishments in Europe outside of Soviet control-on Soviet sources of supply. In this respect, the effect is analogous to that of the recent legislation denying the Yugoslavs normal tariff treatment for their exports to this country.

If, faced with such rebuffs from our side, the Yugolsavs still retain their independence, as I believe they will, this will have to be ascribed in the circumstances solely to their own fortitude and good sense, manifested in spite of, and in defiance of, the best efforts of some of our legislators to put them in a position where they would have no choice but to resubmit to Soviet leadership.

Why any Member of Congress, and particularly any Congressional leader, would wish this to be said of him-and how, in particular, he could reconcile it with a professed devotion to the cause of anti-communism— escapes me.

PRINCETON, N.J.

GEORGE KENNAN.

THE NEXT STEPS TOWARD PEACE Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. President, the Department of State Bulletin for

October 21, 1963, includes a thoughtful, carefully reasoned statement by Mr. McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to President Kennedy, entitled "The Next Steps Toward Peace: Some Notes on the TwoLegged Process." Mr. Bundy, as the Members of the Senate know, is a key official in the administration charged especially with responsibility for national security affairs.

His article is an appeal for the balanced judgment in the formulation of foreign policy positions. He centers his remarks on five major foreign policy issues: First, the partial nuclear test ban; second, our adventure in space; third, our policy toward Europe; fourth, our involvement in South Vietnam; and fifth, our hope for improvement in Soviet-American relations.

In each of these problem areas, Mr. Bundy calls for a balancing of our hopes for peace with our determination to be vigilant in the face of a potentially dangerous enemy. He pleads for an appreciation of the viewpoints of our fellow citizens who may happen to be in disagreement with us on any given issue:

Error comes mainly not from support of one's own position but from suspicions of the other man's

Mr. Bundy says. He adds:

*

Where danger comes is not in these equally right perceptions of important phenomena but in the human tendency to suppose that one's own reality is the only reality, so that the observation of the other man is somehow misleading.

Mr. President, I think Mr. Bundy would agree that Members of the Senate often pressed hard for a particular point of view without apparent concern for a conflicting viewpoint because of a conviction that a corrective is needed to a generally accepted position. Such zeal for one's own personal insight or bias is perhaps a necessary quality of political effectiveness.

But I am grateful that high in the councils of Government where final policy decisions are made, there is a man of Mr. Bundy's intellect and emotional balance-one who is capable of looking clearly at all sides of vital issues. In this highly dangerous nuclear age, there is a desperate need for restraint, moderation, and objectivity in decisionmaking.

I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bundy's article be printed in the RECORD at this point and I commend it to my colleagues.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE NEXT STEPS TOWARD PEACE: SOME NOTES ON THE TWO-LEGGED PROCESS

(By McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President 1)

We have all heard a great deal in recent months about steps toward peace, large and small, and in taking them as my topic I do not intend to try to say what the next steps may be, or even whether we can now look forward to rapid progress in the fulfillment of hopes we share with other men everywhere. Certainly we can agree that there is more reason for hope than there was

1 Address made before a World Affairs Conference at Albany, N.Y., on Sept. 30.

a year ago. Certainly also we can agree that much remains to be done. As we meet, discussions are proceeding both with our allies and with the Soviet Government on a

wide range of possibilities. So this is not the time, and I am not the person, to attempt any general prediction.

What I want to do instead, and what I think may be more useful, is to offer a description of one aspect of the reality of international affairs which is likely to be characteristic of many of the next major events in our affairs. What I want to suggest is that, when there is a debate on these great issues among us, there is almost always both an element of truth and a danger of error in each of the opposed positions. And I want to suggest further that, precisely because we are now entering a period in which tension is lower and the sharpness of danger less apparent, it is important in thinking about these issues not to ignore one aspect of the truth in concentration on another.

The most general form of this proposition, of course, is that all steps toward peace rest upon adequate readiness for defense, at every level of force. The prospect for peace now is better than it was last September; the major cause of this improvement is the resolution displayed by the people and Government of the United States in the crisis of October 1962. The indispensable connection between military strength and the maintenance of peace is obvious-and frequently forgotten.

It is crucial to the understanding of international affairs that we should never separate the idea of peace from this requirement of vigilance in defense. It follows that, when we think of steps toward peace, we should not think only of disarmament, or international agreement, or cooperation among nations. We should think also of successful resistance to subversion, of proper planning for the defense of the free world, and of our own strength and health as a free society. The specific cases on which I wish to comment are related to these areas too, and I hope you will agree that it is right to think of all of them as elements in our national

pursuit of peace.

THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY

As I say, my central proposition is that in nearly all of these great matters, where feelings become strong and difference of opinion becomes evident, there is some truth on every side and also some danger of error. One way of stating the problem of statesmanship is to see it as a matter of the resolution of arguments in which both sides are partly right and each runs a risk of error. Before I apply this proposition to current issues, it may be helpful to begin with the recently concluded debate on the test ban treaty. That debate is familiar, I am sure, to most of us, and it happens that it illustrates my point quite neatly.

The central arguments for the test ban treaty, as the President put them in his first report to the country,2 are four in number: first, that it can be a step toward reduced world tension; second, it can be a step toward freeing the world from radioactive fallout; third, it can be a step toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons; and fourth, it can limit the arms race in ways which strengthen our security far more than the continuing of unrestricted testing. These four arguments withstood the test of national debate, and the vote in the Senate records the consensus of the country that, in sum, they justify the treaty.

Yet at the same time, and in the same speech, the President took note of the requirement that under this treaty the United States should observe and maintain a substantial vigilance, in defense of its interests and those of all freemen, against the risk

2 Bulletin of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

of violation or evasion and also against the danger of unwarranted relaxation in our defense. As the debate developed, the President and his administration were always ready to respond to requests for reassurance on this point, and in successive statements, culminating in the President's letter to Senator EVERETT MCKINLEY DIRKSEN of September 10,3 it was made plain that with this limited treaty the United States will, because it must, maintain strong weapons laboratories, an energetic program of underground testing, a readiness to resume tests in the atmosphere in the event of violation of the treaty by others, and of course a full constitutional respect for the rights and obligations of the Senate if at any time this treaty should be amended.

The limited test ban treaty, then, is an opportunity for hope but not a reason for relaxation, and the national consensus which has emerged rests upon both hope and vigilance. It is this balanced spirit which has governed both the executive branch and the Senate, and it appears very plainly in the eloquent statements supporting the treaty made by such leaders as Senators [MIKE] MANSFIELD, DIRKSEN, and [J. W. FULBRIGHT. The best advocates of disarmament, like Senator [HUBERT H.] HUMPHREY, have always understood the requirement of vigilance, and determined supporters of our nuclear strength like Senator [JOHN O.] PASTORE, have understood the necessity for hope.

But not everyone in the country observed the same balance, and in the national debate there were on each side errors of excess. On the one hand, in their emphasis on hope, some of those supporting the treaty were inattentive to the problem of safeguards and appeared to believe that it was somehow not in the spirit of the treaty that the United States should make clear the need for vigilance. And on the other hand, some of those most concerned about safeguards and vigilance were blind to the real hopes represented in the treaty and unwilling to entertain the possibility that any agreement with the Soviet Union could conceivably be in the interest of both sides. I am not now debating the overall merits or demerits of the treaty as such, but only pointing out the hazard of a one-sided concern for either its dangers or its hopes, taken alone.

The limited test ban treaty is more a beginning than an end in itself. It may or may not lead onward. But it does indeed offer the four kinds of hope of which the President spoke, and it does indeed require the safeguards he has stated. So when we sift the arguments, we find much to keep from both sides; and what it is wise to reject, in the main, is the conclusion or attitude which rests primarily upon a total rejection of the concerns of others. Those supporting the treaty uncritically have been wrong mainly where they have too much resisted the concerns of those more cautious than themselves. Those who have opposed it root and branch have erred mainly in neglecting or underrating the reality of the hope it represents. My suggestion is that there has been more truth in the affirmative beliefs of both sides than in their criticisms of each other.

And what I wish to do next is to suggest that this same conclusion has some validity in four other fields; our adventure in space, our policy toward Europe, our effort for freedom in South Vietnam, and our hope for improvement in relations with the Soviet Union.

U.S. POSITION ON COOPERATION IN SPACE

I take the problem of space first because in a measure it is the simplest. Here we have a single national policy with two major

For text, see ibid., Sept. 30, 1963, p. 496.

strands. The first is our national effort to develop the technical, industrial, and human resources which are necessary for the extension of man's capacity from the earth toward outer space. This wide undertaking is symbolized as it is stimulated by the national decision taken 2 years ago to aim at the landing of a man on the moon within this decade. But it is the wider program and purpose, and not the single personal adventure, which shapes our policy and justifies this effort.

Parallel to this national effort, and steadily sustained over a 5-year period, is our purpose of cooperation in space. This purpose was dramatically reaffirmed by the President 10 days ago in his address to the United Nations; there he urged that we should explore the possibility of joining with the Soviet Union, even in sending men to the moon. And again, it is the broad purpose of cooperation, and not only the possible sharing of a single great personal adventure, which is at the center of our policy.

The question which has been raised in this last week is whether there is somehow a contradiction between the national effort and the purpose of cooperation. The position of your Government is that these two undertakings are part of a single program, each reinforcing the other. As the President put it last week in a letter to Representative ALBERT THOMAS: "This great national effort and this steadily stated readiness to cooperate with others are not in conflict. * We do not make our space effort with the narrow purpose of national aggrandizement. We make it so that the United States may have a leading and honorable role in mankind's peaceful conquest of space. It is this great effort which permits us now to offer increased cooperation with no suspicion anywhere that we speak from weakness. And in the same way, our readiness to cooperate with others enlarges the international meaning of our own peaceful American program in space."

It is right then, we believe, to press on with the space program of the United States and to press on also in the effort to find wider paths to greater cooperation. In this policy we accept great parts from each of two kinds of arguments-those urging we must be strong in space, and those urging that we must miss no opportunity for cooperation with the Soviet Union.

At the same time, as in the case of the debate on the test ban treaty, it is also necessary to reject some parts of the two different arguments. On the one hand, we do not believe that the very limited progress which has been made so far in real cooperation with the Soviet Union in any sense justifies a weakening or slackening in the national space effort. To abandon or attenuate our clear national commitment to a major effort in space, on the strength of hope and good will alone, would be as wrong as accepting a test ban treaty without proper safeguards.

On the other hand, we must also reject the notion that the national program in space is somehow weakened or endangered by a peaceful program of cooperation. We have not entered space only in fear or in hostility. Our strength and our readiness to meet any hazard-in this and other areasdo not require that we turn our back on every prospect of cooperative effort. In this instance, then, as in that of the test ban treaty, there is truth on both sides of the argument, and error comes mainly not from support of one's own position but from suspicion of the other man's.

ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP AND EUROPEAN UNITY

I turn now to the politics of Europe. This problem is more complex, and the subtleties of a full-scale argument are impossible here; I must content myself with a sketch.

4 Ibid., Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

But I think it clear that once again the great hazard is in the tendency to think of "either-or" instead of "both-and." There is a belief. that somehow there must be either an Atlantic or a European focus to the policy of the Western nations. And the argument rages over the head of reality, between men who fear that the greatness of Europe may be somehow drowned in the Atlantic and men who seem to believe that the Atlantic partnership may be endangered by growing strength and unity in Europe. The policy of the United States is to reject this false choice-to assert, in every field and on all occasions, the interlocking and mutually supporting ideas of Atlantic partnership and European unity. Atlantic partnership and European unity. The clearest and most authoritative statement of this position is in the President's address at the Paulskirche, in Frankfurt, on June 25 of this year, and I cannot do better than to quote to you these sentences which state the double commitment of our policy:

"We are partners for peace-not in a narrow bilateral context but in a framework of Atlantic partnership. The ocean divides us less than the Mediterranean divided the ancient world of Greece and Rome. Our Constitution is old and yours is young, and our culture is young and yours is old, but in our commitment we can and must speak and act with but one voice. Our roles are distinct but complementary-and our goals are the same: peace and freedom for all men, for all time, in a world of abundance, in a world of justice.

"The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership-a system of cooperation, interdependence, and harmony whose people can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world."

That was the Atlantic commitment, but the President went on to Europe:

"It is not in our interest to try to dominate the European councils of decision. If that were our objective, we would prefer to see Europe divided and weak, enabling the United States to deal with each fragment individually. Instead we have and now look forward to a Europe united and strongspeaking with a common voice, acting with a common will-a world power capable of meeting world problems as a full and equal partner.

"This is in the interest of us all. For war in Europe, as we learned twice in 40 years, destroys peace in America. A threat to the freedom of Europe is a threat to the freedom of America. *** And that is why we look forward to a united Europe in an Atlantic partnership-an entity of interdependent parts, sharing equally both burdens and decisions and linked together in the tasks of defense as well as the arts of peace."

Here again, as in our previous examples, there is truth in both concepts, and error comes mainly from hostility to one or the other. It is not necessary, in the construction of the new Europe, that the ties of partnership across the Atlantic should be cut. Still less is it required, for the effectiveness of the Atlantic community, that there should be any hostility to the idea of Europe. This is what American policy has recognized; it is also what the greatest men of Europe have understood and preached.

THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM The difficult situation in the troubled country of South Vietnam is one which I have even less desire to discuss, in substantive terms, than the other questions I have taken as examples. The important mission of Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and General [Maxwell D.] Taylor is only just ending, and it would be wholly inappropriate for me to comment on the course of action which may be chosen in the light of this mission and of the con

Ibid., July 22, 1963, p. 118.

tinuing consideration which is going forward in Saigon under the leadership of Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge, and also in Washington.

Yet it is not wrong, I think, to suggest that in this case again there are two propositions, both of them true, and two kinds of error which can result from an unwillingness to accept them both. And again both propositions have been stated clearly by the President. The first is that the object of American policy in this part of the world is to assist in a most difficult and important struggle against Communist subversionmilitary, paramilitary, and political. The commitment of the United States to the independence of South Vietnam goes back many years. This commitment was intensified and reinforced 2 years ago, and since then a major cooperative effort has been carried forward with increasing energyand at least until recently with increasing success-by Americans working closely with the people and Government of South Vietnam. It is the policy of the United States to sustain that effort.

Yet it would be folly for the United States to neglect, or to regard with indifference, political developments of recent months which raise questions about the ability of the Government and people of South Vietnam to support each other effectively in their contest with communism. The President has made it clear that the United States is not indifferent to these events and regards them with great concern. It is and must be the policy of the U.S. Government to make clear its interest in whatever improvements it judges to be necessary, always of course with a proper regard for responsibilities which rest in the first instance upon the people of South Vietnam.

It is no secret that observers of the scene in South Vietnam have often differed sharply in their interpretation of events. From these differences there have come divergent recommendations for policy. There is nothing discreditable in the existence of such differences. In a situation in which easy solutions do not exist and in which commitments of purpose and hope are high, it is only natural that there should be a tendency in each observer to emphasize the part of the truth to which he is nearest. If a particular antisubversive effort is going well, the man who is working on that effort is bound to see that part of reality as very large. If in the cities there is repression and alienation of public support, men living in those cities, with responsibilities more civil than military, will feel a special and intense concern. Where danger comes is not in these equally right perceptions of important phenomena but in the human tendency, here as in each of my preceding examples to suppose that one's own reality is the only reality, so that the observation of the other man is somehow misleading.

The requirement upon statesmanship, once again, is to seek ways of meeting both the need for effective prosecution of the struggle and the need for a workable relation between the people and government of a friendly country. No one can say that this task is easy. No one can even say it is certainly possible. But what can be said, and what the President has said already, is that the United States will not shrink from this responsibility or attempt to make it easier than it is by pretending that only one part of it is important.

UNITED STATES RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION

Finally, returning to the wider arena, I come to the question of our relations with the Soviet Union. And again I offer two propositions. The first is that we must and

• See p. 624.

For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13, and Sept. 30, 1963, p. 498.

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