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RECOGNITION OF PRESENT GOV- niversary of the initiation of the Castro Manifestly the Dominican people reERNMENT OF DOMINICAN RE- revolutionary group, Bosch sent from the

revolutionary group, Bosch sent from the jected the honeyed words coming from PUBLIC

Dominican Republic 48 students to par the Marxists and Leninists. They recog

ticipate as the representatives of the nized the failure of the Communist sysMr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the present Government of the Dominican

Dominican Government in the celebra- tem, especially in the agricultural field,

tion. Republic should be recognized by the

which has been so clearly evidenced by United States promptly and without any portant governmental positions, espe

Sixth. Communists were placed in im the embarrassing acts of the Commufurther delay. Recognition is required portant governmental positions, espe- nists in buying, with their gold, wheat

from the United States, Canada, and in the interest of fairplay to the people cially in the agency having control of the

radio and television facilities. These Australia. of the Dominican Republic, the United

The claim that the present regime is States, and the Western Hemisphere in facilities were used by the Communists

to attack the non-Communist political made up of Trujillo devotees is comgeneral. We cannot afford to have the creation parties, advocate what was called social pletely without foundation; it is false.

Manuel Enrique Tavares, a present memof any further Communist governments revolution, and otherwise to extol the

Communist cause. in this hemisphere. Failure to recog

ber of the incumbent government, was nize the present regime of the Domin

While these things were happening, implicated and arrested in connection ican Republic is likely to produce that Bosch was being urged to bring to an with the death of Trujillo; a second very unwanted condition. By our re

end the privilege that was granted to member, Mr. Tapia Espinal, was secre

the Communist exiles, the rental to the tary of the government after the downfusal to recognize the present govern- the Communist exiles, the rental to the ment and to give it the aid that was Communist Party of the school and the fall of Trujillo's reign.

The triumvirate government was, in formerly being given to the Bosch regime, television and radio facilities, and the we are inexcusably rejecting the will of use of facilities

for a Cuban base of in the main, opposed to Trujillo; and it is the Dominican people and the friendly doctrination. Bosch turned a deaf ear opposed to the Communists, and is rep

resentative of the thinking of the people attitude of the present government; thus to all these pleas and, if anything, al

of the Dominican Republic. giving encouragement to the leftwing lowed the activities of the Communists

to be expanded. forces of that country.

Mr. President, I submit that two The revolution against Bosch had the

Early in October, when Bosch was courses are left for the people of the

United States with respect to the Dopractically solid backing of the Domini- asked whether Castroism had influence

in the Dominican Republic, he replied minican Republic: First, by our failure can people. It is true that the military in the Dominican Republic, he replied forces led the movement in overthrow that in Santa Domingo there was a Cas to recognize the encumbent government ing the government. All the evidence,

te movement, as in Venezuela, Colom and to give it aid, we can deliver it to however, shows that they did not have bia, and Mexico. “This movement,” he the Communists; second, we can preserve personal ambitions, as indicated by the added, “is fighting, not for communism, the government in that nation for the fact that within 24 hours the military but for liberty."

people, through immediate recognition forces succeeded in having the six most

Mr. President, with that statement, I of the present civilian government. important political parties—genuine cannot agree.

The assertion that a government can representatives of the people—selecting

We do know that in Venezuela Castro at the same time be democratic and and electing a triumvirate from among ism is dynamiting the interests of the communistic is a paradox and an unthe nonpolitical elements to rule provi- Venezuelan people and those of the truth. The existence of communism sionally for 2 years.

United States. The army there has demonstrates that democracy and conThe Bosch regime was overthrown by sounded the alarm against what is hap stitutional government are absent. The the people because of general discontent pening.

people of the United States want democin the soft-handed treatment, and in

The opponents of the present regime racies established everywhere, but will fact paternalism, that was accorded to argue that it has usurped power, is un not be duped into believing that a conthe Communists.

lawfully holding office, and should not stitutional form of government can exI suggest that a careful study of the be recognized or aided, because it over ist where Communists are in charge. developments since the Bosch govern- threw a constitutionally selected govern Let us not delay. We should let the ment went into power will disclose the ment.

world know now that the overthrow of existence of facts that justified the Do

It is true that the military did act. the Bosch regime was induced by the minicans in becoming apprehensive of what it did, however, was the product

What it did, however, was the product manifest rejection of communism by the the Communists taking control of their of the will of the workers, the farmers, Dominican people. Mr. Bosch was soft government.

the religionists, the business, professional and yielding to the Communists, and Several specific and manifest situa- and mining men, the housewives and the thus suffered his overthrow. tions finally had such an impact upon merchants. The Dominican people do I believe Bosch is an idealist; but he the people that they concluded the need not want a Communist government in allowed the Communists to take charge. of removing Bosch in order to es their land; they are friendly to the West. The result was that the strong and the cape communism. The people became The military leaders foresaw what was weak, the rich and the poor, those from alarmed because:

happening, and, for that reason, pro- every rank of life in the Dominican ReFirst. The exiled Communists were ceeded to remove the government which public, became apprehensive, and joined coming back into the Dominican Re- was allowing communism to take hold; in the movement for the removal of the public in droves and without hindrance. moreover, it was actually aiding the Bosch government. Second. The Bosch government rented Communists. But these military persons

Mr. President, we must not delay. If to the Communist Party a school build- did not have personal ambitions, for it we do, we are likely to create another ing to be used in the teaching of the is obvious that within 24 hours after Cuba in the Western Hemisphere. Communist technique and doctrine. they removed the Bosch government,

My words become especially imporThird. The governmentally operated they turned it over to a triumvirate se

tant because we are now at the threshradio and television station was made lected by the six leading political parties hold of deciding what we shall do in available to communists for the spread of the land.

regard to South Vietnam. If the United of their propaganda against the free

Emilio de los Santos, the President of States recognizes the South Vietnamese West and in favor of the Communists.

the provisional government triumvirate, Government, how can it fail to recognize Fourth. An uninhibited outflow and in his inaugural address 24 hours after the government in the Dominican inflow of Cuban and Dominican Repubthe overthrow said:

Republic? lican youth made possible the use of the

We are not a product of Castro's institu Mr. President, I yield the floor. Communist beachhead in the Western tions; this government came as a result of

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I sugHemisphere in Cuba as a further place suffering, and the will of the people who

can gest the absence of a quorum. of indoctrination in communism. be considered to be represented by political

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McFifth. On July 26, 1963, when Castro parties which command a vast abundance INTYRE in the chair.) The clerk will in Cuba was celebrating the 10th an of national votes.

call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call deferred until February 1 so that a Sen last year's deflated price as a concession the roll.

ate committee might study these matters to the Soviets, the price of wheat and Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I and submit its report for the guidance flour on the American market has risen ask unanimous consent that the order of Congress and the administration. substantially. Not merely are we subfor the quorum call be rescinded.

As matters turned out, we were granted sidizing the Soviet Government to the exThe PRESIDING OFFICER. With- no such time for consideration.

tent of almost $100 million, but the out objection, it is so ordered.

On the following day, October 9, it American housewife, in consequence of was announced that a decision had been this deal, is already called upon to pay an

made to approve the sale of American extra 40 cents per hundredweight of flour AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSISTsurplus wheat to the Soviets.

because of the increased price of wheat ANCE ACT OF 1961

This entire matter has been handled futures on the Chicago market. The Senate resumed the consideration in a piece-by-piece manner which has Third. The impression was fostered at of the bill (H.R. 7885) to amend further obscured the true extent of the conces the time the announcement was made the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as sions we have made both from Congress that this was to be a cash sale, or, at amended, and for other purposes. and from the American people.

least, a sale based on a normal comMr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, while I gravely fear that these concessions mercial credit arrangement. many Senators are presently in the may prepare the way for the complete On Friday, October 18, however, we Chamber, I ask for the yeas and nays collapse of the defenses which we have were informed, through an article in the on the pending amendment.

so painstakingly erected in our country New York Times, that the Export-Import The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there and in the free world community Bank would guarantee loans made on the a sufficient second?

against the shipment of heavy industrial sale of U.S. wheat to the Soviets. It was The yeas and nays were ordered. equipment and other strategic goods to stated that the Export-Import Bank Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I do the Communist bloc.

would charge five-eighths of 1 percent to not wish to press the question at any I intend to speak about this matter at guarantee such loans made by comparticular time. I certainly do not wish length in the very near future.

mercial banks in this country to Amerito call up the amendment when the But meanwhile, so that my colleagues can grain traders. Senator from Oregon is not present in may have a clearer understanding of the For the entertainment of my colthe Chamber. But while so many Sen- scope of our concessions and the degree leagues, I should like to point out that ators are present, I should like to state of our humiliation, I wish to tabulate Mr. Harold F. Linder, President of the again briefly that my amendment would the separate concessions that we have Bank, while refusing to affirm or deny merely seize the present golden oppor- made, sometimes in defiance of assur

the reports, made the following statetunity to say to the Nation and to every ances to Congress and the public, over ment to the press: one concerned that the Senate desires to the past several months.

It would be perfectly normal for us to bring the program down, Instead of First. Immediately on the heels of the

guarantee all or part of a credit for an exreenacting the present authorization of ratification of the test ban treaty, it

port transaction of this nature. We would $1.5 billion for each of the years 1965 was announced that the Johnson Act do the same for France and Switzerland, for and 1966, the amendment would reduce would not be applied to the sale of agri example. the ceiling of authorization for each of cultural commodities to the Communist

We have come to a sorry pass, indeed, those years to $975 million, the same as bloc, and that these commodities would

bloc, and that these commodities would if high-ranking officials can discern no is proposed for the present year, which be available to the Communist nations

difference between extending credits to would mean eliminating $1,050 million on the same terms as apply to friendly

friendly nations that traditionally from the authorization now contained countries.

honor their obligations and extending in existing law.

Nothing was yet said about selling

credit to a government that is comI have already stated-and I state wheat to the Soviet Union.

mitted to our destruction and that is in again I am sorry that I do not have But even in the general terms in which

default on more than $800 million on the information, and I do not believe it was couched, I do not see how this ac

it was couched, I do not see how this ac- prior credits extended. anyone else does, to propose a reduction tion can be reconciled either with the

Mr. President, I consider this to be a even lower than the $975 million, but I Johnson Act itself, or with the Latta

clear violation of the Johnson Act which do not want it to appear that we are re

amendment to the Agricultural Act, prohibits the extension of credit to naauthorizing a program which we expect which prohibits subsidies on the sale of

tions that are in default on prior obligato be very much larger for next year and agricultural commodities to Communist

tions. the year after that than what we are nations.

Fourth. On Friday, October 25, I was passing for the present year. I say Second. The official announcement on informed that the Justice Department again that I think we now have a preOctober 9 that wheat would be sold to the

had ruled that a "normal commercial cious opportunity to see that the program Soviet Union sought to obscure the fact

credit” could extend to 18 months. will be on the way out, and we are cutting that this sale would be at a subsidized

I say that this arbitrary ruling, which down the future authorizations when we price.

may be intended to cover up the violahave an opportunity to do so.

We were told that the subsidy would

tion of the Johnson Act, flies in the face The PRESIDING OFFICER. The go not to the Soviets, but to the American

of banking practice and the accepted question is on agreeing to the amend- graingrowers, and that the wheat itself

usage of the term. ment of the Senator from Florida to would simply be sold at the world price.

It has always been my understanding the Mansfield amendment to the com What we were not told is that the that normal commercial credits extend mittee amendment.

world price previously prevailing was an from 30 to 90 days at the most. An 18

artificially deflated price based upon the month or 3-year credit would not be a FURTHER AMERICAN CONCESSIONS

existence of substantial reserves in a "normal commercial credit" but a

number of countries; and we were also medium-term loan. ON THE SALE OF WHEAT TO THE not told, although the Agriculture De In this connection, it seems clear that, COMMUNIST BLOC

partment subsequently confirmed this if we enter into such a transaction, we Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the deci- fact, that the United States at this mo shall probably be called upon to extend sion to sell wheat to the Soviet Union at ment is the only country still command the loans beyond the original period, as a subsidized price was announced to ing large reserves of wheat and other the Chinese Communists have already Congress and the American public with food grains.

done in the instance of two 18-month so little advance notice that there was If the law of supply and demand has loans negotiated with Canada. no time for serious discussion of the any meaning at all, what it means in this Fifth. Finally, Mr. President, we were implications of such a deal from the case is that last year's price is no longer given the firm assurances that this standpoint of our national security or relevant; the world price should not dif wheat would be carried in American of the terms that might make it com fer substantially from the current do- ships where available. patible with the national security. mestic price.

The Soviets have objected strenuously On October 8, I introduced a resolu I find it most disturbing that while we to the use of American bottoms because tion asking simply that this decision be have insisted on artificially maintaining the American conference rate of ap

proximately $23 per ton is approximately I am convinced that the orders for leagues particularly to the article pubdouble that of foreign tramp or charter these harassments came directly from lished in last Sunday's Washington Post, rates.

the Kremlin; and I am also convinced written by Professor Brzezinski; to the It is now reported that the issue will that we have not seen the end of them article written by Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., and be compromised by having the Maritime unless we learn to respond in a more published in the Sunday Times magaAdministration set a rate of $18 per ton vigorous manner to Communist provo- zine of October 20, 1963; and to the for American shipping and by limiting cation.

article written by Mr. Leslie Gould, and American shipping to a maximum of 25 Indeed, this morning brought the

brought the published in the New York Journalpercent of the total tonnage carried. news that another American convoy has American of October 30, 1963. I find it difficult to reconcile this decibeen stopped on the autobahn.

Second. “The Collapsing Controls on sion with the Cargo Preference Act which Third, an official Soviet delegation in East-West Trade.” requires that at least 50 percent of any Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam, Third. "The Soviet Agricultural Government-financed cargo shall move broadcast a call for the overthrow of Crisis." on American-flag ships, if available at the Diem government and for the ex

Fourth. “The Soviet Industrial and "fair and reasonable" rates. The arbi- pulsion of the American imperialists Economic Crisis.” trary rate of $18 per ton will be imposed, from South Vietnam,

Fifth. "Soviet Economic Warfare." apparently, in the face of the fact that Fourth, the Soviets have further in

Sixth. "Moscow Continues the Cold the tighter shipping situation has flamed the highly dangerous situation in

War." already moved foreign shipping rates up- north Africa by sending arms and equipward, some say as much as $4 and $5

There being no objection, the articles ment to the Ben Bella government in per ton. large quantities, and by openly inciting were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,

as follows: So now the picture is complete.

the Algerians against the Moroccans. We shall be selling wheat to the Soviets Each concession we offer the Soviets

THE SOVIET WHEAT DEAL at a subsidized price which we have arbi on the sale of wheat is repaid not by any [From the New York Times magazine, Oct 20, trarily chosen to regard as the going reciprocal political gesture, but by some

1963] world price. new indignity or act of aggression.

DIALOG? YES-CONCESSIONS? BEWARE! IN American banks will be lending them I say that this is an intolerable situa

THE WAKE OF THE WHEAT DEAL, AN OBthe money with which to make purchase,

SERVER WARNS THAT TRADE ALONE IS No tion.

ANSWER TO THE HARD PROBLEMS THAT REand the American Government, through Regrettably, it is a situation which we

MAIN TO BE WORKED OUT WITH THE RUSthe Import-Export Bank, will stand ourselves have encouraged by our failure

SIANS guarantor for a government that refuses to impose political conditions and by

(By A. A. Berle, Jr.) to honor prior obligations. our insistence on minimizing, or even

(NOTE.-A. A. Berle, Jr., an attorney and American shipping will not be used "as disregarding, all of the recent actions to professor at Columbia Law School, was an available;" it will be limited to some 25 which I have referred.

Assistant Secretary of State, 1938 to 1944. percent of the tonnage carried, although Further dangers loom in the offing. He wrote "The 20th Century Capitalist Revothe Cargo Preference Act calls for 50 Now that we have agreed to sell mas

lution.") percent.

sive quantities of wheat to the Soviet The Soviet Union and several satellite And instead of the prevailing Ameri Union, American manufacturers are be

countries have just arranged to purchase can rates, American shippers will be paid ginning to 'clamor for a relaxation of ginning to 'clamor for a relaxation of about 150 million bushels of American wheat.

The purchase of 240 million bushels from at the reduced rate of $18 per ton, which export controls to the Soviet bloc. Even

Canada had already been reported. It was may turn out to be just about on a par machine tool manufacturers have asked not enough to meet Russian needs. Bread, with the foreign shipping rates now the question, "If wheat, why not ma the chief item of Russian family food, is alemerging. chine tools?”

ready rationed, and the squeeze will become No political concessions will be de As for the Western European nations, very severe next spring. manded; and new acts of aggression will it is now becoming increasingly ques Preliminary information of Russia's desire be disregarded or played down, in order tionable whether they will be willing to

to buy from U.S. stocks reached Washington

last month. Formal negotiations to purnot to disturb this strangely one-sided listen to any argument or urging on our detente. part to exercise some control over ex

chase were opened in early October. On

October 7, President Kennedy held a White I believe that no one would object to ports to the Soviet Union.

House conference on the problem. Fortyselling wheat to the Soviets if they were

Under the imperfect controls that eight hours later, he approved, in principle, willing to pay for it at a reasonable price heretofore existed, the Soviet Union has a single-shot deal to sell wheat to the and if, in return for our bailing them out been able to obtain, from the United Soviets. from their manmade agricultural cri- States and from its allies, an amazing Does this decision suggest a new policy of sis, they made a few concessions that variety of machine tools, heavy indus- open trade with the Soviet Union, and would contribute to the peace and sta- trial equipment, transportation equip- change the settled plan of campaign in the bility of the free world. ment, pipeline, and even entire chemical cold war? The one-shot wheat deal is one

thing. General opening of trade barriers is Not only have we not demanded such and metallurgical plants.

something else. My own view is that the concessions, but the Soviets have, on at But at least they were debarred from

one-shot deal, on balance, was justifiable least four occasions since the negotia a fairly long list of critical items that but that a change in the no-trading policy tions begun, made it clear in a most were obviously of strategic importance. at present would not be. humiliating manner that there will be Now the danger is that the barriers

Sentimental arguments may be eliminated no abatement of the cold war and no will come tumbling down, both here and at the outset, Soviet “goodwill” will not be consideration of any kind in return for abroad, and the Communists will be able bought by selling wheat, still less by lifting

trade restrictions. I doubt that the Soviet American wheat.

to purchase even the most sophisticated man in the street will even know about it. First, on October 22, the very anniver- and clearly strategic equipment, in the The Moscow government can hardly be exsary of the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet name of business and of coexistence. pected to emphasize the Communist agriMig fighters, operating out of Cuba and Mr. President, again I ask that we cultural failure. Nor will Communist offiprobably manned by Soviet crews, at- pause to consider the possible conse

cials attribute to the United States any motacked an American-owned freighter on quences of our action before it is too late. tive higher than capitalist avarice. the high seas. I earnestly hope that the Agriculture In 1919, hoping to find a basis for peaceful

I had a vivid experience with Soviet trade. Second, there has been the series of and Forestry Committee will not delay adjustment with Russia, a commission harassments of American and British too long in reporting the resolution which headed by William C. Bullitt, reporting convoys on the Berlin autobahn. We I submitted on October 8, with the co through my office in the American Peace chose to regard these harassments as sponsorship of several other Senators. Commission in Paris, negotiated a very fair minor incidents that probably resulted Mr. President, I ask unanimous con working arrangement with Lenin, and refrom the excessive zeal of some Soviet sent to have printed in the RECORD a

turned with the document. (Nothing came officer. number of newspaper items arranged in of it: Clemenceau and the French Govern

ment torpedoed it.). But I challenge the concept that any groups under the following captions:

Later, the researches of George Kennan unSoviet officer would risk such initiative First. “The Soviet Wheat Deal.” Un- covered Lenin's real motive as expounded by without direct orders from the Kremlin. der this caption I would refer my col- him at the time to his colleagues. He said

he was worried about Japanese moves in Si- dialog and concessions to Hitler at Munich amounts have gone into supplying bloody beria; he wanted temporary relief from the in 1938.

adventures like those in Cuba, Indonesia, Western side. The agreement he offered Opening general trade barriers is such a and Laos, and political-economic adventures would set American capitalists slavering for concession. In doing that, the United States like the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Now the profit and plunder of concessions in might well enable the Soviet Union to con she has not enough product to go around. Siberia. He explained that these hopes would tinue a policy of armament rather than pro The Communist rulers of Russia know it. be dashed in due time, but that, meanwhile, duction, of maintaining armed occupations, In recent speeches arguing against Red the capitalists who controlled the U.S. GOV of subsidizing imperialist grabs, of making China's shrieks for military conflict, Khruernment would make sure that American covert seizures in great areas. Without the shchev has come pretty close to saying so. and allied moves were not dangerous to the trade opportunity, Russia might have to The Soviet Union accordingly may one of Soviet Union.

modify, if not relinquish, her policy in sub these days want a real detente. The Kennedy Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Gromyko, and many stantial areas.

“dialog' is intended to explore this posof their colleagues today come straight out of The Soviet Union now is supplying arms, sibility. Yet Moscow has never yet indicated the Leninist school. If therefore the United planes, and training to Indonesia to attack that its policy might shift to minding its States opens trading with the Soviet Gov- Malaysia; to Cuba to attack Venezuela and own business for awhile, although such a ernment, it must do so either because the Central America; to communist armies in policy is the only possible foundation for an arrangements satisfy our moral instinct, or Laos. At the same time, a growing volume enduring peace. because they strengthen our position-or of evidence indicates that the Soviet econ For an agreement in any sphere, the Ruspreferably both.

omy is in difficulties. Agriculture is in ter sians want concessions from us. Open trade The question of trading has released sev- rible shape. Manufacturing is at best a bad with the United States would be a solid coneral sets of American instinctive reactions, second rate. The Soviet Union has commit cession on our side. What does the Soviet none of them originally political, though the ted too large a part of her gross national Union propose in return? So far as we know, issue is rapidly pushing toward a high place product to arms and military or paramili- it has yet to offer anything of significance. on the agenda in the 1964 presidential cam tary adventures. Indeed, she has overcom In the case of the test ban, the Russians paign. The wheat deal released a natural mitted herself, promising other countries conceded little; we conceded something, emotion: if Russians are hungry and need arms and other products (including wheat, though not much. President Kennedy and food, Americans ought not to sit on fat sur- yes, wheat) which she cannot deliver. For Secretary of State Rusk stated that the diapluses, saying "No." But even that emotion these reasons, she is buying outside. If the log had produced a tiny fragment of tolwas qualified by facts, which apply with far United States dropped trade barriers, we erable agreement which just might pave the greater force to a policy of general trading should merely help the process along. way for more significant settlements. The

The Soviet Union is anything but friendly The Soviet agricultural picture is particu- next round, probably in quiet preparation to the United States. True, there has been larly serious. Disaster and bad weather did now, will raise far more dangerous subjects. some relaxing of tension. This means only not produce its defects; they are endemic to There are Berlin and its wall-involving that propaganda directed at the U.S. public

Communist agricultural system. A the security of all Western Europe. There has temporarily stopped some of its abuse. friend of mine, an excellent farmer, last year is Russian military control of Cuba-endanNot so elsewhere, I was recently in Venezuela. spent some time looking over farms in the gering the peace of Latin America. There There, the Soviet fifth column is damning the Soviet Union. He was shocked. How could are the broken treaty agreements and the United States, bombing American enterprises, anyone, he asked rhetorically, expect even Russian military supply lines running into murdering friends of the United States and tolerable results under a system so inefficient, Laos. There are always the betrayed acoccasionally kidnaping Americans. In vary so bureaucratic, so centralized?

cords of Yalta and the continuing agony of ing degrees of intensity, such activity goes on Forty-five percent of Soviet workers are

Hungary and Poland. over much of Latin America. Washington agricultural (in the United States about 11 I doubt that the Soviet Union is yet prediplomates talk of detente-but try to find it percent of the population is engaged in ag pared to make real concessions in any of in the Caribbean.

riculture). With reasonable efficiency, the these areas. I think at present the Russian Will not enlarged trade with Russia merely Soviet Union and certain of the satellite leaders would rather squeeze their people give the Soviet Union more resources to fight countries, notably Hungary, could produce than give up an even partly successful terour friends and ourselves? Certainly it can; more food than they need with less than half

ritorial grab. If they retire from any posino one has forgotten American sales of scrap the labor. More than half the food finding

tion it will not be for temporary economic iron to Japan just prior to Pearl Harbor. its way into Soviet city markets comes from advantage, but because they have become

Common business considerations, it is the small plots Russian peasants are allowed convinced the position is untenable. argued, indicate selling to the Soviet Union. to cultivate in their spare time for their own The dialog is still going on. The results We have agricultural surpluses of little use account.

have still to be observed. I for one will to us. We can sell heavy machinery, chemi If this allocation of labor, however ineffi watch carefully the terrorist campaign cals and manufactured products to the Rus cient, produced adequate food, and left ade against our good friend, the enlightened and sians. We can use some extra foreign ex quate labor for manufacturing, it might be

successful Government of Venezuela, as a change. American farmers would rather see justified as a way of taking care of people. sort of thermometer. If that and similar their surpluses eaten than stockpiled. But it does not, and shows no signs of ever campaigns continue, the dialog test will American manufacturers certainly want to doing so. Certainly it will not support a

have failed. We shall then have to recogsell more, and nobody would object to more huge policy of military aggression.

nize that materials sold to the Soviet Union employment. But, important as trade con This is the dusty result of a half century

will merely increase her capacity for parasiderations may be, they are, ultimately, of Communist organization in Russia, and

military and propaganda campaigns against only, incidental to a vastly deeper issue. of more than 18 years of Communist control

the United States and its friends. What bearing does trade have on the great in the Iron Curtain countries. These areas

Business considerations, it seems to me, question of the current war, now "cold" but were the breadbaskets of Europe before the are childlessly trivial compared with the potentially very hot (especially in Latin Communists took over. Some of them, like great issues involved. Of course, we would America), and on the chance of peace? East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and parts of

gather in a little foreign exchange. Of The Kennedy administration has developed Poland, were great manufacturing produc

course, some manufacturers and traders the strategy of a continuing "dialog" with ers. Blame has been laid by Communist could make a little money. But the United the Russians. The hope is that tiny accords governments on bad planning. Yet if the States as a nation, and our businessmen as in some fields may pave the way for a Communist governments more nearly re

well, do not greatly need this; our country is widening range of more significant agree- sponded to what human beings want, in

quite comfortably prosperous without it. ments that possibly might set the stage for stead of pushing them into arbitrary frames,

Equally trivial is the argument that some a real ending of the cold

of our friends and allies will sell to the Ruswar. This the planning would not have been so disdialog is an experimental operation.

astrous. It will take more than new ferti sians—and make money-if we do not. PerThe test-ban treaty was a first, tiny step.

lizer plants and good weather to bring So haps. But the precise result of a trading Diplomatic exchanges are already going for

viet agriculture within hailing distance of agreement made for business considerations ward in other areas—as with Foreign MinisAmerican productive standards, or, indeed,

would be to pretend that we are neutral in

the cold war. Some of our allies may feel ter Gromyko's visit to President Kennedy of Soviet needs.

differently—I think they are wrong-but I in Washington—but no one can forecast the In manufacturing, though the picture is result. The President merely points out that better than in agriculture, the “guns or but

am clear we cannot so pretend. the dialog policy seems better than paster" ratio is at length exacting its grim price.

The single-shot wheat deal can probably

be cobbled up with conditions, and deliveries sively waiting for a collision. The Soviet Union has a population of 221

so arranged that it affords minimal support Dialog-as such-can do no harm. But million, as against 190 million in the United

for Russian imperial adventurism. Withconcessions can become dangerous gambles. States. Her gross national product is on the out a major shift in Soviet policy, it is difIf they result in peace, they may later be order of two-thirds of ours. She devotes a ficult to see how this could be done with a hailed as great statesmanship. If they fail, far greater proportion of that than we do current of general trade, the end could be disaster. That was the fate to armaments-guided missiles, land armies This will not be the last opportunityof the British attempt to settle matters by and submarine fleets. Additional substantial and is not even the great one-to change

*

9

out economic policy toward the Communist in short supply, and this would create con which wheat constituted 4.7 million tons. countries. My guess is that the Soviet siderable social and political difficulties for The list of clients shows clearly the political Union will not be out of her agricultural the Soviet Government.

importance of the exports: the largest controubles for a long time. She will not be

"OUTRAGEOUS" APPROACH

sumer was East Germany, followed succesable to meet her needs for consumer goods

sively by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil, and until she cuts down on her foreign military

The economic argument is more complex.

Cuba. adventures and her enormous armament The simple equation of profit and trade is

The restriction that President Kennedy program. deeply rooted in the American tradition, and

wishes to impose on the re-exportation of A realistic base for trading is the only it is not easy to convince an American that

American grain to these countries creates the Soviet approach to the problem is someone that makes sense to Communist negoti

a technical impediment to such exports. ators. If they think our chief concern is what different. Yet as George Kennan has

The Soviet Union would not be able to ship that some of our traders can make money, amply demonstrated in his book “Russia and

them American wheat directly. Nonethethe West," the Soviet approach to the probthe dialog will get no further than did the

less, the availability of American wheat, and British dialog with Hitler in 1938. They lem of trade is a highly political one.

indeed of other Western wheat, would mean

Writing about the Soviet attitude toward will use pressure, of course (the recent brief

that Soviet grain itself could be exported to blockade at Berlin may have been an illusthe West in the very early 1920's, Kennan

the countries concerned. Hence the polittration). Their propaganda machine will thus projected the Soviet reasoning on the

ical problem would not be resolved by the subject of trade with the West: make bad noises about us. They will create

"We despise you.
We consider that you

proposed restriction. tensions and ask us to buy alleviation. But

The above comments should not be conshould be swept from the earth as governtheir abuse has ceased to be important one

strued as an argument against an Americanway or the other: it has already done its ments and physically destroyed as individ

Soviet wheat deal. They are meant to sugwork. The last thing Americans should uals. We reserve the right, in our private if

gest, however, that this wheat deal ought consider is making concessions to buy relief not in our official capacities, to do what we

to be viewed in a political perspective and can to bring this about; to revile you pubfrom Soviet abuse.

that U.S. negotiators ought to seek political licly, to do everything within our power to My conclusion, therefore, is that trade

concessions from the Soviets in return. detach your own people from their loyalty restrictions ought not now to be suspended to you and their confidence in you, to sub

Naturally, there would be no point in exthat, although I think the wheat deal justifiable, it should be treated as a single-shot

vert your armed forces and to work for your pecting fundamental concessions. For exdownfall in favor of the Communist dictator

ample, it would be illusory to expect a Soviet operation while the dialog continues. Alship.

acknowledgement of our position in Berlin ways, we must remember, unrepresented

"But since we are not strong enough to

in return for our willingness to sell Russia millions have to be considered. There are destroy you today—since an interval must

some wheat; there is no political equivalence East Germans, there are Hungarians; there

between these two interests. However, on unfortunately elapse before we can give you are Poles. There are Malaysians in Souththe coup de grace-we want you during this

a number of marginal issues, there is no east Asia; peasants and patriots in Veneinterval to trade with us * *. An out

reason why the United States should not zuela; silent, suffering Cubans in the Carib

insist on a quid pro quo. bean. Soviet authorities alone know what

rageous demand? Perhaps. But you will
accept it nevertheless.

For example, it would seem ironical for the stakes are on the Sinkiang border of

You will accept it because you are not

the United States to be enabling the Soviet Red China. free agents, because you are slaves to your

Union to maintain its collectivized agriculMost of us would be glad to trade with a own capitalist appetites, because when profit

ture and its politically motivated grain expeace-seeking, peace-loving Soviet Union atis involved, you have no pride, no principles,

ports and at the same time for this country tending to her own people and administering no honor. In the blindness that character

to endure continued Soviet harassment in her own country. Yet, few if any, of us izes declining and perishing classes, you will

its access to Berlin. At the very least, our want to become part of a supply line for wink at our efforts to destroy you, you will

negotiators could insist on a clear reciprocal a Soviet military and paramilitary machine. compete with one another for our favor."

understanding of the technical arrangements This is the real subject of the dialog. It

involved in Western access. had better continue awhile and show results

One may wonder, in the light of the 1962 before we make a further change in our Cuban confrontation with Khrushchev's gen

Similarly, we could demand that the Soeral policy of "burying" us, whether this ap

viets lift their travel restrictions within economic policy.

Russia. Indeed, a political quid pro quo proach has changed so very fundamentally.

should be sought in the case of other so(From the Washington (D.C.) Post,

A NECESSARY FAILURE

called nonpolitical, technical arrangements. Nov. 3, 1963]

To the Soviet leaders, the wheat deal is For many years, for reasons of political POLITICS OF WHEAT DEAL GIVES UNITED STATES political because two very vital Soviet polit- prestige and also as a precedent, the Soviet UPPER HAND ical interests are involved. The first is the

Union has been very anxious to establish stability of the collective agricultural system

direct American-Soviet air links. Perhaps (By Zbigniew Brzezinski) itself. Over many years, that system has

there is no reason to oppose such links, but (NOTE.—Director of the Research Institute failed to deliver the goods, at least insofar it might be preferable to negotiate about on Communist Affairs and professor of pubas the Soviet consumer is concerned. Yet

them in the context of a reciprocal Soviet lic law and government at Columbia Univerto the political leadership, the collective

willingness to meet some of our political sity, Brzezinski is the author of "The Soviet system is essential.

objectives. Bloc: Unity and Conflict,” "Ideology and

A recent critical reevaluation of the Stalin Of course, proponents of the purely "ecoPower in Soviet Politics" and other books.) ist drive for collectivization, published in

nomic" approach might say that if our posiIt has been argued that the wheat deal Voprosy istorii, state quite categorically that

tion is too hard, the Soviet Union will buy with the Soviet Union is desirable on humanthe collectivist system was necessary in order

the wheat somewhere else. That may be itarian grounds. If Russian people are staryto build socialism in the Soviet Union and

true, but the argument is not entirely coning, the United States should not stand

for the defense of the country. Mounting vincing. If the Soviet Union could easily back, said former President Truman on the

consumer dissatisfaction with the inability buy wheat elsewhere, then why does it not radio, and he has been echoed by some of the present agricultural system to produce

do so? clergymen and by various people of good adequately might, over the long haul, force

It either wishes to deal directly with the will. the Soviet leaders to revise the agricultural

United States because that would strengthen Others have suggested that the wheat deal

system. However, if the Soviet leadership the impression in the West and elsewhere is purely a matter of economics. The Rus

finds other means of meeting domestic needs, of an American-Soviet detente-an impressians need our wheat; we can use their gold. i.e., imports paid for with gold, it can per

sion which intensifies Western European Their food needs will be met; our food surpetuate the collectivist system.

fears concerning the American position; or, pluses will be diminished. We both gain

Collectivization was abandoned in Poland conceivably, the Soviet Union does not see equally. and Yugoslavia because the leaderships had

other markets so readily available and the The humanitarian argument can be disno way out. By importing wheat, the So

American wheat is thus of some economic missed quickly. First of all, there is no fam

viet leadership sees a way out, and hence importance to it as well. ine in Russia. The Soviet people are not

the wheat deal is necessary to Moscow in One may safely assume that the Soviet starving, and the Government has not lost order to maintain its domestic system of Union is not anxious to buy American wheat all of its ability to meet a food crisis. It collectivization.

merely in order to reduce our balance-ofcould certainly divert some of its resources

payments difficulties and to alleviate our from heavy industry to better agricultural

EXPORTS POLITICAL, TOO

own internal agricultural problems. management, and it is still capable of pro Secondly, the importation of wheat is nec Finally, it should be stated unambiguviding the basic staples to meet Russian essary to the Soviet Union in order for it to ously that it would be wrong to conclude needs.

meet its grain export commitments. These that since the wheat deal is political, the Even if all the Western countries were to commitments are important to the Soviet United States should have no part of it. refuse wheat to Russia, no Russian would leadership primarily for political reasons. That is fallacious and extreme. It would be starve because of it. There is no doubt, how Last year the Soviet Union exported ap a pity if we failed to use the limited leverage ever, that certain kinds of foods would be proximately 7.8 million tons of grain, of that this particular situation affords.

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