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RECOGNITION OF PRESENT GOV-
ERNMENT OF DOMINICAN RE-
PUBLIC

Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, the

present Government of the Dominican Republic should be recognized by the United States promptly and without any further delay. Recognition is required in the interest of fairplay to the people of the Dominican Republic, the United States, and the Western Hemisphere in

general.

We cannot afford to have the creation of any further Communist governments in this hemisphere. Failure to recog

nize the present regime of the Dominican Republic is likely to produce that very unwanted condition. By our refusal to recognize the present government and to give it the aid that was formerly being given to the Bosch regime, we are inexcusably rejecting the will of the Dominican people and the friendly attitude of the present government; thus giving encouragement to the leftwing

forces of that country.

The revolution against Bosch had the

practically solid backing of the Dominican people. It is true that the military forces led the movement in overthrowing the government. All the evidence, however, shows that they did not have personal ambitions, as indicated by the fact that within 24 hours the military forces succeeded in having the six most important political parties-genuine representatives of the people-selecting and electing a triumvirate from among the nonpolitical elements to rule provisionally for 2 years.

The Bosch regime was overthrown by the people because of general discontent in the soft-handed treatment, and in fact paternalism, that was accorded to the Communists.

I suggest that a careful study of the developments since the Bosch government went into power will disclose the existence of facts that justified the Dominicans in becoming apprehensive of the Communists taking control of their

government.

Several specific and manifest situations finally had such an impact upon the people that they concluded the need of removing Bosch in order to escape communism. The people became alarmed because:

First. The exiled Communists were coming back into the Dominican Republic in droves and without hindrance. Second. The Bosch government rented to the Communist Party a school building to be used in the teaching of the Communist technique and doctrine.

Third. The governmentally operated radio and television station was made available to Communists for the spread of their propaganda against the free West and in favor of the Communists.

Fourth. An uninhibited outflow and

inflow of Cuban and Dominican Republican youth made possible the use of the Communist beachhead in the Western Hemisphere in Cuba as a further place

of indoctrination in communism.

Fifth. On July 26, 1963, when Castro in Cuba was celebrating the 10th an

niversary of the initiation of the Castro
revolutionary group, Bosch sent from the
Dominican Republic 48 students to par-
Dominican Government in the celebra-
ticipate as the representatives of the
Dominican Government in the celebra-
tion.

Sixth. Communists were placed in im-
portant governmental positions, espe-
cially in the agency having control of the

Manifestly the Dominican people rejected the honeyed words coming from the Marxists and Leninists. They recognized the failure of the Communist system, especially in the agricultural field, which has been so clearly evidenced by the embarrassing acts of the Communists in buying, with their gold, wheat from the United States, Canada, and

radio and television facilities. These Australia.

facilities were used by the Communists
to attack the non-Communist political
parties, advocate what was called social
revolution, and otherwise to extol the
Communist cause.

Bosch was being urged to bring to an
end the privilege that was granted to
the Communist exiles, the rental to the
television and radio facilities, and the
Communist Party of the school and the
use of facilities for a Cuban base of in-
doctrination. Bosch turned a deaf ear

While these things were happening,

to all these pleas and, if anything, al-
lowed the activities of the Communists

to be expanded.

asked whether Castroism had influence
that in Santa Domingo there was a Cas-
in the Dominican Republic, he replied
troite movement, as in Venezuela, Colom-
bia, and Mexico. "This movement," he
added, "is fighting, not for communism,
added, "is fighting, not for communism,
but for liberty."

Early in October, when Bosch was

The claim that the present regime is made up of Trujillo devotees is completely without foundation; it is false. Manuel Enrique Tavares, a present member of the incumbent government, was implicated and arrested in connection

with the death of Trujillo; a second member, Mr. Tapia Espinal, was secretary of the government after the downfall of Trujillo's reign.

The triumvirate government was, in the main, opposed to Trujillo; and it is opposed to the Communists, and is representative of the thinking of the people of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. President, I submit that two courses are left for the people of the

United States with respect to the Dominican Republic: First, by our failure to recognize the encumbent government and to give it aid, we can deliver it to the Communists; second, we can preserve the government in that nation for the people, through immediate recognition

Mr. President, with that statement, I of the present civilian government. cannot agree.

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It is true that the military did act. What it did, however, was the product What it did, however, was the product of the will of the workers, the farmers, of the will of the workers, the farmers, the religionists, the business, professional and mining men, the housewives and the merchants. The Dominican people do not want a Communist government in their land; they are friendly to the West. The military leaders foresaw what was happening, and, for that reason, proceeded to remove the government which was allowing communism to take hold; moreover, it was actually aiding the Communists. But these military persons did not have personal ambitions, for it is obvious that within 24 hours after they removed the Bosch government, they turned it over to a triumvirate selected by the six leading political parties of the land.

Emilio de los Santos, the President of the provisional government triumvirate, in his inaugural address 24 hours after

the overthrow said:

We are not a product of Castro's institu-
tions; this government came as a result of
the mismanagement under which we were
suffering, and the will of the people who can

be considered to be represented by political
parties which command a vast abundance
of national votes.

The assertion that a government can at the same time be democratic and communistic is a paradox and an untruth. The existence of communism demonstrates that democracy and constitutional government are absent. The people of the United States want democracies established everywhere, but will not be duped into believing that a constitutional form of government can exist where Communists are in charge.

Let us not delay. We should let the world know now that the overthrow of the Bosch regime was induced by the manifest rejection of communism by the Dominican people. Mr. Bosch was soft and yielding to the Communists, and thus suffered his overthrow.

I believe Bosch is an idealist; but he allowed the Communists to take charge. The result was that the strong and the weak, the rich and the poor, those from every rank of life in the Dominican Republic, became apprehensive, and joined in the movement for the removal of the Bosch government.

Mr. President, we must not delay. If we do, we are likely to create another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere.

My words become especially important because we are now at the thresh

hold of deciding what we shall do in regard to South Vietnam. If the United States recognizes the South Vietnamese Government, how can it fail to recognize the

government in the Dominican

Republic?

Mr. President, I yield the floor.
Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I sug-

gest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. McINTYRE in the chair.) The clerk will

call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call deferred until February 1 so that a Senthe roll.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

ate committee might study these matters and submit its report for the guidance of Congress and the administration.

As matters turned out, we were granted no such time for consideration.

On the following day, October 9, it was announced that a decision had been made to approve the sale of American

AMENDMENT OF FOREIGN ASSIST- surplus wheat to the Soviets.

ANCE ACT OF 1961

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7885) to amend further the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and for other purposes.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, while many Senators are presently in the are presently in the Chamber, I ask for the yeas and nays on the pending amendment.

This entire matter has been handled in a piece-by-piece manner which has obscured the true extent of the concessions we have made both from Congress and from the American people.

I gravely fear that these concessions may prepare the way for the complete collapse of the defenses which we have so painstakingly erected in our country and in the free world community against the shipment of heavy industrial equipment and other strategic goods to the Communist bloc.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there and a sufficient second?

The yeas and nays were ordered.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I do not wish to press the question at any particular time. I certainly do not wish to call up the amendment when the Senator from Oregon is not present in the Chamber. But while so many Senators are present, I should like to state again briefly that my amendment would merely seize the present golden opportunity to say to the Nation and to everyone concerned that the Senate desires to bring the program down. Instead of reenacting the present authorization of $1.5 billion for each of the years 1965 and 1966, the amendment would reduce the ceiling of authorization for each of those years to $975 million, the same as is proposed for the present year, which would mean eliminating $1,050 million from the authorization now contained in existing law.

I have already stated-and I state again-I am sorry that I do not have the information, and I do not believe anyone else does, to propose a reduction even lower than the $975 million, but I do not want it to appear that we are reauthorizing a program which we expect to be very much larger for next year and the year after that than what we are passing for the present year. I say again that I think we now have a precious opportunity to see that the program will be on the way out, and we are cutting down the future authorizations when we have an opportunity to do so.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Florida to the Mansfield amendment to the committee amendment.

FURTHER AMERICAN CONCESSIONS ON THE SALE OF WHEAT TO THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Mr. DODD. Mr. President, the decision to sell wheat to the Soviet Union at a subsidized price was announced to Congress and the American public with so little advance notice that there was no time for serious discussion of the implications of such a deal from the standpoint of our national security or of the terms that might make it compatible with the national security.

On October 8, I introduced a resolution asking simply that this decision be

last year's deflated price as a concession to the Soviets, the price of wheat and flour on the American market has risen substantially. Not merely are we subsidizing the Soviet Government to the extent of almost $100 million, but the American housewife, in consequence of this deal, is already called upon to pay an extra 40 cents per hundredweight of flour because of the increased price of wheat futures on the Chicago market.

Third. The impression was fostered at the time the announcement was made that this was to be a cash sale, or, at least, a sale based on a normal commercial credit arrangement.

On Friday, October 18, however, we were informed, through an article in the New York Times, that the Export-Import Bank would guarantee loans made on the sale of U.S. wheat to the Soviets. It was stated that the Export-Import Bank would charge five-eighths of 1 percent to

I intend to speak about this matter at guarantee such loans made by comlength in the very near future.

But meanwhile, so that my colleagues may have a clearer understanding of the scope of our concessions and the degree of our humiliation, I wish to tabulate the separate concessions that we have made, sometimes in defiance of assurances to Congress and the public, over the past several months.

First. Immediately on the heels of the ratification of the test ban treaty, it was announced that the Johnson Act would not be applied to the sale of agricultural commodities to the Communist bloc, and that these commodities would be available to the Communist nations on the same terms as apply to friendly countries.

Nothing was yet said about selling wheat to the Soviet Union.

But even in the general terms in which it was couched, I do not see how this acit was couched, I do not see how this action can be reconciled either with the Johnson Act itself, or with the Latta amendment to the Agricultural Act, which prohibits subsidies on the sale of agricultural commodities to Communist nations.

Second. The official announcement on October 9 that wheat would be sold to the Soviet Union sought to obscure the fact that this sale would be at a subsidized price.

We were told that the subsidy would go not to the Soviets, but to the American graingrowers, and that the wheat itself would simply be sold at the world price.

What we were not told is that the world price previously prevailing was an artificially deflated price based upon the existence of substantial reserves in a number of countries; and we were also not told, although the Agriculture Department subsequently confirmed this fact, that the United States at this moment is the only country still commanding large reserves of wheat and other food grains.

If the law of supply and demand has any meaning at all, what it means in this case is that last year's price is no longer relevant; the world price should not differ substantially from the current domestic price.

I find it most disturbing that while we have insisted on artificially maintaining

mercial banks in this country to American grain traders.

For the entertainment of my colleagues, I should like to point out that Mr. Harold F. Linder, President of the Bank, while refusing to affirm or deny the reports, made the following statement to the press:

It would be perfectly normal for us to guarantee all or part of a credit for an export transaction of this nature. We would do the same for France and Switzerland, for example.

We have come to a sorry pass, indeed, if high-ranking officials can discern no difference between extending credits to friendly nations that traditionally honor their obligations and extending credit to a government that is committed to our destruction and that is in default on more than $800 million on prior credits extended.

Mr. President, I consider this to be a clear violation of the Johnson Act which prohibits the extension of credit to nations that are in default on prior obligations.

Fourth. On Friday, October 25, I was informed that the Justice Department had ruled that a "normal commercial credit" could extend to 18 months.

I say that this arbitrary ruling, which may be intended to cover up the violation of the Johnson Act, flies in the face of banking practice and the accepted usage of the term.

It has always been my understanding that normal commercial credits extend from 30 to 90 days at the most. An 18month or 3-year credit would not be a "normal commercial credit" but a medium-term loan.

In this connection, it seems clear that, if we enter into such a transaction, we shall probably be called upon to extend the loans beyond the original period, as the Chinese Communists have already done in the instance of two 18-month loans negotiated with Canada.

Fifth. Finally, Mr. President, we were given the firm assurances that this wheat would be carried in American ships where available.

The Soviets have objected strenuously to the use of American bottoms because the American conference rate of ap

proximately $23 per ton is approximately double that of foreign tramp or charter rates.

It is now reported that the issue will be compromised by having the Maritime Administration set a rate of $18 per ton for American shipping and by limiting American shipping to a maximum of 25 percent of the total tonnage carried.

I find it difficult to reconcile this decision with the Cargo Preference Act which requires that at least 50 percent of any Government-financed cargo shall move on American-flag ships, if available at "fair and reasonable" rates. The arbiThe arbitrary rate of $18 per ton will be imposed, apparently, in the face of the fact that the tighter shipping situation has already moved foreign shipping rates upward, some say as much as $4 and $5 per ton.

So now the picture is complete.

We shall be selling wheat to the Soviets at a subsidized price which we have arbitrarily chosen to regard as the going world price.

American banks will be lending them the money with which to make purchase, and the American Government, through the Import-Export Bank, will stand guarantor for a government that refuses to honor prior obligations.

American shipping will not be used "as available;" it will be limited to some 25 percent of the tonnage carried, although the Cargo Preference Act calls for 50 percent.

And instead of the prevailing American rates, American shippers will be paid at the reduced rate of $18 per ton, which may turn out to be just about on a par with the foreign shipping rates now emerging.

No political concessions will be demanded; and new acts of aggression will be disregarded or played down, in order not to disturb this strangely one-sided detente.

I believe that no one would object to selling wheat to the Soviets if they were willing to pay for it at a reasonable price and if, in return for our bailing them out from their manmade agricultural crisis, they made a few concessions that would contribute to the peace and stability of the free world.

Not only have we not demanded such concessions, but the Soviets have, on at least four occasions since the negotiations begun, made it clear in a most humiliating manner that there will be no abatement of the cold war and no consideration of any kind in return for American wheat.

First, on October 22, the very anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet Mig fighters, operating out of Cuba and probably manned by Soviet crews, attacked an American-owned freighter on the high seas.

Second, there has been the series of harassments of American and British convoys on the Berlin autobahn. We chose to regard these harassments as minor incidents that probably resulted from the excessive zeal of some Soviet officer.

But I challenge the concept that any Soviet officer would risk such initiative without direct orders from the Kremlin.

I am convinced that the orders for these harassments came directly from the Kremlin; and I am also convinced that we have not seen the end of them unless we learn to respond in a more vigorous manner to Communist provocation.

Indeed, this morning brought the news that another American convoy has been stopped on the autobahn.

Third, an official Soviet delegation in Hanoi, the capital of North Vietnam, broadcast a call for the overthrow of the Diem government and for the expulsion of the American imperialists from South Vietnam,

leagues particularly to the article published in last Sunday's Washington Post, written by Professor Brzezinski; to the article written by Mr. A. A. Berle, Jr., and published in the Sunday Times magazine of October 20, 1963; and to the article written by Mr. Leslie Gould, and published in the New York JournalAmerican of October 30, 1963.

Second. "The Collapsing Controls on East-West Trade." Third. "The Crisis."

Soviet Agricultural

Fourth. "The Soviet Industrial and Economic Crisis."

Fifth. "Soviet Economic Warfare." Sixth. "Moscow Continues the Cold War."

Fourth, the Soviets have further inflamed the highly dangerous situation in north Africa by sending arms and equipment to the Ben Bella government in large quantities, and by openly inciting were ordered to be printed in the RECORD,

the Algerians against the Moroccans.

Each concession we offer the Soviets on the sale of wheat is repaid not by any reciprocal political gesture, but by some new indignity or act of aggression.

I say that this is an intolerable situation.

Regrettably, it is a situation which we ourselves have encouraged by our failure to impose political conditions and by our insistence on minimizing, or even disregarding, all of the recent actions to which I have referred.

Further dangers loom in the offing. Now that we have agreed to sell massive quantities of wheat to the Soviet Union, American manufacturers are beginning to clamor for a relaxation of ginning to clamor for a relaxation of export controls to the Soviet bloc. Even machine tool manufacturers have asked the question, "If wheat, why not machine tools?"

As for the Western European nations, it is now becoming increasingly questionable whether they will be willing to listen to any argument or urging on our part to exercise some control over exports to the Soviet Union.

Under the imperfect controls that heretofore existed, the Soviet Union has heretofore existed, the Soviet Union has been able to obtain, from the United States and from its allies, an amazing variety of machine tools, heavy indusvariety of machine tools, heavy industrial equipment, transportation equipment, pipeline, and even entire chemical and metallurgical plants.

But at least they were debarred from a fairly long list of critical items that were obviously of strategic importance. were obviously of strategic importance.

Now the danger is that the barriers will come tumbling down, both here and abroad, and the Communists will be able abroad, and the Communists will be able to purchase even the most sophisticated and clearly strategic equipment, in the name of business and of coexistence.

Mr. President, again I ask that we pause to consider the possible consequences of our action before it is too late.

I earnestly hope that the Agriculture and Forestry Committee will not delay too long in reporting the resolution which I submitted on October 8, with the cosponsorship of several other Senators.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD a number of newspaper items arranged in groups under the following captions:

First. "The Soviet Wheat Deal." Under this caption I would refer my col

There being no objection, the articles as follows:

THE SOVIET WHEAT DEAL [From the New York Times magazine, Oct 20, 1963]

DIALOG? YES-CONCESSIONS?

BEWARE! IN THE WAKE OF THE WHEAT DEAL, AN OBSERVER WARNS THAT TRADE ALONE IS NO ANSWER TO THE HARD PROBLEMS THAT REMAIN TO BE WORKED OUT WITH THE RUSSIANS

(By A. A. Berle, Jr.)

(NOTE.-A. A. Berle, Jr., an attorney and professor at Columbia Law School, was an Assistant Secretary of State, 1938 to 1944. He wrote "The 20th Century Capitalist Revolution.")

It was

The Soviet Union and several satellite countries have just arranged to purchase about 150 million bushels of American wheat. Canada had already been reported. The purchase of 240 million bushels from not enough to meet Russian needs. Bread, the chief item of Russian family food, is already rationed, and the squeeze will become very severe next spring.

Preliminary information of Russia's desire to buy from U.S. stocks reached Washington last month. Formal negotiations to purchase were opened in early October. On October 7, President Kennedy held a White House conference on the problem. Fortyeight hours later, he approved, in principle, a single-shot deal to sell wheat to the

Does this decision suggest a new policy of open trade with the Soviet Union, and change the settled plan of campaign in the thing. General opening of trade barriers is something else. My own view is that the one-shot deal, on balance, was justifiable but that a change in the no-trading policy at present would not be.

cold war? The one-shot wheat deal is one

Sentimental arguments may be eliminated at the outset. Soviet "goodwill" will not be bought by selling wheat, still less by lifting

trade restrictions. I doubt that the Soviet man in the street will even know about it. The Moscow government can hardly be expected to emphasize the Communist agricultural failure. Nor will Communist officials attribute to the United States any motive higher than capitalist avarice. In 1919, hoping to find a basis for peaceful I had a vivid experience with Soviet trade. adjustment with Russia, a commission headed by William C. Bullitt, reporting through my office in the American Peace Commission in Paris, negotiated a very fair working arrangement with Lenin, and returned with the document. (Nothing came

of it: Clemenceau and the French Government torpedoed it.)

Later, the researches of George Kennan uncovered Lenin's real motive as expounded by him at the time to his colleagues. He said

he was worried about Japanese moves in Siberia; he wanted temporary relief from the Western side. The agreement he offered would set American capitalists slavering for the profit and plunder of concessions in Siberia. He explained that these hopes would be dashed in due time, but that, meanwhile, the capitalists who controlled the U.S. Government would make sure that American and allied moves were not dangerous to the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Gromyko, and many of their colleagues today come straight out of the Leninist school. If therefore the United States opens trading with the Soviet Government, it must do so either because the arrangements satisfy our moral instinct, or because they strengthen our position-or preferably both.

The question of trading has released several sets of American instinctive reactions, none of them originally political, though the issue is rapidly pushing toward a high place on the agenda in the 1964 presidential campaign. The wheat deal released a natural emotion: if Russians are hungry and need food, Americans ought not to sit on fat surpluses, saying "No." But even that emotion was qualified by facts, which apply with far greater force to a policy of general trading.

The Soviet Union is anything but friendly to the United States. True, there has been some relaxing of tension. This means only that propaganda directed at the U.S. public has temporarily stopped some of its abuse. Not so elsewhere, I was recently in Venezuela. There, the Soviet fifth column is damning the United States, bombing American enterprises, murdering friends of the United States and occasionally kidnaping Americans. In varying degrees of intensity, such activity goes on over much of Latin America. Washington diplomates talk of detente-but try to find it in the Caribbean.

Will not enlarged trade with Russia merely give the Soviet Union more resources to fight our friends-and ourselves? Certainly it can; no one has forgotten American sales of scrap iron to Japan just prior to Pearl Harbor.

Common business considerations, it is argued, indicate selling to the Soviet Union. We have agricultural surpluses of little use to us. We can sell heavy machinery, chemicals and manufactured products to the Russians. We can use some extra foreign exchange. American farmers would rather see their surpluses eaten than stockpiled. American manufacturers certainly want to sell more, and nobody would object to more employment. But, important as trade considerations may be, they are, ultimately, only, incidental to a vastly deeper issue. What bearing does trade have on the great question of the current war, now "cold" but potentially very hot (especially in Latin America), and on the chance of peace?

The Kennedy administration has developed the strategy of a continuing "dialog" with the Russians. The hope is that tiny accords in some fields may pave the way for a widening range of more significant agreements that possibly might set the stage for a real ending of the cold war. This dialog is an experimental operation.

The test-ban treaty was a first, tiny step. Diplomatic exchanges are already going forward in other areas-as with Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to President Kennedy in Washington-but no one can forecast the result. The President merely points out that the dialog policy seems better than passively waiting for a collision.

Dialog-as such can do no harm. But concessions can become dangerous gambles. If they result in peace, they may later be hailed as great statesmanship. If they fail, the end could be disaster. That was the fate of the British attempt to settle matters by

dialog and concessions to Hitler at Munich in 1938.

Opening general trade barriers is such a concession. In doing that, the United States might well enable the Soviet Union to continue a policy of armament rather than production, of maintaining armed occupations, of subsidizing imperialist grabs, of making covert seizures in great areas. Without the trade opportunity, Russia might have to modify, if not relinquish, her policy in substantial areas.

The Soviet Union now is supplying arms, planes, and training to Indonesia to attack Malaysia; to Cuba to attack Venezuela and Central America; to Communist armies in Laos. At the same time, a growing volume of evidence indicates that the Soviet economy is in difficulties. Agriculture is in terrible shape. Manufacturing is at best a bad second rate. The Soviet Union has committed too large a part of her gross national product to arms and military or paramilitary adventures. Indeed, she has overcommitted herself, promising other countries arms and other products (including wheatyes, wheat) which she cannot deliver. For these reasons, she is buying outside. If the United States dropped trade barriers, we should merely help the process along.

The Soviet agricultural picture is particularly serious. Disaster and bad weather did not produce its defects; they are endemic to the Communist agricultural system. A friend of mine, an excellent farmer, last year spent some time looking over farms in the Soviet Union. He was shocked. How could anyone, he asked rhetorically, expect even tolerable results under a system so inefficient, so bureaucratic, so centralized?

Forty-five percent of Soviet workers are agricultural (in the United States about 11 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture). With reasonable efficiency, the Soviet Union and certain of the satellite countries, notably Hungary, could produce more food than they need with less than half the labor. More than half the food finding its way into Soviet city markets comes from the small plots Russian peasants are allowed to cultivate in their spare time for their own account.

If this allocation of labor, however inefficient, produced adequate food, and left adequate labor for manufacturing, it might be justified as a way of taking care of people. But it does not, and shows no signs of ever doing so. Certainly it will not support a huge policy of military aggression.

This is the dusty result of a half century of Communist organization in Russia, and of more than 18 years of Communist control in the Iron Curtain countries. These areas were the breadbaskets of Europe before the Communists took over. Some of them, like East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and parts of Poland, were great manufacturing producers. Blame has been laid by Communist governments on bad planning. Yet if the Communist governments more nearly responded to what human beings want, instead of pushing them into arbitrary frames, the planning would not have been so disastrous. It will take more than new fertilizer plants and good weather to bring Soviet agriculture within hailing distance of American productive standards, or, indeed, of Soviet needs.

In manufacturing, though the picture is better than in agriculture, the "guns or butter" ratio is at length exacting its grim price. The Soviet Union has a population of 221 million, as against 190 million in the United States. Her gross national product is on the order of two-thirds of ours. She devotes a far greater proportion of that than we do to armaments-guided missiles, land armies and submarine fleets. Additional substantial

amounts have gone into supplying bloody adventures like those in Cuba, Indonesia, and Laos, and political-economic adventures like the Aswan High Dam in Egypt. Now she has not enough product to go around. The Communist rulers of Russia know it. In recent speeches arguing against Red China's shrieks for military conflict, Khrushchev has come pretty close to saying so.

The Soviet Union accordingly may one of these days want a real detente. The Kennedy "dialog" is intended to explore this possibility. Yet Moscow has never yet indicated that its policy might shift to minding its own business for awhile, although such a policy is the only possible foundation for an enduring peace.

For an agreement in any sphere, the Russians want concessions from us. Open trade with the United States would be a solid concession on our side. What does the Soviet Union propose in return? So far as we know, it has yet to offer anything of significance. In the case of the test ban, the Russians conceded little; we conceded something, though not much. President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk stated that the dialog had produced a tiny fragment of tolerable agreement which just might pave the way for more significant settlements. The next round, probably in quiet preparation now, will raise far more dangerous subjects.

There are Berlin and its wall-involving the security of all Western Europe. There is Russian military control of Cuba-endangering the peace of Latin America. There are the broken treaty agreements and the Russian military supply lines running into Laos. There are always-the betrayed accords of Yalta and the continuing agony of Hungary and Poland.

I doubt that the Soviet Union is yet prepared to make real concessions in any of these areas. I think at present the Russian leaders would rather squeeze their people than give up an even partly successful territorial grab. If they retire from any position it will not be for temporary economic advantage, but because they have become convinced the position is untenable.

The dialog is still going on. The results have still to be observed. I for one will watch carefully the terrorist campaign against our good friend, the enlightened and successful Government of Venezuela, as a sort of thermometer. If that and similar campaigns continue, the dialog test will have failed. We shall then have to recognize that materials sold to the Soviet Union will merely increase her capacity for paramilitary and propaganda campaigns against the United States and its friends.

Business considerations, it seems to me, are childlessly trivial compared with the great issues involved. Of course, we would gather in a little foreign exchange. Of course, some manufacturers and traders could make a little money. But the United States as a nation, and our businessmen as well, do not greatly need this; our country is quite comfortably prosperous without it.

Equally trivial is the argument that some of our friends and allies will sell to the Russians-and make money-if we do not. Perhaps. But the precise result of a trading agreement made for business considerations would be to pretend that we are neutral in the cold war. Some of our allies may feel differently-I think they are wrong-but I am clear we cannot so pretend.

The single-shot wheat deal can probably be cobbled up with conditions, and deliveries so arranged that it affords minimal support for Russian imperial adventurism. Without a major shift in Soviet policy, it is difficult to see how this could be done with a current of general trade.

This will not be the last opportunity— and is not even the great one-to change

out economic policy toward the Communist countries. My guess is that the Soviet Union will not be out of her agricultural troubles for a long time. She will not be able to meet her needs for consumer goods until she cuts down on her foreign military adventures and her enormous armament program.

A realistic base for trading is the only one that makes sense to Communist negotiators. If they think our chief concern is that some of our traders can make money, the dialog will get no further than did the British dialog with Hitler in 1938. They will use pressure, of course (the recent brief blockade at Berlin may have been an illustration). Their propaganda machine will make bad noises about us. They will create tensions and ask us to buy alleviation. But their abuse has ceased to be important one way or the other: it has already done its work. The last thing Americans should consider is making concessions to buy relief from Soviet abuse.

My conclusion, therefore, is that trade restrictions ought not now to be suspendedthat, although I think the wheat deal justifiable, it should be treated as a single-shot operation while the dialog continues. Always, we must remember, unrepresented millions have to be considered. There are East Germans, there are Hungarians; there are Poles. There are Malaysians in Southeast Asia; peasants and patriots in Venezuela; silent, suffering Cubans in the Caribbean. Soviet authorities alone know what the stakes are on the Sinkiang border of Red China.

Most of us would be glad to trade with a peace-seeking, peace-loving Soviet Union attending to her own people and administering her own country. Yet, few if any, of us want to become part of a supply line for a Soviet military and paramilitary machine.

This is the real subject of the dialog. It had better continue awhile and show results before we make a further change in our economic policy.

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in short supply, and this would create considerable social and political difficulties for the Soviet Government.

"OUTRAGEOUS" APPROACH

The economic argument is more complex. The simple equation of profit and trade is deeply rooted in the American tradition, and it is not easy to convince an American that the Soviet approach to the problem is somewhat different. Yet as George Kennan has amply demonstrated in his book "Russia and the West," the Soviet approach to the problem of trade is a highly political one.

Writing about the Soviet attitude toward the West in the very early 1920's, Kennan thus projected the Soviet reasoning on the subject of trade with the West:

"We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve the right, in our private if not in our official capacities, to do what we can to bring this about; to revile you publicly, to do everything within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you and their confidence in you, to subvert your armed forces and to work for your downfall in favor of the Communist dictatorship.

"But since we are not strong enough to destroy you today-since an interval must unfortunately elapse before we can give you the coup de grace-we want you during this interval to trade with us *. An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless.

"You will accept it because you are not free agents, because you are slaves to your own capitalist appetites, because when profit is involved, you have no pride, no principles, no honor. In the blindness that characterizes declining and perishing classes, you will wink at our efforts to destroy you, you will compete with one another for our favor."

One may wonder, in the light of the 1962 Cuban confrontation with Khrushchev's general policy of "burying" us, whether this approach has changed so very fundamentally.

A NECESSARY FAILURE

To the Soviet leaders, the wheat deal is

POLITICS OF WHEAT DEAL GIVES UNITED STATES political because two very vital Soviet polit

UPPER HAND

(By Zbigniew Brzezinski) (NOTE.-Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and professor of public law and government at Columbia University, Brzezinski is the author of "The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict," "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics" and other books.)

It has been argued that the wheat deal with the Soviet Union is desirable on humanitarian grounds. If Russian people are starving, the United States should not stand

back, said former President Truman on the radio, and he has been echoed by some clergymen and by various people of good

will.

Others have suggested that the wheat deal is purely a matter of economics. The Russians need our wheat; we can use their gold. Their food needs will be met; our food surpluses will be diminished. We both gain equally.

The humanitarian argument can be dismissed quickly. First of all, there is no famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the Government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis. It could certainly divert some of its resources from heavy industry to better agricultural management, and it is still capable of providing the basic staples to meet Russian needs.

Even if all the Western countries were to refuse wheat to Russia, no Russian would starve because of it. There is no doubt, however, that certain kinds of foods would be

ical interests are involved. The first is the stability of the collective agricultural system itself. Over many years, that system has failed to deliver the goods, at least insofar as the Soviet consumer is concerned. Yet to the political leadership, the collective system is essential.

A recent critical reevaluation of the Stalinist drive for collectivization, published in Voprosy istorii, state quite categorically that the collectivist system was necessary in order to build socialism in the Soviet Union and

for the defense of the country. Mounting consumer dissatisfaction with the inability of the present agricultural system to produce adequately might, over the long haul, force the Soviet leaders to revise the agricultural system. However, if the Soviet leadership finds other means of meeting domestic needs, i.e., imports paid for with gold, it can perpetuate the collectivist system.

Collectivization was abandoned in Poland and Yugoslavia because the leaderships had no way out. By importing wheat, the Soviet leadership sees a way out, and hence order to maintain its domestic system of the wheat deal is necessary to Moscow in collectivization.

EXPORTS POLITICAL, TOO

Secondly, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political reasons.

Last year the Soviet Union exported approximately 7.8 million tons of grain, of

which wheat constituted 4.7 million tons. The list of clients shows clearly the political importance of the exports: the largest consumer was East Germany, followed successively by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil, and Cuba.

The restriction that President Kennedy wishes to impose on the re-exportation of American grain to these countries creates a technical impediment to such exports. The Soviet Union would not be able to ship them American wheat directly. Nonetheless, the availability of American wheat, and indeed of other Western wheat, would mean that Soviet grain itself could be exported to the countries concerned. Hence the political problem would not be resolved by the proposed restriction.

The above comments should not be construed as an argument against an AmericanSoviet wheat deal. They are meant to suggest, however, that this wheat deal ought to be viewed in a political perspective and that U.S. negotiators ought to seek political concessions from the Soviets in return.

Naturally, there would be no point in expecting fundamental concessions. For example, it would be illusory to expect a Soviet acknowledgement of our position in Berlin in return for our willingness to sell Russia some wheat; there is no political equivalence between these two interests. However, on a number of marginal issues, there is no reason why the United States should not insist on a quid pro quo.

For example, it would seem ironical for the United States to be enabling the Soviet Union to maintain its collectivized agriculports and at the same time for this country ture and its politically motivated grain ex

to endure continued Soviet harassment in its access to Berlin. At the very least, our negotiators could insist on a clear reciprocal understanding of the technical arrangements involved in Western access.

Similarly, we could demand that the Soviets lift their travel restrictions within Russia. Indeed, a political quid pro quo should be sought in the case of other socalled nonpolitical, technical arrangements. For many years, for reasons of political prestige and also as a precedent, the Soviet Union has been very anxious to establish direct American-Soviet air links. Perhaps there is no reason to oppose such links, but it might be preferable to negotiate about them in the context of a reciprocal Soviet willingness to meet some of our political objectives.

Of course, proponents of the purely "economic" approach might say that if our position is too hard, the Soviet Union will buy the wheat somewhere else. That may be true, but the argument is not entirely convincing. If the Soviet Union could easily buy wheat elsewhere, then why does it not

do so?

It either wishes to deal directly with the United States because that would strengthen the impression in the West and elsewhere of an American-Soviet detente-an impression which intensifies Western European fears concerning the American position; or, conceivably, the Soviet Union does not see other markets so readily available and the American wheat is thus of some economic importance to it as well.

One may safely assume that the Soviet Union is not anxious to buy American wheat merely in order to reduce our balance-ofpayments difficulties and to alleviate our own internal agricultural problems.

Finally, it should be stated unambiguously that it would be wrong to conclude that since the wheat deal is political, the United States should have no part of it. That is fallacious and extreme. It would be a pity if we failed to use the limited leverage that this particular situation affords.

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