also convinced that all hands at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard recognize the challenge to their efficiency which the assignment of this ship represents.

Sincerely,

KENNETH E. BELIEU, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Logistics.

PROXMIRE CALLS FOR SPACE PROG

RESS WITH LESS WASTE

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, the November issue of the Nation's Business, published by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, carries an article by me entitled "Glamour Masks Waste in Space Spending."

In this article I make three general recommendations on the immense increases in spending by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration:

First. More effective safeguards against duplication, waste, and other leakages of Federal funds must be built into NASA's own procedures. As a minimum, the space agency should fully observe the letter and the spirit of the costcutting requirements established for the Department of Defense and other Federal agencies.

Second. Congress should arm itself with a corps of skilled investigators able to penetrate and analyze the inner workings of the space program.

Third. Private individuals and groups should apply their concern about excessive and unnecessary Government spending to the space program.

Mr. President, I am convinced that we can and should dedicate America's great resources to the magnificent challenge of space. But we should do so with far greater prudence and regard for the taxpayers' money than we have in the past.

I ask unanimous consent that this article be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered printed in the RECORD, as follows:

GLAMOUR MASKS WASTE IN SPACE SPENDING—
CONGRESS MUST TAKE MORE CAREFUL LOOK
TO HEAD OFF UNNECESSARY COST
(By WILLIAM PROXMIRE, U.S. Senator from
Wisconsin)

The tidal wave of spending on the Nation's space program-unprecedented in a peacetime program run by a peacetime agencycan quickly get out of control.

My special, urgent concern, as a U.S. Senator recently appointed to the Appropriations Committee, is that space budgets should get on a rational basis while they are still fairly near the beginning of a period of rising costs. The $2 billion per year increase can be expected to continue and accelerate.

The effort to place men on the moon will alone cost $20 billion before 1970.

(One scientist has jokingly suggested that if a way could be found to weld together 20 billion silver dollars, an astronaut could walk to the moon.)

It is a safe prediction that the real headwall on this steeply sloped mountain of expenditure still lies ahead-and has not been accounted for fully in the understandably conservative projections of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. An intelligent independent estimate for the moon probe puts it at $40 billion by 1970.

When the budget of a federally financed agency grows at the rate of $4 billion in 2 years as has that of NASA to the current

spending request for $5.7 billion-there is a special obligation to scrutinize that budget with extra care. Yet this is precisely what so far has not taken place.

The space budget has received virtually nothing but tender, loving care in Congress. The few of us who have questioned the wisdom of funneling funds into an agency at such a breakneck rate have been buried under a reproving avalanche of votes.

The consequences of this mushrooming rate of spending are predictable. The moon venture has already fallen three-quarters of a year behind schedule-not for lack of funds, but because of a serious management crisis.

Nobel Prize winning physicist Dr. Polykarp Kusch told the Senate Space Committee that the moon program is being carried out with "a certain flamboyance, a mood of haste, that is not commensurate with first

class scientific research."

He also said: "It is my belief that the present space program attempts too much too fast. There is not enough time for profound thought, for imagination to play over the demanding problems that occur."

President Kennedy's proposal at the United Nations, that this country and the Soviet Union jointly undertake lunar exploration, demands further reappraisal of where we are

going and how fast.

Whatever the merits of the President's proposal, his downgrading of the competitive

aspect of the moon program-a major justification for our wasteful haste up to nowstrengthens the argument for a slower, more rational approach to space exploration.

The real issue is not whether we should ex

plore space of course we should. We should do so rapidly and competently, in the great But this does not mean that the space agency tradition of American scientific leadership. should be handed a license to spend billions of dollars unnecessarily on projects that duplicate others, are wasteful, or are nonproductive.

As has been shown over and over again, frenzied science is not good science. The legitimate and understandable desire for rapid accomplishments cannot be satisfied merely by pouring in ever-larger appropriations of dollars.

NASA has been able to route its massive spending increases through the Budget Bureau without anything like the scrutiny given the budgets of other Federal agencies. Nor has the General Accounting Office, Congress's watchdog on Federal spending, been able to stay abreast of the galloping pace of the space agency.

I applaud the suggestion, made in the minority report on the House space authorization, that there be appointed an inspector general for NASA, plus a number of congressional field inspectors to examine and report on the space program. Qualified independent supervision of a program that is growing at such a tremendous rate is absolutely essential.

Despite the absence of careful, detailed investigations, a number of examples of wasteful, duplicating, or unnecessarily lavish space program outlays have surfaced as a result of their own sheer lack of weight.

For example, a formal Air Force memorandum recently showed that NASA is planning to construct $77,671,000 in facilities that directly duplicate existing Air Force capabilities.

Among the specific examples cited are: a life sciences research facility costing $4.9 million and a space materials laboratory costing $3.6 million, both at Ames Research Center, Calif.; a central instrumentation facility, $31.5 million, at Cape Canaveral; a mission control center ($8.4 million), launch environment and antenna test facilities ($7.5 million), mission simulation and procedures training facilities ($2.2 million) and other projects (totaling over $5.6 million), all at

the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston. All these projects would duplicate existing Air Force facilities, according to the memorandum.

The field of space flight simulation has been especially prone to unnecessary duplication. A $10.6 million centrifuge for flight simulation has been approved for Houston, along with two others at other centers, despite the finding by the National Academy of Sciences that existing centrifuges and similar motion devices for research are not being fully utilized.

A bulky 530-page survey published by the National Standards Association lists literally hundreds of space simulation facilities in the United States, many of them competing and overlapping in function and purpose.

In its current budget NASA requested $131,000 to study its own public relations program. This may seem like peanuts compared to $5.7 billion-but that's just the coin for the survey. The resulting programs would probably have lapped up additional millions of dollars, and their propaganda effect would be to guarantee the easy enactment of future billions of dollars in appropriations. Fortunately, this is one item on which Congress flipped the abort switch.

NASA's budget is frequently padded with nonessential items such as $1.3 million for a fatigue research lab to replace an existing building that was "not ideally suited." Rarely does it appear that a serious effort

has been made to see if a job can be done at less cost.

The agency wanted $90 million for three tacking ships for the Apollo project. Careful checking by Congress showed that the Defense Department could provide not three but five fully equipped ships for $80 million, saving a cool $10 million.

It should have been no surprise to those familiar with the space program when the General Accounting Office released a report recently showing waste of some $100 million in the moon program.

While NASA itself has been critical of the performance of industry, the agency can hardly duck the final responsibility for getting what it pays for with the taxpayers' money.

NO MAGIC IN SPACE SPENDING

What disturbs me is the "anything goes if it's for space" attitude that makes it possible for huge spending increases to win congressional approval with only a shadow of the scrutiny applied to earthbound agencies.

In this program, too, I firmly believe there should exist a strong presumption against Federal spending. Simply because the program involves glamorous orbits of the earth does not change the hard fact that every cent spent on it comes out of the pockets of U.S. taxpayers-the same, hard-pressed source for all other, competing Federal programs.

There is no magic about space spending thta converts it into private enterprise. Far from it. In relation to its rapidly growing volume, the space program is probably the most centralized Government spending program in the United States. It concentrates in the hands of a single agency full authority over an important sector of the American economy, one that is expanding with each passing month.

The economic situation created by the space program could well be described as corporate socialism. There are a large number of private corporations and companies in the aerospace industries, a disturbingly large portion of which work only on space agency contracts and subcontracts. But for all the goods and services that they produce, all the many items and products and technologies that they would normally offer for sale in a freely competitive marketplace, there is ony one buyer: the Federal Government.

It has been made clear to occasionally reluctant legislators that the economies of cer

tain States and districts would suffer seriously if pending space projects were cut. This point was stated explicitly to the House Space Committee by NASA officials testifying against a proposed cut in the $1.2 billion Project Apollo budget request.

The House committee recommended a $120 million cut anyhow, seriously questioning whether the space agency could conceivably use all that money in 1 year. Unfortunately, a large part of the funds was restored in the House-Senate compromise signed by the President.

Members of Congress can hardly be blamed for taking an interest in contract awards running into hundreds of millions of dollars. They know full well that a range of consideration going well beyond engineering and scientific know-how enter into the decisions.

DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT LIST

A symbol of congressional interest: NASA has now been asked to furnish a list of projects broken down geographically, which in political terms means State by State and district by district.

One leading science writer recently referred to "NASA's rather blatant pork-barrel approach on how to win friends and influence people in Congress."

Grounds for cynicism are provided when the case for locating the $130 million (official estimate; more likely total, $200 million) Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston includes the argument that this facility will stimulate a technological boom which will attract people and industries to the area in large numbers, while the more recent decision to construct a $50 million space electronics center in the Boston area is justified on the grounds that large numbers of exceptionally skilled and trained scientists already live there.

It is disturbing but undoubtedly true that the space program has come as a bonanza to those who favor big Government spending. These apostles of big Federal budgets-and there are many-see the space program as a means of taking up the slack caused by a possible future leveling off of military spending.

Space spending is also having other unfavorable effects on our economy.

With each passing month a larger percentage of our gross national product goes into research and development for the space program.

Yet it is essential for the United States to maintain an especially high pace of research oriented toward the civilian economy to maintain our traditional lead in productivity and to offset the higher wages of American labor. Otherwise we will soon be shut out of important international markets.

We cannot simply rely on the spin-off of new products or the technological fallout of space-oriented research to provide needed forward strides in fields where our industries are daily challenged by the productive capacity of other nations.

While an occasional byproduct of space or military research will have application to the civilian economy, this is not enough.

This problem would be less serious if the U.S. economy had a limitless supply of resources that could be tapped for research and development undertakings. But the fact is that, in this field in particular, the space program is in direct, sharp competition with other sectors of our economy for the use of a vital commodity, the supply of which is by no means unlimited-our unique reservoir of highly skilled, trained, and talented scientific manpower.

Each year our universities graduate some 3,000 new Ph. D.'s in science and engineering. On the basis of the space agency's own estimates of its requirements for scientific manpower in the coming years it can be predicted that by 1970 one in every four U.S. scientists will be at work on the space program. This

has been described by one scientist as "a spectacular balancing act-education supported by science, science by space, and space by the man on the moon."

OTHER RESEARCH SUFFERS

By skimming off a sizable top layer of scientists each year for the foreseeable future especially the young, able ones, freshly schooled in up-to-date methodology-the space program may well impoverish the scientific input in other vital areas of research and teaching. Schools, medical centers, industry-even other Government agencies and our Defense Establishment-are beginning to feel the pinch. Already, and we are still only in the early stages of our space effort, there are 10 times as many scientists engaged on NASA space projects as are working on heart disease, mental illness, and cancer at the mammoth research centers of the National Institutes of Health, which themselves have been criticized for overly lavish use of Federal funds.

Even a decision to locate a juicy Government plum like the proposed Electronics Research Center in Boston is received with mixed feelings, as local companies and other facilities ponder whether the new projects will compete for their top scientists.

The prestige value of space accomplishments should not be overlooked. But prestige, too, has a price tag.

Our Government information activities and many other programs contribute to it. The question is whether the investment in space should include extra billions of dollars for propaganda.

We compete with the Soviets on many fronts. By concentrating too much attention on space we run the risk of losing on others.

Despite the urgency with which the space program is viewed I do not believe the need for speed can be so great that NASA should virtually ignore competitive bidding. With all the urgency of military procurement, the Defense Department has a far better record on competitive bidding.

In addition, the Defense Department has inaugurated a cost-cutting and control program that has already saved $1 billion and is expected to realize savings of $4 billion over a 5-year period. This kind of rigorous attention to budget practices is urgently needed in our space effort.

WHO HAS RESPONSIBILITY?

Responsibility for keeping our space program lean and on target lies in three places: the space agency itself, the Congress, and the public at large.

1. More effective safeguards against duplication, waste, and other leakages of Federal funds must be built into NASA's own procedures. As a minimum, the space agency should fully observe the letter, and the spirit of the cost-cutting requirements established for the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and other Federal agencies.

This includes reliance on competitive bid procedures to the greatest possible extent. It is important to act promptly, before the space program becomes encrusted with habits and ways of doing business which will make it harder, and more unpleasant, to change later on.

2. Congress must be steadily alert to its responsibility of legislative supervision. In our system of checks and balances, if Congress abandons its watchdog function, a program can quickly get cut of hand because there are few other checkreins to keep it on course. To this end Congress should arm itself with a corps of skilled investigators able to penetrate and analyze the inner workings of the space program. Such a staff

should be established either within the Govenrment Accounting Office or in a separate office headed by an inspector general for space programs.

3. Most important of all, it is essential that private individuals and groups apply their concern about excessive and unnecessary Government spending to the space program. Recent attacks on pork-barrel projects helped immeasurably to alert the country to the misuse of tax dollars.

A similar alertness to signs of waste and inefficiency in the space program would go a long way to combat the "anything goes if it's for space" attitude.

There are great problems to be solved in space, great returns to those who solve them. But we risk losing a great deal-our selfrespect and the respect of others-if we throw billions upon billions into the space hopper without giving careful, sober thought to the price we are paying.

CONCESSIONS

MAKES SENSE IN WHEAT DEAL ACCORDING ΤΟ EXPERT

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, there is an unfortunate tendency on the part of many to regard any criticism of State Department dealing with Communist nations as demagogic, or emotional and ill-informed crackpotism.

The recent wheat deal is a case in point. Those of us who have been critical of it have been criticized as against humanity or against peace or as Red-baiting for votes.

The facts are, Mr. President, that the position which some of us in the Senate have taken that we should not agree to sell wheat to Russia without concessions to freedom has been supported by an outstanding scholar in an article appearing on the front editorial page of last Sunday's Washington Post.

Now I hasten to add that Professor Brzezinski does approve of selling wheat to Russia. But he also insists that we should exact concessions-not great concessions, perhaps, but, as he puts it: At the very least our negotiators could insist on a clear reciprocal understanding of the technical arrangements involved in Western access to Berlin.

The result of that concession has been driven home three times since the wheat deal has been announced-and right now as I speak an American convoy is being held up outside of West Berlin. Professor Brzezinski added:

viets lift their travel restrictions within RusSimilarly we could demand that the Sosia. Indeed, a political quid pro quo should be sought in the case of other so-called nonpolitical, technical arrangements.

Mr. President, this is exactly what certain Senators have been calling for and these are among the concessions-any one of which, in my stated view-would provide a real concession to freedom in this case.

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski also points out that there is no question of starvation in Russia. There is no rationing. There is no plan for rationing. The wheat is mainly to be used to export to Communist satellites and to maintain the kind of chemical and machine tool production in the satellites on which the military strength of Russia depends.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this article may be printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

A NECESSARY FAILURE

To the Soviet leaders, the wheat deal is political because two very vital Soviet political interests are involved. The first is the sta

POLITICS OF WHEAT DEAL GIVES UNITED STATES UPPER HAND

(By Zbigniew Brzezinski) (NOTE.-Director of the Research Institute on Communist Affairs and professor of public law and government at Columbia University, Brzezinski is the author of "The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict," "Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics," and other books.)

It has been argued that the wheat deal with the Soviet Union is desirable on humanitarian grounds. If Russian people are starving, the United States should not stand back, said former President Truman on the radio, and he has been echoed by some clergymen and by various people of good will.

Others have suggested that the wheat deal is purely a matter of economics. The Russians need our wheat; we can use their gold. Their food needs will be met; our food surpluses will be diminished. We both gain equally.

The humanitarian argument can be dismissed quickly. First of all, there is no famine in Russia. The Soviet people are not starving, and the government has not lost all of its ability to meet a food crisis. It could certainly divert some of its resources from heavy industry to better agricultural management, and it is still capable of providing the basic staples to meet Russian needs.

Even if all the Western countries were to refuse wheat to Russia, no Russian would starve because of it. There is no doubt, however, that certain kinds of foods would be in short supply, and this would create considerable social and political difficulties for the Soviet Government.

OUTRAGEOUS APPROACH

The economic argument is more complex. The simple equation of profit and trade is deeply rooted in the American tradition, and it is not easy to convince an American that the Soviet approach to the problem is somewhat different. Yet as George Kennan has amply demonstrated in his book, "Russia and the West," the Soviet approach to the problem of trade is a highly political

one.

Writing about the Soviet attitude toward the West in the very early twenties, Kennan thus projected the Soviet reasoning on the subject of trade with the West:

"We despise you. We consider that you should be swept from the earth as governments and physically destroyed as individuals. We reserve the right, in our private

if not in our official capacities, to do what we can to bring this about: to revile you publicly, to do everything within our power to detach your own people from their loyalty to you and their confidence in you, to subvert your Armed Forces and to work for your downfall in favor of the Communist dictatorship.

"But since we are not strong enough to destroy you today-since an interval must unfortunately elapse before we can give you the coup de grace-we want you during this interval to trade with us. * * An outrageous demand? Perhaps. But you will accept it nevertheless.

*

"You will accept it because you are not free agents, because you are slaves to your own capitalist appetites, because when profit is involved, you have no pride, no principles, no honor. In the blindness that characterizes declining and perishing classes, you will wink at our efforts to destroy you, you will compete with one another for our favor."

One may wonder, in the light of the 1962 Cuban confrontation and Khrushchev's general policy of burying us, whether this approach has changed so very fundamentally.

self. Over many years, that system has failed to deliver the goods, at least insofar as the Soviet consumer is concerned. Yet to the political leadership, the collective system is essential.

A recent critical revaluation of the Stalinist drive for collectivization, published in Voprosy istorii, states quite categorically that the collectivist system was necessary in order to build socialism in the Soviet Union and for the defense of the country. Mounting consumer dissatisfaction with the inability of the present agricultural system to produce adequately might, over the long haul, force the Soviet leaders to revise the agricultural system. However, if the Soviet leadership finds other means of meeting domestic needs, i.e., imports paid for with gold, it can perpetuate the collectivist system.

Collectivization was abandoned in Poland and Yugoslavia because the leaderships had no way out. By importing wheat, the Soviet leadership sees a way out, and hence the wheat deal is necessary to Moscow in order to maintain its domestic system of collectivization.

EXPORTS POLITICAL, TOO

Secondly, the importation of wheat is necessary to the Soviet Union in order for it to meet its grain export commitments. These commitments are important to the Soviet leadership primarily for political reasons.

Last year the Soviet Union exported approximately 7.8 million tons of grain, of which wheat constituted 4.7 million tons.

The list of clients shows clearly the political importance of the exports: The largest consumer was East Germany, followed successively by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil, and Cuba.

The restriction that President Kennedy wishes to impose on the reexportation of American grain to these countries creates a technical impediment to such exports. The Soviet Union would not be able to ship them American wheat directly. Nonetheless, the availability of American wheat, and indeed of other Western wheat, would mean that Soviet grain itself could be exported to the Hence the political problem would not be resolved by the proposed restriction.

countries concerned.

The above comments should not be construed as an argument against an AmericanSoviet wheat deal. They are meant to suggest, however, that this wheat deal ought that U.S. negotiators ought to seek politito be viewed in a political perspective and cal concessions from the Soviets in return.

Naturally, there would be no point in expecting fundamental concessions. For example, it would be illusory to expect a Soviet acknowledgement of our position in Berlin in return for our willingness to sell Russia some wheat; there is no political equivalence between these two interests. However, on a number of marginal issues, there is no reason why the United States should not insist on a quid pro quo.

For example, it would seem ironical for the United States to be enabling the Soviet Union to maintain its collectivized agriculture and its politically motivated grain exports and at the same time for this country to endure continued Soviet harassment in its access to Berlin. At the very least, our negotiators could insist on a clear reciprocal understanding of the technical arrangements involved in Western access.

Similarly, we could demand that the Soviets lift their travel restrictions within Russia. Indeed, a political quid pro quo should be sought in the case of other so-called nonpolitical, technical arrangements.

For many years, for reasons of political prestige, and also as a precedent, the Soviet Union has been very anxious to establish direct American-Soviet air links. Perhaps there is no reason to oppose such links, but it might be preferable to negotiate about them in the context of a reciprocal Soviet willingness to meet some of our political objectives.

Of course, proponents of the purely "economic" approach might say that if our position is too hard, the Soviet Union will buy the wheat somewhere else. That may be true, but the argument is not entirely convincing. If the Soviet Union could easily buy wheat elsewhere, then why does it not do so?

It either wishes to deal directly with the United States because that would strengthen the impression in the West and elsewhere of an American-Soviet detente-an impression which intensifies Western European fears concerning the American position; or, conceivably, the Soviet Union does not see other markets so readily available and the American wheat is thus of some economic importance to it as well.

One may safely assume that the Soviet Union is not anxious to buy American wheat merely in order to reduce our balance-ofpayments difficulties and to alleviate our own internal agricultural problems.

Finally, it should be stated unambiguously that it would be wrong to conclude that since the wheat deal is political, the United States should have no part of it. That is fallacious and extreme. It would be a pity if we failed to use the limited leverage that this particular situation affords.

Since the Soviet Union wishes to buy wheat from us, it puts us in a favorable bargaining position. By all means, we should go ahead with the deal, but our approach should be very conscious of its essentially political character.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMBASSADOR OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC REPORTS TO THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, the military junta which overthrew the democratically elected government of Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic 6 weeks ago, and at the same time dissolved the legislature and annulled the constitution, has now expelled Dr. Juan Cassanovas Garrido, the elected presitional provisions were carried out, autodent of the senate, who, if the constitumatically would be the President of the Dominican Republic, the legal President, Juan Bosch, and the Vice President having previously been expelled by the junta and, therefore, not on Dominican soil. The Constitution provides that succession.

The purpose of this expulsion of Dr. Cassanovas Garrido, is to thwart any effort to return to constitutional rule, which the State Department is properly insisting upon.

It is my hope, and that, I am convinced, of all freedom lovers and believers in the democratic process both at home and in Latin America, that our Government will adhere firmly to this position and never grant either recognition or aid of any kind to the usurping junta in the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican people are bitterly resentful of the overthrow of their government which brought to them the first

breath of freedom after 31 years of tyranny, a fact which is not obscured by the now controlled press and slanted news items being released under the police state management of the usurping generals and colonels and their false facade of civilians.

Today, at the National Press Club, Enriquillo del Rosario, the Ambassador of the legal and constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic, made an address pointing out how tragic the situation is for the people of the Dominican Republic, and urging that the United States continue to insist on the return of law and order, constitutional government, and the democratic regime which was so ruthlessly overthrown.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the address by Ambassador Enriquillo del Rosario to the National Press Club be printed at this point in my remarks; together with two dispatches published in the New York Times for Thursday, October 31, 1963, entitled "Leaders Bar Policy Shift," and "Gains Seen by United States," which show that the usurping junta is not preparing to make any concession whatsoever and that the United States already sees some benefits from the policy of "no recognition" and will adhere to it.

There being no objection, the address and dispatches were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: STATEMENT OF ENRIQUILLO DEL ROSARIO, AMBASSADOR OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED STATES, AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB, NOVEMBER 5, 1963

It is now 6 weeks since the democratically elected government of the Dominican Republic was overthrown by military force. And it is important to establish very clearly at this time how the Dominican people themselves feel about the coup d'etat which terminated constitutional government in my country after only a few months' trial. It has been said that they were indifferent to this act, and that they are relatively content under the present government.

This is utterly untrue.

Never before in history have the Dominican people wanted democratic government and self-rule as deeply and as passionately as now. Being deprived of self-government by a military-dominated junta has made them even more aware than before of how precious democracy is to them. They are well aware that the illegal junta which has seized power in the Dominican Republic represents only a few wealthy men and ambitious officers, and that these people do not want any real democracy. And they are equally aware that any promises by the junta for a return to democratic government are cynical and insincere, entirely contrived to mislead people in the United States.

The Dominican people definitely want a return to constitutional government, and not in 2 years or even 6 months. They want it now. They are united in their contempt and distrust for the illegal junta. And despite the fears engendered by 32 years of living under a brutal police state, they have taken considerable risks to show their deep desire for return to democratic selfgovernment.

Very few newspapers in the United States have given any idea of the scale and intensity of these antijunta feelings. But they are very revealing. Here is just a fraction of the evidence of what the Dominican people themselves are feeling and doing.

CIX- -1326

Over 90 percent of the professional leaders of the country have denounced the coup and are demanding a return to constitutional government. The doctors' association, the lawyers' association, the engineers' association, and the various teachers' associations have gone forcefully on record to this effect. These are obviously no radical hotheads; they are the educated, middle class, respected leaders of the country.

These professional groups have been jointed by virtually all the labor unions and civic organizations in a demand for the dissolution of the junta and a return to constitutional government. Both university and secondary school students, moreover, have secondary school students, moreover, have made repeated demonstrations in favor of democratic self-government.

It is no exaggeration to say that 90 percent of the people of the Dominican Republic are not only indignant, but increasingly indignant, at being deprived of their democratic rights. And they are fully determined, by whatever means, to regain their liberties and the right to have a government of their choice.

In the face of the growing desire to throw the junta out, the police and military have used threats, tear gas, and even bullets against demonstrators. They have started to fill the prisons again with prodemocrats, to fill the prisons again with prodemocrats, and have outlawed the basic rights of free assembly guaranteed by the Constitution. The usurpers still have the arms, but they know that the people are united as never before against them.

The recent imprisonment and forced exile of Dr. Juan Cassasnovas Garrido shows the junta's fear of any return to legality. Dr. Cassasnovas was the President of the Senate of the legitimate Government. In the absence of the legal President and Vice President, both of whom were forcibly expelled from the country, Dr. Cassasnovas was clearly designated by the Constitution and confirmed by the legislature as the legal successor to the Presidency. But the junta, fearful of any possible rallying point for reestablishing legal government, tracked down Dr. Cassasnovas last week, captured him, beat him, imprisoned him, then forced him into exile. The same junta which is trying to dupe public opinion in the United States by saying that it wants to prepare for a return to constitutional government, cynically throws out all persons who constitutionally are designated as the country's leaders.

In the last week, nonetheless, various European governments have recognized the junta. Let me say that this contrasts sharply with the fact that the Dominican people definitely do not recognize the junta, and this is the capital point. Sovereignty resides in the people. They alone have the right to determine who shall govern them

and in what framework. It is this basic democratic right which is at stake, and for which the Dominican people are fighting.

As the lawful representative of the constitutional government of my country in the United States, let me add that the people of my country will not recognize or honor any commitments or agreements entered into by the illegal government which is temporarily in power. Any loans accorded to the junta, for example, will in no way obligate junta, for example, will in no way obligate the people or their legitimate government, and will be undertaken at the risk of the lenders. The Dominican people have given no authorization whatsoever to the junta to undertake any fiscal or contractual obligations in their name.

The basic situation in the Dominican Republic is very clear. The people elected the first democratic government in 36 years by an overwhelming majority in free elections. In a few months after its installation, a military coup backed by a tiny handful of

wealthy businessmen overthrew the legitimate government on the spurious grounds that it was encouraging communism and had allowed the government to be infiltrated by Communists.

Yet 6 weeks later, the junta has been unable to point out any Communists in the government. This was probably no surprise to them, but they were surprised to discover how united the people are in indignation at being deprived of their basic rights of selfgovernment. And the junta has also been surprised that the U.S. Government has not recognized and supported them. They had deluded themselves into believing that the United States has a certain fondness for military dictatorships, a delusion shared by the Communists as well.

The Communist line has been that the United States withdrawal of recognition and economic aid is sheer hypocrisy, and that the United States secretly sympathizes with the military junta and will shortly find a formula for recognizing it. And they are waiting hopefully for such recognition as the basis to start a major propaganda campaign throughout Latin America to the effect that the United States really prefers military dictatorship, which is indifferent to the misery in Latin countries, over democratic government. It is with this big lie that the Communists hope to make Cubas of all Latin America.

Ironically, the junta and the Communists are now united toward the same objective. Both want the military junta to be recognized. The junta wants it in order to perpetuate the privileges of the wealthy few. The Communists want it as a weapon to destroy not only the reactionary forces, but also the democratic ones as well.

The next few weeks will probably be critical in my country. Pressure on the State Department to find a modus vivendi with the junta will probably increase. The junta will make periodic threats of impending chaos and Communist takeover if they are not backed. And they will continue to track down, imprison and exile all democratic leaders with a constitutional right to govern.

But the key fact is that the democratic forces are in an overwhelming majority among the people of my country, and it is their wishes which must be respected, not those of the present junta, who represent no one but their own selfish interests. In this calvary of democracy in one small Caribbean country, there is still very much at stake for the entire hemisphere. Democratic forces look to the United States for moral support, and are calling for that support. And it is unthinkable that the United States should

now or later-destroy the hopes of the democratic forces in the Dominican Republic and in other Latin American countries by recogThis is nizing the antidemocratic junta. not an indifferent minority calling for backing. It is the great majority, passionately wanting a return to democracy, which appeals to the American people not to let them down. [From the New York Times, Oct. 31, 1963] LEADERS BAR POLICY SHIFT

SANTO DOMINGO, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, OCtober 29.-The provisional Government of the Dominican Republic, operating under growing pressures of extreme rightwing civilian and military factions, has decided not to make political concessions as a price for recognition by the United States.

The present disposition of the Dominican ruling groups is to stand firm on the refusal to do anything to speed the return to the democratic process beyond the original promise of general elections more than 2 years from now.

Although the three-man civilian junta in nominal control of the country appeared to be inclined last week to allow presidential

and congressional elections perhaps before the end of 1964, it has now become clear that the powerful military-supported rightist groups would not tolerate even such a concession to win quicker recognition.

In fact, the Dominican rulers are taking the position that the country can go on indefinitely without Washington's recognition and U.S. economic aid. Both were suspended last September 24, when the military ousted President Bosch from the presidency after 7 months in office.

The Kennedy administration indicated at the time that diplomatic relations, aid under the Alliance for Progress and military assistance would remain suspended until at least a semblance of the democratic process returned to the Dominican Republic. Dr. Bosch was the Dominican Republic's first freely elected President in 36 years.

It is becoming increasingly clear that the basic alternatives for the United States is to refuse recognition indefinitely, in the hope of stimulating internal change, or to restore full relations on Dominican terms, which would imply a capitulation by the Kennedy

administration.

TIES WITHOUT AID SUGGESTED

Some observers here believe, however, that the best solution would be a restoration of formal diplomatic relations, without a resumption of economic and military aid. Such a policy, these observers say, would maintain Washington's condemnation of the anti-Bosch coup, but at the same time would end what is becoming an untenable international situation.

Although the Dominican leadership has refused to make concessions as a price for recognition, its inability thus far in finding international acceptance is among the factors causing pressures from the rightist civilian and military groups that placed it in office.

The groups are also publicly finding fault with the leadership for its alleged failure to "eliminate Communists" from the administration and other sectors of national life. The reason given for the coup was that it would defend the country from communism.

Because the rightist groups' concept of what constitutes a Communist is extremely elastic, the Dominican leadership is increasingly faced with the choice of instituting a major purge-one that could lead to a breakdown of public administration-or finding itself replaced by a new, more responsive junta.

The leaders were criticized, in a letter published in local newspapers last week, for slowness in finding and ejecting Communists. The letter was from Dominican Independent Action, the civilian group principally responsible for pushing the military into the antiBosch coup.

A month after the end of the Dominican Republic's brief experiment in democracy, the country finds itself in the midst of growing confusion and dangers from both the right and the left. With rapid polarization, rightists as well as Communists and their allies are seeking to build up their forces for a showdown that many Dominicans fear may end in bloodshed.

GAINS SEEN BY UNITED STATES WASHINGTON, October 30.-The administration believes that its refusal to recognize the de facto regimes of the Dominican Republic and Honduras is beginning to bear fruit.

The objective of this policy is to hasten the return to constitutional order in both countries.

U.S. officials reported today that the Dominican junta has indicated its willingness to negotiate the early restoration of democratic procedures.

POLITICAL SITUATION IN VIETNAM

Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, almost overnight, the political situation in South Vietnam has changed, and our policy toward the new government of that country will change accordingly. The U.S. Government-both the executive branch and the Congress-has, since the severe repression of the Vietnamese students and Buddhists by the Diem government this summer, hoped for the creation of an atmosphere in South Vietnam which might regather popular support behind the war effort.

I think that the President has followed the correct course in relation to South Vietnam. Although we have favored reforms, we have left it entirely to the will of the Vietnamese to implement that reform. If they themselves had not so strongly desired the change, we would have seen no coup in South Vietnam. My one regret about the recent coup was the violent death of Diem and Nhu, and all others who fell in the fight.

It will be no easy task to reestablish a stable and effective government in South Vietnam, a government which can rally the Vietnamese people to victory over the

Communist Vietcong guerrillas. However, I hope we will share in helping the leaders of the new Vietnamese Government to successfully prosecute the war against the Communists, so that the many Americans there can come home again.

The effects of our policy in South Vietnam were well summarized in an article by Warren Unna which appeared in the November 5 issue of the Washington Post. I ask unanimous consent to have this excellent article printed at this point in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

BRIGHTER OUTLOOK: SAIGON COUP BOOSTS
U.S. POLICY

(By Warren Unna)

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam, despite all the cynical predictions of it being either nonexistent or negative, suddenly seems to emerge smelling like a rose.

As things stand now, South Vietnam even may lose its eligibility for becoming a whipping boy in next year's election campaign. Last week's coup in Saigon accomplished two things:

1. South Vietnam gained a new government which now at least has a running chance of gaining the popular support needed not only to win the war against the Vietcong Communist guerrillas, but to keep the country stable enough to move forward once that war is won.

2. The United States which contributes $1.5 million a day and some 16,500 military advisers toward helping South Vietnam in its war effort, managed to stand by its principles and encourage last week's coup without "playing God" and being its instigator.

As some of the Washington pundits observed, "CIA couldn't have been behind this; it worked too well."

More concrete proof of the U.S. innocence as instigator is the fact that one of the very key State Department officials concerned with

South Vietnam was out of town at the time, enrolling his children in school in the South.

The Kennedy administration's policy toward South Vietnam was not always so clean cut and decisive. Until last May, it

was governed by the fear that if this country didn't coddle President Ngo Dinh Diem and his all-powerful brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, these headstrong leaders might scuttle a war which the United States, with its interest in defending the whole of southeast Asia, was desirous of winning.

The Kennedy administration also did not want to scare off the Diem-Nhu regime's backing of a strategic hamlet program which the United States was convinced would give rural Vietnam the protection from the Vietcong and the sense of identification from a caring central government necessary to win the war.

But, according to one U.S. policymaker, May 8 became the turning point. This was the date of the first massacre of Buddhists by government troops in Hue.

From May 8 on, the Kennedy administration became increasingly aware that its old policy of placating Diem and Nhu would get nowhere. These changes followed:

Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., who was sent to South Vietnam with explicit instructions to appease Diem in the hopes of restoring his confidence in the United States, was called home for reassignment.

Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, a bigname politician known for his bluntness, was sent out with instructions to use his head and stand up for things he believed in.

Lodge did just that. He suggested that Nhu be relieved of his duties; he openly countered Mrs. Nhu's criticism of U.S. soldiers; and he put an end to all of Nolting's obsequious visits to the palace.

President Kennedy in an extraordinary in policy and perhaps with personnel”—an Labor Day TV interview, called for "changes explicit encouragement to the Vietnamese military leaders who at that time had come to the United States asking for support if they attempted a coup.

The military leaders called off that earlier coup attempt. But the Kennedy administration, on its own, proceeded to suspend two vital economic aid programs to South Vietnam and cut off the $3 million a year the CIA had been paying special forces troops whose anti-Communist efforts Nhu had redirected against his own Buddhists.

The apparent assassination of both Diem and Nhu reportedly was not in the cards. The administration believes the coup leaders' assertion that they risked three costly hours at the height of the rebellion in holding their fire on the palace in the hope that Diem and Nhu would accept their guarantee of safe conduct out of the country.

But after the white flag was flown and the trucks wheeled into the palace to pick up Diem and Nhu the coup leaders found they had been duped and that the brothers had escaped.

Yesterday the U.S. Embassy in Saigon was instructed to convey Washington's disapproval of the brothers' deaths.

The Kennedy administration is well aware that there is no such thing as an ideal government in South Vietnam. But now at least the United States can hope for working out mutual problems with a sovereign government more representative of its people.

FUND TO HELP FINANCE EXPERT ASSISTANCE FOR INDIANS IN CASES BEFORE INDIAN CLAIMS

COMMISSION

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. President, yesterday President Kennedy signed into law H.R. 3306, which establishes a fund to help finance procurement of expert assistance for Indians in cases before the Indian Claims Commission. It is now Public Law 88-168.