In 1954 Cameron County made south Padre Island accessible to everyone by spanning the Laguna Madre with the Queen Isabella Causeway at Port Isabel. At the same time a system of county parks was instituted on the island, which at the time contained only a few scattered fishing shacks. The beginning was timorous and inauspicious, but when the Cameron County parks got going, private development followed inevitably behind, to the point that south Padre Island now boasts luxury resort hotels and scores of private vacation homes.

This year the developmental growth has received added impetus, with three major projects for the two Cameron County parks. There is simply no predicting how far it will go.

Long before the slender island was named Padre, after a Spanish priest who was deeded the land by the King of Spain, Spanish seagoing adventurers called the long barrier reef "Isla Blanca," Spanish for "white island." The Cameron County Park Board has perpetuated the title in its initial park development on the extreme tip of South Padre Island. Isla Blanca Park now offers complete facilities for vacationers the year round, and more is in prospect.

Just completed in Isla Blanca Park is a $125,000 recreational pavilion. The multipurpose facility houses the office of the park director, as well as shuffleboard courts, volleyball equipment and other recreational provisions. It also doubles as a convention and activity center, with the capacity for accommodating 1,000 persons at open convention, or some 750 at banquet. Architecturally outstanding, the recreational pavilion will answer a long-felt need on south Texas' pleasure island. It is the frosting on an already well-sampled resort and recreation cake.

One hundred and seventeen trailer spaces are booked solid throughout the summer in the trailer park at Isla Blanca Park, with easily three-fourths of that capacity utilized the rest of the year. Complete trailer facilities are available, with running water, electricity and sewer connections. The Cameron County Park Board is planning additional trailer sites to meet the growing demand, as mobile home travel increases in popularity throughout the Nation.

Summer and winter visitors who prefer the more simple accommodations for beach vacationing enjoy the overnight shelters of Isla Blanca Park. With no glamor attempted, these facilities are the next step above camping out. The shelters contain bunk beds for four people (with additional cots available) electric hot plates and a coldwater shower. Tenants use the central bathhouse facilities of the trailer park. As nearly primitive as they are, however, the 17 overnight shelters are filled throughout the summer season.

Equally popular are the 32 open cabanas in Isla Blanca Park. Fronting on the Gulf of Mexico, the cabanas are daytime rental facilities, available until 10 p.m. for lounging, loafing, showering, barbecuing, and as a place to call home base during a day's outing at the beach.

Visitors who simply want a place to spread out their picnic lunch in the shade enjoy the picnic pavilion and the patio at the bathhouse, both just a short walk over the sand dunes to the broad expanse of open beach in Isla Blanca Park. There, also, are picnic tables, set up under colorful sunshades.

Is it a vacationer's paradise? Perhaps so and perhaps not, for so varied are the needs and tastes of our Nation's meandering pleasure seekers that one man's cup of orange pekoe might well be another's hemlock. But the Cameron County parks on South Padre Island are constantly instituting changes and planning new facilities to reach that happy state somewhere on the pekoe side, at least.

Itinerant beachgoers raised the forensic roof a few years ago when automobile traffic was closed off on the beach in Isla Blanca Park. The action cut off the cavalier joys of blasting the family lizzie through the sand to spend a day's outing living out of the car and leaving the litter for the sand crabs, seagulls and wafting breezes. But what was also accomplished was the making of probably the safest public beach on the Texas gulf coast. Parents can feel content to let the kids run and play through the sand and surf of Isla Blanca Park with their own childhood abandon. The surf and sandgoers are constantly under the protective eye of wellconstantly under the protective eye of welltrained lifeguards, watching from high above the throng in candy-striped guard towers. The safety record in Isla Blanca Park is impeccable.

The park's roster of public facilities is impressive already, but it continues to grow.

Now under construction in Isla Blanca Park is the initial phase of a long-range development program. Construction on a marina and boatel near the foot of the causeway bridge in Isla Blanca Park was begun recently by a development firm. The primary construction phase will establish a marina with 30 boat slips and complete boathandling facilities, providing immediate access to the adjacent deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, or a quick outboard run to the favorite bay-fishing haunts of the Laguna Madre. The firm envisions ultimately as many as 400 boat slips for the marina in

stallation.

The firm holds option on additional park land for the construction of a marineland exhibit, to be built across the street from the marina and boatel. It also plans to build an oceanographic research laboratory, from which extensive research and explora

tory operations into the Gulf of Mexico can be launched.

All this in Isla Blanca Park.

But there is a second Cameron County park.

Five miles up South Padre Island from all this activity is Andy Bowie Park, named for a former county commissioner. Until this year it was undeveloped, open beach. Now Andy Bowie Park has sprouted a fishing pier that extends 500 feet into the Gulf of Mexico at one of the most choice fishing spots on the lower gulf coast. Another private enterprise venture operating under lease from the Cameron County park system, the fishing pier contains a 200-foot T-head on the end, in water 18 to 20 feet deep. At that point the ocean bottom drops abruptly, providing deep sea fishing the easy way-without sea sickness. At the entrance to the pier is a concession and bait stand, built out over the water, where the general beach-going public as well as the pier-fishing clientele can have sandwiches and what-have-you while enjoying the spendid vista of the waves rolling in below, with the unbroken and seemingly endless sweep of Padre Island stretched out beyond.

The fishing pier is the first installation in the planned overall development of Andy Bowie Park. Envisioned for the very near future is a complete tent and overnight trailer campground to be laid out with all proper facilities just across the sand dunes from the rolling Gulf of Mexico. Also in the master plan is a camp and youth activity center for the Laguna Madre side of Andy Bowie Park.

Beyond that, there is no limit.

But the rumble of the tourist herds is growing louder and louder across the horizon, and as their influx grows, more facilities are certain to be added. There are those who say that with the Padre Island National Seashore soon to occupy the middle 80 miles of the island, the southern end, immediately adjacent, as it is, to Mexico and the lush Rio Grande Valley, will someday burgeon into another Miami Beach. Others say, "Who

wants it? We like our Padre Island the way it is, relaxed and peaceful."

But there remains a whopping lot of island, with room for many things.

The Cameron County Park Board is now receiving many requests from various entrepreneurs who would like to put this facility and that into the county parks. And as South Padre Island's popularity grows, so will the requests, so that the major development problem of the future is likely to be that of separating the what's-good-forthe-parks from the what's-bad, trying to keep most of the development, as it were, on the pekoe side of the tourist's cup.

CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr.

THURMOND. Mr. President, more and more people are becoming concerned about the civilian leadership in the Defense Department and the evident determination of this civilian leadership to downgrade and ignore the advice and assistance of distinguished military experts on matters which are vital to our national security. I recall, Mr. President, that in 1961 I first raised the cry here in the Senate against what was popularly known as the muzzling of our military leaders by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon and also by the State Department. My efforts to present this to the public were hampered, ridiculed, and ignored as much as possible by many in the Congress, in the news media, and particularly by the civilian leadership in the Pentagon and the State Department.

Since that time, Mr. President, more and more evidence has come to the fore to the effect that our military leaders are having to take a back seat to computing machines and the civilian whiz kids who seem to make most of the decisions in the Pentagon these days through the Secretary of Defense.

A distinguished military analyst, Mr. George Fielding Eliot, has written for the American Legion magazine of November 1963, an eloquent article on the subject of "The Conflict in the Pentagon: Does the Secretary of Defense Put Housekeeping Ahead of National Security?-That's the Question."

In view of the increasing congressional concern over the muzzling and downgrading of our military leaders, I believe that the Members of the Congress would find this article to be interesting and informative reading. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, to have this article printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of these remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE CONFLICT IN THE PENTAGON

(By George Fielding Eliot)

In the early spring of 1963, the lightnings of press and congressional criticism played fiercely around the unbowed head of Robert S. McNamara, the dynamic and very tough Secretary of Defense of the United States. The occasion of this violent outburst was McNamara's decision to award the contract for a new aircraft-called TFX for tactical fighter experimental-to General Dynamics of Fort Worth, Tex., instead of the Boeing firm at Seattle, Wash.

This contract is not peanuts. It involves the production of up to 1,700 planes for the

Navy and Air Force, and the total price tag attached to it is estimated at $6 to $7 billion. It also involves 20,000 prime jobs in the period 1963-1969. So when it was disclosed that Boeing's bid had actually been somewhat lower than that of the successful General Dynamics outfit, outraged cries were heard both from the losers and from disappointed politicians such as Senator HENRY M. JACKSON, Democrat, of Washington. The latter immediately demanded a closed-door inquiry by the Senate's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee chaired by the redoubtable Senator JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Democrat, of Arkansas, ostensibly to determine whether favoritism played any part in the decision. Senator JACKSON hardly believed that McNamara had been influenced by favoritism. What he did think is what many other anxious Members of both Houses of Congress have been saying, openly for the most part and with increasing frequency-that McNamara is paying insufficient attention to the views of professional military men and tends to make high-level decisions of great military consequence largely on data supplied by young, fast thinking civilian analysts whose military experience is zero.

The McClellan investigation, as far as revealed, has focused on the point that in the TFX decision, McNamara set aside the repeated and unanimous recommendations of the military evaluation boards, all of which favored the Boeing offer as promising superior performance. Leaks from the investigation resulted in headlines playing up this feature, and leaks from other interested sources-some in the Pentagon itself-added to the clamor.

Similar charges of ignoring military advice had already been leveled at McNamara in regard to his refusal to go ahead with the RS-70 long-range strike plane, his cancellation of the Skybolt airborne missile, and his delay in advancing the Nike-Zeus antimissile missile from a research project to production status. Any notions that the hearings would cause the stubborn Secretary to change his decision about TFX were wrong.

Instead, he fought back with his usual vigor. "Fighting Bob is at it again," said Time, quoting McNamara's angry statement to the McClellan subcommittee that its leaks

and partial releases of testimony had "needlessly undermined public confidence in the integrity and judgment of the highest officals of the Department of Defense."

McNamara had much more to say. He produced-as he generally does-carefully prepared and "quantified" answers about the merits of his decision. He had never taken his eye off his target: one plane for both Navy and Air Force, not two planes as the services both wanted. This would save up to $1 billion in production and maintenance costs and simplified spare parts inventories. Some modifications between the Navy and Air Force versions would be permitted, but General Dynamics came closer to real "commonality" (or two-service plane) than did Boeing. Boeing's design did promise better performance in some respects, but both designs satisfied the basic military requirements of the services.

The real decision turned on McNamara's judgment, reinforced by that of both service Secretaries. Their choice boiled down to this: With General Dynamics we have a relatively reliable prospect of getting a steady flow of satisfactory aircraft according to schedule; with Boeing we are less certain about timely delivery and are not even sure their lower cost estimates will not be offset by production bugs besides their less satisfactory meeting of the "commonality" requirement. So stated, this was a decision which turned less on the military qualities of the two designs that on production prospects and McNamara's favorite yardstick of cost effectiveness. It was, therefore, a deci

sion which fell properly within the province of the civilian leadership of the Defense Department. That was the McNamara story on TFX, in substance, and he stuck to it determinedly.

A little later in the spring, he again underlined his determination to be master in his own house. The Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. George W. Anderson, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, rugged Gen. Curtis B. LeMay, had not liked the TFX decision and had said so to the McClellan

committee in vigorous language. The 2year terms of both Chiefs expired in August. Admiral Anderson was suddenly notified that he would not be reappointed for a second term, as had been the usual custom; General LeMay was reappointed for a single year only.

Press and congressional comment linked this action to McNamara's discontent with the TFX testimony of the two officers. There followed subsurface rumblings in the Navy and Air Force sections of the Pentagon. The Navy was already apprehensive about a new McNamara order that the value of the fleet as a whole must be restudied in relafleet as a whole must be restudied in relation to the cost of defending the fleet against air attack. The Air Force, already smarting under the RS-70 decision and the Skybolt cancellation, foresaw not only the eventual disappearance of manned aircraft as nuclear delivery systems but also a challenge to their close-support mission by the swift expansion of the Army's own aviation.

The Army has made notable gains under McNamara (with a strong assist from Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, now Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). It rejoices in new weapons, 16 combat-ready divisions instead of 11, and a prospective increase in global mobility with the expansion of airlift.

But the Army shares with the other services the gathering anxieties as to the weight accorded to professional experience in toplevel decisions. The Anderson-LeMay crackdown suggested ominously that McNamara would not tolerate any future military questioning of his judgments.

"Maybe," some military long-range thinkers in the Pentagon began to reason, "outright opposition isn't the best way of dealing with the McNamara phenomenon. He's got a hard head, and whatever impression we make is quickly offset by public admiration for his courage and the growing notion that he's doing a job that has long needed doing. Let's turn our attention to improving communications-with the Secretary himself and the whole crew of civilian analysts and researchers he sets such store by. Our real object ought to be to find a way to hitch up the McNamara drive and energy to the military values that he doesn't yet fully accept. Let's admit that analysis has some very real values and try to get the Secretary's civilian analysts to admit as some of 'em are beginning to that it also has its limits, beyond which judgment and military experience must be relied on."

This "creed of New Hope," as skeptics promptly dubbed it, has shown some promise, but it has not healed all the wounds, nor allayed the deep-seated misgivings, born of even deeper seated military instincts, which torment many veteran officers.

These misgivings revolve around two questions which bear directly on the security of the Nation.

machinery which is tailored to the needs and 1. Is the development of decisionmaking capabilities of "a very special kind of Secretary of Defense with a most unusual array of assistants" producing a defense establishment which can be readily and smoothly taken over by Mr. McNamara's successor in office? Will not the inevitable change, when it comes, result in an interval of relative chaos which an alert enemy might well anticipate, and which (if it occurs as the result of an election) might be so predictable that

hostile exploitation could be prepared in advance?

2. Have overcentralization and overcivilianization already impaired the capability of the defense establishment to react effectively and in timely fashion to any sudden emergency-especially one which might require prompt transfer of authority and responsibility to military commanders? In short, is the military being stripped of initiative which it must exercise in an emergency?

The one major crisis of the McNamara regime was the naval “quarantine" of Cuba last year to compel the withdrawal of Soviet ballistic missiles from the island. Its handling served to feed the anxieties over the destruction of military initiative. In the Cuban instance, the established system of military control was literally pushed aside in favor of a committee, largely civilian in composition and chaired by the President in person, which met daily during the crisis. It issued, through Secretary McNamara, the most detailed daily orders covering such minute points as the exact type and scope of aerial reconnaissance to be carried out each day, and just what steps should be taken to inspect each Soviet ship departing Cuba with a deckload of missiles.

The responsible operational command was the Atlantic Command under Adm. Robert L. Dennison, with which officer Mr. McNamara should normally have communicated through the Joint Chiefs of Staff by means of a directive embodying the President's orders. The details of execution should have been left in Admiral Dennison's experienced and able hands, and in those of his naval task force commanders and the ship skippers-a course far more efficient and far safer than trying to run the show from a Washington committee room practically on an hour-to-hour basis.

The consciousness that the Secretary of Defense was breathing down his neck was certainly no help to Admiral Dennison. The constant stream of minutely detailed orders-not always either responsive to changing situation or consistent with previous instructions-was no help to the commanders who were actually dealing with the situation at sea and in the air.

It may be urged that this was a very special instance, one in which the President himself felt so deep a sense of responsibility,

where the Soviet reaction was so uncertain and potentially terrible, that the tightest kind of personal Presidential grip on the controls was an inescapable requirement. But allowing for that, was it not the duty of the Secretary of Defense to protect the integrity of the military chain of command in passing on the President's orders, instead of taking personal charge himself?

"Certainly, in principle," an officer commented. "But although the principle involved has been developed from the military experience of 25 centuries, there's just no means of communicating it to McNamara so that he'll accept it. He's simply incapable of realizing that there can be times when the decision of what to do next is much better left to a three-stripe destroyer skipper standing on his bridge looking at a situation than to Bob McNamara sitting in Washington with all the miracles of modern communication at his service."

Military opinion is nearly unanimous that McNamara's basic difficulty from the first day he took office has been just this baffling inability to communicate with professional military men. He thinks fast and learns incredibly fast in terms of facts and figures, but not in terms of intangibles. He has an energy and drive which have been described as "ferocious." He is impatient with answers to question which are slow in coming or which do not seem to him sufficiently responsive or precise.

"If you can't explain your answer, you don't understand the problem," is one of

his maxims. He has not disguised his dissatisfaction with competent military associates who have given him answers drawn from the depth of their experience, but who are hard pressed at times to produce convincing, detailed, hot-off-the-griddle supporting explanations that can be mathematically "qualified."

More and more he has tended to depend on answers provided by quick-minded civilian research analysts drawn from civilian institutions such as the Rand Corp. and the Institute of Defense Analyses. These are on the whole freewheeling young men who regard the most sacred concepts of the military profession with skepticism, and what they are pleased to call the military mind with unconcealed disdain.

McNamara's favorite measuring stick for the validity of any proposal is "cost effectiveness." He thinks in terms of dollars and of figures. Ideas which don't lend themselves to those terms he regards with suspicion. Considering the enormous financial burden which today's defense requirements impose on the Nation's taxpayers, no Secretary of Defense can ignore the dollar valuation of his decisions. There are, however, troubled military men in high Pentagon assignments who believe that McNamara can hardly be induced to consider any argument which can't be evaluated in dollars and figures, that he tends to dismiss military judgment and experience as "emotion" unless it can be mathematically expressed. Also he likes fast answers-as one officer puts it, "he gives the impression he'd rather be rapid than right." But another officer admitted ruefully, "It's our own fault if we're in trouble. Our Joint Staff-Joint Chiefs of Staff system is the best and most reliable setup for fighting and winning a war that the mind of man has yet devised, as the Germans and Japanese learned to their cost. But in peacetime, without the prodding of a war, the system often moves slowly. McNamara is a man who can't wait patiently for his answers, so he sets his whiz kids digging at lower echelons for facts and figures and alternatives, and by the time a finalized JCS paper gets to his desk he already has a paper of his own drawn up by these bright youngsters with more or less advice from subordinate military people. Because it's written in the terms in which McNamara thinks himself, he may like this paper better than the JCS production. The job that we professionals have to do is to get McNamara to understand that there are limits to what theoretical analysis can do for him, that it is only an aid to human judgment and not a substitute for it."

The new Secretary took over the Defense Department on January 21, 1961, amid a barrage of press comment to which this writer contributed-that asserted with a confidence based on past experience that a brandnew Secretary with no military experience except a wartime hitch as a statistical officer in the Air Force would certainly take a year or two to get the hang of his job and become anything like effective.

McNamara was sternly resolved to prove otherwise and he was completely confident that he could do just that. "He didn't underestimate the size of the job," a civilian aid remarked. "He just figured that he was equal to it despite its appalling dimensions." McNamara was also aware that strong pressures had been brought to bear on the incoming President to reappoint, at least for the time being, the last of President Eisenhower's three Secretaries of Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr. Gates in his single year of office had displayed great ability and certainly possessed the full confidence of the military. McNamara promised himself that he would prove to President Kennedy that no mistake had been made in the final decision. He, however, can hardly have understood the handicap under which he would suffer-his lack of that "visceral understanding" of mili

tary men and their motivations which was the key to Gates' close relationship and easy communication with the services and the Joint Chiefs, as had been the case with Robert A. Lovett and James Forrestal in earlier times.

McNamara had his own view of the special interests of the services-"knocking heads together" was not his own way of putting it, but it was his concept of how to deal with service differences of viewpoint. This view started the new Secretary off with a certain distrust of military judgments as being predominantly merely pro-Army, or pro-Navy or pro-Air Force. Experience has begun to erode this distrust, but it is still not wholly eliminated. Combined with his tremendous self-confidence, this has led McNamara to insist on "finalizing” all important decisions himself. His almost incredible capacity for hard work enabled him to make good on this resolve.

The writer will not soon forget the distress with which a very senior Army officer told of McNamara's court order regarding ROAD— reorganization of Army divisions-a huge Army-wide concept that was fairly well under way when McNamara took over.

"Before this is approved," the Secretary snapped, "you are going to have to convince me of the need for every man, every weapon, every vehicle." The general simply could not believe that any one man could find time and energy to make decisions in such detail and go on doing it-"It just means that the decisions will actually be made by some halfbaked civilian analyst or maybe a junior officer in the Secretary's office instead of being made by the Army staff."

But the general wasn't quite right. Robert McNamara has managed to find the time to deal personally with the ROAD decisions as with many others equally detailed. Sometimes he does make snap judgments which he sticks to stubbornly and which are not always fortunate-as when an adviser came in with a paper suggesting that in applying the somewhat flexible ROAD concept to the National Guard, an average strength of 88 company-sized units per division might be a useful rule of thumb.

"Whereupon," the adviser relates, "the trap clicked shut on me. Mac had a figure, and that was it. Now no National Guard division can have either more or less than 88 company units no matter how much better a different number might fit its mission and its local circumstances. The cardinal virtue of ROAD-organizational flexibility-is to this extent denied the National Guard because the boss just doesn't think in terms of military values which can't be fed into a computer."

Nevertheless, Secretary McNamara's decisionmaking machinery is not entirely a oneman show. It couldn't be and get the work done.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has grown and grown as more and more people are required to feed papers, information, and computerized data into the McNamara personal-decision mill. A graphic illustration of what this may mean is presented by Col. William R. Kintner in the Naval Review two charts contrasting the organization of the Defense Department (Gates model) on January 1, 1961, and (McNamara model) in March 1961. In both charts, the Secretary of Defense is at the top of the pyramid. There all similarity ends.

In the Gates chart, the next line below the Secretary of Defense was occupied by a civilian-military balance. On one side of the center line were the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the unified and specified commands below them (according to the established military chain of command). On the other side were two separate civilian-ruled areas, the Office of the Secretary of Defense with its Assistant Secretaries and other senior officials, and the three military departments with the

service Secretaries of Army, Navy, and Air Force, in association with their Chiefs of Staff.

In the McNamara chart, the Assistant Secretary of Defense appears directly under the Secretary of Defense, above everything else, showing visually the new domination of the Secretary's immediate staff over all the remainder of the Defense Establishment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military departments occupy opposite ends of the third line, together with the new Defense Supply Agency.

Colonel Kintner reserves judgment as to the interpretation of this chart as a guide to the future, suggesting that it might be "more charitable" to call it a "Freudian slip *** which unconsciously reflected the inner attitude of the new defense team."

An equally graphic illustration was furnished the writer by a military friend who is not stationed in the Pentagon but has occasional reason to visit it. "Every time I get back there," he reported, "I find that the spaces occupied by various functionaries of the Office of the Secretary of Defense have spread a little farther in both directions around the E Ring. It won't be too long before the three service Secretaries and the Chiefs of Staff are all relegated to the inside offices which are doubtless considered the appropriate status-symbol of their reduced importance."

That the status of the three service Secretaries had indeed been sharply downgraded can hardly be questioned.

Nominally they still have some degree of independence, as Congress always has intended they should.

For a service Secretary to be able to command the respect and loyalty of his own service, he must be able to champion the views and objectives of that service with some effect. He must not merely be a transmission belt for carrying out the wishes of the Secretary of Defense.

McNamara's first Secretaries of the Army and the Navy (Elvis J. Stahr and John B. Connally, Jr.) have both left the Pentagon because they could not stomach the downgrading of their historic offices. Mr. Stahr has subsequently expressed anxiety lest "the leadership of the military services might become stultified and its identities and initiative lost to the Government. *** The Department of Defense is too big to be run by only a few people, and (anyway) there just are not enough McNamaras."

Granting that Mr. McNamara has met frequently with the service Secretaries since he took office, Mr. Stahr went on to say: "The frequency of these contacts, however, led to continuous intrusion on his part in many small details of the administration of the services." Mr. Connally has been somewhat more reticent as to his experiences, though he is reported to have told a friend that he went to Washington thinking that he was to be Secretary of the Navy and left when he discovered otherwise.

Mr. McNamara also meets with the Joint Chiefs of Staff more regularly than any previous Secretary of Defense except Mr. Gates, but the difficulties of communication and of viewpoint already referred to have made these meetings far less productive than they ought to be.

Unquestionably, there has grown up a feeling of deep mutual distrust between the professional military officers on the one hand and the civilian scientists and analysts on the other. This feeling is exacerbated by the often disdainful attitude of the civilians, or occasional loss of temper by one of the military when it is demanded of him that he reduce to a mathematical formula a military value-judgment which cannot be measured in that fashion. Every civilian analyst knows that he must satisfy the standard McNamara requirement that "for every proposed expenditure, there must be a proven benefit; and for every benefit, the cost must

be measured and all possible alternatives examined to determine whether the same re

sult can be attained by expanding existing programs or in some other less expensive way. Show me the benefit; show me the cost; and show me the proof."

Under such a system it is far easier to wash out existing projects while still in the development stage than it is to initiate new projects and keep them alive until they reach the stage of actual production of military hardware. Few indeed are the military novelties that the McNamara regime has produced so far; but its path is well marked by the tombstones of projects which have become the victims of cost effectiveness-at times against a substantial weight of military opposition.

Here is the very nub of the public question which underlies the present conflict in the Pentagon. It is a well-worn cliche to term the Department of Defense "the biggest business in the world"-but it is not a business

in which the annual profit-and-loss figures

are the final criteria of success or failure. Its success is measured by the degree to which it continues from year to year to conserve the safety of the Nation.

Remembering always the continued presence of formidable enemies, the constant likelihood-indeed the certainty-of future attempts at surprise (as in Korea and Cuba), how far should cost-effectiveness and business-type analyses be depended on to come up with the right answers? Acknowledging the very real value of these processes within prudent limits, is there not a point beyond which military judgment and instinct, born of experience, must be given priority? If we do have another war of even limited dimensions, it is from the military chiefs that the Nation will expect the decisions that will mean victory or defeat. A system of peacetime decisionmaking in which military judgment and initiative are consistently subordinated to financial and housekeeping considerations is hardly a system which develops a healthy interplay of initiative and responsibility between civilian and military leaders. This is one of those rather rare situations in which compromise could provide a happy solution. The rather significant success already achieved by military officers on duty

in the Pentagon in improving communications and restoring mutual confidence between military and civilian personnel at what may be called the second and third echelons of decision has already been noted. But the top level remains-and at the top level stands Robert S. McNamara with his powerful personality, and his vast and often justifiedself-confidence.

Can Secretary McNamara be brought to understand that there is a limit to the value of quantified analysis in reaching the momentous decisions which are his to make? Can he be convinced that beyond that limit he must accept the considered judgment of military professionals whose wisdom is drawn from sources foreign to his own experience?

If he can, Robert McNamara's place in history as one of our truly great Secretaries of Defense seems assured. If he cannot, the American people must walk with danger in the years that lie ahead.

Here is a new form of family recreation which I am convinced will become increasingly popular in the years ahead, and I commend the Mason-Lake Soil Conservation District for their leadership in supporting this new source of income for rural families.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this newsletter article describing the Eikenberry farm be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FARM VACATIONS IN MASON COUNTY Vacation farming heralds a new type of income for the American farmer. It might best be thought of as a byproduct of the farm. On a vacation farm, paying guests come and live on the farm for a vacation. Pioneering in this type of farming in Mason County, is the Carl Eikenberry family. On their farm the guests live right with the family. Mrs. Eikenberry cooks the meals and the guests can observe the farming operation

and chores that are being done at the time of their visit.

The Eikenberry's own a 116-acre farm. They have 55 head of dairy cattle, a 32-acre orchard and a large family garden. After observing this farm operation one might describe it as a typical family farm. That is what makes it a good vacation farm. Many persons that live in the large cities were raised on farms. They miss the quiet restful farm life of their youth. Vacation farming allows them a chance to enjoy rural living again and also gives the vacation farmer an additional income.

Last June, Mr. Eikenberry was assisted by the Soil Conservation Service in developing a complete soil and water conservation plan for his farm. For his cropland a rotation was selected. It was based on two needs: (1) The type of crops needed for his farm operation; (2) the type of rotation that can be used safely on his fields. Other soil and water conservation practices Mr. Eikenberry will use on his cropland will be soil testing, lime and fertilizer application, cover crops, and crop residue use. He will renovate his

pastureland for top production. Selective cutting will be done in his woods to improve the quality of his timber. Three wildlife areas will be improved to encourage small game and songbirds. This will be done by planting shrubbery and pines for food and

cover.

In addition to seeing the regular operation of this dairy farm, the Eikenberry's have provided means for recreation and relaxation for their guests. Badminton, croquet, and horseshoes can be played on the lawn. Besides cooking the meals, Mrs. Eikenberry makes homemade butter and bakes bread for the guests. Next year they plan horseback riding and a program for butterfly collecting. A walking trail is planned for the future with the identification of trees along the way. Fourteen different kinds of trees have been found along the proposed trail.

The guests at the Eikenberry farm this summer were two families from St. Louis, one family from Pennsylvania, one family from Detroit, and a young girl from Indiana. The

VACATIONS

Mr. HART. Mr. President, we have heard a great deal in recent years about the opportunities for family farm vacations.

A few days ago the Mason-Lake Soil Conservation District newsletter came to my desk telling of such opportunities on the Carl Eikenberry farm in Mason County, Mich.

will take them for weekends or overnight. This summer the Eikenberry's just advertised for families as guests, but next year they will accept groups of children as well as families.

"We feel that it is a good farm supplement and we thoroughly enjoyed having the guests" said Mr. Eikenberry. "We haven't traveled extensively and we find this a good source of travel experience" he added.

Mr. Eikenberry feels to be successful with vacation farming it is most important that

TAIN NATURALIZED CITIZENS
Mr. HART. Mr. President, on October

30 the Washington Post commented editorially on the change in citizenship laws which has been proposed by the distinguished junior Senator from Rhode Island, Senator PELL.

As the editorial notes, the Supreme Court presently is considering this discrimination against our naturalized citizens which requires special residency standards if they are to retain their United States citizenship.

I know that I am joined by many of our colleagues when I indicate support not only for this change but also for changes in other provisions which tend to limit the privileges and rights of U.S. citizens for those who are naturalized citizens.

The junior Senator from Rhode Island is to be commended for his leadership, pointing as he does to injustices which continue to exist in our citizenship laws. His role in support of immigration reform rightly has attracted national attention and praise. The repealer which is the subject of the editorial is but a part of the many constructive suggestions made by Senator PELL.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the editorial from the Washington Post of October 30 be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RELIC OF ISOLATIONISM

Sometime within the next few months the Supreme Court will decide whether Congress may impose on naturalized citizens penalties that may not be inflicted on native-born citizens. Meanwhile, however, Congress also has the issue before it in the form of a repealer introduced by Senator CLAIBORNE PELL. If Congress would hasten to correct this grave injustice to naturalized citizens,

the difficult constitutional issue would not have to be decided.

The case which the Court has consented to hear is that of Angelika L. Schneider, who came here from Germany at the age of 4 and was naturalized while in college. Having grown up in this country, she has an attachment to it, but since 1956 she has been living in Germany with her husband, a German attorney. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 she has forfeited her citizenship by living in her native land for more than 3 years since her naturalization.

Similarly the law provides that a naturalized citizen living abroad in any foreign land for 5 years loses his citizenship. Since Congress could not impose any such harsh penalty on a native-born citizen, there is a good deal of substance in the argument that this reduces those who are naturalized to secondclass citizenship. In 1913 the Supreme Court asserted that "under our Constitution, a naturalized citizen stands on an equal foot

ing with the native citizen in all respects save that of eligibility to the Presidency."

The present Court may or may not find this view controlling, but any conscientious legislator should be able to see that it is unreasonable punishment to deprive a citizen of his rights as an American for merely living abroad for a few years. It is said that this unreasonable provision stripped citizenship from 1,200 Americans in a recent 12month period. Why the irrational haste to disclaim citizens who cherish their acquired allegiance to this country? Regardless of what the Court may decide, Congress ought

to repeal this harsh and self-defeating relic from the isolationist years.

AUTOMATION AND THE DISIN

HERITED

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. President, the story of automation, its promises as well as its problems, is being covered in increasing detail by news media of our country. This emphasis is well placed. Automation, which has as companions people out of work and people in need of training, may well be the overriding economic problem to face the United States this century.

What occasions my comment today is the sobering article, "Automation and the Disinherited," which is carried in the November 5 edition of the Christian Science Monitor, a fine newspaper which consistently carries articles of worth.

It begins by quoting Richard L. Worsnop of Editorial Research Reports, who says:

There is general agreement that automation is a more serious threat to employment

than was the Industrial Revolution.

It is because of the magnitude of the economic change which is accompanying automation that I have long advocated a White House conference on automation, a conference which would have local community education about automation as its most important product. Only after automation was studied at local levels would delegates meet in Washington to sift the best ideas for living with the changes of automation and for making the most of them for the good of the public as a whole. Passage of S. 185 would bring about the White House conference we need.

I mentioned that people in need of training are companions of automation,

and so they are. For this reason we need greatly expanded programs of education for employment in this country.

and

Automation, unemployment, training also have a vital tie-in with the need for jobs if minorities in this country are to improve their lot. In this connection I am proud to mention the position on hiring practices emphasized 2 days ago by Henry B. Du Pont, a director of the great Du Pont Co. in my State. Mr. Du Pont said:

Our policy-and every branch of the company is aware of it-is not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry with respect to hiring, promotion, demotion, transfer, recruitment, termination, rates of pay, or other forms of compensation and selection for training.

Mr. Du Pont added:

Unfortunately our experience right here in Wilmington as well as elsewhere in the

country is that only a very small percentage of Negroes are adequately prepared for the kinds of jobs that American industry will need to fill in the years ahead.

Mr. President, in the interests of spreading information about automation, and with the sincere hope that it will be carefully read by my colleagues, I ask unanimous consent that the article referred to from the Christian Science Monitor be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 5, 1963]

AUTOMATION AND THE DISINHERITED-TECHNOLOGY MAKES MORE JOBS, IT IS TRUE, BUT NOT ALWAYS, OR OFTEN, FOR THE PEOPLE WHO ARE DISPLACED

"There is general agreement that automa

risen to an annual rate of more than $588 billion and disposable personal income is at a new high of more than $400 billion annually.

ARE AMERICANS LIVING IN TWO COMPARTMENTS? Several months ago the traveling interviewer, Samuel Lubell, observed that while older workers in stable industries were doing well, many younger workers "have been virtually walled out *** by seniority rights and high fringe benefits."

Does this mean that, unless steps are taken to prevent it, a situation described by Prof. Andrew Hacker, of Cornell University, is taking shape? To the American

Political Science Association, September 6, Dr. Hacker said, "It may well be that two Americas are emerging, one a society protected by the corporate umbrella and the other a society whose members have failed to affiliate themselves with the dominant institutions.

If such a situation is to be avoided there will have to be some hard thinking, plan

of some businessmen as well as of labor

John I. Snyder, Jr., board chairman of U.S. Industries, Inc., a company that makes automatic machinery, admits, "We're using sophisticated machines to destroy jobs." His company is financing a foundation, cosponsored with the International Association of

Machinists, to study problems of technologi

cal displacement.

John F. Henning, Under Secretary of Labor, estimates that 2.2 million jobs a year are eliminated in the United States by increased output per man-hour due largely to technological progress. This means that new jobs need to be found for 40,000 displaced workers a week besides new workers.

The classical contention has been that in

vention creates new jobs as it wipes out old ones. But as applied to automation, or "cybernetics," Mr. Snyder declares this is "a myth." And Mr. Worsnop sums up the evidence thus:

"Ideally, displaced workers should be the first to share in the benefits of automation.

so far, just the opposite has been true. Workers who have managed to hold on to their jobs in automated factories find working conditions and fringe benefits improved. Many of those who have lost their jobs to machines are likely to remain unemployed, or employed only part time, for the remainder of their lives."

MINERS: FROM PAYROLLS TO DANGEROUS "DOG HOLES"

One of the regions where displacement of scribed by Homer Bigart in the New York this sort has taken a most heavy toll is deTimes. In the Cumberland Mountains of eastern Kentucky tens of thousands of idle miners, replaced by coal-cutting machines, face a winter of grinding poverty. "Three generations of living on handouts," he reports, has eroded their self-respect and "resulted in a whipped, dispirited community." foods are not available because the county In one county even Government surplus has no funds to fetch and distribute them. Able-bodied men, barred from the relief rolls, leave their families so the women can qualify for aid to dependent children (ADC).

These, as described by A. H. Raskin in the Saturday Evening Post, are "the once-proud men whose high wages and industry-financed pensions made them the soot-smudged aristocrats of American labor only a dozen years ago." Today some of them "scratch out a perilous subsistence" in played-out pits or "dog holes" where the coal seam is too thin for effective mechanization.

All this takes place while Department of Commerce statistics show that the gross national product for the country at large has

States. There are remedies but they are not automatic. Congress and State legislatures have hardly caught up with the age of the typewriter, let alone the computer.

Some remedies are nonpolitical. For example, does all research have to be directed toward using mineral and other inorganic resources? Why not more research and development toward devising industries that can utilize relatively unskilled or semiskilled

hands? Ingenuity has found use for once

waste materials from bones and sawdust to cinders and bagasse; why not for surplus human resources? Industry already does vast amounts of training and retraining; but a company can afford this only where there is a prospect of use within its own organization.

Much of the need in an age of rising technology is for a spread of elementary education, then for more and better vocational education, and finally for retraining programs where an obsolete skill must be replaced by a current one.

HOPE IN EDUCATION AND REHABILITATION

This calls for more schools such as one in New Haven, Conn., described in the October

Reader's Digest by Lester Velie-an elementary school that has made itself a 16-hour

hood and sparks an interest in learning a-day community center in a slum neighboramong Negro families hitherto without hope.

It calls also for such initiative as has been displayed in Chicago, where the Cook County Welfare and Rehabilitation Service last year placed in jobs 12,000 persons formerly on the relief rolls. It did this by a basic literacy program and evening vocationcipients were required to take. In addition, al or high school courses which_welfare re

5,000 relief clients were put on work projects for the city, county, or State.

The problem of idle human resources is complicated by the fact that in some States compensation is being paid to persons in fairly comfortable circumstances while in others the compensation payments have been hungry and for whom the prospect of reexhausted by workers whose families are employment is remote if not nonexistent.

Among workers with displaced skills, such as notably the coal miners, one of two needs exists. Either new industry must be brought to them or they must be retrained and enabled to move where employment is assured. The latter course involves some kind of sustenance payments.

LABOR-INDUSTRY FUNDS ONLY PARTLY
SUCCESSFUL

Automation, through its economies, does create new market demands and ultimately new jobs-but they are not generally for the same people, or even the sons and daughters of the same people, unless a great deal