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to the point where they accounted for fully one-third of the domestic market. The larger part of the increase in the import of zinc sheet is attributable to the phenomenal rise in Yugoslav imports, from near zero in 1952 to 776 tons in 1962. Imports from Yugoslavia, in fact, now account for almost 60 percent of total imports.

This has done very grave damage to an important American industry that is not in a position to compete with the state-directed labor of Communist societies. According to the figures of the Rolled Zinc Manufacturers Association, the industry has run at a loss for 4 consecutive years, and the losses have increased with each year of operation, virtually in direct proportion to the increase of Yugoslav imports.

It is not merely the zinc sheet industry that has been affected. The production and consumption of zinc strip is several times that of zinc sheet, and this industry, too, is feeling the pinch of foreign competition, primarily Yugoslav competition, in the domestic market.

necticut are suffering from it. This is
just one example of the harm we are
doing to our own people in our misguided
effort to assist Communist regimes. I
know that business and labor in other
parts of the country have also been ad-
versely affected.

I earnestly hope that the Senate will
take into consideration the plight of the
American zinc sheet industry and of
other industries that have suffered from
the favored-nation treatment accorded
to Yugoslavia.

I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an exchange of correspondence with Mr. Orton P. Camp correspondence with Mr. Orton P. Camp of the Platt Bros. & Co. zinc plant in Waterbury, Conn., and of several statistical tables prepared by the Rolled Zinc Manufacturers Association; and I also ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD an excerpt from a study of "United States Aid to Yugoslavia and Poland," by Milorad M. Drachkovitch, published by the American Enterprise Institute.

There being no objection, the information was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Platt Bros. & Co., of Waterbury, Conn., is one of the companies in the zinc strip and wire business. In his letter to me, Mr. Orton P. Camp of Platt Bros. & Co. Old Senate Office Building,

said:

We have every reason to believe that the domestic zinc strip business will be ruined, as has the sheet business, if the most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia is continued.

Mr. President, I am particularly concerned about this situation because busines and labor in my own State of Con

Hon. THOMAS J. DODD,

Washington, D.C.

JULY 18, 1963.

DEAR SENATOR DODD: Thank you for your
letter of July 10. I am glad to give you some
statistics in connection with the Yugoslavian
zinc import problem. Am enclosing the fol-
lowing schedules:

A. Zinc sheet produced in the United
States, 1952-62.

B. Zinc sheets-imports by volume and
value, 1952-62.

Zinc sheet produced in the United States

C. Zinc sheet imports by country of origin, 1956-62.

D. Zinc strip produced in the United States, 1959-62.

You will see from schedule C that there were no imports of zinc sheet from Yugoslavia prior to 1956 but that in 1962, the imports of sheet zinc from Yugoslavia were more than 50 percent of total imports, and total imports were 48 percent of domestic production. This means that total imports were about one-third of domestic consumption. This is a terrifically high figure. The domestic zinc sheet business has already been ruined (see the last column on schedule A).

The production and consumption of zinc strip is several times that of zinc sheets but we do not have imports statistics on zinc strip. The Bureau of Census does not maintain this information although on several occasions, our association has requested the Bureau to do so and has offered to stand the expense. We have every reason to believe that the domestic zinc strip business will be ruined as has the sheet business if the most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia is continued.

It seems to me that the above figures tell the story. I hope that you will do all you can, both in your committee and in the Senate, to see that this most-favored-nation treatment to Yugoslavia is not allowed to continue. As I said in my letter of June 21, it seems to me that from a point of view of ethics and fairness and good relations with friendly nations, it is improper to continue to give most-favored-nation treatment to countries which are either communistic or communistically inclined.

Thank you again for your interest and

help.

Very truly yours,

THE PLATT BROS. & Co.,
ORTON P. CAMP.

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Zinc sheets-Imports by volume and value, average value of imports in terms of cents per pound and imports as percentage of domestic production

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TITO'S INDEPENDENT WAY OF SPREADING

COMMUNISM ABROAD

During the 1962 congressional debates on foreign aid, the leading critics of administration policy toward Yugoslavia particularly stressed the role played by Tito's regime among the nonalined nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Several Senators expressed concern over the harm allegedly done to Western interests by Tito's tireless efforts to influence the domestic policies and foreign political orientation of countries geographically remote from Yugoslavia.

Tito identifies his type of neutralism with the victory of communism over freedom. This is what he is working to achieve, not only in Yugoslavia, but also in Asia and Africa and, it is obvious, in view of his statements, if he can do so, in South America.

Despite the heretic label affixed upon Tito by the Communist bloc, Titoism promotes Soviet interest in the third or neutral world, if not directly, then indirectly by inspiring and supporting attitudes in those countries which are detrimental to the basic interest of the West.1

In the international arena, by and large and on balance, Tito is working against the interests of the United States and the free world, against the interest of NATO, and in support of Soviet policies on Berlin and on other points of conflict.2

The granting of aid to Tito, admittedly a Communist, who has repeatedly declared that the world must be communized, is an inducement to the nations in Africa, in the Middle East and in the Far East, to follow Tito. By giving aid to Communist countries, we are encouraging all of the emerging nations to look favorably upon the Tito form of government.3

While we have been giving billions of dollars to Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia has been spending hundreds of millions of dollars on a foreign aid program of its own, geared to the expansion of neutralist influence in the non-Communist world. India, Indonesia, Burma, Egypt, the Sudan, Ghana, Ethiopia, and other Afro-Asian nations with neutralist leanings, have been recipients of this aid. In short, through our aid to Yugoslavia, we have, in effect, been underwriting the extension of anti-Western neutralism in the countries of Asia and Africa.1

1 Senator PROXMIRE, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol 108, pt. 7, p. 9863.

2. Senator KEATING, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 108, pt. 7, p. 9867.

3 Senator LAUSCHE, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 108, pt. 7, pp. 9923-9924.

The seriousness of these charges was confirmed, in a milder form to be sure, by Ambassador Kennan himself, during his aforementioned NBC-TV interview of July 1962, when he declared that "what the Yugoslavs have said to the other neutrals is often something that I haven't liked, and I don't find to be in the interest of this country." 5

What then are the motives behind Tito's attempts to shape the views and the policies of the nonalined nations? For the answer one must first of all consult the sacred book of Titoism, the LCY's 1958 program. Two principles, according to that program, determine the world outlook of Yugoslav Communists. One is that "inexorably and in a variety of ways, humanity is moving deep into the era of socialism." From this postulate stems the imperative for the LCY to educate the Yugoslav working people in the spirit of proletarian internationalism:

"In all contacts with other Communists, Socialist, progressive and anti-imperialist movements, and in all its international relations in general, the League of the Communists of Yugoslavia has upheld and will continue to uphold the great idea of proletarian socialist internationalism as its guiding principle."

In the practical application of these principles, the program of the LCY actually reformulates two guidelines which go directly back to Lenin's own thesis on national and colonial questions offered to the Second Congress of the Communist International (July-August 1920). Thus Lenin's thesis that "Communist parties must aid nationalist-revolutionary liberation movements in backward countries" finds the following expression in the LCY's program:

"In certain countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, at a certain stage of the

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movement of society toward socialism, a positive role can be played by certain national movements of progressive orientation, movements growing out of the struggle against imperialism and capitalist monopolies.” 8

Likewise, Lenin's explanation that the capitalist phase of development in a given backward country could be skipped and immediately replaced by the Soviet system, was echoed in the LCY program:

"In the underdeveloped countries just liberated from colonial oppression, tendencies and possibilities exist for bypassing certain phases of capitalist development and immediately passing on to the construction of the economic foundations of the development of socialism."9

It is in the same Marxist-Leninist spirit that Edvard Kardelj, chief ideologist of Titoism, explained the meaning of "peaceful coexistence," the central tenet of Yugoslav foreign policy:

"For Yugoslav Communists the justification of the policy of coexistence is based * on the conviction that in the circumstances of today it will be ever more difficult for the forces of imperialism and war to break the existing coexistence, which will bring the internal contradictions and oppositions of the capitalist world to a new stage of development, that is, it will speed up the processes of disintegration of imperialism and capitalism as a system and increasingly strengthen the part played by Socialist factors, material and political.” 10

world.

The same dialectical approach used to explain the concept of active peaceful coexistence underlies also the Yugoslav analysis of the bloc division of the Although in current propaganda the Yugoslav Communists criticize the existence of antagonistic military blocs as detrimental to world peace, they explain also that they do not put the Western and Soviet blocs back to back, as equally responsible for world divisions and tensions. In his report to the Seventh Congress of the LCY, Tito put the responsibility for world partition squarely on the West:

"One of the reasons for the establishment of the Atlantic Pact was the rigid and unnecessarily threatening Stalinist foreign policy, and besides that also the fact that the Western Powers had reached the conviction that through diplomatic ways they would

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not be able to achieve their imperialistic goals. This pact should have served as means toward the realization of world domination and this from the position of strength. The establishment of the Atlantic Pact and the drawing of Western Germany into it have necessarily led to the establishment of the defensive Warsaw Pact of Eastern countries, as counterweight to the Atlantic Pact." 11 Likewise, more subtly but no less significantly, Edvard Kardelj declared in his interview before leaving for Indonesia on December 6, 1962, that the bloc division of the world reflects the existence of contradictory Socialist and capitalist systems. But the social systems which change, necessarily, "by the freeing of the internal social forces in every country," should not be identified with the blocs, which are "a historically conditioned political phenomenon." 12 This distinction, at first sight rather obscure, actually contains two very important implications. One is the confirmation of the Titoist thesis that while the blocs are ad hoc, static, and strictly temporary manifestations, the present bloc division will be overcome gradually, not through a world war but through internal process leading inexorably toward socialism. The second implication suggests that Yugoslavia, although not a member of the Warsaw Pact, and indeed because of this very fact, may serve to accelerate the worldwide movement toward socialism. This was also intimated by Tito in his speech of December 29, 1962. In his address he informed his Yugoslav listeners that he had explained in Moscow how important it was that Yugoslavia enjoy a world status and reputation, particularly among the nonengaged states of Africa and Asia. That would be, in his words, "useful not only to us and to those countries but also to the progressive movement and to the whole peace-loving world." 13 This formulation, veiled in form but not in substance, points to another conclusion reached by Paul Underwood a year before Tito's speech:

"Tito's basic aim in his association with the nonalined nations seems to be to form a group of Socialist-minded, essentially antiWestern supporters in preparation for Moscow's expected triumph. Such a backing might enable him to maintain a certain independence and give him continued influence even in a Soviet-dominated world." 14

Another element to be mentioned in this connection-which has certainly been viewed with some displeasure in Moscow, and with open hostility in Peiping-is the tendency of Titosim to export its version of MarxismLeninism and its socioeconomic experiment as particularly suitable to the underdeveloped countries. "Skip capitalism through Titoism" is indeed the unstated but underlying slogan of LCY propaganda in the "third" part of the world. Before assessing its deeper meaning, we should turn to a brief description of this Titoist Afro-Asian (and to a lesser extent, Latin American) operation.

11 VII Kongres Saveza Komunista Jugoslavije, pp. 25-26.

12 "Vice President Kardelj's Interview With Editor of Tanjug," Review of International Affairs, Dec. 20, 1962, pp. 19-20. It is interesting to note that in his speech at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany on Jan. 16, 1963, in East Berlin, Khrushchev used the same formula as Kardelj when he declared that "the military blocs cannot be identified with the system," the first being the result of international treaties and agreements, and the latter, "an objective law of social development." For the full text of Khrushchev's speech see Soviet Booklet No. 106 (London), January 1963, p. 19. 13 Politika, Dec. 30, 1962.

14 "Tito's Neutral Road-Toward Moscow," the New York Times Magazine, Nov. 26, 1961, p. 129.

Titoist concern for the underdeveloped countries began to pick up momentum after Stalin's death, and has steadily increased along with the emergence of new states in Asia and Africa. Since his first and carefully prepared trip to Asia, in December 1954,15 through several subsequent trips on both continents, and finally through the pivotal role he played at the September 1961 Belgrade Conference,16 Tito tried to influence these new states on three planes: ideological, world political, and socioeconomic.

The LCY program has served as the main vehicle of Tito's ideological proselytism. Its dissemination has reached worldwide proportions with 26 editions, including a Spanish edition in Chile, an Indonesian in Djakarta, a Burmese in Rangoon, and an Indian in New Delhi. Yugoslavia's very smallness, Tito's reformist, revisionist, and nonalined reputation, and the more dignified and scientific outlook of the LCY's program-as compared with the cruder Soviet program, and with aggressive Chinese propaganda-have made the Yugoslav interpretation of Marxism-Leninism much more respectable among the local elites of underdeveloped countries, than the direct influence of the great Communist powers. Thus, in the words of a competent observer:

"The fitting of the Marxist formula onto the natural anticolonial reaction is the greatest service the Yugoslav regime has made to the Communist cause." 17

Titoist influence on the world political outlook of the underdeveloped countries may be correctly assessed from two of Tito's recent addresses. One was his violent hate-thecolonialists-and-neocolonialists speech before the parliament of Ghana, on March 2, 1961, in which the West was pictured as the exclusive villain in the piece.18 Another was his pro-Soviet and anti-Western, and particularly anti-United States, speech of September 3, at the Belgrade conference. On the one hand, he declared his unqualified support for all national revolutionary movements-from southeast Asia, through the Congo, Algeria, and Angola, to Cuba-and he appealed for the liquidation of colonialism everywhere and the right to self-determination for all former or present colonial peoples. All this was expressed in countless communiques following the meetings of Yugoslav leaders with their counterparts from other nonalined countries. But, on the other hand, Tito maintained total silence on the nature of Soviet-satellite relations and deliberately deliberately failed to mention the right of self-determination for the peoples of East-central Europe. The fact of Tito's quarrels with the Chinese, and ups-and-downs in his relations with Khrushchev, make this discrepancy between his anti-Western positions and his tacit approval of the present state of affairs in East

15 Cf. Slobodan M. Draskovich, Tito, Moscow's Trojan Horse (Chicago: Regnery, 1957), pp. 213–217.

16 Between 1954 and 1961 Tito made four official Afro-Asian trips: 1954-55, India and Burma; 1955-56, Ethiopia and Egypt; 195859, India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Sudan, United Arab Republic; 1961, Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, United Arab Republic.

17 George Bailey, "They Call Themselves Neutrals," the Reporter, Sept. 28, 1961.

18 The entire text of this speech, in English, may be found in an official Yugoslav publication entitled "President Tito's Visit to Friendly African Countries" (Belgrade, 1961), Friendly African Countries" (Belgrade, 1961), pp. 5-23.

19 A telling example of the effects of Titoist propaganda in Latin America is the following letter from a Chilean reader to the editors of the Belgrade Review of International Affairs: "We have been accustomed to hearing that the idea of human rights is suppressed in socialist countries, but thanks to the arti

ern Europe less conspicuous in the eyes of his nonalined friends.19

The impact of Titoism on the socioeconomic life of the underdeveloped countries may be observed on two levels. One relates to the advice given by some Yugoslav writers, particularly to African leaders, to shun closer relations with Western imperialist powers which are attempting to replace political with economic domination in their second conquest of Africa.20 Likewise, prominent Yugoslav economic experts counsel the Africans to "restrict private capitalist tendencies," 21 while the Yugoslav delegates at the United Nations have for many years drawn attention to the fact that economic development of the underdeveloped countries cannot simply be left to foreign private capital.23

These strictures against Western economic neocolonialism go well beyond the level of mere anti-Western attacks. They imply, at the same time, an invitation to the underdeveloped countries to transplant the Yugoslav economic model on their own soil. Thus, for example, Edvard Kardelj's visit to Cairo in December 1960 has been credited as contributing to the emerging "Arab socialism." 23 More recently, the president of the new Republic of Tanganyika, Julius Nyerere, declared in an interview with a Yugoslav correspondent that his visit to Yugoslavia and his acquaintance there with the process of industrialization and the socialization of economic activities convinced him that "one day we will introduce in practice many things you are doing now." 24

Another aspect of the same phenomenon is the establishment of many-sided relations between Yugoslavia and the new states of Asia, Africa, and to some extent Latin America, ranging from trade to scientific and technical cooperation and to treaties on economic aid extended by Yugoslavia. This aspect of Yugoslav assistance to the economically underdeveloped countries on a bilateral basis merits particular attention, and its operation is described as follows by Yugoslav official circles:

"As the insufficiently developed countries are not in a position to pay for their imports from Yugoslavia in convertible foreign exchange, Yugoslavia has instituted an ever broader crediting policy toward these countries of late. Special arrangements have recently been concluded to this effect with Ceylon, Ethiopia, the Sudan, Indonesia, Argentina, Brazil and with many emergent African countries. These arrangements enable imports of capital goods from Yugoslavia to be paid for only when the respective investments begin yielding returns in the importing country." 25

The scope and exact amount of aid given by Yugoslavia to various underdeveloped countries is difficult to establish, but even the following and certainly incomplete table

cles in the 'Revue of International Affairs' I have realized that the opposite is true. * * *” May 5, 1962, p. 6.

20 V. Milenkovic, "The Second Conquest of Africa," Ekonomska Politika, Feb. 25, 1961.

21 Janez Stanovnik, "The Struggle of Two Opposite Tendencies in the Economy of Underdeveloped Countries," Nasa Stvarnost, March 1961.

22 Yugoslav View on Assistance to Economically Underdeveloped Countries," Yugoslav Survey, July-September 1960, p. 267.

23 "Officials of the Nasser Government are reported to feel that the Yugoslav Communists' experience in building up industry, modernizing agriculture and organizing the nation on their own pattern could be useful." The New York Times, Nov. 27, 1960. 24 Borba, Dec. 9, 1962.

25 "Yugoslav View on Assistance to Economically Underdeveloped Countries," Yugoslav Survey, July-September 1960, p. 273.

SENATE speaks eloquently about the efforts of over- of countries thousands of miles from the indebted Yugoslavia to become the creditor

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Balkans:

Amount and nature of Yugoslav assistance

Financial and technical assistance; offers of a nonspecified amount
of Yugoslavian credits.

$40,000,000 credits for purchasing Yugoslav capital goods.
$5,000,000 investment credits for the import of Yugoslav capital
goods.

Nonspecified amount of long-term credits granted under the agree-
ment of July 18, 1959.

$20,000,000 credits for the purchase of industrial equipment and
machines.

$10,000,000 credit arrangements.

Agreement on the elaboration of a town plan for Conakry, to be
financed 50 percent by Yugoslavia. (An operational credit of
$600,000 had already been granted in October of 1960, when an
agreement on technical assistance was signed.)

$10,000,000 credits earmarked for the execution of certain projects
of the Malian 5-year plan.

$15,000,000 credit.

$5,000,000 loan.

An earlier credit of $1,800,000 was increased to $3,600,000.
$5,000,000 loan.

$6,000,000 credits for investment equipment.

$5,000,000 credits on deliveries of Yugoslav goods.

Yugoslav economic experts to help prepare the 2d 5-year plan of
Ethiopia.

$15,000,000 credits for investment equipment.

Nonspecified amount of credits for imports of capital equipment.
Agreement on granting of credit facilities for the construction of a
2d naval base in Ghana.

Nonspecified increase of a credit previously granted for imports of
raw materials, subsidiary materials, and spare parts.
Purchase of some industrial plants in Yugoslavia on a nonspecified
credit basis.

Supply, together with Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, of the major
portion of outside aid to launch Algeria's first home-grown in-
dustry for production of textiles, clothing, and leather.

Source: Yugoslav Survey, April 1960-September 1962 (10 issues); Review of International Affairs (1960-63); Thomas
Philippovich, "La Yougoslavie entre l'ouest et l'est" (Paris: Les Cahiers Africains, No. 11, 1962), pp. 69-74; the
New York Times (western edition), Apr. 9, 1963.

There is a last, but certainly not least important feature of these Titoist operational methods in connection with the underdeveloped countries. Hundreds of experts, engineers, teachers, and other technical and diplomatic personnel are being sent abroad, while large numbers-particularly of young Africans are invited to study at various Yugoslav schools and universities under highly favorable financial conditions.26 In addition, a series of Yugoslav social organizations systematically exchange delegations with African, Asian, and Latin American countries. Two of the largest such organizations, the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia (former Popular Front) and the Confederation of Trade Unions of Yugoslavia, have been particularly active in establishing tangible forms of cooperation with underdeveloped countries, ranging from study tours and exchanges of opinion to assistance in the training of personnel, etc. Here, for example, is an excerpt from a glowing report on rich and extensive international activities and relations of the Socialist Alliance.

"Foremost among the activities of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia last year (1961) was its intensive and wide support of the liberation movements of the dependent African countries, so that 1961 may rightly be called Africa Year for the Alliance, too.

"In the course of last year alone Yugoslavia was visited by 26 delegations from various liberation movements of Africa, and by individual representatives of 18 countries. Most of these movements and parties are greatly interested in the work and development of Yugoslav organizations and sociopolitical and state development." 27

26 According to Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Jan. 12, 1963, the African students in Yugoslavia receive scholarships of 60,000 dinars a month ($80), while the scholarships for Yugoslav students amount to only 15,000 dinars ($20).

27 "The 1961 International Activities of the Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugo

Practically the same may be said for the international activities of the Yugoslav the Yugoslav Confederation of Trade Unions.28 Its president, Svetozar Vukmanovic-who is also a member of the Secretariat of the executive committee (Politbureau) of the LCY and thus the fifth highest ranking official in the party hierarchy-is particularly active in establishing close personal contacts with the trade unionists of northwestern and central Africa. Thus, after a trip to Ghana and Morocco, in October 1960, he declared in an interview that Yugoslav trade unions are highly interested in combating anti-Communist tendencies within the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Since the Moroccan Trade Union Federation belongs to the ICFTU, Vukmanovic emphasized, with satisfaction, his influence on Moroccan rejection of the ICFTU's anti-Communist policy.20

EXHIBIT 1

(DECLARATION OF THE 10TH NATIONAL CHURCH ASSEMBLY OF THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX DIOCESE OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA) The 10th National Church Assembly of the Serbian Orthodox diocese of the United States of America convoked in regular session on August 6, 7, 8, 1963, at St. Sava Monastery, Libertyville, Ill., by His Grace, the Right Reverend Bishop Dionisije, and the

slavia," Review of International Affairs, Mar. 20, 1962, p. 19. The same report is interesting also because it stresses the improvement of relations and intensification of contacts with the corresponding sociopolitical organizations of all East European countries (with the exception of Albania) and certain Communist parties and organizations outside the Soviet bloc.

28 "International Activities of the Yugoslav Trade Unions in 1959," Yugoslav Survey, April 1960, pp. 121-28. Also, "The Yugoslav Trade Unions' Links with Foreign Countries," ibid, January-March 1961, pp. 578-83. Also, "Yugoslav Trade Unions and the International Trade Union Movement,” ibid, AprilJune 1962, pp. 1355-62.

29 Borba, Oct. 30, 1960.

diocesan council, sends warm greetings to all our Serbian brothers of St. Sava in this diocese and the free world, but especially in our ancient enslaved fatherland.

Because past occasions have shown that the eyes of the enslaved faithful look to this diocese as the champion of the free Serbian Orthodox Church with its glorious national traditions and determined resistance to godless communism, this assembly must, in its sacred duty, bring the following facts to their attention:

The holy synod of the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate in Belgrade forwarded to this national church assembly the decisions of the holy assembly of bishops as Nos. 21 and 21/Min. 77, No. 1725/Min, 237, and No. 1726/ Min. 238, dated May 17, 1963, as well as its separate undated epistle to the faithful of this diocese in which it informed our assembly that the holy assembly of bishops had decided to abolish the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States of America and Canada by dividing it into three new dioceses the middle eastern American-Canadian diocese, with its seat at Detroit, Mich.; the middle western American diocese, with its seat at Libertyville, Ill.; and the western American diocese, with its seat at Los Angeles, Calif., granting these newly created dioceses the same legal status enjoyed by the Serbian Orthodox dioceses in the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia.

The holy assembly of bishops at the same time appointed the Very Reverend Stevan Castavica, bishop of the new Middle-Eastern American-Canadian diocese; and His Grace, the Right Reverend Bishop Dionisije, bishop of the newly created Middle-Western American diocese. Simultaneously with its appointment of Bishop Dionisije, the holy assembly suspended his conduct of affairs of the new diocese; placed him under interdiction of sacerdotal duties; and announced his investigation by the ecclesiastical court because of numerous alleged accusations against him; and, finally, the assembly appointed the Very Reverend Archmandrite Dr. Firmilijan Ocokoljich, administrator of the newly created Middle-Western American diocese, and the Very Reverend Archimandrite Gregory Udicki administrator of the new Western-American diocese.

For its part, the diocesan council for this see advised the National Church Assembly that after numerous faithful had called its attention to the aforementioned decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod in Belgrade, it convened in plenary session on June 6, 1963, and decreed as follows:

1. The Diocesan Council of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada declares that it is not authorized to accept or reject the three-way division of the diocese for the United States of America and Canada into new dioceses; and for this reason the matter is referred to the National Church Assembly. For emergency reasons, this assembly is convoked for the days of August 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1963, at the Monastery of Saint Sava at Libertyville, Ill., in accordance with the rules and decisions of the last national church assembly held in September 1960. This decision is unanimously adopted.

2. Upon motion of the Reverend Aleksandar Dimitrijevich, seconded by Mr. Milos Konjevich, it has been decided to send a letter to the holy synod requesting that a synodal commission be sent as soon as possible, at the plaintiff's expense, to investigate and adjudicate the accusations against His Grace, the Bishop Dionisije-since according to the previous decision of the diocesan council, no legal changes can be made until the decision of the 10th National Church Assembly already convened. This decision is adopted by all present except for two who vote against.

The diocesan council advised the holy synod of its decisions pursuant to which the investigation commission of the patriarchate, consisting of His Grace, Bishop Chrisostom, His Grace, Bishop Visarion, and the Very Reverends Mladen Mladenovich and Boza Tripkovich arrived in New York, N.Y., on June 28, 1963, where they were greeted by the consul of the Yugoslav Communist Government.

The said commission arrived at Libertyville, Ill., the See of the Bishops for the United States and Canada, His Grace Dionisije, on July 5, 1963, and tried to compel his deposition concerning the alleged offenses while at the same time refusing to divulge the identity of the plaintiffs or to provide him, for his direct response, with the copies of the complaints; alleging canonical misconduct, on which he stood accused, as is provided for by church criminal procedure. In acting thus, the Belgrade Investigation Commission not only deprived Bishop Dionisije of his fundamental rights as an individual and an American citizen to a fair trial based upon the Constitution but also made it impossible for him to prepare his defense by gathering witnesses and using other kinds of evidence.

In private conversations with the individual members of the diocesan council and with individual lay workers in the church affairs of the Serbian people in the United States and Canada, the right reverend members of the investigation commission admitted first, that they had never presented a copy of the complaints for response by His Grace, Bishop Dionisije; and secondly, that they were obliged to act this way in order to protect the plaintiffs from civil or criminal suit by Bishop Dionisije in American courts.

As a matter of fact, the investigation commission was in a hurry to perform the real and principal task for which it had comenamely, the consecration of the Very Reverend Lastavica as bishop of the newly created Middle-Eastern American-Canadian diocese. This it did on July 13, 1963, in the church of St. Elijah at Aliquippa, Pa.

On the other hand the investigation commission, together with the Association of Clergymen and the above-named administrators of the two newly created dioceses, Archimandrites Dr. Firmilijan and Gregory, took a series of measures to reinforce their positions:

1. They sought to misdirect all clergymen, churches, and school communities, by means of incomplete information or half-truths with a view to persuading these groups to sever their relations with the Serbian Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada and to remit their contributions, instead, to the new administrators of the nonexistent dioceses.

2. They sought to take over from the diocese and to enter into possession of the diocesan real property including the Monastery of St. Sava at Libertyville, Ill., the charity home at Shadeland, Pa., and the St. Sava Mission at Jackson, Calif., and they also sought to seize liquid assets of the diocese in various bank accounts.

3. They sought to organize a boycott of the 10th National Church Assembly and to prevent, by whatever means, the election and participation of the delegates of the individual church and school communities to it.

All of these illegal endeavors remain unsuccessful to date. Our diocese continues to perform its activities and carry on its divine mission, although with great difficulties and material and moral losses. Our clergy, our church, and school communities, as well as our national organizations, and all our faithful, although stunned at first by the violent frontal attack not only on His Grace, Bishop Dionisije, but also on the very foundations, autonomy and existence of this diocese, gathered strength and rallied the ranks of de

fenders of St. Sava's heritage on this confenders of St. Sava's heritage on this continent.

The facts strongly suggest that one did not count on such resistance. The facts establish that the holy synod did not consider the views of the free faithful in the diocese of the United States of America and Canada, in accordance with the ancient aphorism: "The voice of the people is the voice of the Son of God." Instead, the holy synod, by its decision of July 1963, heedlessly put the administration of the newly created and on the paper existing dioceses into the hands of His Holiness, the Serbian and Macedonian Patriarch. Thereafter, His Grace, Bishop Visarion, went back to Yugoslavia in order to suggest the convocation of an extraordinary session of the holy assembly of bishops. The assembly was held on July 26, 1963, and then made decision which reads as follows: "The administrators-the Archimandrites Dr. Firmilijan and Gregory-are appointed bishops for the dioceses which previously were given to them for administration."

The oral instruction was added to this decision-according to the statement of the investigation commission itself-that their consecration was to be performed as expeditiously as possible, and before this 10th Church National Assembly convened. Pursuant to this instruction, the Archimandrite Dr. Firmilijan was consecrated in the Church of St. Sava in Milwaukee, Wis., on August 1, 1963, while the consecration of the Archimandrite Gregory took place in the Church of St. Steven at Alhambra, Calif., on August 4, 1963. The objections of the faithful and their picket lines went unheeded, although these protests obviously were the cries "unaxios," which canonically make invalid the elevation of the unworthy to the high rank of bishops.

The aforementioned decisions of the holy assembly of bishops and the holy synod of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Communist Yugoslavia, as well as the above-cited events and the actions of their investigation commission and of the newly consecrated bishops, clearly demonstrated that the alleged canonical offenses of His Grace Bishop Dionisije are not the real points at issue. The real point at issue is the long and carefully planned and prepared conspiracy of the present Communist regime in Yugoslavia to take over the diocese of the United States of America and Canada as a base for the further Communist infiltration in the United States of America and Canada. The fact of this bold attempt is further proven by Tito's ambassador to Ottawa who said in Windsor, Ontario, that it is indispensable for Communist infiltration to capture at least one church and school community in this country and in Canada as well.

This National Church Assembly particularly emphasizes the fact that the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia lives and acts under the same slavery which has enchained the entire Serbian people of Yugoslavia from the time of the takeover of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Communist regime confiscated almost all of the church's liquid assets and real property. At its inception, the Communist government completely forbade religious education; and while it subsequently permitted such education in theory, in practice it imposed so many attenuating conditions that such education became virtually impossible. Celebration of the greatest Christian holy days was forbidden, and students and workers were mercilessly punished for their absences on such days. The Communists have imposed severe economic sanctions and jeopardized the livelihood of all those who wed in church, who baptize their children or keep the custom of celebrating the feast day of the family patron saint-the greatest and most sacred national religious symbol of each Serbian family from the time of the conver

sion of the Serbs to Christianity down through the ages.

The Serbian Orthodox patriarchate, its holy assembly of bishops, and the holy synod, are not free since they make their decisions either upon the request of the Federal Commission for Religious Questions of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (its divisions are such commissions in each of the federal units) or in collaboration with the commission and with its prior assent. This Yugoslav commission closely corresponds to the Soviet Commission for Religions.

The Association of the Orthodox Clergy of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia has as one of its aims "*** to safeguard and strengthen all the achievements of the heroic partisan liberation struggle of our peoples, especially freedom, brotherhood, and equality"; i.e., to safeguard the power and dominion of the Communist Party elite of Yugoslavia. This association actually plays the part of a political commissar in all the institutions of the patriarchate.

The long resistance of the Patriarchs Gavrilo and Vikentije, whose memory will always be blessed, against the schismatic endeavors of the Communist regime to split the Serbian Orthodox patriarchate by establishing the so-called Macedonian Orthodox Church, was finally abandoned by Patriarch German. He gave up the ancient title of the Serbian patriarchs which was, "Patriarch of Serbia, Archbishop of Ipek and Metropolitan of Belgrade and Karlovci." He replaced it with the twofold title "Serbian and Macedonian Patriarch." However, this dual role of the head of the Orthodox church in Yugoslavia is only temporary according to a recent statement of the Macedonian Metropolitan, H. E. Dositej, recently published in this country, the Metropolitan expects that the Macedonian Orthodox church will secede, definitively, from the patriarchate of Belgrade and become independent, and perhaps even autocephalic, after the election of two or three new bishops this coming autumn. The present Communist Yugoslav regime can then use this Macedonian church as a political tool to imperil the Greek part of Aegean Macedonia and the Bulgarian part of Pirine Macedonia. The Communists are promoting this essentially political schism even though an autonomous Macedonian Orthodox Church-much less an autocephalic one-has never before existed, either before or after the establishment of the Serbian Orthodox Patriarchate in 1346.

Thus, the enslaved position of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia demonstrates unambiguously that these decisions attributed to the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the holy synod and communicated to this 10th National Church Assembly belong to the growing category of decisions actually written in the Federal Commission for Religious Questions of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and signed, as a formality, by the highest anthorities of the hierarchy. With respect to these decisions, the National Church Assembly wishes to state emphatically that not one of the previous National Church Assemblies, nor the bishop of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States and Canada ever requested the three-way division of the diocese at least into three new ones. On the contrary, the National Church Assemblies of 1956 and 1960 requested that the Latin American part of the diaspora of our Holy Church, be placed under the jurisdiction of the bishop of this diocese in order to keep the faithful in this portion of the world within the pale of the Mother Church.

During this present session, this National Church Assembly considered the legal status of the Serbian Orthodox diocese for the United States of America and Canada with

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