Mr. Tollefson, Mr. Rogers of Florida, and Senator Lausche, of Ohio.

Later in 1961 the House established a Select Committee on Export Control, chaired by our former colleague, the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Kitchin. That committee worked with diligence on the overall problem, and partly through its efforts the administration's policy was reversed.

THE LATTA AMENDMENT

In July 1961, the "Agricultural Act of 1961" was being debated on the floor of the House. The distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. LATTA] an outstanding member of both the Committee on Agriculture and the Select Committee on Export Control, offered an amendment to the declaration of policy section of the pending bill. That amendment stated in unequivocal terms the policy of Congress that our Government should not sell, make available, or subsidize the export of surplus farm commodities to the Soviet Union or any area or Nation controlled by world communism.

The amendment was adopted by the House. It was retained in conference with the Senate and was part of the positive law included in Public Law 87-128 signed by President Kennedy on August 8, 1961.

The Agricultural Act of 1961 carries the Latta amendment in section 2(c) which you will note follows the enacting clause.

PUBLIC LAW 87-128, 87TH CONGRESS, S. 1643,

AUGUST 8, 1961

An Act to improve and protect farm prices and farm income, to increase farmer participation in the development of farm programs, to adjust supplies of agricultural commodities in line with the requirements therefor, to improve distribution and expand exports of agricultural commodities, to liberalize and extend farm credit services, to protect the interest of consumers, and for other purposes

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Agricultural Act of 1961".

DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 2. In order more fully and effectively to improve, maintain, and protect the prices and incomes of farmers, to enlarge rural purchasing power, to achieve a better balance between supplies of agricultural commodities and the requirements of consumers therefor, to preserve and strengthen the structure of agriculture, and to revitalize and stabilize the overall economy at reasonable costs to the Government, it is hereby declared to be the policy of Congress to

(a) afford farmers the opportunity to achieve parity of income with other economic groups by providing them with the means to develop and strengthen their bargaining power in the Nation's economy;

(b) encourage a commodity-by-commodity approach in the solution of farm problems and provide the means for meeting varied and changing conditions peculiar to each commodity;

(c) expand foreign trade in agricultural commodities with friendly nations, as defined in section 107 of Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as amended (7 U.S.C. 1707), and in no manner either subsidize the export, sell, or make available any subsidized agricultural commodity to any nations other than such friendly nations and thus make full use of our agricultural abundance;

(d) utilize more effectively our agricultural productive capacity to improve the diets of the Nation's needy persons;

(e) recognize the importance of the family farm as an efficient unit of production and as an economic base for towns and cities in rural areas and encourage, promote, and strengthen this form of farm enterprise;

(f) facilitate and improve credit services to farmers by revising, expanding, and clarifying the laws relating to agricultural credit;

(g) assure consumers of a continuous, adequate, and stable supply of food and fiber at fair and reasonable prices;

(h) reduce the cost of farm programs, by preventing the accumulation of surpluses; and

(i) use surplus farm commodities on hand as fully as practicable as an incentive to reduce production as may be necessary to bring supplies on hand and firm demand in balance.

Section 107 of Public Law 480, 83d Congress, provides:

SEC. 107. As used in this Act, "friendly nation" means any country other than (1) the U.S.S.R., or (2) any nation or area dominated or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world Communist movement.

During the floor debate on the amendment on July 27, 1961, I expressed my support for the amendment by saying:

I think it is a very good amendment. It is timely and appropriate at this very critical time in world history. I think we should make our voices heard and be very specific in dealing with the Communist countries.

I then pointed out that the amendment pertained only to the policy section of the bill. The Attorney General has taken that one sentence of mine out of context to sustain his contention that the Latta amendment did not apply to the present situation. That, Mr. Speaker, is a complete distortion of my position and the entire legislative history that went into the adoption of the amendment.

After President Kennedy signed Public Law 87-128, the administration quietly dropped its new policy on subsidized exports to Red nations. Apparently the President agreed with the Congress in 1961 and chose to follow the declared public policy of section 2(c) because he signed the bill and there was a change in Executive policy to conform with the statute. He did not veto the bill which, of course, he could have done if he had objected to the change in policy.

In a press conference held by the Secretary of Commerce on Tuesday, August 8, 1961, the following colloquy was held: PRESS CONFERENCE OF HON. LUTHER

HODGES, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, WASHINGTON, D.C., TUESDAY, August 8, 1961.

The press conference was convened at 2:30 p.m.

for being a friendly nation I can't answer. That would be for the State Department, which handles officially all international relations and negotiations.

Question. Will you follow the declaration of policy through?

Secretary HODGES. Let me say this about the declaration of policy: We have not received in the Department of Commerce any request for a license to ship anything abroad, and nothing has been done.

The Secretary of State and I, as you may recall the release is available on August 4 stated that because of the negotiations— reading between the lines so that we might keep ourselves flexible there would be no change at the present time in what we were going to ship or not ship, but that we reserved the right to change at any moment.

Now, as quickly as Dean Rusk gets back, I am going to sit down with him, and I'd rather reserve an answer until we have a chance to talk it out together.

Question. Well, while we're on this subject, Mr. Secretary, would you explain to us why about 6 weeks or so ago the Department ruled that subsidized commodities may be sold to Soviet bloc countries provided the sales are for convertible currencies? That was a change in the direction of more trade I think.

What was the reason for that? Secretary HODGES. What was the reason for doing it at that time? Question. Yes.

Secretary HODGES. Because the various departments of the Government felt like it was something they could do properly, but developments in the last 6 or 8 weeks have almost turned the situation around as far as Berlin is concerned.

rescinding that ruling? Question. You mean you're thinking of

Secretary HODGES. Whether we will rescind the ruling or not I can't answer. It's entirely possible that that will be the effect

of it.

*

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to note that since July 1961 no export licenses have been granted for the sale of subsidized U.S. farm commodities to the Communists.

The President has made a point of the fact that our country has been selling the Russians and the satellites unsubsidized farm goods for some time. That is true on a very modest and limited scale. But,

I submit, it is one thing to sell to the Communists at the full U.S. price and quite another to sell to them at subsidized prices.

The President stated that he considered the Latta amendment before he chose not to follow it. He stated his opinion that the sense of the Congress has changed since the Berlin crisis in July 1961. But has it? Speaking for the representative of the people of the Sixth District of Iowa, I, for one, told the President that my intent had not changed. Perhaps others have changed their minds. Perhaps some who supported the amendment are no longer in Congress.

Question. Do you regard Poland and Yugoslavia as friendly nations?

Secretary HODGES. Well, let's put it this way: In the technicality of discussion of those nations they are more friendly than the Soviet, but whether or not they qualify

then ignore it when it is not. The Congress should have been consulted when a change in policy was contemplated.

The precedent set by the President in this instance is indeed a serious one. Since he has chosen to ignore subsection

2(c) of Public Law 128, he is now free to ignore the other provisions of policy in section 2.

He may now say it is not the policy of Congress to work for parity of income for farmers; it is not public policy for a commodity by commodity approach; it is not our policy to improve the diets of needy people; the family farm is not important; Congress does not seek to facilitate and improve rural credit services; consumers are no longer entitled to a continuous, adequate and stable supply of food; and payment in kind will not be used when practicable to balance supply and demand.

Following this Kennedy rationale, the President need not follow the resolutions of Congress on Formosa, Berlin, captive nations, labor relations or a host of other areas of law. He need not do so, according to this precedent, that is, unless it is expedient and the President is assured of a minimum amount of congressional and public opposition. Well, Mr. Speaker, I, for one, am opposed to such a philosophy and I think that Congress and our country are too. We must all be opposed to this power grab or representative government in America has come to mean nothing but a rubber stamp of the Executive.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S BRIEF

So far, Mr. Speaker, I have directed my remarks to the President's arguments in justification of his action in ignoring the policy of Congress in the Agricultural Act of 1961. The President's legal position was fortified by his brother, the Attorney General.

I think it would be appropriate to examine that fortification because I do not believe it will withstand a logical legal assault.

The Attorney General's brief covers the Johnson Act-where a "credit" is held not to be a "loan"-the Battle Actwhere the congressional declaration of policy section is cited to support his position-the Export Control Act which is found to be no prohibition-and the Latta amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1961. The Attorney General lays down an interesting rule of law when he states:

Declarations of policy in legislation, like preambles and other introductory material, do not alter specific operative provisions of

in a subsequent statute the Agricultural Act of 1961.

Before getting further in the matter, let us just look at the four Supreme Court cases cited by the Attorney General. The first two cases (Yazoo R. R. Co. v. Thomas, 132 U.S. 174, 188 (1889) and Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 and Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899)) involve the construction of preambles to State and a Federal statute. In both statutes the preamble appeared before the enacting clause and as such were not part of the positive law.

It is well established that preambles are not part of the statute unless they follow the enacting clause. Sutherland, section 1805, states as follows on this point:

The enacting clause, however, must precede the purview of the statute for no material preceding the enacting clause may be treated as law (Barton v. McWhinney, 85 Ind. 481 (1882)). Thus the purview of an act is said to be the enacting part of a statute in contradistinction to the preamble (State v. Reynolds (108 Ind. 353 (1886)); State v. Ives (167 Ind. 13 (1906)); Frank v. City of Decatur (174 Ind. 388 (1910)); Payne v. Conser (3 Bibb 180 (Ky. 1813)); In re Wiley's Guardianship (239 Iowa 1225 (1948)); Sunshine Dairy v. Peterson (183 Ore. 305 (1948)).

The other two cases (Lauf v. E. G. Shinner and Co. (303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938)), and (Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson (370 U.S. 195, 202 (1962)), both deal with the interpretation of a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act. That act contains both a declaration of policy section and a specific definition of "labor dispute," and the Supreme Court very logically reasoned in both cases that the declaration of policy did not narrow the specific definition set forth in the act.

I urge you to read these cases and see if you can find any application whatsoever to the situation at hand. They are interesting cases, to be sure, but are not at all on the point. The Latta amendment expressed the law of the land clearly and without ambiguity.

The section in Sutherland cited by the Attorney General provides as follows:

Section 4820. In place of a preamble it has become common, particularly in Federal legislation, to include a policy section which states the general objectives of the act in order that administrators and courts may know its purposes. This is frequently of significance where the enforcement of the act depends principally upon administration and the administrative officers have not participated in the preparation of the legislation.

The policy section like the preamble is available for the clarification of ambiguous provisions of the statute, but may not be used for the creation of ambiguity.

of statutory interpretation. Caminetti v. U.S. 242 U.S. 470 (1916) which held: "Where the language is plain and admits of no tation does not arise and the rules which more than one meaning the duty of interpreare to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion." See also Hamilon v. Rathbone 175 U.S. 414 (1899); Armco Steel Corp. v. State Tax Commission 221 Md. 33 (1959).

The argument is also presented that Congress had several opportunities to amend the basic statutes to prohibit subsidized sales to the Reds but failed to do so. This is a foolish argument, Mr. Speaker. Why should Congress do a futile thing? The Latta amendment was law. The policy had been reversed. Every lawyer knows it is wise to cease arguing after the judge has decided in your favor.

The Attorney General also relies on the general constitutional doctrine that the President is supreme in areas of foreign policy and therefore need not follow congressional mandates. Without engaging in an extended discussion of constitutional law, I believe it would be appropriate to just recite article I, section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, which reads:

All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Congress, not the President, makes the laws of this Nation and Congress, not the President, should change these laws. Congress said in the Latta amend

No subsidized sales to the Reds.

The President and his brother disagree, but rather than let Congress change the law, they flaunt it and say:

There will be subsidized sales to the Reds. ARE THERE ADVANTAGES?

So much for the procedural side of this issue. Now let us discuss the merits, or more properly, the demerits involved in the President's decision to sell surplus U.S. wheat to the Communists.

The President presented seven basic arguments in support of his decision. Let us examine each of these claimed benefits:

First, surplus removal: While it must be conceded that this deal will reduce our inventory of wheat, we may properly ask by how much. Recalling that the Commodity Credit Corporation now owns over 1 billion bushels of wheat, a Communist purchase of 100 to 300 million bushels represents only 10 percent to 30 percent of present stocks. This is not to say that such a purchase is not significant, but it does not represent a solution to the wheat surplus problem. As can be seen by simply reading it, Second, balance of payments: I think the citation is not pertinent to the point we all realize the existence of a balanceat issue here. This section of Suther-of-payments problem which is currently land speaks only about ambiguous statutes, which section 2(c) of the Agricultural Act of 1961 most clearly is not. The more appropriate rule is set forth by Sutherland in section 4502 as follows:

The most common rule of statutory interpretation is the rule that a statute clear

and unambiguous on its face need not and cannot be interpreted by a court and only those statutes which are ambiguous and of doubtful meaning are subject to the process

in the magnitude of $2 billion annually. A multimillion-dollar wheat deal with the Soviets will no doubt help ease this problem, but let me submit that other problems facing our Nation are more serious than balance of payments. For example, we would have no balance-ofpayments problem if it were not for the Communists who force us to expend billions of dollars annually on oversea military installations and foreign aid.

Third, consume Soviet foreign change: This argument should be tempered with the thought that the Soviet's capacity to purchase internationally will not be materially depleted by U.S. wheat purchases. The Soviet Union is a traditional wheat exporter. Recently she canceled her export commitments to the bloc nations and to Scandinavia. The wheat we will sell to Russia may well be reexported to these nations, thus restoring the Soviet's foreign exchange and solidifying their control over the captive nations of Eastern Europe.

Fourth, propaganda effect: My only question concerning this claimed advantage is whether it will be used. If this deal is to reduce tensions, as has been argued by its proponents, I seriously doubt that the administration will aggressively pursue the propaganda effects of the sale. And let us remember that propaganda is, to a great extent, just words. It alone will not harm the Communists.

Fifth, a step to world peace through humanitarianism: I question seriously whether we will ever be able to have real peace with the Soviets as long as they persist in perpetuating the delusions of Marx and Lenin. This transaction is not for feeding hungry people. It is for building up Red reserves and for meeting their export commitments. Khrushchev and the Soviet Government actually stand to make a profit on this deal since the internal Russian wheat price of $2.50 per bushel is well in excess of both the world and the U.S. price for wheat.

Sixth, improved economic activity in the United States: I have no doubt, Mr. Speaker, that speculators have enjoyed a field day on the wheat markets since the Kennedy-Russian deal came into being. The effect on our economy is yet to be seen and I noticed that Secretary Freeman himself held out very little prospect of improved wheat prices in 1964 as a result of this deal.

Seventh, present policy not realistic: The argument most often heard in justification of the Kennedy-Russian wheat deal is that the Canadians are trading with them, so why do not we? Let me

point out first that Canada also trades with Red China. Is that now a reason for us to do so, too? The fact is, Mr. Speaker, that the entire East-West trade relationship is unrealistic and should, as the distinguished gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. QUIE] has suggested, be reviewed from top to bottom. In the meantime, the Kennedy administration most assuredly should be able to prevent the transshipment of wheat from our allies to Russia since they claim that they can now prevent transshipment of wheat from Russia to Cuba, China, North Vietnam, and North Korea.

A MISTAKE FOR AMERICA

The real disadvantages involved in this transaction lie more in the areas of foreign and national policy than in areas of farm and fiscal policy.

First. Our Nation's foreign policy will be in a most awkward position from now on. Let us take Cuba for example. How can we ask our South American friends to help us isolate Cuba? When they ask us why, what do we say to them? Do we

say, "You must not help Castro-he is a Communist"? What do we say when they ask us, "Are there not any Communists in Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia?"

I believe it is generally recognized that the Soviets have a great deal of trouble controlling their European captive nations where there is deep-rooted opposition to the Communist system of land tenure. tenure. This wheat deal, I submit, will also ease the pressure within these captive nations for more private ownership of land, thus postponing further the day of their independence and freedom.

How do we justify a foreign policy position advocating freedom for the captive nations of Eastern Europe when we trade extensively with the Soviet Union?

When a country trades with the enemy for the expressed purpose of monetary gain, the hope for freedom of the many Communist-dominated peoples of the world fade away into despair.

How can we insist that our allies take a hard line against the Reds if we take a soft one ourselves?

Second. Is not this a "bail out" for Khrushchev who is facing his own problems at home? The Chicago Tribune put the situation very succinctly recently when it published a cartoon showing Khrushchev with an empty breadbasket and asking Uncle Sam for wheat while saying:

I'll bury you if you'll sustain me until I get my strength back.

No matter how momentarily helpful to our wheat surplus problem and our balance-of-payments dilemma, selling wheat to the Russians would undeniably strengthen them where they are weak; to wit, shortage of grain. Have we waited all these years in the cold war for this weak spot only to now rush in to fill it without demanding anything in return except the price of the wheat itself? If the deal is to be consummated, why does not the Kennedy administration demand concessions such as the withdrawal of all Russian troops from Cuba or the destruction of the Berlin Wall?

Third. The Communists will be receiving U.S. surpluses at a subsidized price. Mr. Khrushchev will buy American wheat at the world price of $1.77 per bushel at Galveston, Tex. The U.S. price is currently 56 cents a bushel more at that port. The United States taxpayer will pick up the 56-cent differ

ence.

semantics can be made as to how export I realize that a fancy argument in semantics can be made as to how export subsidies are paid, how the KennedyRussian deal will be from replenished stocks, and how the American farmer is the recipient of the subsidy. I think we all recognize the fact that export subsidies are actually paid by the U.S. Government to grain companies which are wheat exporters and are the result of the price support program designed to help U.S. farmers. But the indisputable and undeniable fact remains that the foreign purchaser receives the benefit of the lower world price.

In the past, we have tolerated a situation whereby an English housewife

could buy U.S. wheat products at 50 to 60 cents per bushel cheaper than could an American housewife. The English are at least our allies in the cold war.

Now a Russian housewife will be able to do so unless that great humanitarian, Nikita Khrushchev, collects for himself and the Soviet Communist Party the profit from the resale of the U.S. wheat in Russia where internal wheat prices are much higher than in the United States or in the world market.

Where, then, does the U.S. taxpayer fit into the picture? Secretary Freeman has ventured a guess that total U.S. wheat exports might go to a billion bushels as a result of the Kennedy-Russian deal.

Since our normal wheat exports are from 600 to 700 million bushels, this means that the Secretary thinks the Communists will buy 300 to 400 million bushels of U.S. subsidized wheat. Since the export subsidy or loss to taxpayers currently averages 56 cents per bushel, U.S. taxpayers will be paying from $168 million to $224 million for the privilege of providing wheat to the man who is dedicated to the burial of our Nation, our Government, our system, our families, and us.

Fourth. How do we prevent transshipment of wheat to the Asian Communists or to Cuba? While it might be possible to extract reliable promises from our free world allies that they would not resell to Russia, how can we depend on the Soviets to keep a promise on transshipment?

And even if they did keep their word, the new supply of American wheat could their own wheat which might be transeasily and simply displace Canadian or shipped.

Fifth. The precedents established by this deal are indeed most serious. Aside from the legal precedent of ignoring the Congress, the President's decision opens the door for these events: broadened agricultural trade involving other U.S. farm commodities; broadened trade involving U.S. industrial goods; trade with Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba; and diplomatic recognition of each of these Red nations. In regard to our China policy, let me point out that despite the current protests that Red China is not to be in on the present Kennedy-Russian wheat deal, many persons in the administration actively advocate trade with China. In support of this statement let me quote from the following remarks of April 5, 1962, by the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HÉBERT], as appearing on page A2678 of the daily RECORD of that date:

Mr. HÉBERT. Of particular interest to me is the forthright action taken by the Chairman of the Select Committee, Mr. Kitchin, and our esteemed Speaker when they learned of the efforts by a west coast firm to obtain this Government's approval to export wheat valued at $400 million to North Korea and Communist China. All freedomloving people, I am sure, were happy to learn of the rejection of the application.

The news article is as follows: GRAIN FOR CHINA: Two SOLONS BLOCKED IT (By Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott) WASHINGTON.-The vigorous opposition of two influential Members of Congress played

a major role in stopping the sale of $400 million worth of grain to Communist China and North Korea.

The huge grain shipment was barred by President Kennedy after he learned that Speaker JOHN MCCORMACK, Democrat, of Massachusetts, and Representative A. Paul Kitchin, Democrat, of North Carolina, chairman of a special House investigating subcommittee were opposed to the sale and were ready to light a congressional bonfire if it was approved.

EXPLOSIVE

upon a request from the government concerned. It is rejected."

This statement was drafted by Secretary Ball and Dr. Rostow. They prepared it to keep the door open for future sales to Communist China. Their argument is that surplus grain can be used to temper the Chinese Communist hostilities toward the United States.

POLICY REVIEW

The United States does not recognize either Communist China or North Korea, and has

There is a complete embargo on shipments of American goods and produce to the two countries. However, the Commerce Department at least considered making an exception to the rule in this case.

President Kennedy was asked at a recent news conference about reports that a grain deal with Communist China, which has been suffering from agricultural failures, was being considered.

The proposed shipments would have extended over 3 years. Communist China had wanted 6 million tons of grain while North

tion was given the President by Commerce Secretary Luther Hodges during a White House meeting called to determine whether a private export license for shipment of the grain should be granted.

International Trade Corp., a Seattle, Wash., firm, had applied for the license to ship 6 million tons of wheat and barley to Red China and 4.5 million tons to North Korea over a 3-year period.

The refusal of the license was announced by the Commerce Department in a two-sentence statement issued last Friday. It made no mention of the following dramatic White House meeting during which the legislators' intervention tipped the scales against the

sale.

TWO FAVORED

Under Secretary of State George Ball and Dr. Walt Rostow, Chairman of the State De

partment's Planning Commission, had just finished a vigorous argument supporting the grain sale when the President, turning to Secretary Hodges, asked for his views, stating:

"Luther, since it is your responsibility to grant or deny this license, let's hear from you."

"Before giving you my own position," Hodges replied, "I would like to present the views of Speaker MCCORMACK and Representative Kitchin who is chairman of a House subcommittee investigating the sale of strategic materials to the Communist bloc."

"Have they expressed themselves?" inquired the President.

"Quite vigorously," said Secretary Hodges. "They called me personally and expressed very strong objections to the sale. They requested that I make their views known to you."

"On what grounds are they opposed?"

asked the President.

"Speaker MCCORMACK took the position that the sales would serve to bolster a sinking Communist government at a time when we should be taking steps to hasten its downfall," reported Hodges. "He warned that approval of the shipment of grain to Peiping would touch off a major foreign policy debate in Congress that could easily endanger passage of your trade program."

KITCHIN BLUNT

"What did Representative Kitchin say?" questioned the President.

"Kitchin was very blunt," replied Hodges. "He threatened a full-scale investigation." "What is your recommendation?" the President asked.

"As you know," said Hodges, "I have been opposed to granting the license from the outset unless you should rule it in the national interest to permit such sales. This legislative opposition reinforces my position." "There are good arguments on both sides," said the President in summing up. "However, my decision is that we do nothing to jeopardize the trade bill. We can't afford to have that important legislation mixed up in a China policy debate."

TERSE REFUSAL

Later, the President called Hodges and directed him to reject the license and issue a terse statement, reading:

"There was no evidence that the order held by International Trade Corp. was based

countries.

At the President's request, Dr. Walt Rostow has begun an overall review of our policy toward Communist China. This review is based on a State Department policy paper stating that Sino-Soviet relations are deteriorating so fast that the United States should adopt a flexible China policy to take advantage of the alleged split.

This view of a Russia-China split is challenged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CenJohn McCone. tral Intelligence Director John McCone. They hold that the rift is not nearly as deep as claimed in the official State Department paper.

As you can see from the news story, the Speaker was quoted as follows: Speaker MCCORMACK took the position that the sales would serve to bolster a sinking Communist government at a time when we should be taking steps to hasten its downfall.

Secretary Hodges was quoted as say

ing:

Kitchin was very blunt. He threatened a full-scale investigation.

The President was quoted as saying: There are good arguments on both sides, however, my decision is that we can do nothing to jeopardize the trade bill.

The news article then goes on to state that a terse statement denying the request was issued after being drafted by Dr. Rostow and Secretary Ball who prepared it to keep the door open for future

sales to Communist China.

story, but I do know that the InternaI cannot vouch for the accuracy of this tional Trade Corp. of Seattle, Wash., did seek to sell subsidized wheat to Red China last year and was refused permission to do so. I was as happy then to see that result as I am unhappy now to see a wheat sale to the Russians.

March 23, 1962, reported the rejected The Washington Evening Star of sale as follows:

[From the Washington Evening Star,
Mar. 23, 1962]

U.S. REJECTS GRAIN REQUEST FOR RED ASIA A Seattle trading firm's request for permission to ship $400 million of grain to Communist China and North Korea was rejected today by the Government.

Secretary of Commerce Hodges announced the denial of export license applications from the International Trading Corp., Seattle, for sales of wheat and barley to the two Communist nations in Asia.

A brief announcement said "there was no evidence that the order held by ITC was based upon a request from the Governments

concerned."

Officials indicated this was a roundabout

way of saying that the proposed grain shipment had been subject to discussions between the Commerce Department and the International Trading Corp., and did not involve any talks with the Governments of Red China and North Korea.

Informed sources said that International Trading Corp., in negotiating for the sale of the grain, dealt with a private businessman in Hong Kong and had no contact with the actual purchasers in Communist China and North Korea.

WHAT TO DO?

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I would like to remind the House that 2 years ago there was a Berlin crisis marked by the construction of the infamous wall. One year ago there was a Cuban crisis marked by the prospect of an imminent nuclear rocket attack on our Nation. Two weeks ago Russian forces in Germany refused to allow American and British troops to enter West Berlin. Two days ago the Reds again began to harass our troops in Germany. Yet in spite of all this experience, our Government is now going to allow the sale of wheat to Russia. What fate holds in the future is uncertain, but no one should be surprised if 1 month or 1 year from now we are engaged in another showdown somewhere in the world with the Communists. When we do reach that point we may look back with chagrin on October 1963 when our Government decided to bolster up the economies of our potential enemies.

Four times since 1954 there have been

attempts to allow subsidized sales to the

Reds. Three times before those efforts

failed. The fourth time now looks probable unless Congress and the people stop

nedy which was conceived in violation of it. If Congress does not take immediate action, the decision of President Kenthe law of the land and which is now

being executed to the detriment of all of

us will, I sadly predict, become one of America's most tragic mistakes in this decade.

Mr. MILLER of California.

Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr.

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MILLER of California. I may say, Mr. Khrushchev changes his mind quite frequently nowadays. Recently we have had a lot of publicity in this country that has led us to believe he is begging off in his effort to send Russian cosmonauts to the moon, but to a group of American businessmen yesterday, he that the Russians were very definitely in the race, and they were going on. It is the same question of consistency showing here, and I hope we are not going to be misled and accept Mr. Khrushchev's leadership under all the circumstances.

reasserted

Mr. HOEVEN. I thank the gentleman for his comment. Moscow-Washington for his comment. taking the usual negotiations are course. Having won the first big concession, the U.S. offer to supply the wheat, Khrushchev at once started to whittle away at the "firm conditions".