Have we waited all these years in the cold war for this weak spot only to now rush in to fill it without demanding anything in reIf the deal is to be consummated why does not the Kennedy administration demand concessions such as the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba or the destruction of the Berlin wall? Furthermore, if we sell wheat to Russia, there will be no logical reason why we should not sell it to Red China and to Castro in Cuba.

I hear someone say, "We have not recognized Red China." Unless I miss the signs of the time we are drifting that way. It is being advocated in many high places. I read in the paper today where Red China was short of grain. The article said the President was waiting for a request from the Red Chinese. I do not know how reliable that newspaper story is, but I am a bit apprehensive in that once we engage in the sale of wheat and grains to the Communists, we have thrown the door wide open and we are defeating the very purpose of our position in the cold war.

Mr. Speaker, Russia is either our friend or she is our enemy. We either

have a cold war or we do not have a cold war. If we do not have a cold war why are we spending over half of our budget for national defense if it is not to save the world from communism?

Mr. TEAGUE of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. TEAGUE of California. It seems to me the point the gentleman has just so well made has not been set forth in the public discussion on this matter as often as it should be.

I think we can all agree that Soviet Russia is not proposing to buy wheat from us to help our wheat farmers or to help our gold situation. There must be There must be some reason. There must be some reason which the Russians themselves deem important enough so that they have proposed a wheat deal.

Now, there are many people of good faith and good intentions who believe we should sell wheat to Russia. I am not one of them. I have been opposed to the deal from the start. But it seems to me, certainly abundantly clear, if we are to sell wheat to Russia we must insist upon something in return more than dollars or gold. There must be some concession or something given on the part of Russia in perhaps the matter of the removal of troops from Cuba, tearing down the Berlin wall, or some other point on which we have differences of opinion.

Mr. Speaker, I compliment the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. HOEVEN] for making this point so well, and I think we should continue to make it.

Mr. HOEVEN. I thank the gentleman

for his kind remarks.

If we sell wheat to our potential enemies, we may have the satisfaction of getting the gold and the dollars in payment, but we most certainly will be surrendering principles in our fight against world communism. The administration only mentions material considerations-the greed for gold; we want the money, we want to

get rid of our wheat surplus, and I am all for doing those things. But there is something more important and that is the great moral issue involved. The following article in the Iron Age of October 17, 1963, tells the full story:

THE WHEAT SALE: MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE

Let's get this wheat sale to the Communists straight. It is not a humanitarian gesture. It is not an accommodation for a friend. It is nothing but a coldblooded business deal-to save storage space.

The tax

the price of war with Mexico, Senator John C. Calhoun warned us that we were reaching for "forbidden fruit" by conquest.

When Treasury Secretary McAdoo in Wilson's administration arranged to insure American ships in the Atlantic trade and

thereby insure profit, it was another example of taking the fast dollar and ignoring the consequences.

There are, alas, too many such examples from American history when the money seemed more important than the principle and the long-range outcome. The Mexican War, along with our seizure of the Panama Canal zone, is still proof positive in Latin America that we are imperialists-and the will not let it die.

Now that we have that straight, where do we stop? Mr. Khrushchev told us he So their economy is all shot to hell and we would bury us, economically, not militarily. are bailing them out with wheat.

Part of this selling is because other nations are doing it too. So what? They always have. And they have sold to Red China. Why don't we sell to Red China? Is

there any difference between the communism

of Russia and Red China?

You bet your boots there is little difference between what the Red Chinese and the Red Russians think. Maybe they are at each other's throat, temporarily. But when it comes to selling wheat, shouldn't we sell to the Chinese, too?

It was not too long ago that millions of Americans, including the farmers, and wheat

brokers, were crying to the high heavens

about the Russians. What has changed since then? Nothing, we think.

The Russians and the rest of the Commies around the world are out to get us. As far as the gold or the dollars we get for the wheat, it won't help our trade deficit much.

Besides, we could wipe out a lot of the trade deficit if we cut out the international pork barrel for those who do not need it, and haven't needed it for years.

The fact that the President had a public relations conference (press conference to you) a la radio, television, etc., has nothing to do with selling wheat to the Reds.

Questions were answered for the admin

istration's benefit, in view of millions upon millions. And why not, with an election coming up?

Let's make up our minds. Are we partners with Khrushchev or are we not?

I also set out the following news story by Holmes Alexander which appeared in the Sioux City Journal of October 23, 1963:

PART OF LENIN'S GOAL? THE WHEAT Deal:

HISTORY'S WARNING

(By Holmes Alexander) Nobody at President Kennedy's recent press conference, when he announced the

wheat deal with Russia, had the nerve or the handy knowledge to ask his comment on this very pertinent statement by Lenin:

"It is necessary," Lenin said December 21, 1920, "to bribe capitalism with extra profit ment) with the aid of which we will *** and we will get the basics (equip

strengthen ourselves, will finally get up on our feet and then defeat it [capitalism] economically."

How the President would have explained our willingness to fall into this well-marked trap, I do not know-for there is no rational cal answer which the history-minded Presianswer. Yet, I am afraid, there is a historident could have given. When it was contemplated in the 1840's to annex Texas at

The lucrative arms trade of 1914-17

brought profits of $13 billion, as estimated by John Dos Passos in his book called "Mr. Wilson's War." But the disastrous consequences of our entering that European war are still being spun out.

What will be the consequences of the wheat deal? There is a good deal of ready evidence to show what happens whenever the Western World has been beguiled by moneymaking into selling useful goods to the Soviet Union.

Testifying to a Senate subcommittee in 1961, the Library of Congress authority on Russian economy, Joseph Anthony Gwyer, gave this summary of the prewar buildup we supplied in the Lenin-Stalin period:

"In the early 1920's, by granting mineral concessions, the Soviets obtained from the United States and from other countries, key types of industrial equipment, plus trucks and tractors for their agriculture * * French manufacturers shared with Americans the credit of helping the Soviet Union build its airpower.

"The Italians provided the Soviets with Fiat cars, airplane engines, dockyard equipment and ships. Germany, to a large extent, became responsible for building up the Soviet machine tool industry. The first Soviet watch factory began functioning with the machinery purchased from the United States."

Did all this lead to peaceful "coexistence"? Or did it advance Lenin's plan to "get up

our feet and then defeat (capitalism) economically"?

Likewise, during and after World War IIup to about 1947-the United States poured not only war supplies but a billion dollars

worth of industrial tools into the Soviet Union, as Mr. Gwyer told the Senate subcommittee. No doubt, this contribution helped to make possible the Soviet sputnik triumph of 1957.

And now, to Russia, has come another time "to bribe capitalism with extra profit." A crisis has occurred in Soviet industry and agriculture, requiring outside help. It is help we would never give, as we give foreign aid, for the frank purpose of uplifting another nation's economy.

No, we are doing it for very wrong reasons to unload our wheat surpluses and to

get gold. If, like the greedy monkey, we find

ourselves captured, with a clutched fist around the bait, history will have to write that Lenin warned us-but that President Kennedy did not.

er, will the gentleman yield? Mr. OLIVER P. BOLTON. Mr. Speak

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. OLIVER P. BOLTON. I want to compliment the gentleman on the statement he has made. The gentleman has gold for these farm commodities. I indicated that we were going to receive have been trying for several days to ascertain from the Export-Import Bank

the truth or falsehood of a well-substantiated rumor that I get. It is my understanding, at least from people in that field, that the Export-Import Bank is now considering a loan to Hungary which would permit Hungary to purchase corn with our money when they are in our debt already and, as a matter of fact, behind in their payments on that debt.

Has the gentleman any information along that line?

Mr. HOEVEN. I have read some of the newspaper reports relating to the facts the gentleman is giving us. It is even suggested that as a part of our accommodation policy we should lend money to Russia so she could buy our wheat. I do not know whether the administration wants to go that far or not. Mr. LATTA. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. LATTA. In answer to the question propounded by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BOLTON], may I advise the House I have been informed on inquiry of the Export-Import Bank that this loan has been made on the Hungarian purchase for $6.4 million worth of corn, that we are guaranteeing that loan with our taxpayers' dollars in the ExportImport Bank to the extent of $6.4 million. The loan was made by one bank in New York City.

Mr. BEERMANN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. BEERMANN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to commend my colleague from Iowa for his comprehensive interpretation of the wheat sale situation, and perhaps expand upon one point he made; that one in reference to concessions the United States might win if it is going to pursue this sale.

Not that I condone the sale; I firmly believe it is morally wrong that we make it. But if the administration is bent upon pursuing it and willing to negotiate every point in relation to it, then it only seems sensible that we win some concessions.

Therefore, sarcastically speaking, I was wondering whether it might be appropriate to ask Russia to give us free access to Berlin. I know we have the right to free access but, unfortunately, the Russians do not seem to know it. Therefore, we are treated to a series of humiliating instances wherein American troops are forced to wait hours until Russian guards decide to let them pass. I am wondering if we cannot insist, in the sale agreement, that someone speak to the Russian border guards and tell them it is naughty to stop American troop convoys; and if they do not let the Americans pass, we will never let Mr. Khrushchev see Disneyland.

We might also point out that the Berlin wall violates the spirit, if not the letter of World War II agreements, so would Russia please quit restoring it? I am sure the wall will eventually be torn down since East Germans simply cannot stand having their view of their less fortunate capitalistic neighbors blocked.

So all we have to do is to have Russia agree that the wall won't be repaired, and that doesn't seem much of a concession to ask when it is compared against keeping the Russian bellies full during the coming winter.

There are many other concessions I might cite all in sarcasm, but not one expresses the degree of disgust I have for this sale. I think it is extremely unfortunate that we are apparently selling out on a moral issue and being led in that sellout by the present administraIn other times when backbones were stiffer, this transaction could have been labeled "treason."

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

may include Mr. Harriman's outstanding address following my remarks in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LIBONATI). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Dakota?

There was no objection.

Mr. SHORT. I call particular attention to several paragraphs which refer to specific statements made to Mr. Harriman by Soviet leaders reiterating their adherence to Communist principles and to the fact that they intend to pursue their aim of Communist world domination.

Mr. SHORT. I thank I thank the distinguished ranking member of the House Committee on Agriculture for yielding to me. I want to commend him for taking the time to bring to the attention of the House some of the realities on this proposition of selling wheat to Communist Russia or any Communist nation, for that matter.

I think one of the important facets of this whole operation has been the fact that I believe the American people are tending to look upon all of the Communist nations at this time as being a little bit more friendly. In fact, perhaps little bit more friendly. In fact, perhaps a lot more friendly than they have been in the past.

May I say that I was one of those who raised some question and expressed some opposition as to the merits of selling wheat to Russia when this proposition was first publicized. I did this because I felt that many American people were coming to the conclusion that Russia was on the verge of becoming a more friendly country. As I pointed out at the time, Russia had done nothing even at the time of our agreeing to the test ban treaty positively evidencing her good faith. She could have removed cause for tension between the United States and Russia by such action as removing her troops from Cuba or taking down the Berlin wall, or probably even extending a greater degree of freedom to some of the captive nations. No such demonstration of the desire for friendship was ever made and has not been made to this day.

We had some reason to believe that after we signed the test ban treaty they might reciprocate by making some positive evidence of their desire for friendship and move in the direction of eliminating tension. They have not done this.

As we consider the matter of selling wheat to Russia I think we should keep in mind that we are not dealing with a friendly nation. Neither are we dealing with a country which has any intention of becoming friendly. If there is any need for clarification of the fact that Russia still clings to the Communist ideology and is not about to temper her adherence, this proof was offered in a speech delivered on October 27 by the Honorable W. Averell Harriman at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I

I urge the Members of the House to read in the RECORD on tomorrow the speech made by the distinguished exGovernor of New York, who is now an Under Secretary of State. This speech as contained in a press release issued by the Department of State is as follows:

"The limited Nuclear Test Ban Agreement reached with the Soviet Union this summer is a step in the direction of reducing the danger of nuclear disaster," W. Averell Har

riman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said tonight. "But we must not take it as a signal that we can drop our guard or reduce our vigilance. It may be that our competition with the Communists in the political and economic fields will become more intense, not less."

The Under Secretary spoke at the award dinner of the American Jewish Congress at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City. Governor Harriman received the congress Stephen S. Wise Award for Advancing Human

Freedom.

"It is most important for us to keep in mind what this agreement is, and what it is not," Governor Harriman said. “It is a first step in the direction of bringing the destructive power of nuclear weapons under rational control. It will sharply reduce the danger to health from radioactive fallout for all mankind. We hope it will lead to other steps forward-in the direction of ending the danger of war by miscalculation or surprise attack and, eventually, of halting and then reducing the upward spiral of competition in the arms race."

"But we should make no mistake about

it being a step into the millenium. Chair

man Khrushchev has told me that 'there can be no coexistence in ideology; that conflict goes on.' Mr. Gromyko confirmed this in his recent speech at the United Nations when he said there could be no compromise in ideology.

"The Soviet leaders remain devoted Com

munists, pledged to pursue their aim of a Communist world by every means at their disposal-propaganda, subversion and socalled wars of liberation. That does not mean, however, that there may not be areas of common interest where agreements are possible. The nuclear test ban is one such area; we hope there will be others.

learned that nuclear threats could not suc

"One year ago, in Cuba, Mr. Khrushchev

ceed against a powerful and determined United States. President Kennedy, through his courage and wisdom, forced Mr. Khru

shchev to withdraw his offensive nuclear missiles from Cuba. And it is doubtful that the Soviet leader wants to repeat this experience.

"This, I am convinced, was one of the reasons Chairman Khrushchev decided to go through with the test ban treaty. He wanted to reduce the risk of nuclear war which would destroy all the Soviets had built

in Russia. Second, he undoubtedly hoped that a reduction of world tensions would permit him to make good on some of his long overdue promises to his own people for a better life. Finally, in his deepening struggle with the Chinese Communists for leadership of the world Communist movement, he saw that he could use the test ban agreement to isolate Peiping in world opinion. As expected, the Chinese Reds turned down this agreement which has met with the overwhelming support of most of mankind. This supports the Soviet claim that whereas they would communize the world without nuclear war, Peiping's reckless plans would end in nuclear disaster.

"The chilling experience of their Cuban adventure and now their position in the battle with Peiping has moved Moscow's leaders away from their former rocket-rattling course in the Middle East and elsewhere. But we can count on their attempting to gain their ends in all parts of the non-Communist world by every other means-including support of armed subversion where it seems to promise success.

"This is only one reason why our programs of military and economic assistance may now be more essential than ever. This is a time for us to do more and to do it better. If we retreat from our efforts to help underdeveloped nations to achieve their aspirations in freedom, we can be sure that the Communists will take advantage of every weakness.

"In the continuing ideological struggle with the Communists, the field of religion is one of the more important areas of deep difference. From the time that Lenin said that 'Religion is the opium of the people,' to the present day, the effort of the Communists to stamp out religious sentiments and practices has been vigorous and unrelenting. Back in 1927, Stalin told an American labor delegation: "The Party cannot be neutral towards religion and it does conduct anti-religious propaganda against all and every religious prejudice because it stands for science *** it will continue to carry on propaganda against these prejudices."

"When I went to Moscow in 1941, I argued the question of freedom of religion with Stalin as important to our mutual understanding in the war effort. The only result I could identify was the release shortly afterward by the Soviet Minister for Information of a long propaganda statement on the guarantee of religious freedom in the Soviet Constitution.

"I need not remind this group that despite this and other elaborate denials by the Soviet Government, there is still suppression of and discrimination against all religious groups in the Soviet Union. And undoubtedly the heaviest burden of this attack has been borne by the Jews.

"The list of Jewish writers, scholars, and artists who died in concentration camps or at the hands of the secret police in Stalin's final years is a long one. And in the closing days of the ruthless dictator's rule, the notorious doctors' plot was the clear signal of a planned new wave of terror against the Jews.

"After Stalin's death, there was some relaxation. But the respite was brief. Slowly, steadily, new pressures were exerted against the Jews. One after another, synagogues have been closed throughout the Soviet Union until only a few are left. Even the baking of matzohs for the Passover has been prohibited and the last kosher meat market in Moscow has been closed. Nor is the prejudice solely on religious grounds. A person of Jewish descent who may have broken completely with his religious tradition must still carry the nationality designation 'Jew' in his identity card.

"In 1957, the last Jew was removed from the Presidium, the ruling body of the Soviet Union. Of the 175 members of the Commu

nist Party's Central Committee, only 1 is of Jewish descent and only 1 Jew is a senior commander of the Soviet armed forces. It is difficult, if not impossible, for a Jew to play

a significant role in political or military affairs. But the Soviet state has no hesitation about harnessing Jewish technical skills and scientific genius for its chosen purposes. Though Jews represent only 1 percent of the Soviet population, they make up more than 9 percent of that country's scientific workers.

"During my last visit to Moscow, I raised the question of religion with Mr. Khrushchev, prompted by his son-in-law's audience with the Pope. The Soviet leader replied that he is an atheist in an atheist government. He closed the door to any thought

that the Soviet Government might alter its antireligious policies.

"I know that all of you are particularly concerned, as I am, with the plight of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union. distinguished group of Americans met here in New York 2 weeks ago at the Conference on cussion, they adopted an appeal of conscience for the Jews of the Soviet Union. That appeal and its specific recommendations should be heartily endorsed. This action by persons of different races and religions was in the best tradition of American concern over discrimination and religious persecution wherever they occur.

the Status of Soviet Jews. After full dis

"The Government of the United States opposes the loss of basic freedoms wherever it may occur-whether by the Jews or other religious groups in the Soviet Union, by racial or national minorities in any part of the world. The difficulty is in doing something effective to alleviate their trials. As you know, the Soviets are resentful of official approaches on matters which they consider to be within their domestic jurisdiction. We do raise these matters informally whenever there is an appropriate opportunity.

"We are working constantly to reunite families of American citizens and to bring close relatives to this country. Mr. Khrushchev has indicated he wanted to see this problem settled and there has been some progress. As a result, approximately 800 Soviet citizens have been permitted to join their relatives in this country and quite a few of them were Jews. Our efforts in this regard extend to all the countries of Eastern Europe, not to the Soviet Union alone. We are making progress and we hope more will be made in the months ahead.

"At the United Nations, we have called attention to persecution wherever it occurs. As a result of our initiative, the U.N.'s Commission on Human Rights has agreed to accept and to use in its periodic reports information supplied by nongovernmental organizations. This kind of exposure of the facts to the spotlight of world opinion is often more effective in producing useful results than formal protests in government-to-government communications. President Ken

nedy, in his recent speech at the United Nations, condemned the closing of synagogues as one of the violations of human rights.

"But you can be certain," Governor Harriman concluded, "that if it seems likely that a more direct approach will serve useful ends and ease the situation of even a few of our fellow men, our Government will make it. Meanwhile, the relentless exposure of the real facts by groups such as this will continue to serve the cause of freedom and of justice."

Mr. HOEVEN. I am glad the gentleman made reference to Ambassador Harriman's speech.

May I also call the attention of the House to a very fine speech made in the other body on November 4 by the senior Senator from Connecticut [Mr. DODD]. It is one of the finest exposes of this

entire situation. I commend it to you, and I compliment the senior Senator from Connecticut for his very factual and statesmanlike speech. It should make everyone stop, look, and listen. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. DoLE].

Mr. DOLE. I thank my colleague for yielding.

I might point out, first of all, that I am privileged to represent the largest wheat producing district in America. Of course, our farmers are interested in disposing of their commodities. They have been asked by Secretary Freeman, as he travels around rural America after his travels around Communist Russia and other Communist bloc countries, whether or not they wish to sell their wheat, and, needless to say, many hands go up because the farmer, of course, wants to sell his wheat. I do believe, however, they should be given the entire story. It is hard to justify fighting communism with the one hand and feeding communism with the other and I make specific reference to the 130 Americans who have died fighting in Vietnam. In the recent book by J. Edgar Hoover, "A Study of Communism," he pointed out that we cannot isolate one Communist country from another Communist country. We are dealing with an international Communist conspiracy whether we like it or not. We talk about peaceful coexistence-we all want peace and good will but certainly cannot have it as long as we travel a one-way street. Just what has Russia done to relax world

tension?

On this basis, 10 of us from wheat producing districts sent a telegram to President Kennedy on September 30 and another telegram on the very day that he approved the sale on October 8, 1963. We are still waiting for a reply.

The telegrams of September 30 and October 8 are as follows:

SEPTEMBER 30, 1963. The Honorable JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C.

Recognizing the great interest in and significance of the current proposal to sell U.S. wheat to the Soviet Union, we desire clarification of pertinent details concerning such a transaction and the probable ramifications should you make an affirmative decision.

Have any representatives of the Soviet Union or other Communist nations recently contacted our Government, either directly or indirectly, with reference to purchase of wheat or other U.S. agricultural commodities? If so, in what quantity and upon what terms and for what price?

tion on our foreign policy been considered? Has the long-range effect of such a transacWhat will be our policy toward Red China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Cuba in the event any of these nations should hereafter offer gold or dollars for wheat or other U.S. farm commodities?

In the event of a United States-Russian wheat transaction, what diplomatic pressures could our Government apply to free world nations wishing to step up trade with Cuba or other Communist nations? Will such sales to Russia impair the present policy of containment in Cuba?

Another vital factor in your decision involves the current and projected status of the world wheat market. Secretary Freeman has pointed out that Soviet Russia canceled

many of its export commitments and that outside the United States there are but a few substantial sources of wheat in the world. In view of Soviet and European shortages, therefore, there appears a serious question whether our Nation could export any more wheat to Russia than to the free world. If this be so, exporting wheat to

free world countries would seem an obvious

choice.

Will transshipment from Russia to Cuba of any U.S. wheat purchased, or its by

products be permitted?

Finally, we trust the legal aspects of such a sale to Russia-such as the Johnson Act on export credits, the Webb-Pomerene Act on export assistance, Public Law 480 which

prohibits soft currency sales, barter, and Government-supported dollar sales to Russia, and the Latta amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1961 expressing congressional policy against a subsidized sale to Russia

will be full considered.

As representatives of wheat-producing areas, we shall appreciate answers to the questions raised. Without specific information, it is difficult for us and the many farmers we represent to make a proper

appraisal.

BOB DOLE, AL QUIE, DON SHORT, GARNER SHRIVER, JOE SKUBITZ, BOB ELLSWORTH,

OCTOBER 8, 1963. The Honorable JOHN F. KENNEDY, President of the United States, The White House, Washington, D.C.

Since reports indicate an announcement will be made during your press conference this afternoon concerning sale of wheat and possibly other grains to Russia and its satellites, we again respectfully request your position relative to the questions posed in our telegram of September 30. All Americans want assurance the sale of wheat, or any other commodity, to Russia or its satellites will not endanger the life of one American, here or abroad.

Chairman, Federation of Hungarian
Former Political Prisoners.
NEW YORK.

I would like to ask one question, Mr. HOEVEN. Mr. Freeman spent 30 days in Russia and other Communist countries. He came back apparently feeling that technology had advanced in Russia and that Russians were gaining in agriculture. There was not one single bit of evidence he knew anything about a crop failure. Do you know why the top man in U.S. agriculture did not recognize this crop failure?

Mr. HOEVEN. I am glad the gentleman made reference to that particular subject and I want to make an observation. It is regrettable that so many people in this country do not really understand that we are in a cold war with the Communists. Many well-meaning people say we have to feed the hungry. I am for feeding hungry people too, but that is entirely beside the point. I challenge anybody to point out to me wherein

DON BROTZMAN, CATHERINE MAY, BEN in the President's report sent to Congress REIFEL, ODIN LANGEN. in which he justified the wheat sale, he gave one humanitarian reason for such sale. Everything he mentioned related to saving money, to doing away with storage costs, to bettering our balanceof-payments situation, to increasing the income of farmers, et cetera. But, not one single word about feeding the hungry mouths of starving people. I am receiving a few letters from well-meaning folks who kind of chide me for not wanting to feed hungry people. But that is not the issue at all. It is not claimed by our Government that the wheat is needed to relieve the hungry in Russia. There is no famine in Russia and people are Secretary Freeman not starving there. Secretary Freeman upon his return from Russia had a press Conference and it is reported he said that he saw no evidence of hunger. He is also reported to have said that the Russians were able to feed themselves. Russia wants this wheat so it can meet its grain export commitments to the satellite nations. That is why she wants this wheat. This will permit her to devote her money and energies to national defense and the buildup of her vast military resources. Wheat sales are important to the Soviets primarily for political reasons and not for any humanitarian reasons whatsoever.

BOB DOLE, AL QUIE, DON SHORT, GARNER
SHRIVER, JOE SKUBITZ, BOB ELLSWORTH,
DON BROTZMAN, CATHERINE MAY, BEN
REIFEL, ODIN LANGEN.

Mr. Speaker, time does not permit me to point out other very fine statements, but I call your attention to one in a letter to the editor under the heading "Peasants Can Defeat Communism" by Bela Fabian, chairman, Federation of Hungarian Former Political Prisoners The matter referred to is as follows:

PEASANTS CAN DEFEAT COMMUNISM To the HERALD TRIBUNE:

Between the two world wars Hungary exported 5 million tons of wheat a year, as well as cattle, poultry, butter and fruit. Today, Hungary depends on imported wheat. Why? The peasants will not work for a regime that took their land by force and forced them into collectives. They want back their land and freedom.

The 1956 revolt showed that armed uprisings cannot defeat communism without the support of the West. But in Hungary, as in other oppressed countries, the peasants have found that by not working they can force the regime to its knees. Peasant resistance

does not ask for outside intervention in its

fight for freedom. It hopes to lick the Com

munists by itself.

The Hungarian, as well as the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak and Romanian, peasants ask only one thing of the West: do not give aid

Mr. DOLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my remarks and include extraneous matter. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Kansas?

There was no objection.

this problem that we are dealing with; that in addition to opportunity of the Russians to meet their commitments to the Soviet bloc nations, as well as Cuba and Red China and particularly East Germany, this would give an opportunity to the Soviets to stockpile these products, for some unknown reason, because they have not stated what reason they might want to stockpile grain. But we can be certain that it would not be a reason consistent with the best interests of our Nation. This is bad politics for the United States of America, good world politics and internal politics for Mr. Khrushchev, and we should certainly call the whole deal off.

sale of wheat to the Soviet Union, as it Mr. Speaker, the proposed subsidized has been reported so far by the administration, is not in the best interests of our Nation or of the free world.

The proposal has never been described as having any humanitarian aspects, the Soviet Union is facing a famine or and no suggestion has been made that that any Russian people are on the verge

of starvation.

Accordingly, we have no right to assume that Russia needs the wheat for its own domestic needs, unless it is seeking to acquire a large quantity of wheat as a stockpile for some future, unknown purpose. It is much more likely that the Kremlin wants to acquire our wheat in order to export wheat to its satellite nations or, indeed, even to Red China or Cuba.

If, then, the Soviet Union desires to purchase our wheat for the purpose of stockpiling or for export to other nations, it is certainly appropriate to askin the first instance-upon what theory a sale of wheat to the Soviet Union may be justified under any circumstance, or at any price. at any price. I have not heard anyone deny that the Soviet Union continues to be the enemy of our Nation and of our democratic system of government.

A majority of the Republican members of the House Agriculture Committee has denounced this proposed trade with the enemy as morally wrong, and has stated that this wheat deal will destroy our position of moral leadership in the world.

A most remarkable aspect of the deal which is said to have been negotiated is that it indicates no negotiations, whatever. The Russians are buying our wheat at the world price-the price at which we sell wheat to our allies and friends throughout the world. Consequently, the Soviet Union is suddenly exalted to the role of "most favored nation," under this deal. This means

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield.

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and want to compliment him on the very fine statement he has made this afternoon, and also I would like to associate myself with his remarks. Also I would like to compliment him for bringing out the fact

enjoys the preferred status of purchasing a large quantity of our surplus wheat at a price 56 cents lower than wheat can be purchased by domestic buyers. This reduced price results from the contribution by American taxpayers to the extent of the 56-cent differential.

As the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. HOEVEN], the distinguished ranking mi

nority member of the House Committee on Agriculture, declared earlier in remarks on the floor of this House: We are not upset when we learn that the British housewife is able to purchase bread at a lower price than the American housewife, because of the lower price of American grown wheat per bushel in England than in the United States. But the American housewife and the U.S. taxpayer will not sit still while the Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Freeman, negotiates a sale of wheat to the Soviet Union, which may enable the Russian housewife to buy her loaf of bread manufactured from American grown wheat at a price lower than she, the American housewife, has to pay.

If I understand the dilemma which has arisen with regard to cotton-and I believe I do-a subsidy of cotton is desired for the domestic textile manufacturer because the foreign textile manufacturer purchasing cotton at a figure lower than the domestic manufacturer has to pay is able to compete unfairly

with our American manufacturers.

Is it not possible that the Soviet Union might likewise place us in a similar posiif our American wheat is converted into flour or wheat products in the Soviet Union-from wheat which they purchase at 56 cents a bushel cheaper than domestic millers must pay-we may find that we are buying are buying cereals, cookies, cakes, and other manufactured wheat products from the Soviet bloc nations at

tion with regard to wheat? Certainly,

prices which will make it impossible for our domestic manufacturers to compete pricewise.

But, the administration has stated that President Kennedy wishes to impose a restriction against Soviet reexportation of American grain to Soviet bloc nations and to Red China and Cuba. However, it should be pointed out that even though these restrictions were observed there would be nothing to prevent the Soviet Union from consuming the American wheat-itself—and then exporting Soviet-grown wheat to the satellites and Soviet bloc nations, plus Red China and Castro's Cuba.

I am informed that, last year, the Soviet Union exported approximately 7.8 million tons of grain-of which wheat constituted 4.7 million tons. East Germany was the largest consumer, with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Brazil, and Cuba also receiving large shipments from the Soviet Union.

It would seem most important to the political success of Khrushchev that this dependence of the Soviet bloc nations on the Soviet Union should continue. The Soviet Union's stock would certainly plummet if Khrushchev could not deliver wheat, and if the inherent weakness of the Communist system should be brought home-through actual food shortagesto the rank-and-file citizens of the Soviet bloc nations.

Not only does there appear to be no negotiation with regard to the price at which the Soviets might purchase our wheat, there appears likewise to be no

negotiations with regard to any other subject which today stands between our Nation and the Soviet Union. The Berlin wall, the troops in Cuba, the harassment of our troop convoys serving Berlin, and other subjects might appropriately be arbitrated if we are to serve the great internal and political needs of the Soviet leadership. But none of these subjects are said to have been resolved.

Indeed, the arrogant effrontery of the Communists with regard to our troop movements along the road to Berlin appears to have been deliberately stepped up. This is as if to remind us that indeed the Khrushchev promise to bury us will be made good and that, meanwhile, we must subsidize those who would detroy us, and keep them strong and healthy while we await our day with destiny as Khrushchev has planned it.

The wheat deal, as it stands now, is good world politics for Khrushchev and In addition, purchasing his cohorts. wheat at a reduced and subsidized price is a very attractive financial deal for

the Soviets.

But, as it stands today, the wheat deal

is poor politics for our Nation. It is politically unwise in the eyes of the world and, if I may say so, it is politically unof the citizens of the Nation. wise for the administration in the eyes

Perhaps we can learn one important lesson from the Soviet leaders; namely, that whenever they discover that they have made a bad deal—they call the whole deal off.

tural failures in Red utopia and that the Russians had a surplus of gold ready to be put on the barrelhead for our wheat. No one raised a question whether the Russian gold was hot-which it is, having been produced mainly by the toil of slave labor-because we need gold to improve our balance of payments. Russian gold, hot or cold, for our wheat looked like and was presented as a sound business deal. Public protests were raised, but the ring of gold drowned them out.

After the lure of gold was fully established, authority for negotiating the deal was given to a combine of private U.S. grain operators. When the haggling process with the Russians began, a series of significant leaks came out of the haggling room.

It soon became clear that the Russians expected to get wheat subsidized by the American taxpayers. That is, the Russian offer was well below the normal market price for wheat and represented a price about 60 cents per bushel less than the actual cost of the wheat, the 60 cents per bushel difference being the U.S. Government subsidy—which in reality is the subsidy provided by the American taxpayers. No doubt the Russians figured that since the American taxpayers had been maneuvered into subsidizing the Tito and Gomulka regimes, it was worth a try on their part.

The next disagreement to leak out of the haggling room was that the Russians refused to use U.S. vessels to transport the golden wheat, a fixed condition required by U.S. law. Their argument Mr. Speaker, was that they could get cheaper rates on non-U.S.-flag ships. Apparently the

and Mr. Freeman. That is my suggestion to Mr. Kennedy

Mr. HUTCHINSON. will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentle- Russians intend to ignore President Ken

man.

Mr. HUTCHINSON.

Mr. Speaker, I simply want to make this observation: I am sure the gentleman will agree with me that the people in the United States have the idea that if we can get gold for this wheat that that will be the quid pro quo. Would not the gentleman agree with me, however, that we will in effect be shortchanged so far as the gold is concerned to the extent of the subsidy which we are giving to the Russians? We are going to get less gold for the wheat due to the fact that they are going to buy on the world market whereas our economy has to purchase the wheat on our domestic market.

Mr. HOEVEN. I tried to point that out. The gentleman is exactly correct. Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

nedy's promise that the deal would produce "added income and employment to American shipping, longshoremen, railroad workers as well as grain traders and farmers." There is an escape clause in U.S. law with regard to use of U.S. vessels, limiting use to "when available." No doubt the Russians will produce a plan in which American vessels will not be available.

These events were followed by news that if we did not bow to Russian haggling, they would turn to other nations of the free world to make their wheat purchases. Someone should have asked them to whom they could turn for the volume of wheat they need to survive. Canada and Australia, the other great wheat producers, have already sold their surplus to Red China and the Russians. There is no other wheat surplus in the

Mr. HOEVEN. I yield to the gentle- world able to meet the Russian needs. man from Ohio.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, the issue of selling U.S. wheat to the Russians has passed through so many contradictory stages and conflicting reports that the whole matter has reached the proportions of an Odyssey-with the real proportions of an Odyssey-with the real issues lost in the wanderings up and down a well marked Russian trail.

The first public notice of a possible sale of wheat to the Russians played the line that the Russians were in desperate need due to another round of agricul

But here again Russian threats have a way of influencing too many people.

These events were capped with hints that the Russians would seek a loan from the United States in order to cover the cost of our wheat. Someone forgot to ask what happened to all that Russian surplus gold that was supposed to be on the barrelhead for our wheat.

Finally, President Kennedy announced a few days ago that negotiations during the immediate days ahead would reveal whether we will succeed in selling our