ance-of-payments expenditures or budget expenditures for the budget of some other country.

It is not necessary to take action of that kind overnight; there is no possible emergency connected with it. There is ample time for any President to tell Congress that Brazil wants money for budget-support purposes or for balanceof-payments purposes, and that ought to require congressional action at the time.

What we are really writing is a blank check for the President. We are writing a blank approval of his approval of wide, unchecked discretion. When Brazil has monetary troubles, it makes a plea to the President of the United States, and he writes a check on the contingency fund. I do not believe that is good foreign policy, and I am satisfied it is not good public policy. If that is why Brazil wants $300 million, that is all the more reason why we should not grant it. I cannot imagine any emergency arising that would require an immediate expenditure by the President of more than $100 million before he had time to obtain the approval of Congress for whatever money he might need to meet the emergency, if he could show that that an emergency

existed.

I do not like to talk about this subject, because however one phrases his statement, those who are enemies of the President and those who are enemies of the speaker will read into one's words meanings that were not intended at all. They will seek to leave the impression, as the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH] said at the beginning of his speech, when he stated he was opposed to certain parts of the bill, that one is not loyal to the President. No Member of this body is more loyal to the President than is the Senator from Idaho [Mr. CHURCH]; and I do not yield to anybody in my loyalty to the President. But being loyal to the President does not mean that one must act as a rubber stamp. The test of loyalty very often is whether one is loyal enough to disagree with the President when he thinks it is in his own best interest to disagree with some policy of the President's, and to use one's position as a Senator to try to change that policy. That is exactly what I am trying to do in connection with the contingency fund.

I opposed in committee the proposal of the administration for a $300 million contingency fund. I offered an amendment. My recollection is that my first amendment was to reduce the amount to $100 million, as is provided in the pending amendment of the Senator from Louisiana. That was a substantial reduction from the President's proposal. I thought a final agreement was reached on $150 million, but perhaps it was $175 million. I shall ask the Senator from Arkansas what our final agreement was in committee with respect to the contingency fund. Did the committee agree upon $150 million or $175 million?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The committee agreed on $175 million.

Mr. MORSE. There was a proposal for $150 million, and some Senator proposed $200 million. The committee compromised by recommending $175 million.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I believe a proposal was made also for $100 million. Mr. MORSE. I made a proposal for $100 million.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes.

Mr. MORSE. My proposal was defeated. Then I believe a Senator suggested that we take $100 million off the President's proposal of $300 million, and make the amount $200 million. Another make the amount $200 million. Another Senator then suggested $150 million, and Senator then suggested $150 million, and some Senators suggested that the amount should be $175 million.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator from Oregon has stated the situation correctly. That is what happened.

Mr. MORSE. That is what happened in committee. I finally went as high as $150 million. I did not like the proposal $150 million. I did not like the proposal for $175 million; and my recollection is that I refused to vote for it. So this subject has been discussed at great length in committee. Therefore, I am disturbed that the Mansfield-Dirksen amendments seek a restoration of the Presidential figure, which cannot be reconciled with the amount provided in the bill or the statement in the committee report. I know of no good reason for increasing the amount to $300 million. creasing the amount to $300 million. I know of no good reason for going beyond the committee's recommendation of $175 million. For the reason I have just stated, the proposal of the Senator from Louisiana to provide $100 million is adequate. If that amendment should fail, quate. If that amendment should fail, I shall return to the final proposal in the Committee on Foreign Relations, $150 million.

I am at a loss to understand why we should chip away at one of the great safeguards to the American people in our representative system of governour representative system of government; namely, the principle that Government administrators should not, as a matter of principle and policy, be given unchecked power. That is why I have said it is difficult to discuss this matter, because some will say, "The Senator from Oregon severely criticized the President of the United States about the exercise of unchecked discretionary power." Mr. President, I am talking about the presidency, not any particular President. It makes no difference to me who occupies that office; I am discussing a basic principle of representative government, under our constitutional system; namely, that it has always been recognized that it is not safe, for the welfare of the American people, to provide unchecked discretionary power to any administrator, at any level of government, including the presidency. The exceptions to that principle should be rare; and when we come to one which we think is a justifiable exception, we should examine it carefully, to make certain that in that connection we are not granting more power than is needed. That is my case on this point.

There is general agreement that, in view of the situation in the world today, the President should have some emergency power, and he should have the ability to react quickly, if necessary, to meet an emergency. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] is stating that $100 million in a contingency fund would be adequate. I agree. In the Cuban

crisis of a little more than a year ago, the President used very little from the emerThat is the testimony of gency fund.

his witnesses; and I do not know of a more serious emergency that could be imagined.

We should take judicial notice of the fact that there could not be an emergency which would require the immediate availability, at the disposal of the President, of more than $100 million, in order to permit him to take quick action.

Some say, "But the President might have previously drawn on the $100 million fund, in connection with another emergency, and then a new emergency might develop." However, any President should make sure that he kept his inventory in stock; and if such a situation developed, the President would merely have to ask Congress for an addition to the fund, if that became necessary. But the arguments to which I have referred are really empty and without substance.

Next, I refer Senators to the use to which the contingency fund has been put, and last night I placed evidence of this in the RECORD. I am satisfied that most of the American people did not know about the purposes for which the fund was used, and I suspect that most Members of Congress did not know, either, for I believe that if the average Senator or Member of the House of Representatives were asked what the contingency fund is for, he would reply, "For a matter vital to the security of the United States which calls for immediate action." Would such an emergency include aid to Bolivia, Ecuador, the Argentine, or Brazil, to provide them with budgetary support or assistance in connection with their balance-of-payments problems? Nonsense. I believe the contingency fund should never be used for such purposes; and if it ever has been used for such a purpose, now is the time to make sure to stop it.

A case could be made-in theory, at least for holding that to be a violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine. No President should be given authority to use a contingency fund to contribute to Brazil, Argentina, or any other country millions of dollars for balance-ofpayments matters or for budgetary support matters. Those countries have some responsibilities in connection with their own budgets; and before I conclude my remarks I shall show that they have been doing a rather poor job of assuming those responsibilities. However, so long as the United States keeps available a contingency fund which enables them to beg from the President of the United States millions of dollars, they will continue to do so.

We should not put our President on such a spot. We should never put our President in a position where an Ambassador from Brazil or an Ambassador from Argentina or an Ambassador from any other country, or the President of any of those countries could, in connection with diplomatic negotiations, say to him, "Mr. President, you can help us; you have a contingency fund, and you have discretionary authority to help us by giving us x million dollars."

We have a duty to protect our President, too-and I am not referring to any particular individual; I am referring to the occupant of the Presidency of the United States, whoever he may be. In my judgment, the present operation of the contingency fund constitutes bad public policy, and I believe we should stop it now. However, if we provide the President with $300 million for use as the contingency fund, we shall not stop it. Instead, we shall give him a green light, and it would be interpreted as seeming sanction by Congress of the past practice.

To put it bluntly, contingency funds in Latin America are "bailout" money. They have been used to bail out Latin American governments that have not had the courage or the determination or the political backing at home to undertake the reforms required of them if they are to obtain funds through the Alliance for Progress program. In my opinion, that is the ugly reality. It may explain in part why among certain industrial forces and certain moneyed interests in the United States there are such powerful lobbies at work in an attempt to have the bill as it now stands enacted into law. These funds have been used to bail out certain governments, so they could pay their debts to American business, from which they have obtained loans or with which they are involved in some form of indebtedness. But we cannot justify the use of the contingency fundwhich consists of money belonging to the taxpayers of the United States-to help the Government of Brazil or the government of X country or the government of Y country pay the debts it owes American business concerns X, Y, or Z. However, that has happened; when such bailout payments are made with the use of this contingency fund, in some instances that is exactly what the result has been.

When any country needs some money for that kind of purpose, it ought to be earmarked in the legislation we pass, or it ought to be earmarked by the passage of new legislation to meet the situation. It should not be in a pot called a contingency fund given to a President of the United States into which he can dip his hand and, with no authority from the Congress for the specific payment, but only by reason of the fact that because of the authorization he has the authority in connection with the contingency fund to use it in his discretion and proceed to pay to Argentina or any other country a sum of money that it in turn will use to pay some American creditors of that government.

That is what is involved in the contingency fund fight. I have not yet talked with a single Senator who did not think a contingency fund was money available to the President for some great emergency that might arise which would involve the national security of this Republic, with respect to which the President would have to be ready to move quickly. Perhaps he would have to move troops somewhere, maneuver the 7th Fleet somewhere, or move in air wings somewhere. Senators have thought of it in terms of the security of the country. They have not thought of it in

In that sense the emergencies have not been our emergencies, at all, except for the negative effects if some country is in fiscal difficulty. But that is no emergency. The emergency has not been an American emergency, but an emergency in some other country. That is a stretching of the contingency fund concept too far. The contingency fund should be used only to meet an immediate emergency in this country so critical that theoretically the President does not have time to obtain the necessary legislative approval for the course of action that he wishes to take. That is why I have sought to put the data in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as to how the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD as to how the money has in fact been spent. I spoke on this subject on the Senate floor on June 25. At that time I pointed floor on June 25. At that time I pointed out that Latin American nations were finding it too easy to obtain grants and loans from the United States from nonAlliance sources. One of these has been the contingency fund.

REQUIREMENTS OF ALLIANCE IGNORED

In my opinion, by far the biggest problem the Alliance for Progress faces is the faintheartedness of the nations to the south to get started on the economic and social development that our capital is supposed to finance. Many of our friends in Latin America are complaining that the money is not coming as fast as they would like. But the real problem is that they themselves are not moving fast enough to meet the conditions and requirements of sound investment.

And why should they, if they can always obtain from the contingency fund the money that they cannot get under the requirements of the Alliance itself?

I emphasize that point. It is the position of the senior Senator from Oregonand I make this statement in behalf of the work that I have done in Latin America as a member of the Latin American Subcommittee-that in my judgment there have been uses of the contingency fund that have been inconsistent with the objectives of the Alliance for Progress program. One of the primary objectives of that program is that the countries ought to help themselves. That does not mean that they should help themselves to a contingency fund. That themselves to a contingency fund. That means that they ought to help themselves by adopting the necessary economic reforms and enforcing the necessary economic reforms that will help to stabilize their currency-for example, stabilize their currency-for example, that will do something about their interest rates; that will tackle their tax problem; that will come to grips with the economic problems that confront them because of policies that have led to economic stability in country after country. nomic stability in country after country. I do not believe that the contingency fund should ever be used to help them to fund should ever be used to help them to avoid their responsibilities in connection with going ahead with such reforms.

I have an amendment printed that would ban all balance of payment and budget support aid to Latin America from any source whatever. I do not see much point in Congress authorizing the Alliance for Progress, setting forth the

amounts to be available under it if the whole section-the whole program-can be circumvented with the contingency fund.

CONGRESS WILL ACT IN REAL EMERGENCY

Every year during consideration of this subject we hear a great recital of the necessity for a large contingency fund for the President to use for purposes that were unforeseen when the foreign aid bill was being written. But when a true emergency develops the President can come to Congress and get whatever sum he may need almost overnight.

Consider a sum even as much as $150 million, to say nothing of a sum of $300 million. Unless we wish to go along with what I think is a misuse of the contingency-fund concept in connection with the balance of payment and budget support programs, will Senators name for me an emergency that might arise which would require more than $150 million of our money in the hands of the President immediately to meet it?

If there were an emergency so serious that it would require $150 million, it

would be so serious that the President would not be in the White House at all. He would be before the joint session of the Congress telling us about the emergency and asking for whatever action was necessary in order to support his hand. An emergency of that type would be so serious, and in all probability our national security would be so involved, that in most instances we might be pretty close to a war. There is still the constitutional provision that war must be declared by the Congress.

Again, with no relationship to the present occupant of the White House, unchecked and discretionary power vested in the Presidency through giving such huge contingency funds to the President-for example, letting the President handle unchecked $300 million-might lead us into war.

One might say, "That is a theoretical objection. That is not very realistic.” We have always taken the position that these principles of government are the safeguards that protect us from abuses that could lead to a loss of our rights.

It is easy for the American people to forget about these abstract principles of government, but they have no rights separate from them. The American people do not have a single right of freedom separate from the abstract principles of our Government that guarantee their freedoms.

One of those principles, bewhiskered with American history from the days of the Founding Fathers until now, is that we are not free men and women if we give unchecked discretion to mere men administering government. That is basically what is involved in the contingency fund fight. I do not believe we can justify giving to any President $300 million to be spent in accordance with his discretion.

If we wish to talk in terms of the hypothetical, periods of hysteria can sweep any country. A wave of hysteria can sweep this country. We can never know

when a political typhoon may arise any more than when a weather typhoon may hit us. But some day someone in the Presidency who may not have a deep respect for these abstract principles of government might have the means to exercise unchecked discretionary power, which could very well be exercised in a dictatorial way, and we might find ourselves at war without a declaration of

war.

I am well aware of the kind of answer which could be made to that kind of argument, namely, that the Senator is conjuring up a most extreme hypothesis. Let us grant for a moment that it is an absurd hypothesis. Sometimes it is only by showing an absurd example that a point or a principle can be proved. Absurd or not, if it should happen, one of those great, precious safeguards which I call abstract principles of freedom will be lost. I do not believe we can justify taking legislative action on a proposal that permits such discretion. This one does. The $300 million cannot be justified, particularly when a President can come to Congress in 20 minutes and ask for whatever amount of money he needs to meet a true emergency-which he can establish very quickly with proof-and he can get the money before the sun sets. Any President knows that. History shows the rapidity with which Congress can always be counted upon to act when the Republic is really in jeopardy.

The President did come to Congress in 1961, during the Berlin crisis. Congress very quickly appropriated some $3 billion in defense funds, in addition to the regular defense budget, when the President outlined the need for it.

That is how the U.S. Government should provide the financing for genuine international emergencies.

All the talk about the need for a huge contingency fund does not stem from an argument of need; it stems from an argument of convenience. I add the word "expediency." There is a great deal of expediency in this bill; and expediency has no place in it. I believe every proposal of expediency should be stricken; and this is one of them.

All Senators need to do is to come to the desk of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] and take a look at the material on the worldwide uses of contingency fund money that he has prepared. I have submitted it for Latin America and he has submitted it for the world. As I look down the list of countries that have received assistance out of the contingency fund, I am hard put to find a single one or a single purpose to which the money was put that anyone could possibly call a true emergency. Balance-of-payments loans and budget support grants are a prominent use of contingency funds everywhere in the world.

A large amount from the contingency fund has gone for various uses in Indonesia. A good deal of this, too, was for balance-of-payments problems.

I entirely share the view of the Senator from Louisiana that natural disasters and a few, rare political crises are truly qualified for aid from the contin

gency fund. But if these are of any magnitude, such as the Berlin crisis of 1961, Congress will still have to provide the funds by special action.

In short, the contingencies covered in the justification for a large contingency the justification for a large contingency fund are not either unforeseen in most cases nor are they of a nature that carries a threat to the security of the United States. They are expenditures that the executive branch finds it more convenient to make out of the contingency fund ient to make out of the contingency fund than from the other categories of foreign aid. They are "small potatoes," as international contingencies go.

The $300 million blank check for this fund requested by the administration and contained in the Mansfield amendment ment is completely unjustified. It It should be cut at least to $150 million. I believe it should be cut to $100 million to conform to the Ellender amendment. to conform to the Ellender amendment.

As the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] said last night, we have a problem LER] said last night, we have a problem in Latin America to get the nations who in Latin America to get the nations who are partners with us in the Alliance to do their share. It is, by far, the most important share, because unless they are portant share, because unless they are willing to undertake the policies that maximize the effectiveness of capital, we maximize the effectiveness of capital, we are wasting time and money on the Alliance for Progress program.

Under the act of Bogotá, and the act of Punta del Este, each party is supposed to prepare an outline of the specific conditions it faces, the progress achieved, the need for external aid, the fields in which national efforts should fields in which national efforts should be expanded, and the structural deficienbe expanded, and the structural deficiencies that must be eliminated to attain an annual per capita growth rate of at least 2.5 percent. That rate of growth is the objective of the Alliance. It is an objective that is projected over a 10objective that is projected over a 10year period.

Yet since the act of Punta del Este, only eight nations have submitted such country plans to the ad hoc committee chosen from the panel of nine, commonly called the "nine wise men," created by the Charter of Punta del Este. They are Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, MexiThey are Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, Panama, Honduras, Ecuador, and Venezuela.

Two of the largest recipients of aid under the Alliance, Argentina and Brazil, have not submitted any country plan.

One might ask, "Why should they? They have done pretty well under the contingency fund." contingency fund." They are also the two nations of the hemisphere that have been receiving the largest nonproject amounts from the contingency fund to meet their balance-of-payments problems.

One of the issues now facing the Alliance is that of increasing the authority and responsibility of the nine wise men. Former President Lleras of Colombia has expressed the view that they should make the basic decisions as to whether a given applicant has met conditions and provided the climate that will make a loan or grant under the Alliance effective in achieving the objective of the growth rate. Mr. Lleras is probably right in believing that the panel would be much tougher than the United States has been in fixing conditions and

demanding that they be met before any funds are advanced.

It would be very good to turn that problem over to such a panel. It would be performing a service for the President of the United States. We ought to relieve the President from the international pressures that are bound to be placed upon him because of the availability of this money. We would help the President if that would exclude use of the contingency fund for budget support money and balance-of-payment money.

Now is the time to do it. The issue is in our lap. The Ellender amendment raises the question. In my judgment, it must be done now, or it will not be done this year.

We shall never solve the monetary problems of Brazil by the use of American contingency funds. We all know what happened to the economy of Brazil, and I do not think another dollar should go to that country out of the contingency fund.

That is not a national emergency. Let us stop kidding ourselves, and the people. That does not involve any problem of American security. It cannot be reconciled with the Alliance for Progress. I say it cannot be reconciled with the President's own statements when he announced the Alliance for Progress program. The use to which he has put the contingency fund, in my judgment, in many specific instances, has been inconsistent with the purposes of the Alliance for Progress program, because he made very clear-I supported him then, and I support him now-the objectives of the Alliance for Progress program.

He made it very clear that the program would be one of mutuality and mutual assistance. By "mutual assistance" we meant that we would help supply some funds, provided-and I underline that word and spell it in capital letters-the Latin American countries would assist themselves.

A plan is called for. We do not even have one from the Argentine or Brazil. Economic reforms are called for. There have been no reforms in any such degree as was provided for.

I say to the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], who has just arrived in the Chamber, that I have been talking about his amendment, and the contingency fund. I do not ask for agreement; I ask only for knowledge on the part of the Senator from Minnesota of what I have said. I believe it is important, because I consider him a key figure at the present moment in the Senate in connection with the bill. I do not wish to embarrass him, but I said off the floor of the Senate, and I say again on the floor of the Senate, that to the Senator from Oregon and other Senators who agree with his views, the Senator from Minnesota is a key figure.

The reason why the powers of the panel of nine to which I have alluded have not been increased has been due to the opposition of the largest members of the Alliance, who believe they can do better by dealing directly with the United States. They know very well that the panel of nine would not allow Alliance

for Progress money to go for the $20 and $25 million nonproject loans that Argentina and Brazil have negotiated with the United States, the money for which has come from our contingency fund.

What I am trying to do is not to weaken the hand of the President, but to strengthen it. He ought to be relieved of the type of international pressures which the past use of the contingency

fund are bound to raise.

Therefore, rather than taking a course of action of being against the President or weakening the President, I am seeking to strengthen the President.

I am hopeful that before the afternoon is over it will be possible to reach an agreement to modify the amendment to make it possible to get along with a further discussion of the foreign aid program.

No Member of Congress has been more anxious than I to see the nations of the hemisphere get moving on their domestic development programs. No Member of Congress has deplored more strongly than I the retrogression from the objectives of the Alliance that have been displayed by the military juntas. No Member of Congress has been more insistent than I that if the nations of the hemisphere fail to help themselves, and if they persist in forcing the political choice

down to an alternative between communism and militaristic fascism, they are going to fall under the heel of communism regardless of what happens to Fidel Castro.

I wish to put in the RECORD at this point a column which appeared in the Washington Post this morning-it makes much more sense than the editorial in the Washington Post this morning to which I referred earlier today. The article is entitled "The Post-Castro Era." It is written by Evans and Novak.

I ask unanimous consent that the entire article may be printed in the RECORD at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE PRO-CASTRO ERA

(By Rowland Evans and Robert Novak) Fidel Castro is still entrenched as Cuba's Communist dictator, but he is a dead pigeon elsewhere in Latin America.

conclusion

That is the unmistakable brought back from a 23-day swing through South America's northern fringe.

As a revolutionary doctrine capable of inflaming the continent's miserable masses, Fidelismo is no more. Latin America has moved into the post-Castro era.

From Washington's standpoint, this era ought to be less hectic than the 3 or 4 years that preceded it. The danger of an epidemic of Castro-inspired nationalistic revolutions is gone. What may replace that danger, however, is a return to the bad old days for Latin America.

Certainly, Castro is the fallen idol of the hemisphere's left-wing nationalists. His 1961 profession of Marxist-Leninist faith hurt him a little, but Fidelismo really did not suffer until Castro exposed himself as Moscow's puppet during the Cuban missile crisis a year ago. His popularity outside Cuba has been going steadily downward ever since.

The typical view of the young Latin American radical today can be seen in the attitude toward Castro of Francisco de Paula

Jaramillo, leader of Colombia's fledgling (and ultraleftist) Christian Democratic Party. Jaramillo is considerably more anticapitalist than he is anti-Communist and appreciably

more anti-American than he is anticapitalist. It is therefore significant when he turns Castro's picture to the wall with these words:

"I thought once that Fidel was the man who was going to lead the Latin American revolution. But now I know he is in debt to the Russians. He is no nationalist now.

For this, I blame you Americans. But Castro cannot lead the revolution."

America overnight, it's predictable that U.S. interest in hemisphere affairs will fade again. Partly because the Kennedy administration continues to present foreign aid as an antiCommunist prophylactic, Congress is more inclined to cut back on aid once it appears that Latin America is safe from communism for the moment.

Herein lies the danger. Nothing really has changed since Castro came out of the Cuban hills nearly 5 years ago to shake the entire hemisphere-for a season or two. Latin America is still ripe for another Castro any time he comes along.

If Castro no longer attracts the fiery young Jaramillos, he certainly cannot hope to lead calmer, more mature leftists. Indeed, his followers today are limited to pistol-packing young hoodlums in secret terrorist bands and guerrilla gangs. Even the radical (and often Pro-Communist) student leaders at the uni- ress is being made. versities have dropped Castro as their pinup boy.

That means Fidelismo outside Cuba is primarily a police problem. No longer really No longer really a matter of capturing men's minds, the struggle against Castroism boils down to the infinitely easier task of containing terrorist infinitely easier task of containing terrorist bands. It is a battle that is being won.

It can't even be said that Castro com

mands full loyalty over the pro-Communist left in Latin America (though he still manages to find enough money to finance terrorism throughout the hemisphere). Mosrorism throughout the hemisphere). Moscow-oriented Communists have been quietly cow-oriented Communists have been quietly belittling him ever since the missile crisis. For instance, Gustavo Machado, Venezuela's

veteran Communist chief, hasn't hesitated

to drop anti-Castro insults in the presence

of U.S. newsmen.

Yet, Fidelismo at its worst was not an unmixed scourge for Latin America. It frightened the Latin American oligarchy into some token reforms. And it so terrified Uncle Sam that he began to pay some attention to

his southern neighbors.

But now that Fidelismo is not an immedi

ate danger, the oligarchs may forget about reform. In fact, there is ample evidence that they never intended to give up their old habits of tax evasion, investing badly needed capital in Europe and the United States, blind indifference to their Nation's welfareexcept at gunpoint.

Moreover, as the immediate threat of Fidelismo subsides and the Alliance For Progress proves unable to change Latin America overnight, it's predictable that U.S. interest in hemisphere affairs will fade again. Partly because the Kennedy administration continues to present foreign aid as an antiCommunist prophylactic, Congress is more inclined to cut back on aid once it appears that Latin America is safe from communism for the moment.

Herein lies the danger. Nothing really has changed since Castro came out of the Cuban hills nearly 5 years ago to shake the entire hemisphere for a season or two. Latin America is still ripe for another Castro any time he comes along.

Mr. President, it will be

Mr. MORSE. noted that they say:

Yet, Fidelismo at its worst was not an unmixed scourge for Latin America. It frightened the Latin American oligarchy into some token reforms. And it so terrified Uncle Sam that he began to pay some attention to his southern neighbors.

But now that Fidelismo is not an immediate danger, the oligarchs may forget about reform. In fact, there is ample eviIn fact, there is ample evidence that they never intended to give up their old habits of tax evasion, investing badly needed capital in Europe and the United States, blind indifference to their nation's welfare-except at gunpoint.

Moreover, as the immediate threat of Fidelismo subsides and the Alliance for Progress proves unable to change Latin

We must watch the rate of reform in Latin America. Latin America. As the Senator from Minnesota in a very able speech pointed out the other day, a great deal of progress is being made. Much more must be made. I do not wish to see us contribute to retrogression. In my judgment, we shall be contributing to retrogression if we accept the Mansfield proposal to put the contingency fund back to $300 million, when the Foreign Relations Committee, after a great deal of debate, and after considering amendment after another, finally settled on the recommendation of the majority that $175 million should be an acceptable compromise.

one

The Congress of the United States is going to play a large role in how they finally make up their minds in Latin America. If it is evident from the actions of the Congress that we really do not have anything more in mind than a few pious pledges of economic reform on their part, then we can be sure there will never be any meaningful economic reform. If we do expect self-help, if we do expect them to put our money to use in meaningful ways, then we must see to it that there are no loopholes through which American money can pour when they fail in their obligations to the Alliance for Progress.

It will be seen from an examination of the figures I put in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD last night that only a few thousand dollars have been used from the contingency fund for emergency public safety and for relief from natural disaster. Much of the rest has gone into Latin America for purposes that are emergencies only in the sense that the recipients have procrastinated and postponed the day of economic reckoning for so long that their economic condition became precarious. So they were bailed out with our Presidential contingency fund.

One of the greatest of our foreign aid failures has been in Turkey, where we have poured in an average of $300 million every year for 10 years, and still have nothing to show for it economically. Let me tell Senators that if they want to start the same thing with Argentina and Brazil, the way to do it is to continue making grants and loans to them without regard for the requirements of the Alliance for Progress. They are not the only countries I have in mind as having failed in their obligations to the Alliance for Progress.

I believe, as does the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], in the objectives of the Alliance. I do feel that the lack of progress under it to date is largely due to the governing classes in

Latin America, who walked up to the brink of economic and social reform when Castroism looked like a threat and who have now become alarmed at the meaning of their own signatures on the Charter of Punta del Este. To quote from an article on the Alliance for Progress by President Lleras, which appears in the current issue of Foreign Affairs:

The governments *** that set their seal on the policy at Punta del Este were not fully aware or convinced of its ultimate implications. In Latin America, perhaps more than anywhere else in the world, political leaders have a habit of carrying revolutionary statements beyond the point to which they are really prepared to do ***. When When the governments pledged themselves to change fundamentally certain traditional structures in the political, social, and economic life of Latin America-as in the case of agrarian reform-they were not yet absolutely determined to carry all this out. The unwarrantable delays which later took place, and which did not give the Alliance for Progress a chance to make the impact on the Latin American peoples that was hoped for, clearly indicate that when Punta del Este witnessed the signing of the most broadly sponsored and socially advanced document in the common history of our hemisphere, not all the signers understood its scope or divined its depth and gravity.

Mr. President, I am anxious that the United States continue to express its belief in the Alliance, and to keep up with our pledge to make available the money to finance it. But as we keep our own feet in the fire, we must make it clear that we are keeping their feet in the fire, too, and that if the governments of Latin America do not live up to the requirements of the Alliance, there will be no money available to them from this country from any source.

Therefore, we shall be performing a great service for the Alliance for Progress, and strengthening the Alliance for Progress, if we adopt the amendment of the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. ELLENDER] to reduce the amount of the contingency fund to $100 million.

Mr. MORSE. Iyield.

Mr. ELLENDER. I suggest to the Senator that in 1963 Congress made available to the President $250 million. Of that sum, $100 million was returned to the Treasury. Of the remainder, for the first 9 months of 1963, as I sought to point out a while ago, in my judgment only $33,756,000 would come within the category of the contingency fund. Mr. MORSE. That is what the Senator's figures indicated. That is why I asked Senators to go to the desk of the Senator from Louisiana and examine them.

Mr. ELLENDER. The rest of the money was used, as the Senator indicated, to assist Argentina, Brazil, and many other countries in balancing their payments, and for other purposes that were not connected with, but were foreign to, the use of the contingency fund. Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. MORSE. Iyield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I compliment the Senator from Oregon on his statement. CIX- -1337

I know that he has another meeting to attend. The Senator from Oregon and the Senator from Minnesota have visited extensively today about the Alliance for extensively today about the Alliance for Progress and other aspects of the bill. I Progress and other aspects of the bill. I am of the opinion that the differences which exist can be solved if we will but sit down and discuss them. That is what we have been doing.

First, I feel that uses have been made of the contingnecy fund beyond what were contemplated or intended by Congress. Candor is required in the debate. In certain cases, some of the budget deficits that have been covered by dipping into the contingency fund were not within the purview or intention of Congress.

We are admittedly unhappy in the measures taken by the Government of Brazil to put its fiscal house in reasonable order. Admittedly, we in the United States are not too exacting, because occasionally we have some troubles with our own housekeeping. But certainly, all available evidence suggests that some of the commitments made under the Bell-Dantas agreement, the agreement between the U.S. Government and Brazil, have not been kept. In Brazil there zil, have not been kept. In Brazil there is a growing problem connected with the budget and inflation. No amount of the contingency fund can meet such basic problems nor should it.

The Senator from Oregon is right in pointing out the necessity for having country-by-country plans to make the Alliance for Progress work. The Alliance for Progress would become a mockery, if it were merely an effort to patch up holes in an economy that was breakThat is why ing apart at the seams. the Charter of Punta del Este set forth certain criteria. We are not now discussing first aid treatment; we are not talking about prophylactic treatment of a sick body politic; we are talking about basic rehabilitation. That is why the Alliance for Progress does not always make the sensational advances that some people want it to make.

The fact is that it is designed to build constructively and surely, rather than for the moment, merely to get over another particular crisis.

The Senator from Oregon stated that 9 or 10 countries have fulfilled the requirements or met the criteria set forth in the Charter of Punta del Este in reference to fully participating in the Alward that objective. The statement liance. Other countries are moving toThe statement that has been quoted from the current issue of Foreign Affairs represents the kind of thinking that ought to be guiding our efforts. In my speech on the Alliance on Tuesday, I quoted at length from the article in Foreign Affairs by Alberto Lleras Camargo.

The panel of nine, to which the Senator referred-I believe it is sometimes called the nine wise men-constitutes a type of operation that is absolutely estype of operation that is absolutely essential. Our experience, that has given us the best results, was in connection with the Marshall plan. The moneys that were made available under the Marshall plan, while they were made available bilaterally, were made available only after the regional office of the Economic Cooperation Administration in nomic Cooperation Administration in

Europe had, in a sense, filtered the applications for funds and balanced them country by country and region by region, so that when the funds were poured into an area, such as in Western Europe, the economies of France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Holland, and Britain were all weighed and measured at the same time in reference to the economic aid that was to be given.

Such hemispheric coordination and planning is needed, in the sense that it is really a concept we are trying to achieve. There must be some deciding voices, opinions, and judgments, so that we shall not always be held in a bilateral relationship, fully responsible for any rejection or retention we might make, because we are constantly under pressure to give in, lest we be looked upon as Yankee imperialists or as cruel and tough.

In this debate I have centered my attention upon the Alliance for Progress, because I believe it offers us the most sensible program we could have, if it is properly developed.

The Senator from Oregon is rendering a good service in outlining to us the qualifications and criteria which we must follow in connection with this program. Otherwise we would be "off to the races" again, as we are in connection with southeast Asia, where we have no plan. I feel that there we are sort of "boxed in." Furthermore, we really had no plan in regard to the African area. Instead, we deal with it country by country.

But in the Latin American area we have tried to develop a hemispheric concept of economic and social rehabilitation, reform, and progress, within a framework of constitutional government. As was said several weeks ago by the Senator from Oregon, some of the first guidelines of the Alliance for Progress, insofar as the United States was concerned, came from the Foreign Relations Committee. They were begun there by the Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs, on the basis of a study handled by contract, as I recall. Thereafter, the study was carefully considered and was further studied by the full Foreign Relations Committee, and subsequently it was relayed to the administration.

Mr. MORSE. That is correct.

Mr. HUMPHREY. So this is one of the guidelines. President Kubitschek provided inspiration and a plan on the Latin American side. Therefore, the authorization for the contingency fund should be restored in order to have our program in Latin America developed in accordance with the country-by-country workbook. We have had before the Foreign Relations Committee, and we shall have before the Appropriations Committee, books which tell us, ahead of time, what the money will be used for. But no use will be made of those studies if too large a contingency fund is made available. In that event, it will be possible to say, "Do not worry; we can always dip into the fund." We would really be saying, "No plan is needed; if the situation becomes too difficult, we will dip into the fund and get some more money from it."

On the other hand, we are saying that for the Alliance for Progress program, at