One must recognize that there are certain distinguishing features between those several programs, but likewise there is also considerable overlapping. A well-coordinated vocational education program had developed, beginning with the Smith-Hughes Act, in 1917, and through the George-Barden Acts of 1946 and 1956. More recently, there has been a tendency to consider problems to be too critical to wait for adaptation of existing programs. Special vocational education programs have been initiated. The table I have put in the RECORD, although possibly not all-inclusive, does point to programs designed for 11 different purposes, provided under 6 major legislative acts, administered variously by the Department of Labor, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, or the two in combination, and involving authorizations in excess of $650 million annually.

President,

Our concern Mr. now, should be that these programs are coordinated in their programing and administration, so as to assure not only the most economic use of available funds, but also the effective counseling and proper training of the personnel whom they are designed to aid.

We need to consider, for example, whether these programs are designed to meet the needs of the unemployed generally, and are not limited to specific cases and causes of unemployment. There are jobs begging for people with special skills; and the source of the trainee is not as important as the emphasis and quality of the program which attempts to prepare him to fill a position.

We need to be concerned with meaningful coordination between these several programs, at both the Federal level and State levels, and between these programs and the U.S. Unemployment Service. Some, but not all, vocational education programs are keyed to area and regional manpower needs, as determined by USES. Is not this a factor which all programs should take into consideration? Furthermore, is the best use made of USES, so that a responsible effort is made to locate and utilize personnel with newly acquired knowledge and skills?

It might be well to survey the administration of the several programs, to determine whether top-level policy planning and administrative organization reflect the increasing national concern for the direction of vocational education and rising governmental costs. I am not convinced that a single administration is the answer to all organizational problems; but attention to a reoriented, universally available vocational education program may be justified at this time.

The many programs should certainly be reviewed in the light of these and other questions which can legitimately be raised, before further expansions are approved or before any new programs are authorized.

CONGRESSIONAL ACCOMPLISH

MENTS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the work of this Congress would be no

further advanced if, beginning in January, we had gone in at 8 a.m. every day, ary, we had gone in at 8 a.m. every day, including Saturdays. It would more likely be less advanced because under the rules of this body the committees might rules of this body the committees might well have been estopped from meeting while the Senate was in session.

The Senate Calendar, which represents the bills reaching the Senate floor and not disposed of, has not during this entire session contained more than a bill entire session contained more than a bill or two of great significance at all times. or two of great significance at all times. As the bills have reached the calendar, As the bills have reached the calendar, it has been the policy of this leadership to stay with them until they are cleared; and in this respect we have received the wholehearted cooperation of the Senate as a whole.

The work completed on the Senate floor has been substantial during this session.

Those who complain of the total legislative output would do well to look elsewhere than the Senate floor. On the Senate floor, the leadership-majority and minority-has a primary responsibility which it must discharge without any greater authority under the rules than that authority enjoyed by any other single Member of this body.

Allegations have been made that the leadership is "dull and dreary." I must admit to the accuracy of that charge insofar as it involves the majority leader alone. Glamour is not the hallmark of the Senator from Montana. But I must say that the Senator from Montana in 20 years or more of experience in the Congress has operated on the principle that it is not the headlines, but the results, which count. And the results of two sessions of the 87th Congress and the Senate's output to date in the 1st session of the 88th Congress require no apologies whatsoever.

I believe I speak with some experience when I say that the hours on the floor have been perhaps long and tedious, but not unproductive. No Member who has been here consistently to attend to his primary legislative responsibility needs to apologize for the time he has put in this session-and without time-and-athis session-and without time-and-ahalf for overtime. A Roman circus may make good newspaper copy, but it does not necessarily make for greater or better legislative output. So long as the Senator from Montana has anything to say about it, the operations on the Senate floor will be those of a body of mature men and women charged with a serious national purpose.

We will work on the floor when there is work to be done-when the calendar tells us there is work to be done. But we will not arrange sideshow sessions of the Senate for the edification of the press or in order that this body may give the appearance of being busy, for the purpose of impressing the boss, the American people.

Mr. President, may I say that if I had had my way-and I do not speak defensively the Senate would have remained in session longer last week and this week than it did; and as long as there are amendments to be offered and amendments to be voted on, the Senate can and should be prepared to remain in session until late hours in the evening.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, conforming to the suggestion of the majority leader, I shall say very little about the incoherencies that I have found, this morning, set forth in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

The brave crusader from the Nutmeg State on his white charger has great zeal for being here and getting on with the business, and he is not here. If he does not know that the Senate is in session, he ought to know it. So I will be prepared to suggest the absence of a quorum and see if he can find his way to the Senate Chamber where the business is done. I shall withhold my suggestion of the absence of a quorum long enough

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. DIRKSEN. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator to whom the minority leader has referred has been most assiduous in his attendHe has been present as much as any other Senator, to the best of my knowledge. The RECORD ought to make that very clear.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, what I said still goes.

Mr. MORSE and Mr. JAVITS addressed the Chair.

Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I believe I have the floor.

Mr. MORSE. I am sorry. I beg the Senator's pardon.

Mr. DIRKSEN. I shall relinquish the floor, since the Senate is in the morning hour, but I will reserve the right to make a point of no quorum. I yield the floor. Mr. MORSE and Mr. JAVITS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Oregon is recognized.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I rise to speak in defense of the majority leader's record in the Senate.

I believe that the RECORD is clear that on substantive issues from time to time the majority leader and I may be in opposition as to our position on the merits of controversial proposed legislation. But there is nothing to which anyone can point that shows that the majority leader and the Senator from Oregon are in any conflict whatsoever with regard to the operation of the Senate under the able leadership of the Senator from Montana. I wish the RECORD to show that the Senator has extended to the senior Senator from Oregon unfailing courtesy, unfailing cooperation, and unfailing good will at all times.

Mr. President, I wish to speak for a moment about some of the accomplishments of the present session of the Senate about which the Senator from Montana is too modest to talk. We have made a good legislative record as far as Senate business is concerned in connection with proposed legislation that has reached the calendar. For unanswerable proof of the comment I have made, all one would have to do would be to take a look in the Senate Calendar as of this morning. Yesterday, I had printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the calendar of the Senate. As of yesterday the calendar contained a listing of 14 bills. Not a single one of those bills could be considered a major bill which would call for long, major discussion in the Senate

other than the foreign aid bill, which we were then dealing with and still are dealing with.

In fact, aside from the foreign aid bill, I do not believe that there is a bill on the Senate Calendar that would call for consideration in the Senate for more than 2 or 3 hours at the most. We could clear up the entire Senate Calendar in a couple of days of sessions if we went down the calendar. That speaks more than I believe anything that can be said about the leadership of the Senator from Montana in handling the business of the Senate.

What that means—and he did not specify it, but I think it was clearly implied in the remarks of the majority leader-is that we should not look to the floor of the Senate to find out what is wrong-if anything is wrong in regard to the legislative record of the present session of Congress. I suggest that we look to the committees, where there are some major pieces of proposed legislation that have not yet been reported from committee.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have 2 additional minutes.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. Those major pieces of proposed legislation have not yet reached the floor of the Senate. I do not criticize the committees. I merely say that that is where much of the major proposed legislation still is. That is not the fault of the majority leader. It is not the fault of the committees, so far as I am concerned. I do not know what the facts are about the proposed legislation, but I know something about what we have done, because I have worked long and hard hours on some of the things that we have done. I know what the Senate has done in connection with the proposed legislation related to education.

We have taken through the Senate, with the able assistance of the majority leader, a higher education bill and a bill on vocational education that represent weeks of work of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and long debate in the Senate. So today I rise So today I rise in complete and total defense of what I believe has been a remarkable job of fine leadership that the Senator from Montana has given to his body at the present session of the Congress, as he has given in the past.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I believe neither the majority leader nor the minority leader needs any defense. Although I am a comparatively recent comer to the Senate, I heartily approve of the character of leadership given the Senate by our majority leader and the quality of cooperation, and occasionally effectively presented dissent, given by the minority leader. I think it is unfortunate that any doubt as to the ability of the leadership of those two men should have been raised. I dissent from it completely. On the contrary, we have had a fine example of leadership. It is the

kind of leadership that the Senate should welcome. It is a leadership that involves respect for the wishes of individual Senators, and recognizes that their function in the Senate should be left to their consciences. That has been the policy of our distinguished majority leader. am heartily in favor of the type of leadership that he has shown.

I wish to say an equally kind word for the minority leader, the Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIRKSEN], who I think has at all times shown his cooperation while maintaining his position of opposition to measures he does not approve. His dissent, when his party policies cause him to dissent, is always performed effectively, goodnaturedly, and constructively, and often with refreshing humor.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I should like to address a question to the majority leader based upon his statement that the calendar is clear. About 3 weeks ago we all understood that the Committee on Commerce had reported the so-called public accommodations section. All of that intervening time has gone by. It seems to me that an opportunity should be afforded to test out the time when the Senate should go into the civil rights debate, which opportunity could be afforded if that report were filed.

I should like to join my colleagues in saying to the majority leader and the minority leader that I do not believe there is any question about their good faith or their dedication to the tasks at hand in their endeavor to accomplish the business of the Senate, but I have a very strong difference with the majority leader as to when debate on the civil rights issue shall begin.

The question I am addressing to the Senator from Montana is not invidious. I am puzzled by the long delay which has taken place. After all, the Senator does not bear that responsibility unless he knows the facts. If he does not, I shall address myself to the chairman of the committee. But, as was said, the calendar is clear. I raised the question because there is a major domestic issue before us. Three weeks ago we understood that the Committee on Commerce had ordered reported a bill. In all the intervening time the report has not been made. I wonder what is holding it up, if the majority leader happens to know.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in response to the question raised by the distinguished Senator from New York, may I say that even if the public accommodations bill is reported from the Committee on Commerce, it is not my intention to call it up. I repeat again what I have previously said. When the Senate faces the civil rights bill, it will face as whole a civil rights bill as is possible. If a fragment of the civil rights bill is reported, we shall be here until doomsday.

Again I wish to say that I will not engage in any kind of Roman holiday or sideshow. When the Senate faces the issue, it will face it as a whole.

Mr. JAVITS. I should like to say to the Senator that if other Senators differ with him, they should have the right to

endeavor to call up the committee bill. If the bill is reported, as propriety would require, it seems to me, it would therefore appear on the calendar. Without its being on the calendar we are deprived of an opportunity to call it up. The calendar may appear clear, but the fact is that there is a critically important bill in the wings which the Senate should have the right to decide whether it wishes to take up or not. The Senate may not agree with the majority leader. Knowing him as I do, he would be the first to say that the democratic processes which the Senate rules afford should at least be followed through.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if the Senator from New York wishes to take over the leadership of this body, he is welcome to do so, but as long as I happen to be the leader on this side, I have announced what the procedure will be, and it will be that as long as I am leader.

Mr. JAVITS. With all respect to the Senator, I say to him that the Senator from New York does not wish to, and could not if he wished to

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KENNEDY in the chair). The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have an additional minute.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator from New York has no desire to take over the leadership. I believe that is a completely different question from the question of an opportunity to test out this very serious question. I hope that we shall see the bill to which I have referred placed on the calendar. I understand that it is fully ready for the calendar. I am very much puzzled by the fact that the report has not yet been filed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. I am not interested in a headline or an issue. I am interested in results. And if we want results-if it is at all possible to get results-the Senate will wait for the whole bill, and not merely a part of it. If we want a sideshow or a Roman holiday, we will take up one segment of the civil rights bill and then let everything take its course.

Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. President, I have not in past years been reluctant to criticize the previous leadership of the Senate. I have done so, and I have done so vigorously. But I believe that the present distinguished majority leader is absolutely right when he points to the calendar and says that if we dispose of the foreign aid bill we shall not have other pending legislation before us on which we could act for very long. I do not believe we can blame only the majority leader for holding up action in the Congress. I believe that the Senator from Oregon was correct when he said he did not have the facts. I do not have the facts, either. None of us has the facts. We do have this single fact, however: this is November 7 and there are still a number of appropriation bills

Second, all disarmament obligations must be subject to effective international controls

The control organization must have the manpower, facilities, and effectiveness to assure that limitations or reductions take place as agreed. It must also be able to certify to all states that retained forces and armaments do not exceed those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process. Third, adequate peacekeeping machinery must be established

There is an inseparable relationship between the scaling down of national armaments on the one hand and the building up of international peacekeeping machinery and institutions on the other. Nations are unlikely to shed their means of self-protection in the absence of alternative ways to safeguard their legitimate interests. This can only be achieved through the progressive strengthening of international institutions under the United Nations and by creating a United Nations peace force to enforce the peace as the disarmament process proceeds. There follows a summary of the principal provisions of the U.S. program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world.

SUMMARY-DISARMAMENT GOAL AND OBJECTIVES

The overall goal of the United States is a free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world which has achieved general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and a world in which adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

In order to make possible the achievement of that goal, the program sets forth the following specific objectives toward which nations should direct their efforts:

The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations peace force;

The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations peace force and for maintaining internal order;

The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations;

The establishment and effective operation of an international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations to insure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations.

TASK OF NEGOTIATING STATES

The negotiating states are called upon to develop the program into a detailed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved. To this end, they are to seek the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date. At the same time, and without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program, they are to seek agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form part of the total program.

GOVERNING PRINCIPLES

The program sets forth a series of general principles to guide the negotiating states in their work. These make clear that:

As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations must be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure

international security and the peaceful settlement of disputes;

Disarmament must proceed as rapidly as possible, until it is completed, in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures;

Each measure and stage should be carried out in an agreed period of time, with transition from one stage to the next to take place as soon as all measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and verified and as soon as necessary arrangements for verification of the next stage have been made;

Inspection and verification must establish both that nations carry out scheduled limitations or reductions and that they do not retain armed forces and armaments in excess of those permitted at any stage of the disarmament process; and

Disarmament must take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the security of any state.

Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles of specified categories and weapons designed to counter such vehicles would be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps; their production would be discontinued or limited; their testing would be limited or halted.

Arms and Armed Forces Would Be Reduced The Armed Forces of the United States and the Soviet Union would be limited to 2.1 million men each (with appropriate levels not exceeding that amount for other militarily significant States); levels of armaments would be correspondingly reduced and their production would be limited.

An experts commission would be established to examine and report on the feasibility and means of accomplishing verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of all chemical, biological, and radiological weap

ons.

Peaceful Use of Outer Space Would Be
Promoted

The placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass distruction would be prohibited.

States would give advance notification of space vehicle and missile launchings.

U.N. Peacekeeping Powers Would Be
Strengthened

Measures would be taken to develop and strengthen United Nations arrangements for

arbitration, for the development of international law, and for the establishment in stage II of a permanent U.N. peace force. An International Disarmament Organization Would Be Established for Effective Verification of the Disarmament Program Its functions would be expanded progressively as disarmament proceeds.

It would certify to all States that agreed reductions have taken place and that retained forces and armaments do not exceed permitted levels.

It would determine the transition from one stage to the next.

States Would Be Committed to Other Measures To Reduce International Tension and To Protect Against the Chance of War by Accident, Miscalculation, or Surprise

Attack

States would be committed to refrain from the threat or use of any type of armed force contrary to the principles of the U.N. Charter and to refrain from indirect aggression and subversion against any country.

A U.N. peace observation group would be available to investigate any situation which might constitute a threat to or breach of the peace.

States would be committed to give advance notice of major military movements which might cause alarm; observation posts would be established to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

Second stage

The second stage contains a series of measures which would bring within sight a world in which there would be freedom from war. Implementation of all measures in the second stage would mean:

Further substantial reductions in the armed forces, armaments, and military establishments of States, including strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and countering weapons;

Further development of methods for the peaceful settlement of disputes under the United Nations;

Establishment of a permanent international peace force within the United Nations;

Depending on the findings of an experts commission, a halt in the production of chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons and a reduction of existing stocks or their conversion to peaceful uses;

On the basis of the findings of an experts commission, a reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons;

The dismantling or the conversion to peaceful uses of certain military bases and facilities wherever located; and

The strengthening and enlargement of the International Disarmament Organization to enable it to verify the steps taken in stage II and to determine the transition to stage III.

Third stage

During the stage of the program, the States of the world, building on the experience and confidence gained in successfully implementing the measures of the first two stages, would take final steps toward the goal of a world in which:

States would retain only those forces, nonnuclear armaments, and establishments required for the purpose of maintaining internal order; they would also support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. peace force.

The U.N. peace force, equipped with agreed types and quantities of armaments, would be fully functioning.

The manufacture of armaments would be prohibited except for those of agreed types and quantities to be used by the U.N. peace force and those required to maintain internal order. All other armaments would be destroyed or converted to peaceful purposes.

The peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations would be sufficiently strong and the obligations of all states under such arrangements sufficiently far reaching as to assure peace and the just settlement of differences in a disarmed world.

APPENDIX-DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT
The nations of the world,

Conscious of the crisis in human history produced by the revolutionary development of modern weapons within a world divided by serious ideological differences;

Determined to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of the arms race and to create conditions in which all peoples can strive freely and peacefully to fulfill their basic aspirations;

Declare their goal to be: A free, secure, and peaceful world of independent states adhering to common standards of justice and international conduct and subjecting the use of force to the rule of law; a world where adjustment to change takes place in accordance with the principles of the United Nations; a world where there shall be a permanent state of general and complete disarmament under effective international control and where the resources of nations shall be devoted to man's material, cultural, and spiritual advance;

Set forth as the objectives of a program of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world:

(a) The disbanding of all national armed forces and the prohibition of their reestablishment in any form whatsoever other than those required to preserve internal order and for contributions to a United Nations peace force;

(b) The elimination from national arsenals of all armaments, including all weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery, other than those required for a United Nations peace force and for maintaining internal order;

(c) The establishment and effective operation of an International Disarmament Organization within the framework of the United Nations to ensure compliance at all times with all disarmament obligations;

(d) The institution of effective means for the enforcement of international agreements, for the settlement of disputes, and for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations.

Call on the negotiating states:

(a) To develop the outline program set forth below into an agreed plan for general and complete disarmament and to continue their efforts without interruption until the whole program has been achieved;

(b) To this end to seek to attain the widest possible area of agreement at the earliest possible date;

(c) Also to seek-without prejudice to progress on the disarmament program— agreement on those immediate measures that would contribute to the common security of nations and that could facilitate and form a part of that program.

negotiations

Affirm that disarmament should be guided by the following principles:

(a) Disarmament shall take place as rapidly as possible until it is completed in stages containing balanced, phased, and safeguarded measures, with each measure and stage to be carried out in an agreed period of time.

(b) Compliance with all disarmament obligations shall be effectively verified from their entry into force. Verification arrangements shall be instituted progressively and in such a manner as to verify not only that agreed limitations or reductions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not exceed agreed levels at any stage.

(c) Disarmament shall take place in a manner that will not affect adversely the

security of any state, whether or not a party to an international agreement or treaty.

(d) As states relinquish their arms, the United Nations shall be progressively strengthened in order to improve its capacity to assure international security and the peaceful settlement of differences as well as to facilitate the development of international cooperation in common tasks for the benefit of mankind.

(e) Transition from one stage of disarmament to the next shall take place as soon as all the measures in the preceding stage have been carried out and effective verification is continuing as soon as the arrangements that have been agreed to be necessary for the next stage have been instituted.

Agree upon the following outline program for achieving general and complete disarmament:

Stage I

A. To Establish an International Disarmament Organization

(a) An International Disarmament Orga

nization (IDO) shall be established within the framework of the United Nations upon entry into force of the agreement. Its functions shall be expanded progressively as required for the effective verification of the disarmament program.

(b) The IDO shall have: (1) a general conference of all the parties; (2) a commission consisting of representatives of all the major powers as permanent members and certain other states on a rotating basis; and (3) an Administrator who will administer the Organization subject to the direction of the commission and who will have the authority, staff, and finances adequate to assure effective impartial implementation of the functions of the Organization.

(c) The IDO shall: (1) Insure compliance with the obligations undertaken by verifying the execution of measures agreed upon; (2) assist the states in developing the details of agreed further verification and disarmament measures; (3) provide for the establishment of such bodies as may be necessary for working out the details of further measures provided for in the program and for such other expert study groups as may be required to give continuous study to the problems of disarmament; (4) receive reports on the progress of disarmament and verification arrangements and determine the transition from one stage to the next. B. To Reduce Armed Forces and Armaments

(a) Force levels shall be limited to 2.1 million each for the United States and U.S.S.R. and to appropriate levels not exceeding 2.1 million each for all other militarily significant states. Reductions to the agreed levels will proceed by equitable, proportionate, and verified steps.

(b) Levels of armaments of prescribed types shall be reduced by equitable and balanced steps. The reductions shall be accomplished by transfers of armaments to depots supervised by the IDO. When, at specified

periods during the stage I reduction process, the states party to the agreement have agreed that the armaments and armed forces are at prescribed levels, the armaments in depots shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(c) The production of agreed types of armaments shall be limited.

(d) A chemical, biological, radiological (CBR) experts commission shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verifiable reduction and eventual elimination of CBR weapons stockpiles and the halting of their production.

C. To Contain and Reduce the Nuclear Threat (a) States that have not acceded to a treaty effectively prohibiting the testing of nuclear weapons shall do so.

(b) The production of fissionable materials for use in weapons shall be stopped.

(c) Upon the cessation of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, agreed initial quantities of fissionable materials from past production shall be transferred to nonweapons purposes.

(d) Any fissionable materials transferred between countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy shall be subject to appropriate safeguards to be developed in agreement with the IAEA.

(e) States owning nuclear weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such nation information or material necessary for their manufacture. States not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons belonging to other states, or seek or receive information or materials necessary for their manufacture.

(f) A nuclear experts commission consisting of representatives of the nuclear states shall be established within the IDO for the purpose of examining and reporting on the feasibility and means for accomplishing the verified reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons stockpiles.

D. To Reduce Strategic Nuclear Weapons Delivery Vehicles

(a) Strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles in specified categories and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be reduced to agreed levels by equitable and balanced steps. The reduction shall be accomplished in each step by transfers to depots supervised by the IDO of vehicles that are in excess of levels agreed upon for each step. At specified periods during the stage I reduction process, the vehicles that have been placed under supervision of the IDO shall be destroyed or converted to peaceful uses.

(b) Production of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be discontinued or limited.

(c) Testing of agreed categories of strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles and agreed types of weapons designed to counter such vehicles shall be limited or halted.

E. To Promote the Peaceful Use of
Outer Space

(a) The placing into orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction shall be prohibited.

(b) States shall give advance notification to participating states and to the IDO of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicle. F. To Reduce the Risks of War by Accident, Miscalculation, and Surprise Attack

(a) States shall give advance notification to the participating states and to the IDO of major military movements and maneuvers, rise to misinterpretation or cause alarm and

on a scale as may be agreed, which might give

induce countermeasures. The notification shall include the geographic areas to be used and the nature, scale, and timespan of the event.

(b) There shall be established observation posts at such locations as major ports, railway centers, motor highways, and airbases to report on concentrations and movements of military forces.

(c) There shall also be established such additional inspection arrangements to reduce the danger of surprise attack as may be agreed.

(d) An international commission shall be established immediately within the IDO to examine and make recommendations on the possibility of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication.