Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am a cosponsor with the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] of the amendment. I know that Senators are ready to vote on the amendment. I am anxious to have the Senate vote.

We have two problems. I should like to talk for 5 minutes on those two problems.

First, we must copper rivet that provision in the bill, which we are now doing. I compliment my colleague for the wit to see that we cannot change any part of the amendment if we are to do that first job.

Second, when we have the opportunity to do so, which is now, to impress the State Department with the invalidity of the arguments and the rationale which it has used to continue a policy which is contrary to the interests of the United States, we should do so. We are considering a policy of continuing to give aid to Nasser notwithstanding aggressionnot merely preparation to aggress-but aggression in the Yemen, against Saudi Arabia, by infiltration and fomenting revolution in other Near East countries, including threats to assassinate rulers, and now direct interference in the Algerian-Moroccan conflict. Incidentally, though it has not been mentioned, it is entirely documented and boasted about by the leading newspaper in Egypt, AlAhram, that Nasser has proudly announced that Egyptian warships and aircraft have gone to Algeria.

This is the time and place to explain why we take a very different attitude from that of the State Department, because apparently the State Department

seems to rationalize its way out of anything we have done and, I predict, will rationalize its way out of the amendment even if we adopt it, if we permit it.

The whole point or idea-and we have had a couple of clues to it on the floor of the Senate-is that we are going to do some business with Nasser so that he will not completely depend on the Communists, and so that we may have some effect with him.

The great fallacy in that argument is that it is exacly what Nasser wants. That is exactly what we would place into his hands. He cannot, and he dare not, depend exclusively upon the Communists and still retain his power in his own country. The very thing that is keeping him in power in Egypt is that he passes as the consummately clever Near Eastern ruler to his people to play off the Communists against the United States and receive aid from both. The consummate cleverness which he demonstrates in the eyes of his own people is one of the main elements which keeps him in power. President Nasser in Egypt could not get away with sole dependence on the Soviet Union even if he wanted to, and even if the Soviet Union would help him to the extent that would be required.

So the whole idea out of which the State Department is rationalizing its Nasser policy is wrong. It has been demonstrated to be wrong, because Nasser continues to do everything he possibly can contrary to the interests of the United States. He proceeds against us with the greatest arrogance and the greatest impunity. He receives our aid

and then interferes directly with his Egyptian troops in the Yemen war. He receives our aid and keeps the whole Near East in turmoil and ferment, including conspiracies against established governments there. He receives our aid and threatens every day—and he means it— to drive the Israelis into the sea and to eliminate Israel.

We have heard some intimations about the aid that Israel receives by way of voluntary contributions. Who is compelling the arms race in the Near East which is so terribly costly to the tiny country of Israel to which we give no military aid?

So far we have only let them have the privilege of paying in cash for some Hawk missiles purchased from the United States.

The man fomenting that Near East arms race is none other than Nasser. As my colleague from Alaska has properly pointed out, there is nothing the Israelis can do except to escalate their arms preparations to keep pace with him. Otherwise, they are sitting ducks.

He is getting jetplanes of the latest design, and he is getting his pilots trained in Czechoslovakia and other parts of the Communist bloc to operate the planes. He now has battle-tried troops who have been through a Yemenite war. He has submarines and rockets made largely by ex-German Nazi technicians with material supplied from the Communist bloc. He has the latest tanks and the latest arms which the Communists are capable of giving him. boast about it. Yet we absolutely shut our eyes to what is creating the most

They

dangerous situation of conflagration in the Near East, which is the escalating

arms race.

What is critically important is one fundamental point: There can be no rationalization out of a ruler-and that is what Nasser is-who proceeds with the greatest arrogance to defy the American policy at the same time that he receives its aid and makes that one of the principle props of his regime. The fact is that his people consider him to be consummately clever because he is receiving aid both from the Communist bloc and the United States as well. He cannot persist in any such ridiculous attitude. Yet that is precisely what the State Department is doing. We must demonstrate beyond peradventure that we will have none of it.

Mr. President, I value the opinion of the Senator from Minnesota. I feel that he has much heart in the idea of preventing this charade by President Nasser as any of us. I believe he is mistaken on one point, and that is in his effort to have the particular language to which we have referred eliminated from the amendment, which would only imperil the whole amendment. At the same time he omits the fact that we entrust the President of the United States with far more weighty decisions than this.

If the President of the United States

Yet

believed that Khrushchev was preparing for aggression, if he made a value judgment that Khrushchev was preparing for aggression against the United States with the atom bomb, I would expect him to put his finger on the red button. That is a great deal more important than whether to give aid to Nasser or not. under the way our Government is organized we are giving the President that power. He is the only one in our country-and we all know it-who can direct when the country shall react against an aggressor preparing for aggression in such a way that we cannot allow such aggression to occur against us before we react. We are laying bare one of the most trying and difficult responsibilities and duties which the President has. It is almost beyond human comprehension, endurance or will.

And I lay it bare only to answer the argument. This is far less in magnitude, in terms of decision on the part of the President, than the decision with which we entrust him now in the greatest theater of life and death ever known to all mankind.

The President of the United States can very well make this qualitative judgment as to whether, under the amendment, Nasser or any other ruler in the world is actually preparing for aggressive warfare or has engaged in aggression.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. will the Senator yield?

Mr. JAVITS. I yield.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I realize the con

only one of the conferees. I know we cannot make any advance pledges as to the result of the conference.

My concern with the amendment is the broadness of its scope, and the fact that it might very well necessitate internationally embarrassing decisions for our Government. Possibly, it would not. I have been reading the language on page 1. I read, starting with line 3:

No assistance shall be provided under this or any other Act, and no sales shall be made under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954

Would the Senator agree that language would not deny the right of the Government to engage in famine relief? Mr. JAVITS. I agree.

Mr. HUMPHREY. I wished to clarify that part of the amendment.

Mr. JAVITS. The Senator knows I agree with him that when it comes to direct relief of starving people, aid could be given even to the Red Chinese, or to anybody.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Exactly. I continue to read:

to any country which the President deter-
mines is engaging in or preparing for ag-
gressive military efforts directed against
(1) the United States,

I wish to get the interpretation of the Senator from Alaska. As I understand, under that language the initiative with respect to ascertaining the facts would rest with the President.

Mr. GRUENING. That is correct. Mr. HUMPHREY. He might or might not, under his own discretion, view the situation as involving preparation for aggression.

Mr. GRUENING. That is correct. He could.

Mr. HUMPHREY. The only obvious point is if there were actual military aggression, the President would not have much discretion. We would not want him to have it.

Mr. GRUENING rose.

Mr. JAVITS. I shall be glad to yield to the Senator who is the author of the amendment whenever he wishes.

The President will have discretion, even as to whether aggression is under

This is often a qualitative judgment, too. Troops might be marshaled at the border-perhaps a shot has not yet been fired, but the border has been crossed. That would be aggression.

There might be a situation in which planes were in the air but had not actually broken the barrier of the other country. That might be aggression.

This is a value judgment that the President must make. He makes much more serious decisions than this.

I should say, as a part of the legislative history, that one of the reasons President, why the Senator from Alaska says the amendment is not as strong as it should be-and as a lawyer I agree with him is precisely this reason. I feel we are right about the fact that if we build the record strongly, as we are trying to do, with facts and figures to copper-rivet the amendment as it stands in the bill, so that it cannot be played around with in conference, on balance we will accomplish more than if we try to toughen it at this point.

cern of the Senator from Alaska and the concern of the Senators from New York and other Senators about losing the substance of the amendment in conference. I wish I could say that it would not be lost in conference. If I were a conferee, I could give my word of honor that we would not lose it, but I would be

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, my concern with the amendment is not its target or its primary objective. I accept its primary objective of refusing to aid a government, namely, the United Arab Republic, which has consistently threatened one of our best friends, the State of Israel. My concern is about saying, "No assistance shall be provided under this or any other act." For example, it would knock out the Peace Corps, which I believe should not be involved in some of these tough diplomatic decisions. It would surely knock out the Export-Import Bank transactions, which relate to our own economic well-being. I regret that there is such a fear over the conference. I repeat, in the committee I offered this particular amendment, and I voted for it in the committee. After we discussed the amendment, I found that there were serious limitations, which have deeply disturbed me. I wish to goodness we could, with one or two modifications, remove the doubts. But I gather the Senators feel that if we do, in conference the State Department will work on us to the point that we will recede to their request or to their advice.

The House of Representatives passed this language, and wants it in the bill. I hope that we can pass this language with one or two things modified, such as rethe moving "any other act" from amendment, which would not basically change the substance or the thrust of the amendment. We know what the thrust of the amendment is.

It is to prevent the Government of the United States from giving aid to countries committing either direct or indirect acts of aggression, contrary to the interests of the United States and to the objectives of our foreign policy. This is a very good purpose, which I wish to support.

Mr. JAVITS. It is of significance that in this whole debate no word is heard from the State Department. After all, there has been a general declaration in the law that we shall not aid one who is an aggressor, and so forth. This is covered in the "sense" resolution to which

the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING] properly referred. Every effort to obtain an interpretation of that language by the Senator from Alaska [Mr. GRUENING], by me, and by my colleague from New York [Mr. KEATING] has always been frustrated by the rationalization by the State Department away from the position we thought we were adopting.

I say to the Senator, with all respect, that his situation would be much

stronger with all of us if we had a declaration from the State Department as to what would be its policy, even under this amendment. We cannot even know that. How can anyone be blamed for wanting to be sure, at least, that we shall have this point to emphasize. About all we have is a license to "holler."

Mr. HUMPHREY. I do not blame the

Senator at all. I could bring down from my office some correspondence between the State Department and me on certain matters-Yemen and others—which I believe would reflect as much anger,

concern, and dismay over that situation as that of any other Senator.

I am concerned, I repeat, over the scope of the amendment. I know what its purpose is. I like its purpose; and, therefore, I should like to see its purpose preserved. I can understand how the Senators who sponsor the amendment might feel that the purpose and substance might not be preserved in conference, even though I would surely give my word, if I were on the conference committee and I might be, as one of the ranking members of the committee-to see to it that the substance was preserved.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I believe the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER] desires to speak; if so, I shall yield to him. I ask unanimous consent that he may speak as long as he pleases and that then I may resume.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. Mr. President, I have a personally arrived at position on this whole situation.

I hold no brief for Nasser or Egypt under the circumstances which have occurred. I have been in serious corre

spondence with the State Department and the Secretary of State, practically to the point that I believe I will file, for whatever action the Senate may wish to take, a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that we should withdraw recognition of the State of Yemen.

I believe that the Egyptians have particularly failed to keep their word in connection with the recognition that was given the Government of Yemen. I am not in sympathy with them. We are furnishing probably 50 percent of the food that feeds the people of Egypt. We could have tremendous control over the

peccadillos of Mr. Nasser. So I am not waving any flag for Nasser or Egypt.

By the same token, I am not raising any flag for a biased specialized act with respect to any other country. But when we enact legislation, it should be equitable and provide a sensible means of application; and I do not believe this amendment would do that.

I know the House passed the language contained in this amendment. That is the House's decision. I feel that a great many Senators have a position that is sympathetic toward what this amendment seeks to do, but I do not think the amendment will do it.

I did not hear any voices raised when India committed an act of naked aggression against Goa, when it went into that country suddenly, overnight, and by force took away property which had belonged to Portugal for centuries. I did not hear any voices raised against India. That seemed to be all right.

I have not heard any voices raised against the raiding parties from the Congo who go into Angola, raid and destroy and steal, and go back to the haven of the Congo. Yet it has been the policy of this country to give aid to the Congo. Under any kind of interpretation, the amendment would require a decision to dissociate ourselves from aiding the Congo. That is what we would have to do.

I do not approve of what the Egyptian troops are doing in the Yemen. I am quite convinced that Nasser agreed to take his troops out of there. I happened to be not only in Egypt, but in Saudi Arabia, when the negotiations were underway. I know what the proposals I know what the proposals were. I know what the agreement was. It has not been carried out.

But, from a technical standpoint-and I am not defending or supporting him— Mr. Nasser is in the Yemen today at the invitation of a legally constituted government that we recognize.

Under what other circumstances is this country in Vietnam? Under what circumstances did this country land 10,000 troops in Jordan? At the invitation of a legally constituted, recognized, de jure government.

I am only saying that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. I am not supporting biased legislation. But I will support generalized legislation, and I will support legislation that strengthens the act and tries to accomplish something in Egypt that should be done.

With the House passing the resolution, with the Senate using suitable language which I think can be drafted, if we go into conference I think we can come out with reasonable language that will tend substantially toward the accomplishment of the desired purpose.

Basically, I do not think this language is needed. However, I am willing to go along with some language.

The President has authority to withdraw aid whenever he feels it is in the interest of the United States. He did not hesitate to withdraw it from Peru when

there was a coup down there.

Mr. GRUENING. For 2 weeks. Mr. HICKENLOOPER. I do not care whether it was for 2 weeks or 2 minutes.

He had the authority to withdraw it. He has the authority to withdraw aid from the Dominican Republic. He has withdrawn aid from Sukarno and Indonesia. It did not require an affirmative act of Congress to do it. He has the authority to do it if he thinks it is in the interest of the United States.

So I contend that, from a technical standpoint, this language is not necessary. I believe it creates conditions which, if the President meticulously enforced the provisions of the act, would cause a great amount of confusion in various parts of the world, which would not be to the best interest of the United States.

All I am suggesting is that we go into conference, and we will come out with language that will be specifically directed to the purpose which is sought.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, I highly applaud the Senator's suggestion of adopting a sense-of-Congress resolution withdrawing aid from Yemen. While we recognize this so-called legally constituted government, it was done only in connection with Nasser's promise to withdraw his troops if we did so and largely, I regret to say, to propitiate Nasser. It was another one of our tragic mistakes in foreign policy in the Middle East.

Now I am fearful about losing a half a loaf if I consent to modification of my

amendment because there is apparently no desire on the part of the executive agencies to curtail Nasser. It should have been done before.

Unless Congress acts, and acts in this way, it is not going to happen, because the State Department, I regret to say, has many pro-Nasser people in it, and its Middle East policy seems to be to build him up.

Instead of supporting the one oasis of free democratic government in the Middle East, namely Israel, it has done little to encourage its existence and to discourage the efforts to boycott and destroy it.

Now if we modify the amendment in the slightest respect, I fear the State Department will be telling the conferees how disruptive this amendment is going to be, and we will lose it. That is why I prefer to stand by the exact language of my amendment which is identical with the House-passed amendment.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. It is still the responsibility of the Members who will constitute the conference committee.

Regardless of whether Nasser should have been in the Yemen prior to recognition, our very act of recognizing the government amounts to a de jure recognition of a duly constituted government. I was in both Saudi Arabia and Cairo when this matter was under intense discussion, and when preparations were being made for recognition of the Yemen.

The point is, we were given certain. understandings. We were given certain commitments. Those commitments have not been carried out. Mr. Nas

ser has not carried out the conditions and promises he said he would.

On the contrary, Saudi Arabia has, in great measure, and to all intents and

purposes, carried out its share of responsibility for withdrawing.

Mr. GRUENING. That is correct.

Mr. HICKENLOOPER. It could be said that there was a waiver of any commitment of our recognition because we relied on promises which were not carried out. Therefore, I think we should consider withdrawing recognition from the government of Yemen, which cannot sustain itself except with Nasser's troops, and it has gone back on its word that it would rid itself of foreign troops, in exchange for the promise that this country would recognize the newly established government.

That is the way I feel about it. I think this amendment is not a good amendment. I think it will in many ways embarrass us, because there are other ways and means of arriving at a solution. We could draft an amendment which would really be of effect in putting the finger on where the trouble is. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I wish to yield to the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL].

Mr. KUCHEL. Mr. President, I conceive the American policy of mutual security to be, or at any rate it ought to be, designed to promote the cause of man's freedom, rather than to exacerbate the potential intrigues of war. That is the reason why I have supported mutual se

curity in the past. That is why I propose again to vote in favor of it this year, with due regard to the amendments I shall support.

I was prepared to vote, earlier in this debate, had there been a yea and nay vote on the amendment which was adopted without a rollcall, to approve the restrictive amendment with respect to Sukarno and Indonesia.

My judgment is that Senators, taking the position which was taken with respect to that question on aid to Indonesia, indicated that a nation, having received $670 million, over the years, from the American Treasury, and having thereafter prepared for aggression and having committed it, ought not to be permitted to continue to participate in a program designed for peace and freedom, and not by way of a coverup for aggression or for potential aggression.

The same thing is true of the Middle East. We have given $863 million to Nasser and the United Arab Republic. Yet the record is clear not simply with respect to Yemen and Israel, but to Jordan as well. Egypt has been guilty of continuing acts of naked aggression. I repeat what I have said before. If the lights of freedom dim in the Middle East, if the cause of freedom in the one Middle East free government, the democracy of Israel, fails, then this whole, troubled, historic area could lead all the globe toward an obliterating nuclear conflict. Mankind cries out that our great America never, never, never feed the appetite of hate and conflict with American aid which would, thereafter, be channeled into a fanning of the flames of potential conflict.

I raise the question: What is wrong with a congressional statement of policy, which will invest the President with the specific responsibility of determining whether or not nations desiring the assistance of this country to be free and to remain free are deserving; or, to the contrary, may be preparing for acts of aggression? To give aid to Egypt, only to observe Egypt use her own funds to buy instruments of war from the Communist bloc, makes a mockery of America's national security program.

It has been said in the debate that it is difficult for the President of the United States to determine when country is on the verge of committing an aggressive act. I deny that. The Government of the United States, under this administration or under any other administration, knows full well what countries may be covertly preparing for the commission of an aggressive act and we must not lend ourselves, directly or otherwise, to any aid, of any kind, to any would-be aggressor.

For all these reasons, I have risen for these few moments to say that the Senator from Alaska, the Senators from New York, and the Senator from Oregon have offered an amendment which should be adopted. It is an amendment which the House of Representatives adopted and which, speaking for myself, I shall vote for with enthusiasm when the roll is called.

Mr. JAVITS. I yield to the Senator from Iowa.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. President, I should like to ask the distinguished Senator one or two questions. Did I correctly understand the Senator to say in his colloquy with the Senator from Minnesota that with the Senator from Minnesota that there is nothing in the amendment which would prevent the obtaining of famine assistance?

Mr. JAVITS. I was asked about famine relief, which we have often given to other nations and distributed through American agencies. I said that I did not see how it would prevent such assistance. Such assistance would not be encompassed in the act.

Mr. JAVITS. Yes. That is direct aid which we have given even to the Soviet Union.

Mr. MILLER. That answers one question. The next one is this: Suppose there is a situation in which a country is engaging in an aggressive military effort, and the United Nations sends observers, and then makes a finding, on the basis of the reports of the observers, that one of the parties is an aggressor. Is it the intention of the proponents of the amendment that the President shall be bound by that finding?

Mr. JAVITS. The President would not be bound by it. I again speak as a lawyer when I say that this amendment leaves the determination to the President. The President would not be bound by the findings of another agency. These are the very clear words in the amendment, and they are not capable other interpretation. The any amendment reads: "which the President determines is engaging or preparing for aggressive military efforts."

of

That means that if the U.N. or any other agency finds that there is aggression, the President may find that there is not.

Mr. MILLER. I thank the Senator. I should like to conMr. JAVITS. clude my argument, because I want to vote. I see that the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee is preparing to speak.

What is really at stake is the fact that we shall unmistakably incorporate in the bill the proposition, not that we can compel Nasser not to supply troops to Yemen, but that there shall be some penalty, in the eyes of his people, for throwing his weight around. That is why the amendment carries the language as to what will happen when the President determines that a particular country-namely, Egypt in Egypt in this instance is engaging in or preparing for aggressive military efforts.

Other countries should know when another country is threatening to push it into the sea, or to invade it, and that this will result in a heavy penalty-in this case for Nasser-and the United States will not be with him, but against him. It is a question of discouraging him from throwing his weight around.

I appreciate very deeply the statement of the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HICKENLOOPER]. It may turn out, in my judgment, that his statement may have more effect than even the adoption of the amendment. What I believe we are suf

fering from is not any real inability to communicate our intention to the State Department. I believe we are suffering from the fact that the State Department is acting on its own, without regard to our intentions. The very least we can do-and the debate is as important as the amendment-is to make unmistakably clear what we have in mind. That the amendment will do.

Finally, I hope even if an effort is made to amend the amendment, the Senate will turn it down. The great thing that we can gain here is agreement with the House.

Even though the amendment does not satisfy Senators, on either side of the aisle, at least it is a certain expression of our desire to the President. This is supremely important. Therefore, I hope that the Senate will vote down any proposal to change the amendment and will vote the amendment into the bill, in that way making it a part of the bill and unchangeable in conference.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, I offer a substitute for the pending amendment.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. amendment will be stated.

The

(1) the United States, or
(2) any other free country,

until the President determines and reports to the Congress that such military efforts or preparations have ceased. The President may waive this section only:

(a) if he is unable to determine from all of the facts coming to his knowledge whether or not an aggression has occurred or may occur, or

(b) if an aggressive act is reviewed and the facts determined by an appropriate international body, or

(c) if he determines that the national security of the United States would be affected adversely by a determination under this section.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, this is a very difficult matter to deal with. The question of aggression has been struggled with in the United Nations for years, and it has never been defined accurately. It would be difficult for the President to do so.

The substitute amendment would give the President some discretion in administering foreign policy. It amounts to a statement of policy. We are all agreed with the idea that we should not be giving aid to a country which is engaged in an aggressive action. I do not believe anyone disagrees with that statement. The difficulty is in applying it.

I wish to reiterate the points made by the distinguished Senator from Minnesota when he described the difficulty between India and Pakistan.

The amendment further has the virtue of giving the two bodies in Congress an opportunity to reconcile their language into a workable amendment as between

the two Houses. The point that if we adopt the pending amendment, there can be no leeway and no discretion, is one of the principal arguments against it. I do not believe we should pick out any specific country. There must be some respect for the difference in functions between the executive branch and the legislative branch.

I do not believe that all of us can act as Secretary of State. We do not have the ultimate responsibility for the success of this policy, or in the application of the policy. We can determine the broad policy. I believe the broad policy is expressed in the substitute, namely, that we do not wish to support aggression with our aid.

We talk about specific acts of aggression, between Israel and its neighbors, and at the moment we disagree with the disposition of Nasser's troops in Yemen. However, there was a time when we also disapproved of the overt attack by Israel on Egypt.

As a matter of fact, that has been the most serious overt act, as among those countries. We disapprove of that. We We went to the United Nations and asked Yemen to stop that particular act of aggression. There are recurrent instances of aggression-that is, of a minor nature-against Israel by her neighbors. On one occasion, at least-perhaps others-the United Nations team in that area found that it was the fault of Israel. On the other hand, they found that the fault was with Egypt. So there have been recurrent conditions.

I do not think that we in Congress should, as a legislative matter, undertake to tie the hands of the President in administering our foreign policy. I think, in spirit at least, this is contrary to the constitutional principles we are supposed to follow in this body. Perhaps the principal difference between my substitute amendment and the amendment itself is that it gives the President some reasonable flexibility in the application of the principle which both of them carry-that we should not aid aggression against any other free country.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Is there not also-before I deal with the Sinai situation in 1956-a difference between the Senator's amendment and the pending amendment, in that the Senator confines his amendment to this act alone? Therefore other types of assistance would come under other acts-for example, the one mentioned by the Senator from Minnesota, the Peace Corps. This amendment would apply exclusively to the Foreign Aid Act, and no other.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is as far as it ought to go. I do not think it ought to apply to the Peace Corps and to other acts. However, I do not believe the President would, by any means, continue even that kind of aid; but I do not think we should try to tie his hands.

What I object to principally with respect to a number of the amendments offered, and others, is that we are attempting to usurp the discretion of the

Executive in the administration of foreign policy. We are not merely writing foreign policy; we are going further and seeking to tie the President's hands in the actual administration of it. That is the actual administration of it. That is unwarrantable and could force the President into many embarrassing situations dent into many embarrassing situations that would be of great harm to our foreign relations in many areas. I think some of the other actions may do that, particularly the criticisms of friendly countries which occurred in the debate on the fishing amendment. I dare say that many of those statements will be repeated in the press of the respective countries referred to and be highly offensive to those countries. When we undertake in public to discuss each of those countries in turn and recount all of their misdeeds, it is a very bad thing. But that is another matter.

On this particular issue, I hope we will not go so far as to tie the hands of the not go so far as to tie the hands of the President without giving him an opportunity to exercise a fair discretion in the administration of the act.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator further yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. Is it not true that the Senator's judgment is dictated by the fact that the Senator feels that so far, knowing what we have said in the bill, as affecting the President's general power to cut off aid whenever he feels, the State Department and the President have behaved quite properly in respect to President Nasser? Is not the basis to President Nasser? Is not the basis for the Senator's argument that we should not tie the President's hands, because he is doing the right thing now, and therefore we should not tie his hands? If he wishes, he can continue to do the same thing?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the President has good reasons for the policy he is following. I think the statement that was made by the Senator from Alaska that our State Department is Alaska that our State Department is under the predominant influence of proArabs is wholly unfounded. If the Senator will consider what has been done for the State of Israel during the past for the State of Israel during the past years, there is no comparison at all, because we have done infinitely more for Israel than we have for the Arab countries. But that is another subject. I do not wish to labor that point.

We know of the sympathy that exists in this country for Israel, particularly in the Senator's State of New York. I have great sympathy for his position. have great sympathy for his position. He is representing his constituents, as all of us represent our constituents. I do not criticize him for that. He is quite within his rights.

On the other hand, the foreign policy of this country should not be completely subjected to any particular interest, no matter how worthy it may be. The making of decisions of this kind should be left to the President as representative of all the United States. We must, and should, trust whatever President is in the White House. We certainly did not try to tie the hands of President Eisenhower in this fashion.

For 8 years the Senator from New York did not seek to tie down the President of his party in this fashion. A

foreign aid bill has been before Congress every year, and never before have I seen such an inclination to try to administer the act on so many sides, some of them related, and many of them unrelated. It strikes me that Senators should not expect this bill to solve all the outstanding difficulties that exist in the worldand there are many of them. This is a very poor vehicle with which to seek to do that.

This subject was discussed once before with the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. DOUGLAS]. I did not disapprove then of the feeling that we should urge Nasser in every possible way to open the Suez Canal; but I did not think the foreign aid bill was a proper vehicle to use in that connection. It was not because I had no sympathy with the views of the Senator from Illinois about the advisability of opening the canal. I still think the canal ought to be open and free to all. But I make the point now, as I made it then, that the foreign aid bill should not be used to solve all the other problems that exist. That is why we have the State Department and the Diplomatic Service. That is why the President has been given the responsibility under the Constitution to administer foreign policy.

Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield briefly, to enable me to complete my point?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. JAVITS. I am not speaking merely for the record; these are deep convictions of mine.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I am sure they are.

Mr. JAVITS. For decades, I have demonstrated, both by vote and by advocacy on the floor, that when it is necessary to lead, I am quite prepared to lead. One of the most unpopular positions I ever took was in 1956, when I felt the forces should be withdrawn from Sinai, although there was a tremendous wave of sympathy throughout the world, and quite properly so, for Israel, which had been at the point of destruction, if it had not done what it did. Notwithstanding the fact that the promise made at that time by none other than President Eisenhower that these provocations would stop, they never did, until United Nations forces moved into the Gaza Strip.

But laying that aside, let me ask a precise question: Will the Senator tell us how, if we adopt the substitute, the policy of the President and the State Department will change the relationship to Nasser?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I cannot speak for the President. It is his responsibility to administer this policy in what he believes to be the best interests of the United States.

I do not think a legislative body, least of all this one, is in a position to administer these laws and apply them. We state the broad policy. We say that this is a policy which we approve. Some Senators think they have information that aggression is about to be committed against the State of Israel. I do not know that. We do know about the Yemen problem. I agree with the view